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ABSTRACT
THE DIAGNCTIC THINKING PROCESS IN MEDICAL EDUCATION AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE. A study of medical students, house officers and
registrars with special reference to endocrinology and neurology.
by
Janet Gal.
Aims
1. To add clarity, specificity and breadth to current descriptions
of the diagnostic thinking process as hypothesis generation and
testing.
2. To propose possible pedagogical strategies for efficient and
effective development of appropriate diagnostic thinking
processes.
Subjects and Methods
The study was in two complementary parts:
1. Quantitative data. Structured questionnaires in endocrinology
and neurology allowed analysis of the relative contributions of
(1) factual knowledge, (ii) interpretation of symptoms and. signs,
and (iii) selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities, towards
predicting diagnostic ability in 35 final year clinical medical
students and 35 registrars per questionnaire.
2. Qualitative data. Introspective account gathering by videotape
stimulated zecal]. of clinical interviews yielded data concerning
the diagnostic thinking processes of 22 final year medical
students, 22 house offloers and 22 registrars.
The research design allowed analysis of the development of the
diagnostic thinking process, the relative effects of medical
education and clinical practice and comparison of these in two
specialities.
Results
After parametric, non-parametric and content analyses, the results
of the two studies were related to yield a unified explanation and
description of the diagnostic thinking process in medical education
and clinical practice. Its fundamental psychological features are
identified as structure and extrapolation. Three stages are Identi-
fied and discussed In terms of wider psychological theory. Speciality
specific and generalised cognitive processes are identified.
Development of the diagnostic thinking process is described In terms
of increasing equilibration of the skills measured in the quantitative
study. The qualitative study shows that students, house officers and
registrars are In command of the same range of cognitive processes
although their relative contributions and associated appropriateness
and accessibility of content might vary between groups yielding
different degrees of diagnostic accuracy. The diagnostic thinking
process in all groups of subjects is shown to be considerably more
complex than previous descriptions have suggested. Pedagogical
implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction to the Problem
"Any heretic who talked to a Curriculum
Committee about the skills that were needed
to practise medicine, was accused of wanting
to produce technicians ... not the medical
scientists that they wanted their students
to become. This produced the tacit and naiwe
assumption that once the student's head was
stuffed full of all the knowledge of basic
and clinical medicine, and all the rituals
of history taking and physical examination
technique were well memorised, the mystique
or art of the good physician would magically
happen, as if by the touch of a fairy's wand'.
(Barrows, 1976).
The naive assumption, described here by a Professor of Neurology, is
no longer made without challenge. This chapter presents an introduct-
ion and guide to the present study which seeks to evaluate and deepen
our current understanding of the "art of the good physician" and its
development in medical education and clinical practice.
Firstly, an explanation is offered of why the present study is a
necessary pre-requisite for 'pedagogical development in relation to the
diagnostic thinking process and clinical problem solving. Secondly,
the aims of the research and an outline of its methodology are des-
cribed. Thirdly, a brief statement is made of areas excluded from the
study. Finally, the content and organisation of the thesis is set out.
1.1	 Reasons for the Research
There is a well recognised and documented need to make the
content and structure of medical education more appropriate to
the student's future needs as a practising clinician (see
sections 4.2 and 13.1.2). In particular, it is considered
that diagnostic thinking processes (or clinical problem solv-
ing skills) should be dealt with more conscientiously by
undergraduate medical education:
"There is no more important field in medicine
than diagnosis. Without it, we are charlatans
or witch doctors treating in the dark with
potions and prayers. Yet there is no field
more difficult to teach. Strange that this
art and science has not attracted innumerable
- 25 -
theorists to make it more teachab1e
Thousands are studying membrane transfer,
yet few strive to make a science of
diagnosis".	 (Cutler, 1979)
Here are posed both sides of the question. The skill of
diagnosis must be taught, and our assumptions underlying
such teaching must be sound (Berner et al, 1977). It is,
therefore, necessary to define the nature of the cognitive
process involved. The first major reason for the present
reasearch, then, can be stated quite simply. It is that if
a subject is to be taught,e±'fiCieflt]-y and effectively, it
must be understood by the teacher. Therefore, if the acqui-
sition of effective diagnostic thinking processes and
clinical problem solving skills is to be facilitated by the
pedogogy of the undergraduate medical curriculum, those pro-
cesses and skills must themselves be understood, The need to
consider the cognitive skills of clinical practice and to
provide a suitable learning environment for their acquisition
or development has for long been recognised (Ellis, 1960).
Shulman and Elstein (1975) cite Hammond (1971) on this point:
"... the teacher ,is frequently unaware of the
real system he uses to cake his expert judgments.
He may even believe that he operates in a very
different fashion from the way he actually does.
Imagine the frustration of students who must
learn to ignore what he says they should do and
instead must infer the model of his judgments.
Alas, claims Hammond, this is far more frequent
in the teaching of clinical judgment than has
been admitted or recognised". 	 (p. 28)
Cutler (1979) echoes this opinion. Dudley (1969) considers
that the clinical teacher needs to recognise the diagnostic
process apart from the technique of collecting information
and distinct from the imparting of factual knowledge.
McWhinney (1972) also believes that students should be taught
some theory of diagnosis so that they may engage in effective
problem solving and decision making. While accepting these
judgments, lansek and Balla (1979) bring us back sharply to
the reason for the present study. Balla, himself a neurologist,
speaks from a particular vantage point:
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"The majority of doctors are well aware of the
many diagnostic decisions they make in their
daily practice. However, not many doctors
are aware of the underlying mechanisms
involved in the making of such decisions,
except to attribute such an ability to 'exper-
ience', 'art' or encyclopaedic knowledge.
This nebulous attitude to their diagnostic
ability is, of course, extended to an important
facet of a doctor's responsibility: medical
education. In this context, an incongruous
situation is apparent in that the teacher is
responsible for imparting to his students
knowledge which the teacher does not fully
understand or of which the teacher is unaware.
Such an approach is obviously unacceptable,
and requires rectification".
Such criticism of medical education is echoed by many medical
teachers who point to the failure to teach clinical problem
solving or reasoning skills (see the introduction to section
4.2 below). The need to avoid the incongruous situation
described by lansek and Balla (1979) is mentioned by workers
whose proper field is the study of education (Gage, 1963):
"Any scheme of tuition or graded experience
calculated to produce better insights into
the act of judging must proceed from what we
have discovered about the stages and facets
of the process". (Peel, 1971)
"Designing curricula in a way that reflects
the basic structure of a field of knowledge
requires the most fundamental understanding
of that field". (Bruner, 1960)
Specification of educational objectives presupposes such
knowledge (Bloom, 1956). Ausubel et al (1978) reflect these
premises but, like lansek and Balla (1979) from consideration
of the role of the teacher:
"It seems self evident that the teacher should
constitute an important variable in the
learning process. From a cognitive standpoint
it should certainly make a difference, in the
first place, how comprehensive and cogent the
teacher's grasp of his or her subject matter
is".	 (p. 498)
In the pedagogy of the diagnostic thinking process, that sub-
ject matter concerns the cognitive operations of both neophyte
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and experienced clinician. Therefore, it is considered
necessary for the present research to take samples of subjects
at more than one station along the developmental continuum
and so students, house officers and registrars are studied.
De Groot (1965) and Marton (1975) describe the reasons for
adopting a developmental and comparative approach:
"... the more 'experience' a person has collected
in any field, the more difficult it becomes for
him to understand the behaviour of have-nots.
Thus, every teacher knows the following frequent
brand of overestimating his students: opining
that from the given problem situation his students
can'immediately' derive (see) some property or
means that he himself finds quite obvious - where-
as in reality, in order to 'see' it, much perceptive
and abstractive experience is required. The teacher
has had this experience for so long that he is no
longer aware of it. An experienced problem solver
in any field is particularly apt to forget about
his primary and fundamental problem transformations
even before he starts his own consciously operational
thinking". (de Groot, 1965)
HA necessary pre-requisite of ease of learning on
the part of the learner ... is that the teacher
has a clear conception of what lack of understanding
looks like and as regards the absence in the student
of these pre-requisites on which it may depend
The idea is simple enough: in order to help the
students understand, we must first understand their
way of thinking about the topics with which we are
concerned". (Marton, 1975)
It is shown in subsequent chapters that, despite much work, our
knowledge of the diagnostic thinking process and its develop-
ment remains at a rather general level (see section 3.1 in
particular) and that by this the development of pedagogical
approaches is hampered (see section 4.2.3).
A second major reason for the present research is that the
study of the development of the diagnostic thinking process in
medical education and clinical practice has implications not
only for the medical student's training, (Schroder et al, 1961)
but also for the efficiency and effectiveness of his subse-
quent practice. It is not suggested that the experienced
clinician's diagnostic thinking processes are without blemish.
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Hence, achievement of a better, more complete and accurate
description of the process than is currently available might
allow advantage to be taken of Abercrombie's (1960) hypoth-
esis. She substantiated by her research that "we may learn
to make better judgments if we can become aware of some of
the factors that influence their formation". This is given
greater significance by Barrows and Mitchell (1975) who
point out that "central to the effective delivery of health
care by the physician is the complex skill of clinical prob-
lem solving". Knowledge of their own thiniing processes
should enable clinicians to modify them according to the
demands of each. individual clinical situation. Such know-
ledge may also stimulate a constructive questioning of
established applications and a more rigorous self evaluation.
A final, and no less important, reason for the present research
is suggested by Norman et al (undated, unpublished report).
This is that the study of clinical problem solving is of
significance to psychology and psychologists as an example of
general problem solving behaviour, and the development of an
appropriate theoretical framework for teaching and learning
is of significance to the body of educatiosa1 theory and its
applications.
1.2	 Aims and Outline of the Research
The research aims of the present study are twofold:
Firstly, to add increased clarity, specificity and breadth
to current descriptions of the diagnostic thinking process in
undergraduate medical education and clinical practice.
Secondly, to propose possible pedagogical strategies in
relation to the efficient and effective de'elopment of appro-
priate diagnostic thinking processes.
To achieve these aims complementary research methods were
developed. The first comprises two structured, multiple choice
questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology, respectively.
The questionnaires were designed to analyse the relative con-
tributions of different types of knowledge towards predicting
_ 29 -
subjects' diagnostic ability and to ccmpare these in two
separate specialities of internal medicine. Each questionnaire
is made up of four sections dealing with different aspects of
the diagnostic process:
A. Mastery of factual knowledge.
B. Interpretation of symptoms and signs.
C. Selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities.
D. Formulating a diagnosis.
The questionnaires were each administered to two groups of
subjects for comparison of performance at the end of under-
graduate medical education and after some years of clinical
practice. The subjects were final year clinical medical stu-
dents and medical registrars.
The second research method is a form of introspective account
gathering by stimulated recall of clinical interviews using
immediate videotape playback. The subjects for this part of
the study were final year clinical medical students, pre-
registration house officers and medical registrars. This part
of the study allows comparison of the three groups' diagnostic
thinking processes per se but does not lend itself to the
rigorous quantification possible with the multiple choice
questionnaires. The two research methods are however, com-
plementary, each lending interpretative value to the results
of the other. From them an overall psychological perspective
on diagnostic thinking is acheived (see Chapter Twelve).
The research design allows analysis of the developmental
aspects of the diagnostic thinking process and of the relative
effects of medical education and clinical practice. Taken in
conjunction with a review of current teaching approaches and
a discussion of related theoretical issues in teaching and
learning, the pedagogical implications of the research findings
are drawn.
1.3	 Areas Excluded from the Research
Some closely related areas and issues are not within the
bounds of the present research. These may be confused with
its proper subject matter which is the diagnostic thinking
process of subjects of varying clinical, experience and their
implications for medical education. The present study is
therefore confined to the realms of cognitive psychology and
education. However, because of the potential for confusion,
we may usefully mention some of the major excluded areas.
Firstly, the study does not address itself to either the
interviewing or interpersonal skills of the students and
clinicians who form its samples of subjects, regardless of
whether or not such skills might enhance data gathering. We
address ourselves only to the information with which each
subject worked,whether that information had been either
actively elicited or offered by the patient without prompt,
and to the cognitive manipulation of it. The subject's hand-
ling of the patient while gathering and processing the
information is not a variable for this study.
Secondly, the study was not designed to measure subjects'
competence in terms of factual recall in the manner of, for
example, Byrne and Freeman's (1971) study. A test of factual
knowledge is included, but this is strictly circumscribed,
and is not generalisable to the subjects level of professional
factual knowledge as a whole. Clinical problem solving
obviously has an element of retrieval of information from long
term memory, but the study concentrates on the subjects'
cognitive processing of the information so retrieved (as well
as other information) rather than measuring the size of the
store or efficiency of the retrieval mechanism as such.
Thirdly, we do not discuss whether or not clinical enquiry and
problem solving may be seen as a scientific method (see, for
example, Medawar, 1969; Dudley, 1970; Forstrom, 1977).
Barrows and Mitchell (1975) suggest that the skill of the
physician is not an art but "an exacting discipline, every bit
a scientific method in its own right". It would seem a matter
of philosophical debate, however, whether or not such cognitive
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processes may be characterised as either art or science. It
is not a debate in which we wish to join.
Fourthly, the study does not attempt to define diagnosis, a
term about the meaning of which there is some lack of clarity
or consensus (see, for example, Ruff and Mechanick, 1975).
Although our subjects were asked to make a diagnosis where
they could, they were left to define for themselves what con-
stituted that diagnosis. In other places, we have taken
diagnosis to mean that which appeared under such a heading in
the patient's medical record. A precise definition of the
term would have hampered those aspects of the study which
required subjects to define where and when they had reached
a concluding point and is of no interpretative value in our
consideration of a process of thinking.
Finally, the study is confined to hospital medicine. We have
no indication of the generalisability of our findings to
general practice medicine, which is different in a number of
aspects (Thwaites, 1954; Royal College of General Practitioners,
1972).
1.4
	
Content and Organisation of the Thesis
The content and organisation of the thesis may be presented
diagrammatically as follows:
CFIPTER
	
CONTENT
	 GROUP
2	 Mathematical and logical
models
3	 Cognitive studies	 Literature review
4	 Pedagogy, theory and
practice__________
5	 Hypotheses, methods,	 Overall research
subjects, validity	 design
6	 Validity, reliability,
data analysis
7	 gesults	 Questionnaire study
8	 DiSCUSSiOn
GROUP
Account gathering
study
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CHAPTER
9
10
1.1
12
13
14
CONTENT
Method, validity, relia-
bility, data analysis
Results
Discussion
Unified psychological
perspective
Pedagogical implications	 Synopsis
Limitations and indica-
tions
1.5	 Summary
Major reasons for the current research are described and
summarised. Aims of the research are defined and an outline
of methods and subjects given. Areas and issues excluded from
the study are listed and the content and organisation of the
thesis explained.
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CHAPTER 'IWO
Review of the Literature 1. Mathematical and Logical Models
The diagnostic thinking pocess has been characterised in a number
of ways which may be divided into two types; firstly, are those
models of the process which are based on statistical, algebraic or
logical approaches, and, secondly, are those models and theories
which have a basis in cognitive theory. In each case, some work
has been based in research, and some in little more than speculation.
Although our own interest does not lie primarily in mathematical or
logical models of the process, these must nonetheless be reviewed
since they achieve some considerable currency in the literature and
appear to attract some credit as representations of the actual think-
ing process. This chapter, then, will give a brief description of
such models and will evaluate their usefulness in illuminating the
diagnostic thinking process. Chapter Three will give a more detailed
account of cognitive approaches, these constituting our major
interest.
2.1	 Statistical Models
The development of statlstica1L models of the diagnostic process
has occurred in parallel, and with considerable interaction and
mutual influence,in the fields of medicine and clinical
psychology. The following discussion will, therefore, include
work in the latter field where this is relevant to the former.
Goldberg (1968) traces the development of statistical modelling
of the diagnostic process from early research on accuracy of
clinical judgments in clinical psychology, and validity studies
to determine in what way clinical judgments are accurate. Such
investigations progressed to the process of clinical inference
and the representation and simulation of clinicians' cognitive
processes. The statistical models which have been, and are
being, developed predictably fall into the two broad categories
of linear and non-linear. In turn, the studies can again be
sub-divided into two groups as indicated by Hoffman et al
(1968); those which focus upon. outcome, reliability and accuracy,
-and those which focus upon the judgment process itself
especially upon the manner in which cues are weighted and
combined by the clinician.
2.1.1 Linear Models
Typical of this approach have been models based on linear
regression, analysis of variance and conditional probability
or Bayes' Theorem. Typical of the linear regression approach
are the studies described by Hoffman (1960) and Hammond and
Summers (1965), although these are in clinical psychology.
In such models, the dependent (or criterion) variable is the
clinician's diagnostic judgment, and the independent
(predictor) variables are the values of the cues (test scores,,
symptoms, signs, etc.) • The result of such an analysis is a
set of regression weights, one for each predictor. Xn such
studies, clinicians are asked to estimate some criterion on
the basis of given values of several predictors. Hoffman
U960) used a multiple regression procedure to compute the
relationship of each predictor variable to the decisions of
each judge across a group of test protocols. The results,
stated in terms of 'relative weights' indicate the relative
importance of each predictor in contributing to the decisions
of each clinician and to the criterion classification.
Complex terms may be inserted into such linear models, in an
attempt to account for non-'linear relationships in the data.
Hoffman's (1960) model included in the equation cross-products
between pairs of variables.
Hammond and Summers (1965) cite more than a dozen studies of
clinical judgment in which the accuracy of prediction derived
from linear regression analysis was great enough, for them,
to suggest that clinicians axe primarily linear in their mode
of combining cues. Although they do not eliminate the possible
existence of meaningful non-linear cue use, they considered
that it had not yet been exhibited in the experimental situa-
tion. Three years later, Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) compared
three models as representations of the cognitive processes of
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29 clinicians, and, although for some clinicians a non-linear
model was slightly better, for 23 of the 29 a linear regression
model was equal or superior to a quadratic model.
Closely related to linear regression models are those which are
based on analysis of variance. Such methods became known as
'policy capturing'. Using analysis of variance, Hoffman et al
(1968) captured the policies of radiologists in diagnosing the
benign or malignant nature of gastric ulcers • When clinicians'
judgments are analysed in terms of analysis of variance, a
significant main effect for Cue 1 would imply that clinicians'
responses varied systematically with that cue. A significant
interaction between Cues 1 and 2 would imply that clinicians
were responding to particular patterns of these cues. In
general, then, such a model represents clinicians' judgments
as a weighted, additive combination of the factors, both main
effects and interactions. Significance tests can provide an
indication of the clinician's use of a particular cue individ-
ually or in combination with one or more other cues (Hoffman et
al, 1968).
Hoffman et al's (l968 results indicated statistically signifi-
cant differences among their nine radiologist judges, both in
diagnoses made, and in their use of individual cues and cue
patterns. However, groups of judges appeared to agree with
one another. Four types of judge were identified by principal
components analysis and analysis of variance indicated the
nature of the differences between these groups in terms of the
cues used. However, in view of the small number of subjects
in this study (nine) one may question the validity of the
statistical analysis and results.
Analysis of variance has proved less useful than linear
regression as a method of developing statistical models of the
diagnostic process for two reasons. Firstly, its use is
limited to those situations for which experiments can be de-
signed so that all cue patterns are orthogonally arrangelwithin
a factorial design. This is not possible for more than a small
6-.
number of cues. Secondly, by orthogonalising the set of cues
which are correlated in nature, one might alter the judges'
conceptualisation of the environment, thereby causing him to
deviate from his normal judgment model. This second problem -
a lack of congruence with reality - is a major drawback and
jeopardising variable for almost all studies concerned with
the development of statistical, algebraic or algorithmic
models.
The final major approach to the development of linear models
has been based on conditional probability theory or Bayes'
Theorem. According to this, in relation to medicine, accurate
decision-making depends on the prior probabilities of the
possible diagnoses and the observed signs and symptoms, and on
their probability of joint occurrence. The strength of an
association is indicated with probabilities also. Bayes'
Theorem allows mathematical revision of opinion about possible
diagnoses in the light of new information.
The earliest, and probably most formative paper on the use of
conditional probability models in computer-assisted diagnosis
is that of Ledley and Lusted (1959) • This paper laid a broad
foundation in symbolic logic, conditional probability theory
and statistical decision theory on which most of the subsequent
work in this area has been based. Taylor (1971) gives a com-
prehensive review of conditional probability models of diagnosis.
Taylor's (l970a) own opinion, reflected by Card (197O, is
that in clinical practice, the doctor collects data sequentially,
guided at each stage by a mental estimate of the probability of
diseases under consideration, and his Bayesian model of this
process showed a success rate of 93 per cent, }Iowever, the
model had to select between only three possible diseases, which
introduces a certain element of unreality into the process;
firstly, by having the possibilities designated and provided,
and, secondly, by limiting them to only three. This element
of unreality is present in all such studies, and was recognised
by Taylor (l970b) • Bowever, his solution of developing a system
with more tests (88), nine diagnoses and eight treatment possi-
bilities does not necessarily reduce the unreality of being
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'given' possibilities from which to select in the first
instance. The technique still demands a closed set of symptoms
and possible diagnoses (Lindberg, 1968), and it is in this that
the unreality is seated, not in the magnitude of that closure.
Nonetheless, Bayesian conditional probability models of the
diagnostic process have been widely used. Taylor (1971) quotes
studies in which Bayes' Theorem has been applied to problems in
haematology, gastro-enterology, Cardiology, primary bone tumours,
psychiatric diagnosis and Cushing's syndrome, in addition to
his own work on thyroid disease. Knill-Jones et al (1973) used
a Bayesian model in diagnosis of jaundice, and K1T1il1-Jones
(1977) reports its use in calculating the prognosis for severe
head injury patients. Lusted and Stahl (1964), however, point
out that Bayesian models have greatest diagnostic accuracy
when used in areas such as thyroid disease and ccqenital heart
disease in which diagnostic data is drawn mainly from labora-
tory tests rather than the clinical history and ç4hysical
examination which is difficult to present in quantitative form.
Lusted and Stahl (1964) conclude their paper with the suggest-
ion that perhaps the Bayesian iuodel does not entirely account
for the clinician's thinking process. They speculate that
the diagnostic thinking process is more nearly one of pattern
recognition than numerical adjustment, although, after pattern
recognition, the clinician may bring in hs own subjective
probabilities, developed from past experience and related to
'pattern weighting. There is no evidence to support such a
view.
De Dombal et al (1971) take this further. On the basis of
their finding no statistically significant correlation between
levels of certainty reached by probabilistic analysis and
certainty levels recorded by clinicians, they conclude that
clinicians do not 'think Bayes' or that pure probability theory
plays a relatively small part in the diagnostic thinking
process. Gorry (1968) also disagrees with those who consider
Bayes' Theorem to model the clinician's thinking processes,
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Re points out that we cannot, as yet, capture the processes
used by physicians in a sufficiently precise manner to permit
use in at computer programme, and that such a simulation of
human thinking processes would fail to exploit the special
capabilities of the computer. Despite this, two years later
Gorry (1970) suggests that Bayes' Theorem is a reasonable
model of the physician constantly updating his 'current view'
of the patient's problem, with the qualification that "a
basic model of the diagnostic process may be valid without
accounting for the detailed processes employed by individual
doctors.
A number of other workers have considered the possibility of
clinicians thinking in terms of probability estimates (Sarbin
et al, 1960 Meador, 1969) and, indeed, the Poyal College of
General Practitioners (1972) considers that all diagnoses are
themselves statements of probability; a view reflected by
Ledley and Lusted t1959). However, the opposing viewpoint,
that clinicians do not think in terms of exact probabilities,
is held by other workers (Albert, 1974) and substantiated in
other fields (Anderson and Shanteau, 1970).
These, then, are the major linear models of the diagnostic
process, and reference to the papers cited will evidence an
associated consistent and considerable degree of predictive
accuracy. Despite this, linear models have been the target
of criticism. Hoffman's (1968) discussion mentions some of
the points of controversy. Firstly, adoption of a linear
model would imply that individuals do not alter their mode
of 'weighting' the dimensions of information, regardless of
their pattern or configuration. Secondly, clinicians "report
in fairly emphatic terms that judgment involves a sequential
consideration of many dimensions (symptoms, signs or cues),
and that the interpretation of a given dimension is conditional
upon the values of other dimensions. This subjective
assessment is supported by Goldberg (1968), and mentioned
by lieehl (1954, 1960). Elstein et al (1978) found the
very diagnostic accuracy of the linear models which they
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applied to their data reason enough to reject the linearity
principle:
"Thus to the extent that a linear model resulted in
increased diagnostic accuracy without changes in
the data base, its adequacy as an account of human
performance may be questioned". (p.104)
En clinical psychology, Nystedt and Magnusson (1975) quote
five studies between 1968 and 1970 alone which indicate that
judges use cues in a configurative way, typical of which is
that of Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) which demonstrated
'configurality' as a consistent judgmental characteristic of
16 of 29 judges. In view of such factors, some workers have
addressed themselves to the development of non-linear models,
considering that the interpretation of symptoms and signs is
conditional upon the presence, absence or nature of other
symptoms and signs.
2.1.2 Non-linear Models
As Hoffman et al (1968) indicate, there have been very few
studies of the degree to which judges operate in a configura].
manner as opposed to using some weighted combination of indi-
vidual cues and those there are may be described in the
framework of	 Lens Model Theory or probabilistic
functionalism.
For a detailed discussion of Lens Model Theory, see Postman
and Tolman (1959); but briefly, the model has, unlike others
so far mentioned, a large cognitive component. It is used
to describe the process of clinical judgment by describing
the judgment situation as an interaction between two systems:
an ecological system (being the outer environment) and a
cognitive one (being the judge, or clinician, and judgment or
diagnostic process). (Figure 2.3. gives a simplified represent-
ation of the Lens Model, applied in a clinical situation).
Patient Dia€noeie
Clinician's predictive efficiency
-
Cues
(symptoms and signs)
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM
	 COGN?IVE SYEM
Figure 2.1: Simplified Representation of the Lens Model
The cognitive system may be seen as a mediatory link between
the input - providing ecological system and the instrumental
response system. The unbroken lines in Figure 2.1 represent
correlation coefficients or probabilities. It is seen as
necessary to consider both the systems of ecology and cog-
nition since qualities within the ecological system restrict
the clinician's possibilities of making perfect predictions,
while properties within the cognitive system hut his
maximal predictive efficiency.
The Lens Model will not be discussed further since, although
it has been widely applied In the field of clinical psychology
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(Sarbin et al, 1960; Goldberg, 1970; Nystedt, 1972; Brehzner,
1973) no study has yet been completed in the field of
medicine. It therefore remains for a non-linear model to be
developed.
2.2	 Other Models
Prominent among other models has been the use of decision
trees, decision analysis and decision theory. Schwarz et al
(1973) discuss the nature and use of decision trees and
associated probabilities and values. They give an example
of a decision tree describing possible actions by the
physician, and their potential consequences, in a patient
thought to have either essential hypertension or functionally
significant renal artery stenosis. The tree consists of
nodes and branches. At decision nodes the physician must
choose one from a set of actions and procede to travel down
the consequent branch to the next od. Although Schwarz et
al U973) suggest that TMmost physicians will find the dia-
graininatic representation ...... quite in keeping with their
thinking about medical problems", there is no experimental
or research evidence of such a thinking process. Some deci-
sion trees and flow-charts, such as those of Essex (1976),
do not purport to represent a thinking process, but are
merely an aid to diagnosis, as are others reported by Vay1or
(1971). Kleinmuntz (1968) has used logical decision trees
to study diagnostic behaviour of clinical neurologists.
Studies using the theoretical framework of decision theory
and decision analysis have been completed by Garland (1959)
with radiologists, comparing the effects of lax and strict
decision attitudes and Aitchison (1970) in relation to
treatment allocation. Aitchison and Kay (,1973) interpret
the clinician's diagnostic behaviour in terms of decision
theory and the reduction of uncertainty. However, to what
extent each of these represents a formal model of the diag-
nostic thinking process is not always made abundantly clear
by the authors.
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The only remaining major interpretive framework - again, it
is difficult to judge the extent to which authors consider
these to be models of the diagnostic process - is that based
on set theory. Feinstein's (1967) book has been formative
in this area, and is clear that a model is being proposed:
"Like the character in Molire's "Le Bourgeois
Centilhonmie", who was astonished to learn that he
spoke in prose, clinicians may be startled to dis-
cover that they think in mathematical sets. The
thinking occurs during every act of diagnosis,
prognostic estimation, therapeutic decision, and
correlation of clinical and laboratory data. As
exercises in deductive and inductive reasoning,
these acts can be described in mathematical terms".
(p.156)
Such an attempt to describe the clinician's thinking processes
had been made previously (Feinstein, 1963), yet the discussion
of the application of set theory shows that a clinical taxon-
omy, or an objective organisation and classification of
clinical data, is being achieved, and not a description of a
thinking process. Set theory and Venn diagrams were attract-
ive in this endeavour, because of their ability to identify
and construct overlapping collections of items. As Bashook
(1976) suggests, "the logic Feinstein presents is reasonable
and attractive except that it represents what we would like
to see in physician thinking and not what our present knowledge
suggests as reality". The Royal College of General
Practitioners (1972) also has used set theory as an interpre-
tive framework, but without suggesting that clinicians
actually think in this way, while Dudley (1971) suggests that
clinicians "run through Boolean lattices of a diagnostic
continuum",
These, then, are the major statistical and logical models of
the diagnostic process. As has been indicated, authors do
not always make it clear whether or not their formulations are
intended as formal models of a thinking process, and have not
usually been evaluated as such experimentally. Despite this,
- L3..
the very construction of models, particularly of statistical
models, has given rise to considerable controversy. A dis-
cussion of this controversy may indicate the degree to which
credibility may be attached to the models described as
descriptions of a thinking process.
2.3	 Statistical versus Clinical Prediction
The essence of this debate turns on whether, in a given pre-
diction situation, the procedures of the clinician or the
statistical actuarial formulae are more accurate. Llthough
this question per se is not of relevance to our studr, the
elaboration of arguments associated with its answer is of
interest in evaluating the models already discussed.
When clinician and actuary have been compared, the latter has
almost invariably been found to be as good as or better than
the former in accuracy of clinical prediction or diagnosis in
clinical psychology. Meehi's (1954) work set the scene.
having surveyed the field, he concluded that, given the same
quantitative or scalable information about the patient,
statistical methods of combining it were consistently as good
as or better than clinical methods in diagnosing the correct
disease. Sawyer (1966) later summarised results from 45
comparative studies and gave strong support to Meehil's 1954
conclusion.
Similar comparisons of clinician and statistical formula have
been made in medicine, and usually show similar resuJ.ts (de
Dombal et al, 1972a; Lusted and Stahl, 1964), Taylor et al
(1971) have not only compared outcomes, but also the diagnostic
processes of man and computer. Where the choice is to be made
between three possible diagnoses, the probability estimates
as they are revised during the process, may be plotted within
a triangle and the 'pathways' to diagnosis compared. (See
Figure 2.2)
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F'igure 2.2 Illustration of Clinicians' and Computer's
Pathways to Diagnosis, Plotted within a Triangle
(after Taylor et al 1971)
The pathway selected by the computer is normally shown to be
the most direct.
On the basis of such findings as these in clinical psychology,
Sarbin et al (1960) have maintained that, fundamentally,
clinical prediction is always actuarial, and since this is the
case whether the clinician knows it or not, it is to his
advantage to make these actuarial predictions explicity so.
However, it is the arguments against this viewpoint which
provide the basis of an evaluation of all mathematical and
logical models of the diagnostic thinking process.
Shulman and Elstejn (1975) review a basic distinction between
'process-tracing' approaches, which attempt to describe the
intellectual processes used by subjects forming judgments,
making decisions or solving problems, and the 'black box'
investigations which attempt to model the processing of the
judge mathematically through studies of input-output relations.
The models discussed in this chapter are primarily of the
'black box' variety. Even Taylor et al's (1971) 'pathways'
fall into this categgry, giving no indication of how probabil-
ity estimates are arrived at, or whether, were the subjects
not forced to behave like the computer, they would naturally
do so 0 Elsewhere, Elstein et al (1972) point out that
statistical models replicate the judgments of the clinician
without necessarily reproducing his mental steps.
Holt (1958, 1970) argues that a comparison of clinician and
statistical model is wrongly set, since the issue of how data
is gathered is ignored, and only combination of data in
isolation from other processes considered. Sawyer (1966)
supports this view. One can add to this that even that corn-
bination of data is not always as it may be in reality.
Taylor et al's t197l) workgivesa fine example of clinicians
competing with a computer, on the computer's terms. The allo-
cation of numerical, rather than subjective, probabilities, even
if the concept of a numerical probability is understood, is not
conspicuous in everyday problem solving thinking, and evidence
has yet to be provided that it is present in everyday diagnostic
thinking processes. Even Sarbin et al (1960) admit to differences
between clinical and actuarial processes. Dudley (1970) writes of
"a sense of odds ... derived from other methods of inferenceu, but
not a sense of numerical probability.
It would seem reasonable to conclude that comparisons between
clinician and statistical formulae are spurious. The two are
not compared on equal terms. The true comparison is not
between statistical and clinical methods, but between a
statistical model and a clinician attempting to behave as a
tatistica1 model, having been given an array of data in an
unfamiliar form and an unfamiliar context and being allowed to
use clinical skills hardly at all. It is not to be wondered
at, then, that he should compare unfavourably with a mathe-
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matical fornna].a.. It is interesting to note that the primacy
of the processes of the computer rather than the clinician
in developing a model has been questioned by some workers in
the field and Pauker, Gorry, Xassirer and Schwarz (l976,
some of whose work has already been cited, have tried to
tackle the problem by taking the clinician as primary and
attempting to make a computer simulation of his processes,
rather than vice versa.
A final evaluation of mathematical and logical models may be
made by reference to Hoffman (1960), who considers the
problem of whether models are parainorphic or isomorphic
representations of the clinician. That is, whether they are
symbolic representations or exact replicas of the clinician's
thinking processes. If a model using, for example, linear
regression analysis, derives an accuracy of prediction equiv-
alent to that of a computer, we cannot logically conclude
that clinicians are primarily linear in their mode of combin-
izig. We would contend that each of the models discussed is
a paramorphic representation of the diagnostic process, not
an isomorphic one. In order to understand the diagnostic
thinking process, we must consider work which takes a study
of the clinician as its major reference point.
2.4	 Summary
Mathematical and logical models of the diagnostic process are
descrthed. These have been based on linear and non-linear
statistical methods, decision theory and set theory. The
relative effectiveness of the clinician and the models is
discussed. It is concluded that, regardless of relative pre-
dictive validity, mathematical and logical models are only
symbolic representations, and not exact replicas of the
clinician's diagnostic thinking processes.
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CHPTER THREE
Review of the Literature 2. Cognitive Studies
In making a psychological enquiry into the nature of the diagnostic
thinking process, two alternative approaches are available. Either
the process as a whole may be traced and characterised, probably in
fairly broad terms; or variables of possible relevance to that pro-
cess may be identified, studied separately and the results of such
studies be used in an additive manner. Examples of the former
approach are seen in the application of such conceptual and explan-
atory frameworks as 'pattern recognition', 'information processing'
and'hypothesis generation and testing'. Examples of the latter
approach are seen in studies of the effects of varying amounts of
clinical experience, redundant information and variability in
content. Of course, another choice of approach is available in
that the process as a whole may be broadly defined and the effects
of isolated variables on that process studied either consequently
or simultaneously. This final approach has been the selection of
the two most significant groups of workers in the field - Barrows
and his colleagues at the Project for Learning Resources Design at
McMaster Medical School, Canada, and Elstein, Shulman and their
colleagues at Michigan State University.
This chapter will begin with a review of the work of the groups at
Michigan and McMaster which may be characterised under the broad
heading of "Hypothesis Generation and Testing". This section will
include a report of their work on both the characterisation and
description of the process as a whole as well as indicating which
variables they have isolated for special study and the results of
those studies. It is to these studies that the present work, to
be reported, is most closely related. The aim of the first section
is specifically to describe the findings and theories of these two
most significant groups, only scant reference, therefore, will be
made to either complementary or contradictory findings from other
workers • The full review of other work will be made in subsequent
sections and, where appropriate, related to the findings of the
McMaster and Michigan groups. Likewise, where variables isolated
and studied by these two groups have also been studied by other
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workers, they will be reviewed under separate headings in later
sections.
3.1	 ypothesis Generation and Testing
Although the findings and viewpoints of the Michigan and
McMaster groups are very similar, we shall commence with
a separate description of each, referring in each case to
recent publications in which each group has drawn together
and reviewed its own findings and described its own
current thinking.
3.1.1 The Michigan Medical Inquiry Project Studies
These are collected and summarized in Elstein et al (1978).
The book reports a series of separate, but related, studies
by different members of the group. Their most realistic
method of enquiry comprised three high-fidelity simulations
in which actors were trained to simulate conditions in
haematology, gastroenterology and neurology. The subject
interviewed ai examined the simulated patient in the normal
manner, during which time he was encouraged to verbalise his
thoughts as much as ossib1e. This included episodic
reviews during the interview. The clinical interview was
recorded on videotape. The videotape was then replayed to
him. He was given a stop/start switch with which to control
the playback and was encouraged to use the videotape as a
vehicle to stimulate his memory and relate what he was
thinking throughout the session being reviewed.
This process resulted in three kinds of data. Firstly,
material from concurrent thinking aloud; secondly, episodic
reviews during the clinical interview; and thirdly, material
from videotape - stimulated recall. Where discrepancies
were found they were weighted highest to lowest In the order
given. Although verbal report protocols have been widely
used and have achieved a respectable place as a method in
psychological research (Peel, 1971; Newell and Simon, 1972),
the technique of 'thinking aloud', which Elstein et al
- 2+9 -
U978) imply to be their most important source of data, has
been criticised (de Croot, 1965) for its disturbing influence.
It is reported that thinking aloud during a problem-solving
exercise has the effect of markedly slowing down the thinking
itself and obliging the subject to think more explicitly, ' at
a higher level of conscious organisation, than he would
otherwise do. In other words, thinking aloud may itself
alter the thinking process of which It is a report. Even
though Flaherty (1975) found no differences In problem-
solving scores while thinking aloud, Elstein et al's (1978)
results of the high-fidelity simulations must be conservat-
ively judged In the light of this qualification.
The second research method employed by Elstein et al (1978)
involved the use of paper and pencil simulations, called
'patient management problems', in which the subject was
presented with a brief verbal description of the patient's
problems and then recorded his steps towards making a
diagnosis. Each step involved the selection of a test or
examination or further information, in response to which a
decision about the next step may be taken. Results of these
tests, again, must be interpreted conservatively in the
light of the unrealistic nature of the TMpatient", the data,
the means of eliciting information and the necessary
structuring of the subject's strategy and tactics of
problem-solving.
In a third study, fixed-order problems were presented to
subjects in which the sequence of data presentation was pre-
determined. Four such cases were presented, which varied
along two dimensions, diagnostic specificity and cue
consistency. Two cases were designed to converge on a
single diagnosis, whereas in the other two several cues
could reasonably be applied to more than one diagnosis.
Further, in only two problems were all cues consistent with
one diagnosis. This method, obviously, represents a low-
fidelity simulation, but was designed to study the interaction
between the structure of the diagnostic problem itself and
the physician's own problem-solving strategy.
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The subjects for the three studies were some or all, of 24
experienced, peer-nominated physicians, who were subdivided
into two groups: 'criterial'physicians who were judged by
their peers as good clinicians, and 'non-criterial' physi-
cians who had not been so judged, but no differences were
found between these subjectively derived groups on any
measure. Parametric statistical analyses were applied to
some data, although the number of subjects may appear to
be inappropriately small. This must be borne in mind when
evaluating Elstein et al's (1978) results.
Finally, before reporting results, a brief description and
discussion of the scoring system and analysis of data from
the high-fidelity simulations is necessary in order to
evaluate the validity of results. We may take Elstein et
al's (1978) own summary of the system, which took more than
a year to develop:
"The fundamental units of protocol analysis are
information search units, cues and hypotheses.
Information search units tabulate the data-
gather ing behaviour of the physician; cues are
the data obtaine&; and hypotheses are the formu-
latiorEof possible solutions to the problem. A
matrix of cues and hypotheswas constructed to
represent the appropriate cue weightings for each
hypothesis, as determined by an expert. The
analysis of each protocol initially examined the
following variables: total number of information
search units, point at which the first hypothesis
was generated, number of hypotheses active one-
quarter and one-half of the way through each
work-up, total number of hypotheses generated,
number of hypotheses retained at conclusion of
work-up, number and per cent of cues acquired,
number and per cent of critical findings obtained,
efficiency, accuracy of interpretations, modal
interpretive error, accuracy of formulation, and
accuracy of outcome". ( pp 62-63)
It is the case that data obtained by verbal report protocols
cannot be taken as complete. De Groot (1965) quotes the
opinion that "a protocol is relatively reliable only for
what it positively contains but not for that which it
omits" • In addition, a verbal report protocol, partic-
ularly if elicited by Elstein et al's (19781 second and
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third methods of episodic reviews and stimulated recaLL,
cannot be taken as a simultaneous commentary on thought
processes; thus identification of time of cognitive
occurrences may be hazardous. These two deficiencies in
verbal report data render Elstein et al's (1978) variables
less valid than their quantitative nature may imply.
Despite their assertion that "a conservative line of inter-
pretation of the stimulated recall segments was consistently
adopted", it would appear, on the contrary, that some over-
interpretation of data has occurred. This also is to be
considered when evaluating the results of their studies.
Elstein et al (1978) suminarise their findings in a four-stage
general model of medical inquiry that calls attention to cue
acquisition, hypothesis generation, cue interpretation, and
hypothesis evaluation. This model has also been discussed
elsewhere (Elstein et al, 1977; Shulinan and Elstein, 197 S).
Findings showed thoroughness of cue acquisition and accuracy
of cue interpretation to be statistically independent. The
clinical interview is interpreted as consisting partly in a
guided search for findings implied by each hypothesis,
although Elstein et al (1978) were unable to distinguish
reliably between hypothesis - testing questions, and quest-
ions asked routinely. In the process of cue interpretation,
data are evaluated in terms of their fit to the anticipated
findings. It is suggested that this evaluation is ordinarily
conducted by designating each cue as positive, non-contribu-
tory or negative with respect to a particular hypothesis.
This latter finding, however, is based on the comparison of
differential weighting systems with the result that, "the
'pro', 'con' and 'does not help' formulation does at least
as good a job of describing information - processing behavi-
our as does a more complex differential weighting system"
(p.100). This would suggest a parainorphic model, rather than
a description of a cognitive process (Betein-and Sprafka,
34
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The findings further suggest that diagnostic accuracy is
related to both thoroughness of cue acquisition and accuracy
of cue interpretation, despite these two variables being
uncorrelated. The majority of diagnostic decisions could be
accounted for by one of two rules: either select the hypo-
thesis with the maximum number of positive cues; or, select
the hypothesis with the maximum difference of positive cues
minus negative cues. However for one problem, rules proved
superior to physicians in diagnostic accuracy, which may well,
again, suggest a form of paramorphism. Listein et al (1978)
have defined other judgmental rules as: "If feature A is
absent, it cannot be diagnosis X", while sane diagnostic
strategies are implied by the very definition of a disease:
"X is diagnosed if and only if all of the following features
are present". However, no indication is given of the fre-
quency or circumstances of application of such rules, the
possible range of rules, the consciousness or not of their
applications, or each clinician's degree of awareness of
them. It may be more appropriate to describe such circum-
stances not as	 but as a logical description of
cognitive strategies isplayed. The term 	 seems to
have too many implications and defining parameters
(definiteness, method of application) which cannot be
accounted for.
A further finding is that hypotheses are generated early in
the clinical interview, Elstein et al (1978) suggest by ten
per cent of the way through or, usually, within the first
five minutes of the interview. In earlier work (E].stein et
al, 1972) these early hypotheses had been identified as
specific rather than general. However, this formulation is
now rejected. The nature of the hypotheses are now seen as
dependent upon the structure of the medical problem. They
may therefore be specific or general at any stage of the
interview. Kleinmuntz's (1968) finding of a 'general to
specific' development may, therefore, not be generalisab].e
but specific to the neurological cases in question or to the
research method used. In addition to hypotheses being
generated early, new ones may be generated later in the
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interview or older ones reformulated. As descri.bed by
Sprafka and Elstein £L974), "the hypotheses define the
framework of possible solutions to the diagnostic problem
and thus constitute a problem space (Newel]. and Simon,
1972)", transforming the ill-defined problem into a well
defined one.
The concept of a prob].n space is taken from information
processing theory and amounts to describing the subject's
internal representation of the task environment, Accord-
ing to the theory, the structure of the task environment
determines the possible structures of the problem space,
while the structure of the problem space determines the
possible programmes that can be used for problem solving.
The clinician's choice of hypothesis is obviously not
arbitrary or random. Elstein et ai. (1978) consider that they
are typically generated by associations from clusters of a
few cues. Each hypothesis accounts for some, but usually
not all, of the Initial data base. They find that the
number of hypotheses considered at any one time is limited,
averaging between fodr and seven and rarely exceeding five -
although it must be noted that the limitations of verbal
report protocols may also limit the number of hypotheses
+
reported. Elstein et al (1972) give the figure as 4 - 1,
and their derivation as having four components - attending
to initially available cues; identifying problematic elements
from among these; associating from problematic elements to
long-term memory and back, generating hypotheses and suggest-
tions for further enquiry; and, informally rank-ordering
hypotheses according to subjective estimates. The concept
of 'problematic elements' has since been replaced by cue
clusters.
An important finding of Elstein et al's (1978) work has been
that clinical competence may be case related, both physicians
and students varying considerably in their diagnostic effect-
iveness, according to the nature of the problem in hand. In
particular, intra-individual consistency across the patient
management problems was found to be low, although t1is
finding is strongly qualified by noting that the task envir-
onment is itself structured by the problem solver imto a
psychological problem space. Despite this, they suggest that
"among people who are knowledgeable about a class of problems,
they are structured in predictable ways, adapted to the task".
Content-specificity of the problem solving process is
seriously questioned by Berner and Bligh (1974) who found
more similarity between students in performance across cases
on the same skill than within a given case on different
skills, the skills being: definition of an initial problem
list, correct diagnostic procedures, incorrect procedures
chosen, and final diagnoses. It is possible, however, that
a group of experienced physicians would show different
results from these students.
We may put forward an alternative, and reconciling, interpre-
tation of these apparently conflicting findings. It. appears
that the measures of the problem solving process made and
compared across cases are measures of a process per se to
different degrees, some being measures which are directly
related to content, in particular to amount of infarmation,
and diagnostic significance of cues. For any given amount
of information, or given number of cues, there is a finite
number of possible diagnoses; this number will vary from cue
cluster to cue cluster. Likewise, cues differ in their
diagnostic significance; presentation of 'a pain in the
chest radiating down the left arm' is likely to give rise to
fewer diagnostic hypotheses and a narrower initial range of
questions than 'a pain in the chest'. Elstein et al's (1978)
variables are largely content-dependent in this maimer, it
therefore follows that content-specificity should he dis-
played. This is quite in accord with the information
processing proposition that the structure of the task envir-
onment determines the possible structures of the problem
space. The problem solving process of hypothesis generation
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and testing, however, is ccmunot to all problns and subjects
studied. This may more appropriately be called a process
than the other quantitative parameters. This viewpoint is
echoed by Berner et al (1977) who also consider that such
studies do not allow process and content aspects to be
separated.
Pilthough Elstein et al's (1978) studies are not primarily
concerned to compare expert and neophyte, indication is
given that information and experience are basic to compet-
ence in clinical problem solving.
Finally, the study indicates certain sources of error in the
clinical problem solving process. There are dangers inherent
in allowing hypotheses to influence data collection and
interpretation. These dangers include possibilities of pre-
mature closure, inappropriate selective information
gathering, and biased interpretation of information. Other
errors identified include mistakes in combining evidence,
misinterpretation of single cues, and faulty hypothesis
generation. In a non-medical context, $hulman and Elstein
(1972) quote Wason's (1968) work, suggesting that a hypo-
thesis may be a 'strong expectation' and may become a
self fulfilling prophecy by the failure to gather or process
information that has a negative weight for a favoured hypo-
thesis. Other errors noted include over-interpretation and
under-interpretation of cues, excessive data collection where
patients are implicitly assumed to have multiple problems,
and uninterpreted cues.
Elstein et al's (1978) findings, then, have been quite pre-
cise and specific. Some methodological problems which may
jeopardise validity of those results have already been
mentioned. In addition to these, we may ask whether the
studies have addressed themselves to the best questions, or
whether they have been far-reaching enough. Emphasis on
quantitative methods has largely limited the studies to
certain quantifiable aspects - counts and weightings of cues
and hypotheses, divisions by time intervals, etc. - which
are essential but not necessarily sufficient. We know,
therefore, how much information is collected, and how it
relates to hypotheses, but we have no indication of the
clinician's cognitive manipulation of cues, how these are
cognitively structured as clusters, and what process of
structuring generates hypotheses. How is it possible for
more than one hypothesis to be generated? What is the cogn-
itive meclanism which admits of simultaneous {or alternating)
interpretations of cues? How do new hypotheses arise? It
is stated that the first hypothesis is generated by ten per
cent or the first five minutes of the interview. What
cognitive processes are occurring during the nine per cent
or four minutes preceding the emergence of the hypothesis?
How are relationships between cues allocated and reallocated?
According to what tactic or strategy is the clinical inter-
view conducted prior to generation of the first hypothesis?
These questions are not yet answered, although the McMaster
group have approached some of them.
3.1.2 The McMaster Studies
The findings of the McMaster group are summarised in a recent,
unpublished report (Barrows et al, 1978). It will be seen
that this work closely reflects the findings of the Michigan
group, and refers to a study of 37 physicians, made up of 19
general internists (medical registrars) and 18 family
physicians (general practitioners), in 62 standardised pat-
ient encounters, using simulated patients as in Michigan.
In a previous pilot study (Barrows and Bennett, 1972) it was
found that physicians developed multiple hypotheses early in
the clinical encounter (cf. Michigan studies). These hypo-
theses (guesses, hunches, impressions or possible diagnoses)
were seen as a guide for what was essentially a problem
based inquiry. It must be noted that the Mc1aster work is
within the frame of reference of the problem-oriented appro-
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ach to clinical practice and teaching and the development of
problem-based learning. The 1972 study also showed that many
physicians in residency training had ineffective problem
solving skills. The authors suggested that efficient problem
based performance is not developed during undergraduate or
postgraduate training, but appears in clinical practice 'when
the physician encounters heavy patient responsibilities with
insufficient time to handle his responsibility in the trad-
itional way he had been taught".
For the 1978 study, each of the 37 physicians was asked to
examine one of four randomly allocated simulated patients in
the normal manner, but being advised to take about 30
minutes. A year later two-thirds of the original group (13
general internists and 12 family physicians) participated in
a second phase. There was, therefore, a total of 62
physician-patient encounters, from 37 subjects on four simu-
lated patients. The research method differed slightly from
the Michigan design, omitting any thinking aloud.
Each physician-patient encounter was monitored by two
observers. A clinici&n noted down ideas about what the sub-
ject might be thinking on the basis of his questions and
physical examination. These observations were compared with
the subject's subsequent statements about his own thinking.
The second observer recorded inter-personal relationship
behaviours. The encounter was videotaped with the image of
a digital timer superimposed. At the end of the encounter
the subject dictated notes about the patient and then
reviewed the videotape, being asked standardised, non-
directive questions, particularly about thoughts which prom-
pted his questions and physical examination. When the
subject expressed hypotheses, he was asked how they were
ranked, or whether they changed during the encounter • The
videotape was stopped "whenever discussion seemed appropriate".
Significant points during this discussion were recorded by
an observer, as were the physicians actions on history and
examination seen on the videotape. The digital timer was
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used to co-ordinate all observations. A typed transcript was
then prepared containing the physician's questions and actions,
the patient's responses, and structured observations concern-
ing his and the monitorts observations. The physician was
then asked to rate the effect of the information he obtained
in supporting or denying the hypotheses he expressed on a +2
to -2 scale. They also rated whether each question and item
of physical examination was 'routine' or 'non-routine'.
The information thus obtained was coded into 21 variables for
computer analysis (coding procedure is described in Norman
et al, 1977 ). Results showed that 57 per cent of time was
spent in history taking, 12 per cent in physical examination
and 2]. per cent in combined activity. On average,61 per cent
of questions were non-routine, that is directed at a defini-
tion of the problem. Ibout half the questions asked were
specifically to test hypotheses. Subjects reported that
routine questions were used for activities such as scanning
for unrelated and unsuspected problems, building rapport, or
to gain thinking time. On average, physicians elicited 68
per cent of the available significant information.
The extent to which a finding was based on multiple hypotheses
was calculated by expressing the average number of hypotheses
against which a finding was weighted positively or negatively.
On average, a finding was relevant to about three hypotheses.
Barrows et al (1978) conclude that physicians were using
parallel rather than sequential processing. This is not a
permissable conclusion, however, since any one finding could
be processed repeatedly for hypotheses arranged sequentially,
and the relationship to multiple hypotheses merely be a
function of the inter-relatedness of the hypotheses due to
their coeunon derivation from the same information. The aver-
age weight of findings suggested that the physicians tended
to elicit data that confirmed rather than denied. hypotheses.
Multiple hypotheses, then, emerge as a central ieature in
physicians' thinking (cf. Michigan studies) • In contrast
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with the Michigan findings, however, the first hypothesis
in these studies was advanced, on average, within 28 seconds
(range across physicians one to 262 seconds) of the appear-
ance of the main complaint. However, the timing of that
event for each encounter is not given. The correct hypoth-
esis emerged, on average, four minutes into the encounter
(range across physicians one second to 32 minutes). We see,
then, a large degree of variability across physicians. In
both cases, however, variability across cases was less (cf.
previous discussion of content-specificity). On average,
physicians advanced 5.5 hypotheses (range across physicians
three to nine) • The range shows a slight discrepancy with
the Michigan results. Seventy-nine per cent of hypotheses
were generated within the first quarter (by time) of the
encounter.
In their discussion, Baxrows et al (1978) suggest that
generation of the first hypothesis, which appears in a
matter of seconds, results from a process of pattern recog-
nition in which the initial cues are matched with similar
instances from the phsician prior knowledge and experience.
This, however, does not account for the formation of first
hypotheses which appear much later, as some did. Neufeld
et al (1976) defined possible sources of hypotheses as
anatomical structure relating to the symptom, recall of a
specific previous patient and classified text book informa-
tion. But this is speculative. Early hypotheses may be
general or specific (cf, Michigan studies) , The generation
of multiple hypotheses is seen as preventing the clinician
from prematurely closing on an acceptable but incorrect dia-
gnostic conclusion. This does not preclude, however, the
possiblity of some hypotheses being 'favoured', while others
are treated more lightly (see discussion of Michigan studies),
In their broad view of the process of clinical reasoning
and enquiry, the McMaster work supports that of the Michigan
group. It is a dynamic process of multiple hypothesis
generation which guides enquiry for hypothesis testing. The
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McMaster studies add further quantitative data, but their
validity is subject to the qualifications applied to the
Michigan studies. The McMaster group have also added a
further dimension to the study by comparing subjects with
varying degrees of clinical experience.
Norman et al (1977) found no differences in time of onset
of first hypothesis (60 seconds) or number of hypotheses
(six to seven) between beginning medical students and a
sample of physicians. First-year students elicited, on
average, 47 per cent of available information, compared
with 69 per cent for final-year students, and 64 per cent
for physicians, although accuracy of diagnosis was lower
(33 per cent for first-years, 67 per cent for final-years,
100 per cent for physicians). Neufeld et al (1976) found
that students, like physicians, used the method of hypo-
thesis generation and testing. As with physicians, about
half the questions asked were specifically to test
hypotheses. Rimoldi (1964), however, found physicians'
questions more directly case related than those of students,
and the number of questions asked decreased with experience.
Leaper et al (1973) report similar findings as does
Kleininuntz (1968). Barrows and Bennett (1972) suggest that
students and house staff tend to invest their hypotheses
with considerable precision and specificity, "whereas good
clinicians tend to keep their hypotheses broad and vague -
allowing them to be shaped and categorised by the data
from the patient" (p.276). However, Barrows (1976) states
that their studies have shown that "a physician's experience
with previous problems affects the richness, the appropri-
ateness and the usefulness of the hypotheses that he
develops" (p.24). At the same time, Neufeld et al (1976)
suggest that a model of effective problem solving is
characterised by, amongst other things, the use of fairly
specific hypotheses. The question of the contribution of
experience in determining the nature and usefulness of
hypotheses, then, seeias to remain unanswered.
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In conclusion, the McNster studies throw more light on the
question of the clinical reasoning process, but many
questions remain unanswered. It ses that, having identi-
fied a process which may be labelled "hypothesis generation
and testing", this very label has limited research to such
matters of qualitative description as How many? When? and
Related to what information?. The question of What else
besides? has not been put or answered. The questions put
at the end of the previous section, therefore, remain.
To have gathered research evidence of a process of hypothesis
generation and testing is an important step, but perhaps not
as remarkable as the literature may suggest. Ordinary, adult
thinking processes are of this hypothetico-deductive nature
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958; Peel, 1971; Sruner, 1973) and it
has been maintained that children also function in this
manner (Shapson, 1977). It would seem reasonable that no
special broad mechanisms of thinking are necessary to the
clinician, but rather that ordinary adult thinking processes
are applied to a special, and specially problematical, con-
tent. It is the precise mechanism of that application and
the nature of the cognitive operation of that process which
requires further illumination.
3.2	 Pattern Recognition
Barrows et al (1978) and Scadding,(1.967) suggest that gener-
ation of the first hypothesis occurs as the result of a
process of pattern recognition. Such a process has been
invoked by a number of writers, either in partial or in total
explanation of the diagnostic process. For example, Bamilton
(1966) suggests that making a diagnosis is a comparison of
one disease 'profile' with a standard 'profile' which is an
average of all information available to physicians in the
past. Therefore, not all previous patients, nor the present
one, had that exact profile. Pattern matching, therefore,
must be 'as close as possthle' and, of necessity,will have
an element of probability about it. Gorry (1970) holds a
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similar viewpoint. Hubbard in Jacquez (1964) holds a
similar opinion that much of diagnosis is pattern recogni-
tion. However, a major question is Ixw a minimum number of
adequate points that are acceptable in order to identify a
pattern is to be identified. Sprafka and Elstein (1974)
have represented the process of medical diagnosis as a list-
matching activity in which the physician compares observed
findings to the contents of lists retrieved from memory.
Such a process would also involve questions of probability
and sufficiency. These latter problems have been approached
by workers considering pattern recognition in relation to
computer applications in diagnosis (Kulikowski, 1970;
Lissack and Fu, 1976).
It is to be noted that no evidence of a pattern-recognition
process In medical diagnosis is available, it Is merely put
forward as an explanatory concept, with greater or lesser
degrees of certainty. For example, the Royal College of
General Practitioners (1972) suggests, according to the
essentially Hippocratic method (Scadding, 1967), that the
doctor "records a pattern which can be compared with patterns
in a textbook or remembered from previous clinical experi-
ence. From these, the one most closely resembling the
present case is chosen to be the diagnosis", whereas the
Learning Resources Design Proj ect (Prograxrmie for Educational
Development, .1975) at McMaster suggest that diagnosing by
pattern recognition Is fraught with the danger of forcing
the patient to fit the pattern.
Evaluating the theories of a process of pattern recognition
is made hazardous by the lack of definition of the term by
those who use it, and the concentration of psychological
research on visual and auditory pattern recognition. However,
we may say that if, and in whatever form, it takes place, it
is not a process of template matching, If only because of
the uniqueness of each patient. In essence, the clinician
is presented with what may be called a partial pattern and
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must recognise this as a possible instance of a pattern, or
disease, already known. However, these partial patterns do
not really present themselves even as simple partial patterns,
free of distractors. For example (Lindberg, 1968), the onset
of diabetes mellitus classically consists of excessive thirst,
excessive appetite,copious urine and weight loss. When a
patient presents his major problems as loss of libido, grey
hair, weight loss and insomnia, somehow the clinican must
construct the appropriate partial pattern as well as hypoth-
esise or infer the entire one. He must initially operate on
that cue cluster in some way before pattern recognition of
any type is possible. In what sense, then, might the process
of reaching a diagnosis have elements of pattern recognition
in it?
It would seem probably to be only in a very peripheral
manner, in that some of the same principles may hold true.
We may cite the principles that, in terms of predictability,
although the whole is greater than its parts, this is not to
imply that the whole Is unpredictable from its parts; and
that the subject pefception may depend upon his expectations
of the total set of possible patterns (Corcoran, 1971).
However, although such principles may hold true in both
pattern recognition theory and diagnostic decision-making,
they probably do so for entirely different reasons. In terms
of visual or any sensory pattern recognition each element of
the pattern may have no meaning in its own right independent
of all other items in the pattern whereas this does not
apply to any one symptom, sign or item of the patient's
history. Each may have a meaning, or range of meanings, in
its own right. In addition, a group of such symptoms, signs
or items of history has no meaning in its own right, unlike,
for example, three lines, two of which join at one end while
the third is laid across them. Meaning, that is to say a
diagnosis, can only be attributed to an array of clinical
information by means of some other referent - such as
pathology of an organ or a system, or the action of a virus
or bacteria. Pattern recognition, as such, therefore, does
-nappear to provide a very useful explanation of diagnostic
thinking but may obscure more subtle and complex cognitive
processes. For example, we may cite Peel's (1971) work on
bringing outside information into consideration when forming
judgments, or Bruner's (1957) discussion of going beyond the
information given. For Peel (1971) the characteristic of
the highest level of judgmental responses to given informa-
tion is that of conceiving of possible hypothetical
contingencies which have to be evoked from the thinker's own
experience and insights. Any theory of an element of pattern
recognition in the diagnostic thinking process must, at best,
be secondary to considerations such as these.
3.3	 Confirming, Refuting and Irrelevant Information
Kleinmuntz (1968) used a form of the 'Twenty Questions' pan-
our game with neurologists and from it defined 'diagnostic
trees'. After having proceded about half way down a
particular tree, subjects were asked to recall or recite all
information that they had accumulated prior to that point.
It was found that they did not remember those data that did
not substantiate a particular differential diagnostic hypo-
thesis. In other words, they seemed selectively to forget
"irrelevant" data irrelevant,that is, to their hypotheses,
although possibly not irrelevant to the true diagnosis.
This penchant for confirming evidence was also noted by
Smedsiund 11963) who showed that when nurses were presented
with a series of cases in which a particular symptom was
associated with a particular diagnosis as often as it was
not, the subjects concluded that the symptoms and diagnosis
were positively correlated. As discussed above, when a
hypothesis serves as a 'strong expectation', negatively
weighted information may not be processed. Sprafka and
Elstein (1974) found that a diagnostic predictive model
based on negatively weighted cues performed less well than
models based wholly or partially on positive weights.
This tendency tb over emphasise positive information is
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well documented in the psychological literature. Wason
(1968) produced compelling evidence, using numbers games,
that "even intelligent individuals adhere to their own
hypotheses with remarkable tenacity when they can produce
confirming evidence for them .... The subjects appeared
to display rigid or fixated patterns of behaviour because
they failed to overcome the set created by their confirming
evidence" (p.172). Peel (1971) also discusses this phenom-
enon on the basis of his research findings. He states that
once a particular hypothesis has been devised or accepted,
the thinker has difficulty in shifting to another. This
difficulty is twofold; firstly, the thinker is more likely
to try to hold on to his first view, even if it has to be
modified, in the face of new observations, and, secondly,
new explanations may be obstructed "by the directive and
selective influence of the accepted theory upon the sub-
sequent collection of observations and results. People,
even learned ones, may tend to look for what supports their
theory and consciously or unconsciously neglect evidence
which contradicts it". (p.74). Such data Peel calls
'hypothetico-observations'. A number of possible reasons for
the tendency to confirm rather than refute hypotheses are
forwarded by Peel (1971): firstly, the organic quality of
thesis deve1opient as opposed to a clear-cut process of
logical elimination; secondly, confirmation of one hypo-
thesis may, in some circumstances, imply negation of the
other; thirdly, the thinker does not have to go beyond
positive thinking; fourthly, mental inertia may predispose
a person to neglect to clear away alternatives; finally,
we tend to judge things in our environment by their positive
presence.
Reitman (1964) considers constraint proliferation in the
solution of ill-defined problems and suggests that "as
additional constraints are added, the problem solver's
investment in some increasingly particular and delimited
area of the hypothetical solution space mounts • For many
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problem solvers, the sheer fact of this cost sunk in a
particular approach will suffice to make exploration of any
Other unlikely" (p.299).
Finally, the tendency to verification is further evidenced
by Evans and Wason (1976), while Donaldson (1959) gave
some explanatory evidence that subjects found it more dif f-
icult to work with negative rather than positive information
and that the two, although logically equivalent, may not be
psychologically equivalent. However, her subjects were 14
year olds and Inheldand Piaget (1958) identify this as a
stage in the develonent of formal operational thinking. In
a correlational task concerning the relationship between eye
and hair colour, at Substage 111-A their subjects could not
relate confirming and non-confirming cases and the set of
all possible cases. Subjects did not appreciate that p.q and.
p.q are both favourable to a general statement about the
relationship of p and q. Instead, only p.q is considered,
By Substage Ill-B, however, this is resolved, the subject
seeing certain cases as being the inverse of others, and
understanding the reciprocity between confirming and non-
confirming cases. However, presuming that the subjects of
the clinical studies cited have achieved Substage Ill-B, it
would appear that psychologic is sometimes more dominant
than formal logic in problem solving thinking.
The question of information load and relevance has been
approached by some workers. Scadding (1967) points out that
irrelevant features, unless identified as such, may obsure
diagnosis not only by suggesting false conclusions, but also
by falsely limiting the range of possibilities considered.
The British Medical Jo*irral (1977) cites studies of damage
to doctors' performance due to the constant flow of large
quantities of often irrelevant information in a short space
of time, Studies are cited which show that doctors may
overlook radiological and bacteriological evidence of active
tuberculosis, fail to react to adverse drug effects and
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miss a host of other laboratory 'clues' to diagnosis, while
in some circumstances clinical diagnostic accuracy seems to
be related to the amount of information elicited. Nystedt
(1974) and Nystedt and Magnusson (1972) found similar
adverse effects om judgment with increasing information
load in clinical psychology. Psychological research supports
this finding, while Jones et al (1978) add that subjects do
not normally shift to different strategies in order to deal
with the increasing load, and Streufert's (1973) work
suggests that complex decision making varies with relevance,
while simple decision making varies with information load.
Peel 11971) also finds that irrelevance of information is
often a stumbling block to sustained reasoning,
It would seem reasonable to suggest that efficient operation
under varying conditions of information load and relevance
is related to the subject's knowledge base and to his set of
hypotheses, the latter being somewhat dependent upon the
former. It has been suggested (Learning Resources Design
Project ,1975) that a well designed 'net' of hypotheses
should encompass all items of information, and thus assist
memorisation by 'chunking' the information • Such a formulation
allows no room for any piece of information to be identified
as irrelevant. We are therefore left with a mechanism which
can cope with high information load where the clinician's
knowledge and experience base is sufficient and appropriate,
but cannot account for the possible need to identify inform-
ation as irrelevant thereby averting the possibility of
generating irrelevant hypotheses and overloading and
decreasing the efficiency of the problem solving process.
The question of how irrelevant information is to be identi-
fied during the problem solving process therefore remains.
3.4	 Other Factors
In clinical psychology, studies have been made of the
relationships between redundant and new information,
clinician's confidence and time available for assessments
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(huff and Friedman, 1967), and clinicians 1 confidence levels
in relation to amount of information (Oskainp, 1965), but no
systematic studies have been reported in medicine, although
Elstein (1976) mentions the phenomenon of collection of
redundant information in order to bolster confidence in a
clinical inference. Simborg et al (1976) quote characterist-
ics of the patient, the practitioner and the clinic setting
as factors shown to influence clinicians' decisions, and
add the recording of information to that list themselves.
But these are not studies of thinking processes as such.
Two related factors which have received a little attention
are the subject's representation of information in both
long-term and short-term memory, and the role of these stores
in the diagnostic process. Kleinmuntz (1968), on the basis
of his 'Twenty Questions' gaines in neurological diagnosis
postulates, firstly, that the neurologist's search strategies
involve the use of both short-term and long-term memory
storage, the former undergoing moment-to-moment modifications
and revisions, evidenced by his subjects' ability to remember
only those data relevant to particular diagnostic hypotheses.
Secondly, he postulates that the neurologist has a visual
representation of the central nervous system in his long-term
store and that much of his information processing involves
shuttling backwards and forwards between symptoms, test find-
ings and neuroanatomical locus. Kleinmuntz's evidence for
this latter postulate is rather sketchy, being based solely
on the subjects' discussion of anatomical loci. In
addition, since 'localisation of the lesion' is a major
feature of neurological diagnosis, we cannot speculate on
the generalisability of the postulate. Indeed, Elstein et
al (1978) conclude that the mode of mental representation
involved in the generation of problem formulations is, for
all physicians, predominantly verbal, and that, for most
individuals, mental imagery only occasionally occurs, but is
used as an adjunct to the primary verbal mode. However, to
what extent this conclusion is a function of the verbal
mode of account gathering, and the nature of the case
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involved we cannot speculate. The question of the subjects'
representation of information in both long-term and short-
term memory remains an important one, with considerable
implications for medical education and for the ability of
the individual clinican to control and evaluate his own
hypothesis generation and testing behaviour, particularly if
hypotheses are generated, as ElsteiLn et al (1978) suggest,
by an associative process that lii*s cues to content stored
in memory. The Michigan group elicited conflicting results
about whether these cues are single or in clusters, and
suggest that differences in research method may have caused
this conflict, as yet unresolved.
Hypotheses also may serve a purpose in overcoming the limited
storage capacity of short-term memory, in that they may serve
as rubrics in short-term memory under which cues are stored
(Sprafka and Elstein, 1974). This point is also emphasised
by the Learning Resources t)esign PLroject (1975). Human
problem solvers work under severe ftimitations of memory and
processing capacity, which are compensated for by such strat-
egies (Reitman, 1964).
Finally, the effect of personality on diagnostic thinking
processes was considered by Elsteim et al (1978). A small
battery of tests was administered to their subjects, includ-
ing measures of logical reasoning, dogmatism, flexibility
and cognitive complexity. Quoting their own assessment of
results: "The association between personality variables and
clinical problem solving measures was inconsistent at best".
There were also no statistically significant correlations
between measures of logical problem solving and clinical
problem solving. As mentioned above, formal logic and the
logic of the psyche are not necessarily one and the same.
However, one study has reported statistically significant
correlations between personality scores and ratings of clin-
ical performance by peers and supervisors (Kegel-Flom, 1975),
although the interaction effects between these two measures
may be consideab1e. Klein et al's (1969) non-medical work
on anxiety and learning to formulate hypotheses suggests
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that there are no anxiety-related differences in the number
and quality of hypotheses generated, but their more anxious
subjects set higher standards, did not report those evaluated
as too poor, and so communicated fewer of a higher quality
than less anxious subjects. This might suggest that less
anxious subjects would benefit from training in hypothesis
evaluation.
3.5	 Summary
The two main series of research studies of the diagnostic
thinking process (the Michigan and McMaster studies) have
revealed a process common to students and clinicians which
may be defined as "hypothesis generation and testing". The
specific research methods of the Michigan and McMaster groups
are described. Both employ simulated patients and videotape
- stimulated recall, while the Michigan group add the
techniques of thinking aloud and episodic review, as well as
patient management problems. Scoring systems and quantita-
tive parameters are described. Both research studies are
criticised for spurious quantitation and over-interpretation
of inexact data.
The major conclusions of the Michigan group may be summarised
as follows:
1) A four-stage general model of medical inquiry is postulated.
This consists of cue acquisition, hypothesis generation,
cue interpretation and hypothesis evaluation.
2) Cue acquisition and accuracy of cue interpretation are
statistically independent.
3) Clinical data are evaluated in terms of their fit to anti-
cipated findings. Each cue is designated as positive,
non-contributory or negative with respect to a particular
hypothesis.
4) Diagnostic accuracy is related to thoroughness of cue
acquisition and accuracy of cue interpretation.
5) tbst diagnostic decisions could be accounted for by one
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of two rules; either, select the hypothesis with the max-
imum number of positive cues; or,select the hypothesis
with the maximum difference of positive cues minus
negative cues.
6) Hypotheses are generated early in the clinical interview.
They may be specific or general and further hypotheses
may be generated as the interview progresses.
7) Hypotheses define the framework of possible solutions to
the diagnostic problem and are generated by associations
from clusters of a few cues,
8) The average number of hypotheses held at any- one time is
between four and seven.
9) Clinical competence may be case related. This finding is
questioned and an alternative interpretatio&m put forward.
10) Information and experience are basic to competence in
clinical problem solving.
11) Possible errors in the clinical problem solving process
are identified as premature closure, inappropriate select-
ive information gathering, biased interpretation of data,
mistakes in combining evidence, misinterpretation of
single cues, faulty hypothesis generation, over-interpre-
tation, under-interpretation and uninterprettation of cues,
and excessive data collection.
Many of these conclusions are questioned. It is considered
that the data do not support such precise findings. In certain
instances, also, the statistical analysis is found wanting
(see section 8.10 below). In addition, many relevant questions
are neither put nor answered. These are identified as:
Row are cues cognitively manipulated?
What process of structuring generates hypotheses?
How can multiple hypotheses be generated?
What cognitive mechanisni enables multiple interpretations
of cues?
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How do new hypotheses arise?
What cognitive processes occur before generation of
the first hypothesis?
How are relationships between cues allocated and re-
allocated?
According to what tactic or strategy is the clinical
interview conducted prior to generation of the first
hypothesis?
The major conclusions of the McMaster studies may be summa-
rised as follows:
1) Physicians develop multiple hypotheses early in the
clinical encounter.
2) Efficient clinical problem solving skills develop with
clinical practice rather than medical education.
3) Physicians spent 57 per cent of the clinical interview
in history taking, 12 per cent in physical. examination
and 2]. per cent in combined activity.
4) On average, 6]. pr cent of physicians' questions were non-
routine. About 50 per cent in both physicians and stu-
dents were hypothesis testing questions.
5) Routine questions are used for scanning, building rapport
and to gain thinking time.
6) On average, physicians gain 69 per cent of available
significant information.
7) Each clinical finding was relevant to about three hypotheses.
8) The correct diagnostic hypothesis emerged, on average, four
minutes into the encounter (range across physicians one
second to 32 minutes). Variability across cases was less
than variability across physicians.
9) On average, physicians advance 5.5 hypotheses (range three
to nine) 79 per cent of which are generated within the
first quarter of the encounter.
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10) Generation of the first hypothesis arises from a process
of pattern recognition. This theory is considered to be
inadequate.
11) Early hypotheses may be general or specific.
1.2) Multiple hypotheses prevent premature closure.
13) Some hypotheses are 'favoured'.
14) Students and physicians do not differ in time of first
hypothesis or number of hypotheses.
15) First year students elicited 47 per cent of available
information; final year students 69 per cent; and
physicians 64 per cent.
16) Accuracy of diagnosis was 33 per cent for first year stu-
dents; 67 per cent for final year students; and 100 per
cent for physicians.
17) Students and physicians display the process of hypothesis
generation and testing.
It is concluded that the McMaster studies are subject to the
same problems of spurious quantitation as the Michigan studies.
The McMaster conclusions complement those of the Michigan group,
but the unanswered questions, identified above, remain largely
unanswered due to the limiting effects of the theory of
"hypothesis generation and testing". This formulation is eval-
uated in the light of the work of Piaget, Bruner and Peel, and
is not found unexpected.
Theories of a diagnostic process of pattern recognitions are
considered and rejected as over simplified in their present
form since they do not fully take into account the partial
nature of the clinical information offered and elicited. Studies
of the effects of confirming, refuting and irrelevant inform-
ation are discussed and related to broader psychological theory.
The question of how information is designated as irrelevant
remains unanswered.
Other factors which may influence clinicians' decisions are
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discussed, including the roles of short-term and lOng-term
memory, the internal representation of information, end per-
sonality. Very little research has been conducted ia these
areas.
3.6	 Implications for the Present Research
The literature review has revealed a number of points and
omissions which are important for the present research design
and associated hypotheses. These points and omissions are as
follows:
1) The application of methods of data collection and inter-
pretation of the Michigan and McMaster groups have been
severely criticised. Although no criticism of the method
of stimulated recall qua research method is offered, it
is considered that the Michigan additions of thinking
aloud and episodic review seriously jeopardise the valid-
ity of the data. It is also considered that the counting
or recording of exact timing and numbers of hypotheses on
the basis of stimulated recall data is unmerited since we
may not rely on either completeness or congruent timing
of reports. In addition, some findings seem to be
interpreted beyond the tolerance of the associated data.
For example, the McMaster studies showed that a clinical
finding, on average, was relevant to about three hypo-
theses, and the conclusion is drawn that physicians use
parallel rather than sequential processing. It is argued
(above) that such a conclusion is not permissible because,
firstly, any one finding may be processed repeatedly and
sequentially in relation to different hypotheses and,
secondly, the relationship to multiple hypotheses is less
likely to be a deliberate economy of cognition than a
function of the necessary inter-relatedness of different
hypotheses derived fron the same data. Our present
research design, then 1
 must ensure that similar errors of
research method and data interpretation do not occur.
2) Neither the Michigan nor I4cMaster groups offer a full
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discussion of the theoretical background or rationale
associated with the method of stimulated recall, which
is necessary to enable proper evaluation of the reason-
able scope of the method. The present study will offer
such a discussion and evaluation (see Chapter Nine ).
3 Areas of omission as identified above will be addressed
by the present study (see research hypotheses, section
5.1 below).
4) The literature review has identified or is suggestive of
certain definable components of the diagnostic process,
the subject matter and the person. These are knowledge,
cue interpretation, hypothesis testing, arriving at a
diagnosis, generalisability or specificity of thinking
processes and amount or nature of clinical experience.
Conclusions related to these variables, as yet, are not
without some degree of doubt. The present study, there-
fore, will begin with a study of these defined variables,
based on multiple choice questions and case histories.
This will provide- a strong, appropriately quantified
background agaiQst which further qualitative findings
gathered from accounts by stimulated recall may be more
accurately interpreted and some of the present dark areas
illuminated (see research hypotheses, section 5.1..
below).
5) Finally, although some relevant work has been referred
to above, no consistent comparison of student and clin-
ician, or of the effects of medical education and
clinical practice, has been made. The present study,
therefore, will, at all. stages, compare student and
clinician and provide an indication of the developnental
aspect of diagnostic skill.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Review of the Literature 3. Teaching the Diagnostic Thinking Process
Since the uiid-1950s, attempts have been made to devise teaching
strategies appropriate to the development of the diagnostic thinking
process. Although these have occurred against a background of massive
innovation and change in medical education, it is not our intention
to review or discuss this broader context, but merely to describe the
main responses when, as Bistein et al (1978) express it:
"With increasing frequency medical educators were told
that their objective was to produce problem solvers,
inquirers, individuals skilled in gathering and inter-
preting information for the purpose of rendering
judgments, making decisions and taking action". (p.2)
Of course, it cannot be said that before this time no attempt was
ever made to teach students how to make a diagnosis, but it can be
said that the attempts were neither as explicit nor as systematic as
those to be descrthed here.
However, these approaches hava largely been purely empirical in
their development and implementation or have been based on the
hypothesis generation and testing model and the concomitant problem
centred approach to learning. So far, there has been lacking any
evaluation of these teaching strategies against a background discuss-
ion of models or theories of teaching and learning. Before
describing and discussing the various teaching methods devised,
then, a discussion of relevant aspects of theories of teaching and
learning will be presented.
4.1	 Theoretical Aspects of Teaching and Learning
Any discussion of teaching and learning can be pursued at a
variety of levels of specificity. For example, criteria for
the selection of teaching method may be defined so that a
rational choice may be made between lecture, group discussion,
practical classes, self-instruction, educational games or
simulations, problem solving exercises and so on. Or the
discussion may be in terms of teaching media: Should we use
-77-
film, slide, audiotape, videotape, models, handouts or some
other aid? We may consider teaching tactics such as pro-
vision of feedback, opportunity for active learning,
repetition and reinforcement of learning, assessment strategies
and remedial teaching. Or we may be interested in teaching
styles: authoritarian, heuristic, socratic or counselling.
The present discussion, however, addresses none of these
since decisions or recommendations about them can only follow
on from specific knowledge of the characteristics of the
learners, the teachers, the materia3 to be learned and the
context of teaching and learning. Instead, questions of a
broader, perhaps more fundamental and generalisable, nature
will be considered.
We take as our starting point Peel's (1971) conclusion that
"the level of judgment may be quite susceptible to cultural
and educational influences" and consider some of the major,
general conditions which may promote mature and reasoned
judgment in the medical student or, at least, provide a firm
foundation for its future development. We take it also that
the diagnostic thinking process may be defined sufficiently
to make it amenable to a planned teaching strategy. However,
it is our contention that such definition is, as yet, lacking
in appropriate specificity. So, other criteria must also be
used to assess and evaluate the teaching methods devised. In
particular, we shall consider three fundamental concepts
which are seen to be relevant given the degree of specificity
already achieved in defining the diagnostic thinking process,
and the range of reasonable generalisations to be made in
applying teaching and learning theory to particular situations.
These concepts are: structure in learning; transfer of learn-
ing; and the relationship between problem solving and learning.
4.1.1 Structure in Learning
The concept of structure in learning may be interpreted in a
number of related ways. It is difficult to consider any one
of these without implicit reference to or acceptance of the
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others. This difficulty arises from the necessary set of
inter-relationships between the objective, internal structure
of the subject matter to be learned, that structure as inter-
nalised, either similarly or differently, by teacher and
learner (which may be referred to as cognitive structure) and
the structure of presentation of the subject matter by the
teacher and its reception by the learner. These structures
may complement or conflict with important results. For
example, McKeachie (1963) and Gage (1964) cite research show-
ing that students who structure the field in the same way as
the teacher, even though they do not agree with the teacher's
opinion, complete courses more successfully than do other
students. This finding is given support by Broadbent (1975).
Bowever, McKeachie expresses uncertainty about whether or not
a teacher could communicate his structure to students who
did not already have it. Perhaps, however, this would be an
unreasonable aim if, as Brurier (1960) describes it:
"Grasping the structure of a subject is understanding
it in a way that permits many other things to be
related to it m9aningfuhly. To learn structure, in
short, is to learn how things are related".
Since these relationships and manners of relating may vary
depending upon the prior knowledge and structures of the indi-
vidual, then perceived subject structures or cognitive
structures may also vary, but be equally efficient in later use.
Bruner emphasises this aspect of learning also:
"Students, perforce, have a limited exposure to the
materials they are to learn. How can this exposure
be made to count in their thinking for the rest of
their lives?"
This must surely be the central question when devising
strategies for teaching the diagnostic thinking process also.
Bruner's emphasis on thinking is particularly apposite, for
the diagnostic thinking process has a structure, whether the
same or different from clinician to clinician or student to
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student or student to clinician, and the content of that
process and its referents (previous knowledge) also have a
cognitive structure of their own. Definition of these
structural aspects is complicated by the ill defined nature
of the diagnostic problem and the dynamic, gradually unfold-
ing nature of the diagnostic problem solving process. Thus
structural aspects of the content of that process, if the
model of hypothesis generation and testing is conditionally
accepted, may change many times during its progress, ref err-
ing to a series of hypotheses which may be stable in their
individual structural characteristics. In other words, the
process may be one of cognitive structuring and restructuring
of information. We may also be certain that the diagnostic
thinking process itself is a structured one if we take R.C.A.
Dale's reasonable definition cited by Bartlett (1958).
According to this definition, " a system is unstructured if it
is such that search for the assigned objective can just as
well begin at any stage in the system as any other". Although
this is substantively true, the direct implication that "there
is indeed no possible objectively preferential order" for
search cannot be tru'e once the first piece of clinical inform-
ation has been elicited and the problem solver's response
required. Thus the relationship between structure of content
and the process of restructuring is a complex one. Teaching
for that relationship affords even greater complexities, for,
as Lunzer (1968) and Broadbent (1975) point out, an experimenter
(or teacher) may define a situation as an objective stimulus
complex, but the subject's (or learner's) schemata (prior
knowledge) determine what will function as a stimulus for
him, that is, what he will attend to, what he will retrieve
from memory, and so on. This brings us back again to the
question and role of cognitive structure in relation to
curriculum design.
Shavelson and Stanton (1975) define cognitive structure as
"a hypothetical construct referring to the organisation
(relationship) of concepts in long-term memory". They consider
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that education attains the goal of communication of subject
matter structure to the learner effectively and efficiently
when "there is a close correspondence between the subject
matter and the represefltation of the subject matter structure
in the cognitive structures of students". Again, with refer-
ence to teaching the diagnostic thinking process, this
correspondence is a complex one. The complexity arises from
the dual nature of the subject matter itseLf for, on the one
hand, it has a definable content (factual. information,
explanation, skills, interpretation, classification and so on)
while, on the other hand, based on this content are processes
(making a diagnosis and managing the patient) the development.
of which must be a major aim of both undergraduate and post-
graduate medical education. In a.sense, the major subject
matter of medical education may well be taken as the relation-
ship between the content and process of clinical. medicine.
These separate aspects, as well. as their inter-relationship,
must find proper representation in the student's and teacher's
own cognitive structures. In the event, we may find these con-
siderations to be complex only in philosophical terms. In
pedagogical practice,. these complexities may resolve into
relatively simply teaching strategies.
For Bruner (1966), a theory of instruction, and presumably its
practice too, must, amongst other things:
"specify the ways in which a body of knowledge should
be structured so that it can be most readily grasped
by the learner. Optional structure refers to the set
of propositions from which a larger body of knowledge
can be generated, and it is characteristic that the
formulation of such structure depends upon the state
of advance in a particular field of knowledge
The goodness of a structure depends upon its power
for simplifying information, for generating new pro-
positions and for increasing the manipulability of a
body of knowledge". (p.41)
These final two criteria could equally well apply to the
diagnostic thinking process itself. Perhaps theories of teach-
ing as cognitive restructuring (Gage, 1964) seem particularly
relevant here, especially in the light of Bruner's (1964)
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additional contention that "knowing is a process, not a
product". The learning and practice of medicine provide an
example par excellence of this statement, and, indeed, such
a concept is not foreign to its British halls (Womereley
et al, 1974). In essence we are echoing Svensson (1977) who
contends that "the structural properties of an individual's
conception of various phenomena are the most important
aspects of his knowledge, because they also constitute fund-
amental characteristics which determine how he acquires and
uses knowledge". However, we add that the conception here
considered requires in turn an analysis and understanding of a
series of structures and structural relationships which may
vary according to the context of the individual concerned.
4.1.2 Transfer of Learning
The concept of transfer of learning concerns whether or not,
by learning to do one thing, the learner finds it easier to do
something else. The term 'transfer' also covers the possibil-
ity that by learning to do one thing, it becomes less easy to
do something else (Thyne, 1966). The potential for either
positive or negative 'transfer exists only when the existing
cognitive structure influences new cognitive functioning.
n considering teaching the diagnostic thinking process, we are
of necessity concerned with transfer of process more than con-
tent factors. The discussion must be confined to transfer at
its broadest level of generality since, as we have seen in the
previous chapter, questions of speciality specificity or even
case specificity remain open to debate. This having been said,
transfer of learning remains a fundamental consideration for
any pedagogic process, and it may be assumed that the one in
question concerns not only transfer of substance or content,
but also transfer of thinking method or problem solving proce-
sses, referred to as transfer of aptitude (Peel, 1967).
Bruner (1960) posed the question, quoted above: How can limited
exposure to learning be made to count in the learner's thinking
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for the rest of his life? Bus answer, reflected also in
Ausubel et al (1978), indicates the close connection between
transfer and structure:
"... the answer to this question lies in giving
students an understanding of the fundamental
structure of whatever subjects we choose to teach
The teaching and learning of structure,
rather than simply the mastery of facts and tech-
niques, is at the centre of the classic problem
of transfer. There are many things that go into
learning of this kind, not the least of which are
supporting habits and skills that make possible
the active use of the materials one has come to
understand". (pp 11-12)
Using different terminology, Bruner reflects the dual aspect
of transfer: transfer of substance and transfer of aptitude.
But in the case of the diagnostic thinking process, what is
the substance and what the aptitude? The substance must
certainly be, at least, all the basic factual knowledge and
information of physiology, anatomy, biochemistry, behavioural
science and so on which the clinician may require, together
with his knowledge of the possible meaning of all symptoms,
signs and clinical information which he may elicit. In
addition, the clinician must know what particular tests and
investigations are available and advisable for him to use in
any particular circumstance. The aptitude must be, at least,
his ability to interpret symptoms, signs and clinical inform-
ation elicited from the patient, as well as the results of
tests and investigations, together with his ability to suggest
possible diagnoses and, eventually, to select the most likely
of these according to pre-determined or specially set criteria,
as a basis for definitive action. In all of these, the
aptitude transferred is his own thinking processes, however
mature or immature, however sophisticated or ill-drawn. To
teach with special regard to the diagnostic thinking process
may also imply teaching for transfer of self awareness, of
the ability to analyse and monitor one's own thinking pro-
cesses such that, if error of substance be committed, at least
error of aptitude will be avoided and even certain types of
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error of substance be noted and remedied as a consequence.
Such an approach would seem more likely to produce positive
transfer since individual differences in cognitive style
("mode of perceptual and cognitive functioning" (Shapson,
1977); "self-consistent and enduring individual differences
in cognitive organisation and function" (Ausubel et al, 1978))
express themselves in such problem solving strategies as
those under consideration (Gagn, 1965).
Transfer of aptitude may be seen in terms of Bruner's (1973)
coding systems. A coding system is a hypothetical construct
defined as:
"... a set of contingently related, nonspecific
categories. It is a person's manner of grouping
and relating information about his world, and it
is constantly subject to change and reorganisation".
In this context, transfer of training takes on a meaning more
easily related to dynamic cognitive processes which, working
in an interactive and unpredictable environment, will never
quite reproduce themselves but will be combined and recom-
bined in different ways and subsets according to the demand
of the stimulus. This bears some similarity to learning-to-
learning transfer. Following Bruner (1973) again:
"You will sense immediately that what I have been
describing are examples of transfer of training,
so called. But nothing is transferred, really.
The organism is learning codes that have narrower
or wider applicability".
The codes which we have so far considered are thinking process-
es applied to clinical information. Yet upon closer
examination, it would seem unrealistic to consider the aptitude
in isolation from any substance. We may return to Bruner
for clarification:
"Much of what has been called transfer of training
can be fruitfully considered a case of applying
learned coding systems to new events. Positive
transfer represents a case where an appropriate
coding system is applied to a new array of events
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negative transfer being a case either of mis-
application of a coding system to new events
or the absence of a coding system that may be
applied".
The emphasis placed here on the application of coding systems
forces us to reconsider the question of transfer of substance.
The nature of the substance has been described above but some
elucidation of the possible relationship between this and
aptitude is necessary. In the clinical, problem solving
setting, the transfer of substance must involve using the
same, or closely related information in different circum-
Etances, i.e. with different patients or in relation to
different diseases. Gagn (1965) refers to this as 'lateral
transfer'. It must also involve, for both student and
clinician, a learning process which involves building on,
perhaps re-interpreting, the substance already learned.
/	 S	 •	 SGagne (1965) calls this vertical transfer • More import-
antly, to be efficient and effective, it must involve storing
that substance in such a way that the aptitude coding system
can retrieve it appropriately to the flow of information
elicited from the patient. We see, therefore, the likely
interdependence between substance and aptitude and their
mutual mutating effects. In addition, we see the necessity of
transfer of this relationship, as well as its individual
components from patient to patient, from learning experience
to learning experience, laterally and vertically.
The form of transfer being treated with here, and in particular
the relationship between substance and aptitude, may be further
elucidated by reference to Thyne's (1966) concept of the force-
ful feature of a stimulus situation. 2ny stimulus situation,
such as a new patient requiring diagnosis, will have a number
of characteristics or features, any one of which may evoke a
response. But the forceful feature, acc9rding to Thyne, is
the one, above all others, which actually does evoke a response.
The forceful feature, therefore, may or may not actually be
the defining feature or cue of that stimulus situation. Thyne
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(1966) elaborates on this as follows:
we get positive transfer when the forceful
feature of the present situation is its cue and
when it is also the cue of some established
instance of learning. (Transfer is) negative
when F, which was in fact the forceful feature,
should not have been the forceful feature; that
is, when it could be said that the learner had
misunderstood the present situation; that is,
when F was not the cue (intended) of the present
situation. We get negative transfer, then, when
the forceful feature of the present situation is
not its cue, and when that feature is the cue of
some established instance of learning". (p.223)
The complexities of the relationship between transfer of
aptitude and transfer of substance are thus clarified.
Response to the forceful feature of a stimulus situation and
the subsequent thinking processes represents transfer of
aptitude. But identification of that feature and its relation -
ship to the actual cue of the situation requires, of course,
transfer of substance. Depending upon the manner in which
that substance is stored in and retrieved from memory,
however, identity of forceful feature and cue becomes more
or less hazardous or prone to error. Where different stimulus
situations have similar initial presentations, the cue in one
may not be the cue in the other, but that same feature may be
received as the forceful feature of both. A combination of
transfer of substance and aptitude is necessary for resolution
of each problem.
It is apparent, then, that the type of transfer which seems
appropriate in teaching the diagnostic thinking process could
be interpreted in terms of the classical concept of productive
thinking. Whereas reproductive thinking is characterised by
the solution of problems by means of the existence of stimulus
equivalences in the novel situation and in the previously
mastered one, in productive thinking past experience is repatt-
erned and restructured to meet current demands (Birch and
Rabinowitz, 1951). Although reproductive thinking may appear
to be a closer form of transfer, productive thinking is
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certainly the type under present consideration if the
hypothesis generation and testing model is accepted. The
background of past learning and experience is available and
essential. for restructuring and extension when new situational
demands apply. On the other hand, that repertoire of past
learning also has the danger of stereotyping thinking and
rendering it inappropriately reproductive.
4.1.3 Problem Solving and Learning
Both medical education and clinical practice involve parallel
and interwoven experiences of taking clinical histories from
patients, solving clinical problems, reinforcing and building
upon previous learning either on the basis of clinical
experience or by more formal means of education. The outcome
of these processes will be their extension: a clinical prob-
lein solver who is also continuing to learn. Indeed, such
qualities are made explicit in the stated goals of one medical
school which has such a document (Royal Free Hospital School
of Medicine, 1978). The nature of the discipline makes the
relationship between problem solving and learning a central
feature, whether for 'student or practising clinician. We
shall see, below, that the practice of medical education is
developing in many areas according to this principle.
Gagn (1964, 1965) suggests that problem solving itself is a
form of learning. In the following we may substitute 'struct-
ure' for 'rule':
"Problem solving may be viewed as a process by which
the learner discovers a combination of previously
learned rules that he can apply to achieve a solution
for a novel problem situation. Problem solving is
not simply a matter of application of previously
learned rules, however. It is also a process that
yields new learning. The learner is placed in a
problem situation, or finds himself in one. He
recalls previously acquired rules in an attempt to
find a "solution". In carrying out such a thinking
process, he may try a number of hypotheses and test
their applicability. When he finds a particular
combination of rules that fit the situation, he has
not only"solved the problem" but he has also learned
something new". (1965, p.214)
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Gagn, essentially, is describing a process of productive
thinking, where solutions arise not from blind recall of
past experience or blind trial and error, but rather from
the requirements of the problem (Osgood, 1953). Gagn (1966)
makes the correspondence between problem solving and learning
more explicit:
"One of the fundamental criteria of problem solving
is that a kind of performance which could not be
exhibited before the 'problem' was solved can be
exhibited after the 'problem' is solved. In other
words, the observed events in problem solving com-
prise a change in human performance, and this in
turn leads us to infer a change in human capability".
Ausubel et al (1978) relate problem solving back to the con-
cept of structure and transfer already discussed. The
solution of any given problem involves reorganisation of past
experience to fit the current demands, and:
"Since ideas in cognitive structure constitute the
raw material of problem solving, whatever transfer
occurs, positive or negative, obviously reflects
the nature and influence of cognitive structure
variables".
The identity of such .variables may become modified as success-
ive solutions are based upon cognitive reorganisation.
On the basis of the discussion so far, it would seem reasonable
to conclude that proilem solving skills could best be learned
by problem solving learning. Indeed, evidence is available
that by solving problems we develop 'learning sets' and
acquire problem solving skills which may be applied to future
problems (Manis, 1968). However, such work as this has
normally considered only well defined problems and does not
account for the many possible errors of aptitude that may
occur when attempting to apply an old solution method to a new
problem. A more rational and generalisable approach is
described by Peel (1967) based on the premise that "whatever
the problem, certain basic thought processes seem to be
involved - the imagining of possible explanations, the select-
ion of the correct ones, the capacity to relate explanations
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with the data of the problem in a logical way by inference
and deduction". The two attempts at teaching these general
skills which Peel reports have proved encouraging. However,
Peel also suggests that different subjects "seem to emphasise
different aspects of concept formation and usage and so may
entail different elements of thinking". The generalised
problem solving skills defined seem analogous to the hypothesis
generation and testing model and to that extent it would seem
reasonable to teach for such thinking skills as these. However,
if Peel is correct in suggesting subject differences, then the
particularities of clinical problem solving thinking may
remain to be defined before a special prograimne of teaching
can be undertaken. However, this is not to suggest that
specific thinking skills should be taught and learned. The
diagnostic thinking process does not seem to be of the same
order as, for example, long division or the two cord problem,
where the salient features (rules about the permissible forms
of numerical operation and perception of properties of objects,
respectively) can be defined quite clearly. On the contrary,
the diagnostic thinking process must rely heavily upon each
individual's own cognitive style and propensity. Externally
imposed forms, such as method of data collection or recording,
may have no effect upon the problem solver's actual thinking
processes. To specify the particular properties of the
clinical problem solving process, therefore, does not necess-
arily imply specification of a single or particular form, but
may mean only the identification of a range of possible
processes.
From a theoretical point of view, then, this latter option
seems the more tenable, particularly if we consider the two
types of learning that may be important in problem solving as
identified by Birch and Rabinowitz (1951). The first type
involves the acquisition by the problem solver of "certain
broad, nonspecific, general notions about the properties of
the object or method experienced". This type "seems to pro-
vide the repertoire of experience essential for productive
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thinking". The second type of learning involves "the
acquisition of experiences which convert the initial per-
ception of broad, general properties of an object into
perceptions of limited functional characteristics". Such a
type of learning "limits the range of perceptual organisations
capable of being developed by the subject and so interferes
with problem solving".
4.1.4 Conclusions
We have considered three separate yet closely interrelated
aspects of teaching and learning and have described their
relevance and importance for development of the diagnostic
thinking process in student and practising clinician. It is
against these three criteria that the subsequent discussion
of various teaching methods already devised will be measured.
The discussion so far leads us to a number of conclusions:
Firstly, structural aspects of the task, the teacher and the
learner must be taken into consideration. In addition,
appreciation of those structural aspects must be one aim of
the teaching and leatning process. Getzels (1964) discusses
the distinction between "ugly thinking" (problem solving based
on trial and error) and "productive thinking" (solutions based
on cognitive reorganisation) and concludes that:
"What is especially significant for instruction from
this point of view is that the person 'naturally'
seeks the inner structure of a problem situation if
he is unfettered by habits developed through train-
ing in blind association and 'ugly' trial and error
learning". (p.244)
The hypothesis generation and testing model implies exactly
such a search for inner structure. It is to the nature of
this search and its successful and unsuccessful forms which
the pedagogy of the diagnostic thinking process must address
itself.
Secondly, provision must be made for transfer of learning of
both substance and aptitude. Such transfer also pre-supposes
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learning appropriate structures for both substance and
aptitude such that each may be retrieved, accessed or
reorganised according to the demands of a 'variety of tasks.
Therefore questions of the manner, nature and structure of
knowledge and skill acquisition must be considered.
Thirdly, the nature of problem solving as a form of learning
itself must be taken into account. To this extent, it is
not possible to 'practise' problem solving without learning
or assimilating the structure of that practice. We would
conclude, therefore, that although problem solving skills
must ultimately be learned by problem solving learning, this
must be of a special type. Yonke (1979) advocates teaching
the diagnostic process as a separate cognitive process.
To return to our original theme, we would agree and suggest
that the structural aspects of the problem solving process
must be teased out and presented to enable self analysis and
self awareness in the dynamic process. Goldberg (1968)
demonstrates the lack of effect of non-analytical problem sol-
ving learning. However, given an analjtical framework, problem
solving learning becomes a productive process in its own right.
Piaget (1970), in his own terms, reflects this principle:
"... knowledge is derived from action, not in the
sense of simple associative response, but in the
much deeper sense of the assimilation of reality
into the necessary and general co-ordinations of
action. To know an object is to act upon it and
to transform it, in order to grasp the mechanisms
of that transformation as they function in connec-
tion with the transformative actions themselves.
it follows from this that intelligence, at all
levels, is an assimilation of the datum into stru-
ctures of transformations, from the structures of
elementary actions to the higher operational
structures, and that these structurations consist
in an organisation of reality, whether in act or
thought, and not in simply making a copy of it".
(p.29).
Piaget also adds "the hearthreaking difficulty in pedagogy"
that the best teaching methods - active methods - are also
the most difficult. In learning the diagnostic thinking
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process, active methods cannot simply mean clerking patient
after patient after patient, discussing findings and con-.
clusions during the ward round or tutorial, and divining the
cognitive error or the nature of correct thinking. The
difficulty in active learning, here, must be to attain the
correct balance and relationship between theory and practice,
between understanding the structure of one's own thinking
processes and the structure of the substance, and using these
structures to solve clinical problems and thereby, perhaps,
altering them.
4.2	 Approaches in Teaching the Diagnostic Thinking Process
Barrows et al (1978) voice the reasonable anxiety that:
"... the usual subject oriented education in medical
schools does not require actively practised reason-
ing skills as the students learn. There is concern
that the traditional approaches to medical education
may actually diminish the natural problem solving
skills possessed by students before they enter medi-
cal school". (p.16)
The authors trace this development, and the associated division
between the basic sc4ences and the clinical courses, back
to Flexner's (1925) study of 1merican medical schools.
Elstein et al (1978) take a rather harder line, leaving the
reader in little doubt about the direction of their arrows:
"Gaps in medical knowledge are easy to spot when they
produce major obstacles to problem solving, and
remedies are equally obvious. In contrast, failures
to use efficient strategies are difficult to discern
and even more difficult to remedy. It Is no accident
that medical schools traditionally have packed the
curriculum with as much factual content as time and
student capacities permitted, and have offered little
or no formal guidance in problem solving stratgies".
(p.271)
Perhaps the criticism is a little strident and should be
tempered by recognition of our still shallow knowledge of the
clinical problem solving process. But the over predominant
base of factual knowledge and the failure to teach use of that
knowledge for clinical problem solving remains a criticism
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echoed by other workers (Meals, 1973; Hiss and Pierce, 1974;
Barrows and Bennett, 1972; Barrows and Mitchell, 1975; Barrows;
1976; Yonke, 1979; Maddison, 1978; Miller 1978; Wyn Pugh et al
1975; Lloyd et al, 1976). Sherwood (1978) speaks of the
tyranny of information gathering to the exclusion of teaching
what to do with it, while lansek and Balla (1979) point out
that many teachers remain in ignorance of their own diagnostic
thinking processes.
Despite such criticisms as these, many curriculum changes are
under way, and a variety of teaching strategies have been
devised to assist the student in developing his diagnostic
problem solving skills. These will be considered under five
headings: the integrated curriculum; problem based learning;
training in hypothesis generation; cognitive skills training;
and, computer assisted training.
4.2.1 The Integrated Curriculum
Stenhouse (1975) discusses Bernstein's (1971) distinction
between collection- and integrated curricula. In. a col1ectin
type, the contents are clearly bounded and insulated from each
other; in an integrated type, the contents stand in open
relation to each other. Armstrong (1977) suggests that the
pre-clinical curriculum, comprising a study of the separate
basic medical sciences, constitutes a collection type curricu-
lum, whereas the clinical curriculum which follows it is of
the integrated type where "although learning may be mediated
by specialities, there is little insularity from one speciality
to another and knowledge gained in one can be used in another".
However, if we follow this argument through, and consider the
relationship between pre-clinical and clinical curricula, it
is clear that these are not, in their traditional form,
integrated. From the point of view of structure,transfer and
problem solving, as discussed above, the undergraduate medical
curriculum as a whole may be criticised. The structure of
biochemistry as taught in the pre-clinical course, for example,
may well not transfer to the sthdy of endocrine disorders in
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the clinical years. The academic sciences of the pre-clinical
years, set outside the clinical problem solving context of the
clinical curriculum may well require considerable cognitive
restructuring or reorganisation before they assist the diag-
nostic thinking process in an efficient and effective manner,
for disease does not differentiate between separate scientific
territories or levels of enquiry into bodily structure and
function. The collection curriculum also is implicitly
questioned in Ausubel et al's (1978) argument that:
"It is less difficult for human beings to grasp
the differentiated aspects of a previously learned,
more inclusive whole than to formulate the
inclusive whole from its previously learned
differentiated parts". (p.190)
Especially so if structural aspects of those parts make trans-
fer to the inclusive whole difficult in the initial instance.
Awareness of this type of contradiction between structure of
learning and method of use of information has led to an
upsurge in attempts to integrate both within and between the
pre-clinical and clinical courses and thus facilitate the
necessary criterion ctf transfer of learning.
Miller et al (1961) considered at that time that "at the
medical school level probably Western Reserve alone has made
a concerted effort to build an entire curriculum around the
principle of transference". This american medical school -
Case Western Reserve - was the first to develop a co-ordinated
teaching programme, the establishment of which began in 1945
(Spilman, 1965). The integrated teaching was subject based
and inter-departmental with the collaborative effort of
faculty members from different departments and disciplines.
The curriculum included a project teaching programme and
deliberate correspondence between pre-clinical and clinical
material, always with the maximum participation of the student.
Since that time, forms of integration have been adopted in many
British medical schools. The General Medical Council (1977)
Sshowed that six of the 38 British medical schools have adopted
or planned curricula in which vertical and horizontal inte-
gration (pre-clinical - clinical and between disciplines) is
a major goal, while some element of inter-disciplinary teaching
is found in all medical schools. "There is increased
recognition that teachers have a common goal and that it may
be advantageous to work together to attain it" (Harden et al,
1978). In 1973 (Association for the Study of Medical
Education, 1973) alone, the Newcastle upon Tyne Medical School
gave a retrospective appraisal of its ten years of a curriculum
in which the pre-clinical years comprised both temporal
co-ordination and subject integration and the clinical years
constituted 'true multi-disciplinary teaching' based on courses
concerned with bodily systems rather than separate branches of
medicine or surgery. At the same conference the Nottingham
Medical School reported on its vertically and horizontally
integrated pragramme for the first three years of the curric-
ulum, based on three thematic courses (The Cell, Man, The
Community). As the course evolved, so did considerable merging
of pre-clinical and clinical teaching (Olson, 1976). Dundee
Medical School also reported on its examples of temporal
co-ordination and subject integration.
In 1971, the Southampton Medical School took its first students
into a curriculum based on bodily systems courses, with patient
contact for the student from the beginning (Acheson, 1976;
Elstein and Forbes, 1976). It is argued (Howell, 1976) that
the hazards of the traditional curriculum may therefore be
avoided. In the traditional curriculum:
"The student himself is expected to undertake the
horizontal integration of such courses and to
develop an understanding of the different systems
of the body in health and disease".
Vertical integration in the Southampton curriculum arose from
the view that:
"...'clinical relevance' is important in the early
stages of the medical curriculum both as a stimulus
to learning and as illustrating the emphasis to be
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placed on items of factual information ... The
medical student proceeding to clinical medicine
needs integrated models in his everyday clinical
practice, and a programme of learning which
embraces the disordered at the same time as the
normal and the abnormal and peraita economies in
learning and teaching".
Although the student's acquisition of knowledge and skills is
still removed from the clinical situation in which he will
have to use them, the Southampton curriculum obviously repre-
sents a concerted effort to deal with the structural aspects
of learning and the problem of transfer. One cannot divine
how successful that attempt will be in terms of the future
development of clinical problem solving performance in
students, but it is, nonetheless, being made.
It is clear that the concept and implementation of the inte-
grated curriculum is far from monolithic. It ranges from
temporal juxtaposition of courses to the development of systems
based teaching, from horizontal integration to the vertical
integration attempt to cross the traditional Rubicon between
pre-clinical and clinical teaching. But how far do these
strides forward go towards attaining the three criteria of
structural integrity, transfer of learning and development of
problem solving skill?
This question can only be answered speculatively; but first it
might be useful to refer back to Bernstein (1971). Integrat-
ion, as he uses it, refers to the subordination of previously
insulated subjects or courses to some relational idea, some
idea such as a bodily system. Integration can thus be handled
either by a single teacher or a group of teachers. If the
latter, then surrender of traditional sovereignties is
necessary. Stenhouse (1975) points out that if the relational
idea which must predominate in those involved in teaching is
not sufficiently powerful, then the integrated study may not
integrate. In the case of temporal co-ordination of topics,
this is almost certainly so. Integration will still depend
upon the learner's ability for cognitive reorganisation or
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restructuring.
To return to our three criterian our first general assessment
must be that the integrated courses and curricula discussed do
not intend to treat with the diagnostic thinking process per
se, but rather to structure knowledge such that its retrieval
in the process of clinical problem solving is facilitated
better than learning on the basis of scientific, medical or
surgical speciality would allow. In other words, integration
attempts to cope with structural and transfer aspects of
learning, but not with problem solving skills. In psychologi-.
cal terms, it is not possible to judge whether information
learned in an integrated curriculum is structurally more
suitable to clinical practice or the diagnostic thinking process
than information learned in a traditional curriculum would be.
It may be that one requires less structural reorganisation than
the other, but without further data one can only refer to
common sense argument.
Considering the matter from the point of view of later teaching
during the clinical course, it would seem reasonable that the
substance of the integrated curriculum is structurally more
appropriate than the substance of the traditional, speciality
based curriculum. This conclusion can only be reached, at
present, on the basis of the structure and content of the
clinical history which is, itself, largely systems based. how-
ever, whether or not the substance learned in an integrated
curriculum gives rise to, for example, a more precise or wider
ranging interpretation of clinical information elicited from
the patient is not known,
In conclusion, the integrated curriculum would seem to have
the potential for building on structural and transfer aspects
of learning, but its likely effect on the learner's development
as a clinical problem solver remains obscure, however, in that
appropriate structures and transfer of learning are necessary
pre-requisites for effective clinical problem solving, we may
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conclude that the integrated curriculum, in particular if
vertical integration is a strong feature, is likely to have
a positive, mediated effect upon the development of the
diagnostic thinking process.
4.2.2. Problem Based Learning
"When discussing innovations in medical education,
one can easily get the feeling that problem
solving as an educational technique is a new
thing. But problem solving has been used as all
educational technique in medical education for
many years, although during the last period of
time the meaning of the term has changed. Nowa-
days, the term is used not only to describe how
the symptoms and signs are put together to make
a diagnosis, but also to imply an awareness of
the way medical students are taught to use these
stages and techniques". (Strom and Waltcrn, 1978)
So concluded a discussion group at the 1977 Conference of the
Association for Medical Education in Europe off 'Innovations
in Medical Education'. Despite the contention, only four
medical schools yet boast curricula based upon a problem
solving approach (McMaster Shiraz, Maastricht, Newcastle NSW),
but many courses incude problem solving exercises of some
type.
The most recent curriculum to be based upon a problem solving
approach is that of the new medical school in Newcastle, New
South Wales. This curriculum:
'... is based on learning through the mamagement
and solution of clinical problems ... The study
of these problems will ensure that student learn-
ing is relevant to contemporary medical practice.
(The) student will use the clinical problem
to identify and acquire the knowledge, under-
standing, skills and attitudes he needs to manage
(the) patient. (Clarke, 1978).
In dealing with each clinical problem, the student will also
learn the relevant biochemistry, physiology, anatomy, pathology,
risk factors, epidemiology arid prevention, physical examination,
investigations, management of the patient, and other family and
social aspects. In this way:
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"The student will integrate all these in the
context of the patient, and learning will be
enhanced by the motivation which will result
from the clear relevance of the task. Thus
the basic sciences will not be learned as
separate disciplines, but will be studied and
applied in a clinical context from the first
to the last day of the course".
Problem based learning in Newcastle is thus seen as having
three major advantages; firstly:
"The ability to view every encounter with a
patient as a problem enables the doctor to
determine what is new and unknown to him,
where to obtain the additional information
he needs and how to apply it to the problem,
thus adding actively to his store of know-
ledge, understanding and skill". (Engel and
Clarke, 1979)
Secondly:
"As the student is encouraged to apply his
newly gained learning he reinforces this
learning and obtains rapid information on
the success of his studies". (ibid.)
Thirdly:
'... problem based learning allows complete
and continuous integration of the basic and
clinical sciences. We know of no successful
method for achieving this, other than through
learning in order to deal, with problemsw. (Ibid.)
It would appear from this that structural and problem solving
aspects of the learning task are being addressed by the
Newcastle curriculum, although we may wonder whether practice
at solving problems as such, without specific feedback on the
thinking process rather than the knowledge base, will actually
encourage appropriate problem solving thinking or an awareness
of one's own thinking processes. This would seem doubtful.
Shulman and Elstein (1975) point out that 'the essence of
learning is not merely doing, but thinking about what one is
doing". To encourage students to take a problem solving
approach, and to perceive clinical problems and theit solution
as the central feature of medical education and clinical
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practice 8eemS, on a commonsense level, to be a reasonable
strategy. To attempt to create the habit of continuing
education by constant encouragement to formulate and answer
searching questions (Engel and Clarke, 1979) surely is also
an important aspect of undergraduate medical education.
However, despite the undoubted horizontal and vertical
integration of information which problem based learning
achieves, its actual strengths may, possibly, rest there.
Let us firstly consider the question of structure. As we
have already discussed, the structural properties of an
individual's concepts and knowledge are important because
they determine how he will acquire and use knowledge in the
future. But what are the structural properties of knowledge
acquired through problem based learning? Efficient and effect-
ive storage of information in memory requires considerable
organisation (Hunter, 1964). What are the organising agents
in problem based learning? These questions are important,
simpiy because the senior student and the practising clinician
do require reference to material stored in memory Clinical
problem solving is not simply a matter of formulating and
answering searching questions: substance must complement
aptitude. How is that substance to be stored to make it most
easily and appropriately retrieved and related to other pieces
of knowledge and experiences? The difficulty seems to arise
from the view of problem based learning as a teaching method
to achieve integration and build knowledge appropriate to
clinical practice. Learning through solving problems, however,
is not quite the same thing as solving problems and, incident-
ally, learning. The question of structure, therefore, remains
open and interesting. Complementary to this is the question
of transfer of learning. Efficient transfer depends upon
appropriate structure. How is learning set in the context of
one problem to be transferred to a new problem? Finally, it
has been indicated already that learning through problem
solving is not necessarily learning to solve problems or
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acquiring insight into and the means to evaluate one's own
problem solving strategies. Without some special input.
problem based learning does not necessarily achieve these
ends.
}Iaving been thus critical, it is necessary to suggest what
might be a correct perspective. If questions of structure,
transfer and problem solving remain unclear in Newcastle,
NSW, questions of integration, orientation, the centrality of
patient and clinical problem and attitude towards learning
seem to be elegantly resolved.
The McMaster curriculum has addressed some of the questions
which we have so far failed to answer. Barrows (1973) dis-
cusses the educational rationale for problem based learning:
"In problem solving the active participation by
the learner in his learning and the development
of inquiry or problem solving skills along with
self directed study techniques, makes this
method attractive ... In problem based learning
the student must observe, think, define, study,
analyse, synthesise and evaluate. These active
and self directed processes are necessary to
understand, define, solve or manage any problem ".
Specifically, Barrows and Sibley (1978) cite advantages similar
to those discussed in relation to the Newcastle, NSW, curric-
ulum, but Barrows (1973) also addresses the questions of
structure and transfer:
"With problem based learning there is evidence
that information is acquired in a set around the
problem under study. This provides for mental
associations that allow the student to retrieve
the information he has acquired when working with
other problems that may require the same inform-
ation. These information sets, formed around a
particular problem, allow for succeeding problems
in a particular area, such as neurology, to be
solsed with increasing speed and facility. As
the student acquires an increasingly rich number
of learning sets about different problems and
uses these in the solution of new problems
he becomes increasingly more able to solve com-
plex and novel problems. The information the
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student acquires is not only more easily trans-
ferable to new situations and problems but the
acquired information may be better remembered".
No evidence is produced to support these arguments, other
than acquisition of information as a set around the clinical
problem. Details of variety of problem presentation, identity
of the forceful feature, and ability to solve new problems by
reference to stored information would all assist in resolving
the problems of transfer and structure. At McMaster, problem
solving aspects are also considered:
"It is important to identify the student's progress
in developing problem solving skills. Are his
problems in problem solving identif led, are they
rectified by the student? Does the student go to
enough pains on his own to determine whether his
problem solving, approach, references, and self
study skills and quality of the information he has
gained are appropriate?"
To this end, self awareness questions are included in the
problems (Learning Resources Design Project, 1975). Learning
and problem solving at McMaster appear to hold equal pride of
place. This may be illustrated with reference to the McMaster
'problem boxes' (Barrows and Mitchell, 1975).
The problem box contains a printed clinical problem manual
and related study materials in various media. The problem is
presented as it would unfold to the clinician. For example,
after "A 55 year old man complains of a headache", the manual
stops and the student must write down his thoughts about this.
A few more sentences of the problem then unfold on the next
page, and so on. The questiom actually asked of the patient
by the original examiner are reported, and the student is
asked to comment on them. As the case evolves, the student
can compare his approach with that actually used. A separate
manual leads the student into a study of all aspects of the
case - physiology, anatomy, clinical techniques, etc. A list
of learning resources is also provided, and faculty are
always available to discuss the problem. With some boxes the
student may deal even more realistically with the problem by
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interviewing and examining a simulated patient trained to
simulate the patient presented in the problem box. Problem
boxes were used in conjunction with an 'educational pres-
cription' tailored to the learning needs and style of each
student individually.
Following on from the problem boxes, has been the development
of the Portable Patient Problem pack (P4) (Barrows and
Tamblyn, 1977), which was designed specifically "to develop
the student's problem solving or diagnostic skills in a manner
consistent with the skills of the practising clinician".
A scoring system is incorporated to assess the student's
clinical reasoning skills and the cost of his evaluation of
the patient. A P4 unit, simulating one patient problem, con-
sists of 280 coloured cards categorised into types of action
that can be taken (white for questions on history, blue for
items of physical examination, etc.). On the front of each
card, below the title, is a series of questions the student
should ask himself before taking action of that type. Thus
P4 includes a component designed "to help shape the effective-
ness and efficiency of the student's problem solving or
clinical reasoning skills". The back of each card gives
responses to the action indicated on the front. This may
include referral to slides, X rays, laboratory data, etc.
Some cards are designed to facilitate the student's inter-
action with the problem and evaluation of his own performance.
The student works with P4 by spreading the title cards in
front of him, reading a card to acquaint himself with the
patient's problem, and selecting cards until he has handled
the problem as far as he can or wishes to. This process may
include time for reading, study and conference with faculty.
Problem boxes and the P4 format, then, represent teaching
methods designed specifically to improve students' clinical
problem solving skills.
Such simulations as these developed from the original work of
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Rimoldi who developed Diagnostic Management Problems during
his studies of the problem solving process (Rimoldi, 1955;
1.961). Rimoldi's method involved the use of an array of
cards listing all possible tests and questions, from which
the subject must select in response to being presented with
information about a 'patient'. By looking at the questions
asked and their order, an evaluation of the subject's
thinking processes was attempted. The approach assumes that
at every successive step the problem changes and that what
the subject knows and what he may still want to know are not
fixed properties of the problem, but vary as the solution
develops. Using this method, it is also possible to identify
the questions which the subject omits thereby defining the
areas which he may consider to be redundant or irrelevant.
Based on Riinoldi's (1961) work, Heifer and Slater (1971)
devised problems and computer calculations to give students
feedback on their own process and outcome performance. Each
problem was presented in 96 cards consecutively numbered. A
specific historical fact,- physical finding or laboratory
result was given on Sach card. The student was first told
the setting of the problem, such as 'Outpatients' Clinic',
given a brief abstract of the case, and provided with an
index sheet which itemised the type of information on each
card, such as 'Skin', 	 Pressure' or 'Skull X ray'. The
student selects cards in whichever order he prefers, and
records his selection. The primary and secondary diagnoses,
and the point at which the primary diagnosis was made, are
also recorded. The computer output provides feedback to the
student on: the diagnostic score to show accuracy of the
diagnosis made and appropriateness of the point at which it
was made; the process score, derived by comparing the student's
sequence with that of experts; the efficiency score derived
from the total number of helpful cards selected divided by the
total number of cards chosen; cards not selected in the
appropriate sequence; cards considered helpful by experts but
not selected by the student; cards the student failed to
lO4• -
select before he nde his diagnosis which experts felt should
have been selected; unhelpful cards selected; and harmful
cards selected.
Such a method as this, then, provides the student with ample
information for him to compare his selection and processing
of information, as compared with that of an expert. But such
a teaching method is, of necessity, very much based in teaching
the significance of factual information, and interpretative
value of clinical and laboratory data. Such a method, however,
should also prompt the student to think more clearly and
consciously about the nature of his own information gathering
strategies. But the generalisability of those strategies, and
the differentiation between parts which are attrthutable to
the case and parts which are attributable to his own problem
solving thinking processes are likely to remain obscured.
Rimoldi's diagnostic management problem technique was adapted,
firstly by McGuire and her colleagues at the University of
Illinois College of Medicine, and the resultant simulations
were called patient management problems. A book of examples
has been published (McGuire and Solomon, 1971) and many adapt-
ations have been reported (Newbie, 1975). Patient management
problems have been used for assessment as well as teaching.
Each problem begins with some information about the patient,
including the main complaint. The problem solver must then
gain more information for diagnosis and management. A list of
further available information is given, and figures, slides
and X rays may be used to provide some answers. The student
thus collects data in a sequential manner, either linearly
(e.g. Hubbard, 1971) or in a branching way (McGuire and
Solomon, 1971). A variety of technical devices is available
to obscure answers before selection; these include paper tabs,
invisible ink and compounds that can be erased. A record of
selections is kept. Cuing is reduced by offering a large
number of options, and the format facilitates observation of
sequential decision making based on feedback from the answer
sheet. McCarthy and Gonella (1967) used a similar approach
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for ev1uating and teaching clinical competence, but maintain
that the presence of even long lists of possible relevant
choices provides a cuing effect which is not present in actual
clinical situations. This effect is most marked for poorer
students (McCarthy, 1966). An additional problem is that the
cumulative nature of data collection may also cause cumulative
error (Berner et al, 1974). In a factor-analytic study, uul
et al (1979) concluded that patient management problems
measured data gathering and management components of medicine
problem solving.
Although patient management problems have been widely used,
they are subject to the same crticisms as the diagnostic
management problems. They are primarily knowledge based, pro-
viding sophisticated exercise in the collection and sequential
use of medical information. There is little evidence that such
a teaching method will enhance the cognitive problem solving
process of the learner in a real clinical situation or that it
provides him with any insight into his own thinking processes
and use of information. Shulman and Elstein (1975) quote
findings that patient management problems provide indication
of inadequate clinical performance, but they do not indicate
what a physician will actually do in practice. This may
indicate that learning by patient management problems does not
effect generalisaiDle problem solving skills. In other words,
problems of structure, transfer and problem solving remain
unresolved.
In conclusion, a variety of different approaches in problem
based learning have been discussed and evaluated from the point
of view of structural, transfer and problem solving aspects
of education. It appears that problem based learning as such
need not enhance any of these particular characteristics,
although enhancing others equally as desirable but not related
to the development of the diagnostic thinking process. We may
leave the final word to Luchins and Luchins (1950) who were
speaking of mathematics, but whose lesson remains pertinent:
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"One implication for education is that in
teaching mathematics it is not sufficient to
make the problems more concrete, more life
like. The trend toward concretizing mathe-
matical problems by relating them more closely
to everyday activities is in part motivated
by tJie desire to make the subject matter more
meaningful to the child; but this need not
result in giving the child a better insight
into mathematics - he may still repeat blindly
certain rules and formulas. What are needed
are teaching methods which will lead to under-
standing of the structural qualities of
mathematical concepts and encourage productive
thinking".
4.2.3 Training in Hypothesis Generation
Since hypothesis generation and testing has been the dominant
cognitive model of the diagnostic thinking procees, some
workers have attempted to train students, and clinicians, to
generate better, more accurate, more appropriate diagnostic
hypotheses. For example, Elstein et al (1978) report a study
designed to develop and test a procedure for training students
to generate diagnostic problem formulations based on cues
elicited during the first four to six minutes of the clinical
interview. The method of training involved the use of
specially prepared films of the initial segment of the clin-
ical encounter, from the physician's eye view. The student
viewed the film and was given basic demographic information
about the patient He gave impressions and diagnostic problem
formulations, filled out a set of response sheets and wrote
a brief tentative assessment. Feedback materials based on
physician performance were provided; these materials con-
cerned either process or outcome or both. Results of this
process showed that the training model was effective in
improving second year students' skill in generating a set of
initial problem formulations. In addition, the training
model was just as effective when providing outcome feedback
only, as it was when outcome and process feedback were given.
This latter finding is interesting, possibly implying that
practice is primary in developing the skill. The work
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represents an attempt to isolate one part of the diagnostic
thinking process and train for that in particular. It seems
successful in this attempt, although no explanatory theory
accounting for this success and the satisfactory influence
of outcome-only feedback is given.
It will be noted that the approach just described is problem
oriented. The problem oriented medical record has been
presented as a teaching tool (Weed, 1968), but does not pre-
tend to enhance the cognitive processes of the physician as
such; rather, it assists the problem solver to systematise
clinical experience and use and caiununicate clinical Inform-
ation by means of the clinical record (Lloyd et al, 1976). A
side effect of this, of the formulation of problem lists in
particular, may be to encourage efficient and effective
possible diagnostic formulations, but research results are
not reported.
An attempt to encourage students to formulate early diagnostic
hypotheses is also reported by Taylor et al (1978) mi gynae-
cology, in response to the Michigan and McMaster work. The
course consisted of core document objectives, flow charts,
small group sessions designed to encourage appreciation of
the role of hypothesis fornation, simulated patient management
problems and a problem solving approach. The results of the
course were not entirely satisfactory, only 73 per cest of
students learning to form and revise hypotheses adequately.
However, two factors may account for this: firstly, it is not
clear to what extent students were explicitly made aware of
this process; and secondly, the course was designed to encour-
age the student to make "broad, general diagnostic hypotheses
rather than the narrow hypotheses typical of beginning students".
As discussed above (Chapter Three, Section 1.2), this view of
Barrows and Bennett (1972) is now open to some doubt, and so
it may be that Taylor et al's (1978) teaching methods were
running counter to the cognitive inclinations, and effective-
ness, of the students.
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Elstein et al (1978) devised a set of five heuristics to
"improve the problem solving performance of advanced medical
students functioning in a hypothesis guided mode". Students
were thus encouraged to think about the relationship between
their hypotheses and the information available,between the
hypotheses themselves, the effect of new hypotheses in
causing re-interpretation of old information and so on.
Results did not strongly support the research hypothesis of
improved problem solving performance due to heuristic training.
It is possible that the heuristics themselves were too specific
and merely added a confusing, complex dimension to the thinking
process rather than encouraging self awareness.
The P4 units, described above, are introduced to students in
the context of hypothesis generation, with the implicit
assumption that many hypotheses should occur to the student
(Learning Resources Design Project, 1975):
"If your definition of the patient problem only
produces one hypothesis initially then use it
alone and direct your questions and examinations
of the patient towards establishing or denying
its validity. If you eventually end in a blind
alley after following what you feel are approp-
riate investigations, you can then (1) reconsider
your problem definition; (2) ask more general
questions of the patient; (3) survey with system
inquiries for other symptoms or complaints; or
(4) perform other items of examination until new
data suggest a revision of your crystallization
or new hypotheses are suggested and then proceed
in a similar manner".
The guide goes on to explain the importance and use of diagnos-
tic hypotheses in terms of diagnosing, dealing with information
arrays, memory and so on. In addition, students are reminded
to be alert for items of information which do not £ it into any
of the hypotheses generated. Strong advice is given that the
first hypotheses to be generated during any clinical encounter
should be broad, such as "something wrong in the left hemis-
phere", and more specific ideas should only be formed as the
data unfolds. Finally, students are warned againt premature
acceptance of any easy or obvious answer.
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Such an approach to teaching should encourage transfer of
aptitude from case to case, and seems eminently promising,
given its context in problem based learning as described in
the previous section. The only point of doubt immediately
obvious is the unwarranted, although not extreme, advice to
generate broad hypotheses before becoming more specific.
Such a tactic is not necessarily appropriate in all cases,
since hypotheses can only arise from the information given
and the associated structure of informatIon in memory. It
is possible, also, for a broad hypothesis to be as inapprop-
riate as more specific ones. Attempts to follow this advice
where the Information and structures suggest specific ideas
may be more confusing than clarifying. However, awareness of
the advantages and dangers of the process are a positive
contribution to training in clinical problem solving.
Training in hypothesis generation has been attempted in other
fields. Klein et al (1969) studied the role of anxiety in
learning a task which required subjects to formulate original
responses to complex stimulus situations. Feedback was given
to subjects in the form of a list of "acceptable" hypotheses.
Attempts were made to improve both the quality and quantity
of hypotheses, but only the latter actually showed improvement.
Dienes and Jeeves (1965), considering the structural derivation
of hypotheses, believe that false ones should be followed up
since "hypotheses can only be rejected by recourse to the
actual situation in which they were relevant". This is the
substance, not aptitude, aspect of hypothesis generation and
may prove a fruitful approach.
In conclusion, from the point of view of structure, transfer
and problem solving, such training in hypothesis generation as
we have discussed may well assist structuring operations and
help the learner to appreciate how he relates his own knowledge
structure to the presenting stimulus situation. An appreci-
ation of aptitude or problem solving process may transfer from
case to case directly since an operation which could be
110 -
identified as hypothesising will certainly occur in every
instance. Awareness of the dangers of this mechanism is also
to be encouraged. In this way, problem solving itself should
be enhanced. Training of this type would seem, at the moment,
to be limited only by the severely limiting description of the
diagnostic thinking process as 'hypothesis generation and
testing' and concomitant errors such as the assigned temporal
relationship between broad and specific hypotheses. The
general approach, however, seems worth building upon and
refining.
4.2.4 Cognitive Skills Training
Another approach in medical education, although not very widely
used, has been to train students in general problem solving
skills and awareness of their own cognitive processes, with the
belief that the results of such training would generalise to
their clinical problem solving task.
Apart from one unsuccessful attempt to use feedback on direct
observation of the student patient encounter (Hinz, 1966) and
a suggested use of decision trees for teaching management of
uncertainty (Knaggs et al, 1974), the work of Abercrombie (1960)
and related work of Lavelle (l977a 1977b; 1978) represent this
systematic approach to teaching clinical problem solving think-
ing. Abercrombie (1960) devised and implemented a course for
medical students of eight 90 minute discussions in groups of
twelve students. The content of the discussion sections was
seeing/perception, language, classification, evaluation of
evidence and causation. Results showed that students who had
taken the course did statistically better than others in four
respects - they tended to discriminate better between facts
and conclusions, to draw fewer false conclusions, to consider
more than one solution to a problem and to be less adversely
influenced in their approach to a problem by their experience
of a preceding one. That is, overall, they were more object-
ive and more flexible in their behaviour. The aim of the
course - Mto make it possible for the student to relinquish
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the security of thinking in well defined, given channels and
to find a new kind of stability based on the recognition and
acceptance of ambiguity, uncertainty and open choice" - seems
to have been fulfilled. This work has since been followed up
(Abercrornbie, 1978).
Lavelle (1977a; 1977b; 1978) also takes the approach that to
train for general cognitive skills may specifically apply to
the clinical situation and that by becoming conscious of
factors which unconsciously influence judgments, more valid
judgments may be made. The operations examined by Lavelle
(197Th) have been: abstracting informatitm from the literature;
perceiving a number of objects; observing an object; describ-
ing a process; accessing unstructured (sic) memory by assoc-
iation; forming hypotheses; solving problems; and communicating
with others. The parts of the course descrthed in Lavelle
(1977a) are specifically related to clinical topics and
situations. Evaluation results of the courses are not yet
available, although some improvement in information processing
skills is reported (Lavelle, 1977b). However, "whether the
improvement is sustained, or is applicable to medical decision
making remains to be established".
Evaluation of such work as this against our three specified
criteria is difficult. One can do little more than conjecture.
Perhaps awareness of one's own thinking processes and cognitive
bias may transfer to any substance or occasion. Abercrombie's
work suggests this as a possibility, but the indirect nature
of the method also suggests problems of structure and transfer.
4.2.5 Computer-Assisted Training
Although still not very widespread, the use of computer based
systems for training in dcision making is sufficiently ample
to merit some discussion. De Dombal (1979) reports such
prograimnes in England, France, Scotland, Canada and the United
States.
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Interactive computer programmes have been used for sequential
teaching similar to that of the patient management problems.
It is suggested that computer simulations offer the opportunity
to use expert data in the calibration of student error (Johnson
et al, 1975) - an advantage shared by the card packs and paper
simulations already described - and may be used to avoid the
cuing effects of the patient management problems (Berner et al,
1974), although problem boxes can avoid this effect also. De
Dombal and his colleagues at the Leeds University Medical
School have been foremost in Britain in developing computer
assisted learning systems, and have compared these with similar
non-computerised systems.
De Dombal et al (1969) described the initial. Leeds computer
assisted system for learning clinical diagnosis. The student
obtains information by entering questions to the computer via
a teletype and receiving responses immediately on the printout.
The information is stored in the computer under headings or
files, and, in that the student is not allowed to leave a file
until he has collected all the useful information it can give,
there is some control over the sequence in which he gathers
data. At any point in the process, the student can refer to
a Imeaning, 'consultancy' or 'medical teaching' file to assist
him in understanding terminology, interpreting symptoms and
signs or taking a history and physical examination. A special
'help' file is also available if he feels that he is still
making no progress. Having collected enough data, the student
makes his diagnosis and this, together witb the way in which
he gathered that data, is evaluated by the computer. This is
then discussed and reviewed with the teacher.
De Dombal et al (1969) discuss the problems of such a simula-
tion, especially in termsof its unreality and the interference
caused to the student's thinking processes by having to type
in questions, and these problems were gradually to be resolved.
However, the major advantage of the system was seen as its
ability to ensure that "each diagnostic procedure is carried
out logically and orderly" and to give immediate monitoring
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and correction of errors in techniques. It would seem, then,
that this system encourages the student to learn a certain
rigour of approach in eliciting information, but deals only
with the knowledge base and not with his manner of combining
information.. Likewise, the request for a diagnosis at the
end of data collection obscures the dynamic thinking processes
and reasoning of the student. More recent approaches, however,
have overcome some of these drawbacks.
In 1972 were reported the results of an evaluation of four
different modes of diagnostic simulation, including a computer-
ised mode (de Dombai. et al, 1972b). The four modes evaluated
were: I4INISIM based on the diagnostic maaagement problem card
format; VERBAL in which an operator kept the cards and the
student interrogated the 'patient' operator who responded by
giving the appropriate card; VERBAL + CAl) in which the operator
answered the student's questions instead of giving cards. In
addition, students could submit their case history for
Bayesian analysis and ODSAL (off-line diagnostic simulation
for additional learning) involving a teletype in an -off-line
format, with a paper-tape punch and reader. This programme,
in a set form, stopped at intervals for the student to type in
his differential diagnosis. The tape finally gives the
results of the computer's analysis of the case and the (real
life) operative diagnosis and outcome.
Results showed no statistically significant differences in
short term retention of information between students who had
used a simulator and those who had not. However, there were
statistically significant differences between these two groups
on tests of information collection and evaluation. No statis-
tically significant differences were found between the four
modes of simulation. De Dombal et a]. (1974) report further
modifications to the system - in particular, ODSAL gained an
on-line facility and a comparison of students • and doctors'
case histories was made.
Results of evaluation would tend to diminish the criticisms
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put forward of the 1969 system, that students are being
taught quite effectively only to be more efficient and
effective data gatherers. It would seem that they are also
developing skill in evaluation of that data using the simu-
lation technique which may imply development of skills of
combining data. However, the simulations are still very low
fidelity and whether or not students are developing a trans-
ferable or generalisable skill is unknown. It may be that
the presentation of the case histories in a standardised format
assists students' conceptualisation of a history and organis-
ation of data, and that this is indirectly measured
as skills in data evaluation. But we cannot say whether or
not students are better problem solvers or more skilled in
clinical reasoning. Murray et al (1977) report an improvement
in factual knowledge retention and management decision making
skills using computer assisted learning in Glasgow, but the
report is not specific enough to enable any idea of how the
teaching occurred or of what is meant by "management decision".
In any attempt to teach aspects of the diagnostic process, a
model of this process is either formally or implicitly acknow-
ledged by the teacher. Such a model may be either 'normative',
setting out the ideal norm against which people try to make
better decisions, or 'descriptive', attempting to represent
the decision making behaviour of clinicians. (Taylor, 1972).
This fact represents a considerable hazard in any computerised
approach, since either represents a degree of inflexibility
which may be inappropriate to the student's cognitive processes.
In other words, the structures of teacher or teaching method
and learner may well conflict, whether these be structures
of substance or aptitude. Schneiderman and Muller (1972)
report on their Diagnosis Game, which uses relatively simple
remedial loops based on a normative version of a case provided
by a clinician. The aim Of this game is "the development of
problem solving skills, free of the constraints of the real
world". The loop involves the student typing in his revised
differential diagnosis, ordering more data and finally making
a definitive diagnosis. The computer gives an evaluation of
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the diagnosis and, if necessary, explains why it is incorrect.
This format obviously places fewer constraints on the students'
thinking processes than does the ODSAL formulation, and so may
allow greater transferability of the problem solving skill to
real situations.
Harless et al (1971) report a similar normative simulation
called CASE (computer aided simulation of the clinical
encounter). In CASE sessions, the student types in requests,
with no cuing or ordering constraints. When he has enough
information, he enters the treatment phase and is requested to
give his diagnosis and treatment plan. No pedagogical inter-
ruptions are made during the problem, and feedback is limited
to a descriptive analysis of performance and comparison with
optimal problem management. The analysis of deviations from
the norm is much more flexible and detailed than in the
Diagnosis Game. No evaluation is given of the specific problem
solving skills.being trained, nor of transferability of these
skills to the real clinical situation.
Taylor (1972) reports a normative model based on Bayes'
Theorem in which students are encouraged to estimate their
prior probabilities at each stage of the diagnostic process.
It is unknown to what extent this method enhances the cognit-
ive problem solving skills applied in the clinical situation.
Newbie (1975) reports other computer applications including
computerised patient management problems.
Evaluation of computer assisted training programmes in terms
of the criteria of structure, transfer and problem solving is
dependent upon the specific approach and components of the
programme in question. The linear nature of the programmes
and interruptions for use of the type facility, ensure that
practice in clinical problem solving as it would occur in a
clinical encounter, is not given. But this hazard applies to
all the teaching methods so far described. Indeed, this would
be an unreal aim, since the student in each case is undertaking
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a deliberate learning task in the way in which a clinician
is not.
Those programmes, such as Taylor's (1972), which require
students to estimate their numerical prior probabilities are
clearly working within a structure of aptitude which would
not pertain in clinical practice and would only transfer, if
at all, in a very mutated form. Such a programme does not
take advantage of the student's normal thinking processes and
is structurally inappropriate, unless its aim is to teach
students to think probabilistically in numerical terms. But
the type of more recent programme which de Dombal describes
(1972; 1974) may well alert the student to some analysis of
the clinical encounter and his own dynamic, problem solving,
data gathering role in it. Such awareness may well transfer
to the real clinical situation if bridging links of some type
are provided. As far as direct training in problem solving
thinking is concerned, again this method provides only an
indirect, mediated content. The student's original structure
-of knowledge is not challenged or tested for its appropriate-
ness, although structpral reorganisation, or flexibility, may
occur simply as a result of working through the simulation in
a conscious, analytical manner. Thus, computer assisted
training programmes seem, as yet, not to have addressed some
of the basic and fundamental issues for those who wish to
teach diagnostic thinking processes or clinical problem solv-
ing methods.
4.3	 Summary and Conclusions
Three concepts have been identified and discussed which seem
relevant and fundamental to teaching concerned with the
development of the diagnostic thinking process. These concepts
are: structure in 1earnin; transfer of learning; and the
relationship between problem solving and learning. It is
suggested that these three, at a minimum, must be taken into
account when devising teaching strategies for development of
the diagnostic thinking process.
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Strategies already devised and implemented are them discussed.
These are: the integrated curriculum; problem based learning;
training in hypothesis generation; cognitive skills training;
and, computer assisted training. Each of these is evaluated
in the light of the three fundamental concepts of Ilearning.
Each method is seen to have both advantages and disadvantages
and deal with the development of the diagnostic thinking pro-
cess with varying degrees of immediacy and directness.
On the basis of our discussion, description and review, we may
draw a number of conclusions:
Firstly, knowledge must be presented, and assimilated by the
student in a way that will encourage structuring appropriate
to its future use in the clinical problem solving Context and
process.
Secondly, knowledge must be structured such that transfer of
substance is facilitated across learning experiences and
clinical problems.
Thirdly, the structure of knowledge must be sufficiently flex-
ible to enable cognitive reorganisation as new information is
learned.
Fourthly, given the range of individual and case differences,
it is not appropriate to specify the ideal diagnostic thinking
process in other than general, cognitive terms of aptitude, not
substance. The diagnostic thinking process occurs in an
unpredictable environment, therefore that process itself, in
its substance and aptitude must be flexible. It is considered
that teaching strategies must present that process as an
entity amenable to conscious awareness and monitoring but
not necessarily to particular shaping other than correction
should cognitive error occur. Such presentation ot principles,
possibilities and ranges of thinking process should ensure
transfer of learning to any circumstance in which such thinking
occurs.
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Fifthly, our knowledge of the diagnostic thirking process,
even in its current general form, enables the aptitude to be
treated as substance for the purposes of teaching and learn-
ing while, simultaneously, permitting development of the
aptitude itself.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Research Design: Hypotheses, Research Methods, Subjects, Design
Validity
This chapter presents a statement of the research hypotheses of this
study. A broad description of the two research methods is given,
while details of the development and data analysis of these is reser-
ved for the subsequent two chapters. The description of research
methods is followed by details of the subjects of the study. The
chapter closes with a discussion and evaluation of the validity of
the research design, and a statement of the acceptable level of
statistical significance for the study.
5.1	 Hypotheses
Before presenting a statement of the research hypotheses, it
may be useful briefly to consider their derivation. Elstein
et al (1978), in discussing the diagnostic thinking process,
state that:
"There are obvious dangers in allowing hypotheses
and conjectures to influence data collection and
interpretation At an early stage. These dangers
include possibilities of premature closure,
selective information gathering and biased inter-
pretation of information". (p. 253)
The same could be said of research hypotheses, and so a large
nuiber of the present hypotheses, although framed in null
terms, are asking questions rather than making predictions
(see Hypotheses 5 to 9 and 17 to 20 inclusive). As far as
content of hypotheses is concerned, psychological theory
presents myriad potential explanations and models of behavi-
our, but no established criteria for selecting among them
(Paxton, 1976) or for amalgamating different explanations
(pound, 1978). The hypotheses are, therefore, largely empiri-
cal rather than theoretically committed. We consider that
"the macroscopic structure of the whole" (de Groot, 1965) is
defined by 'hypothesis generation and testing" and that
research hypotheses may be built upon this and upon the
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criticisms made and questions asked of this model (see Chapter
Three) and upon our expectations of its corollaries. We may
now consider these hypotheses.
With regard to the questionnaires in endocrinology and neuro-
logy, which have the following sections:
A. Mastery of factual knowledge.
B. Interpretation of symptoms and signs.
C. Selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities.
D. Formulating a diagnosis.
1. Accurate interpretation of symptoms and signs is the prim-
ary pre-requisite for diagnostic acumen, therefore scores
on section B will have more predictive power than scores
on sections A or C for scores on section D.
2. Mastery of the separate skills tested in sections A, B, C
and D is presumed to develop differentially during medical
education and clinical practice. Therefore, statistically
significant interaction effects will be found between
groups of subjects and sections of the questionnaire.
3. Given the presumed greater development of skill in sections
B and D with clinical practice rather than medical educat-
ion, observed differences between students' and registrars'
scores on these sections will be greater than those
observed on sections A and C. However, the greater exper-
ience and postgraduate learning of the registrars will
cause groups' scores on all sections to be statistically
significantly different in favour of registrars.
4. Sections A, B, C and D test different skills which may be
rehearsed in medical education and clinical practice
respectively to disproportionate degrees. Therefore, for
each group separately; statistically significant differences
will be found between scores on the four sections.
5. Scores on sections A, B and C combined have no predictive
power for scores on section D, either in endocrinology or
neurology.
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6. No differences will be apparent between students and
registrars in the relationship between scores across
sections A, B, C and D, either in endocrinology or
neurology.
7. Mo major differences will be observed between results
for endocrinology and neurology.
8. No developmental pattern will be apparent, such that
differences in scores between students and registrars
will not be interpretable in terms of differences
between medical education and clinical practice.
9. Results will have no interpretative value for current descriptions
of the diagnostic thinking process
Note Hypotheses 5 to 9 are framed in null terms as a matter
of formality only. They could equally as well have been
couched as questions.
With regard to the accounts by stimulated recall:
10. (a) Students, house officers and registrars will make
multiple pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations
of clinical information as it is progressively elici-
ted during the clinical interview.
(b) No differences will be observed between students,
house officers and registrars in the relative use of
pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations of
clinical information during the entire diagnostic
thinking process.
11. (Elstein et al (1978) find that, in terms of time of onsets
the first diagnostic hypothesis is generated by ten per
cent of the way through or within the first five minutes
of the clinical interview. Barrows et al (1978) find
that the first diagnostic hypothesis is advanced, on
average, within 28 sconds of the appearance of the main
complaint).
The present study will show that students, house officers
and registrars make immediate interpretative or evaluative
response to initial items of clinical information received
whether or not these actually constitute the patient's
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main complaint.
12. Accounts given by students, house officers and registrars
will indicate that the diagnostic thinking process invol-
yes working within a cognitive context or contexts
extrapolated from the clinical information available.
13. It will be observed for students, house officers and
registrars that reinterpretation of clinical information
occurs during the course of the clinical interview due to:
(a)New thoughts occurring about already interpreted
clinical information when no new information has been
added.
(b)New clinical information being elicited to facilitate
reinterpretation of clinical information already
elicited and interpreted.
14. No differences will be observed between students, house
officers and registrars in use of strategies for selection
between competing interpretations of clinical information.
15. Given that all subjects commence their clinical enquiry
with a question .intended to elicit the patient's present-
ing complaint, the course of the clinical interview can
be determined by the following factors:
(a) The flow of information as presented by the patient.
Cb) The flow of information as elicited by the subject
according to his interpretations of the clinical
information.
(c) The logical structure of the standard (taught) din-
ical history.
No differences will be observed between students, house
officers and registrrs in their use of (a), (b) and (c)
in determining the course of the clinical interview.
16. On review of the clinical interview, students, house
officers and registrars will identify areas of omission
in the information elicited from the patient. Such
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omission may be in two areas:
(a) Specific enquiry directed at the patient's problem,
symptoms and signs or arising from the subject's
interpretation of the clinical information elicited.
(b) General or routine enquiry.
17. Results will not indicate the mechanism of interpretation
and reinterpretation of the array of clinical information
as it is accumulated throughout the clinical interview.
18. Results will not indicate mechanismeof actual or potential
error in the diagnostic thinking process.
19. Results will not indicate any categories or types of
information other than those of the standard (taught)
clinical history, used to assist either in pre-diagnostic
or diagnostic interpretation of clinical information or
in selection of the most likely diagnosis.
20. Results will provide no indication of the nature of psyc-
hological probability in the diagnostic thinking process.
Note Hypotheses 17 to 20 are framed in null terms as a matter
of formality only. They could equally as well have been
couched as questions.
5.2	 Development of the Current Approach
This second section will present a brief introductory discuss-
ion followed by a description of an initial and unsuccessful
attempt to draw up clinical problems to test formal thinking
processes. The section concludes with the rationale for the
research approach finally adopted. The subsequent two sec-
tions (5.3 and 5.4) describe the research methods and ration-
ales.
Note During the stages of design, development, implementation
and analysis of research methods and results, Dr. Leslie
Sedal, Clinical Tutor and Consultant Neurologist, and
Dr. Philip Marsden, Clinical Tutor and Consultant
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Physician specialising in endocrinology,, advised on the
technical medical content of the work and used their
good offices to procure many of the subjects of the
study. Dr. Sedal advised on the questionnaire in neuro-
logy. Dr. Marsden advised on the questionnaire in
endocrinology, the clinical problems in propositional
logic and the account gathering study.
5.2.1 Introduction
Dudley (1971) points out that studies of the clinician in
action had,until that time, been either stylised or were only
Just beginning. He suggests a number of reasons for this:
"... first, the matter is a complex one and has
awaited hypotheses that can direct inquiry; second,
there is the distinct possibility that, in the
context of a clinical encounter, clinicians feel
threatened by an eavesdropper, particularly when
they may feel guilty because their own efficient
methods of pursuing a diagnostic pathway bear such
a small resexnblence to those they were taught in
medical school; third, the experiment is likely to
be an untidy one in that the intrusion of the
observer cannot help but significantly influence
both doctor and patients".
Despite, or perhaps because of, the conceptualLisation of the
process of 'hypothesis generation and testing as the method
of clinical problem solving, the first of Dudley's three
factors appears substantially to have remained. Although
obJectives may be stated (Elstein et al, 1978)), research
hypotheses and questions rarely are defined, and research
seems to have stagnated at the stage of quantification of
aspects of hypothesis generation and testing, rather than
advancing towards a deeper understanding, either practical or
theoretical of that broad process. As for Dudley's second
and third factors, a description of the present research pro-
vides an account of attempts to overcome these problems.
Firstly occurred an unsuccessful attempt. 	 -
5.2.2 Clinical Problems in Propositional Logic
Our initial approach to the study of clinicians' diagnostic
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thinking processes was based on research hypotheses stemming
from the obvious theoretical contiguity between the identified
process of hypothesis generation and testing and the Piagetian
stage of formal operations. Our intention was to test and
define the relationship between formal operational thinking in
everyday situations and the same in the solution of clinical
problems, our hypothesis being a developmentally related one
of a relationship between logical thinking in everyday life
and in clinical problem solving. Our main frame of reference,
having taken this approach, was a special application and cir-
cumstance of Piagetian theory rather than clinical problem
solving thinking per se. We therefore commenced by identifying
the sixteen binary operations which characterise formal
operational thinking. These operations are as follows
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958):
1. Conjunction (p.q) p is true and q is true simultaneously.
2. Non-implication (p.q) p is true and q is false.
3. Negation of ci (q [p]) q is false whether or not p is true.
4. Affirmation of p (p [q]) p is true whether or not q is
true simultaneously.
5. Disjunction (p V q) Either p is true or q is true or both
are true.
6. Negation of p (p [q] p is false whether or not q is true.
7. Affirmation of q (q [pJ q is true whether or not p is
true simultaneously.
8. Incompatibility (p/q) Either p is false or q is false or
both are false.
9. Conjunctive Negation (p.q) Both p and q are false.
10. Exclusion (pVVq) Either p is true or q is true.
11. Inverse Non-im2lication (p.q) q is true, p is false.
12. Equivalence (pq) Either p and q are true simultaneously,
or neither is true.
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13. Implication (pDq) If p is true, q is true; but if p is
false,q may be true or false.
14. Inverse Implication (pcq) if q is true, p is true; but
if q is false, p may be true or false.
15. Complete Affirmation (p*q) Admits of any binary conibin-
ation of p' p, q and q.
16. Complete Negation (0) Admits of no binary combination of
p, p, q or q.
These sixteen combinations result from taking as base elements
the four associations and combining them one by one, two by
two, and so on, forming a set of all possible combinations or
a lattice. (For a full discussion see Flavell, 1963).
On the basis of the sixteen binary operations, construction of
clinical problems was attempted, in the form of:
a) Statement.
b) Subject's action and reason.
C) Result.
d) Repeat (b) and (c to closure.
The problems were to be presented to the subject in a manner
analogous to de Dombal et al's (1972b) VERBAL mode. Each pro-
blem was developed by taking a clinical example of the binary
operation in question and working backwards. For example,
q [p) may be demonstrated in that a diagnosis of diabetes can
be made whether the fasting blood sugar level is normal or
raised as long as the glucose tolerance test (G.T.T.) is
abnormal. On the basis of this, a clinical problem of the
following type was developed:
A patient is found to have glycosuria and the blood
glucose is estimatedbut found to be normal. The
patient is reassured and goes back to work.
Has this patient had adequate investigation and
treatment?
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Two weeks later the doctor again checks the fasting
blood glucose and finds it elevated at 300mg %. Re
refers the patient for a G.T.T.
Do you regard this as sensible? Give reasons.
The G.T.T. result is normal. The patient is now
firmly convinced that he is a diabetic.
Are you also convinced? Give reasons".
For an example of a problem at a different stage of develop-
ment, let us take p.q, the truth of which implies the falsity
of p.q, p.q. and p.q (and vice versa). In developing this
problem, p was taken to be a grand mal seizure (or evidence
compatible with or suggestive of this) and q was taken to be
co-ordinated (cortical) cerebral activities such as communi-
cating speech or co-ordinated motor activity or memory. Prior
to solution of the problem, the subject is given all necessary
information about the features of syncope and epilepsy (see
Appendix 1). The operation in question, then, may be
established by the subject testing the following propositions:
To be proved true
p.q - evidence of grand mal seizure, no speech
possible.
To be proved false:
p.q - evidence of grand mal seizure, with
communicating speech.
p.q - no evidence of grand mal seizure, with
communicating speech.
- no evidence of grand mal seizure, but not
able to speak.
Some problems did not take the form already described, but were
presented more simply if appropriate. For example, when
considering p/q, a problew was presented for solution as follows:
"A patient says that she has not passed water for
5 days but has continued to drink normally. A
weight chart recorded by new nurses shows that
her daily weight has apparently not changed. What
is your action?"
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This impossible finding represents p.q which is therefore
false. Any of three other combinations may be true and each
should be considered by the subject, as follows:
p.q - patient incorrect, chart correct.
p.q - patient incorrect, chart incorrect.
p.q - patient correct, chart incorrect.
Testing, or having the intention of testing, each of the
above combinations would evidence formal operational thinking
in the operation of compatibility only.
Such clinical analogues were defined for each of the sixteen
binary operations. However, the proposed format of the prob-
lems was found to be unserviceable in that it was not proved
possible to construct a problem to test for the presence of a
certain thinking operation without having that problem
encourage the subject to think in the manner being tested. In
other words, due to the structure of the content, the problems
had the apparent propensity to guide the problem solver into
certain ways of thinking, regardless of whether or not he
would have done so when unguided. We concluded that this
intractable problem resulted from an unresolved conflict about
the aims and paradigms of the research, in essence about the
relative importance of the theory of formal operations and the
process of clinical problem solving.
5.2.3 Development of the Current Approach
The resolution of the conflict described entailed giving pri-
macy to the process of clinical problem solving and using
pscyhological theory to interpret our findings. Such a
resolution, then, implied a deeper study of the diagnostic
thinking process itself, rather than testing research hypoth-
eses about certain selected theoretical psychological approaches.
This approach implied recognition of the possible need to
embrace psychological and educational theory more generally for
its varied explanatory, descriptive and theoretical interpre-
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tative frameworks. It was considered that Piagetian theory
may only account for part of the process; for example, the
framework of formal operations may account for the nature of
hypothesis generation less well than it accounts for the
psychology of hypothesis testing. We therefore recommenced
with the point of view that other psychological and educat-
ional theories may be useful, and that the former, in
particular, would most usefully be identified and defined
during the course of the research rather than prior to the
stage of data collection.
Having adopted this approach, the research hypotheses accord-
ingly changed in emphasis and became more closely based on
the conclusions of the literature review. In particular,
the hypotheses are intended to elicit answers to some of the
questions put in 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 above. In parallel, it was
decided to make a study of the development of diagnostic
thinking processes from the final year of undergraduate medi-
cal education until the years of clinical practice at registrar
level. Our research design, therefore, is based on three
groups of subjects: •final year clinical medical students,
house officers and registrars. The questionnaire study,
however, omits house officers, and the groups of subjects are
different for the questionnaires and the account gathering
study. This problem is discussed below (section 5.6). Compar-
ison of these groups thus gives an indication of developmental
aspects of the process under study and of the goodness of fit
or appropriate relationship between undergraduate medical
education and clinical practice.
5.3	 Questionnaires in Endocrinology and Neurology - Rationale and
Description
This section discusses the intended research purpose of the
questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology.which form one
half of the present study. In addition, a brief description
of the format and structure of the questionnaires is given.
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Thus the questionnaires are here discussed from the point of
view of the overall research design only. Details of specific
content selection, format and validation are given separately
below (see Chapter Six).
5.3.1 Rationale
Each questionnaire comprises four sections as follows:
Section A: Mastery of factual knowledge.
Section B: Interpretation of symptoms and signs.
Section C: Selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities.
Section D: Formulating a diagnosis.
It is taken that the sections of each questionnaire sample all
the categories of teaching and learning extant in undergraduate
medical education, with the exception of the physical exami-
nation.
The research aim of each questionnaire is to supply quantitative
information concerning the relative roles and contributions of
the skills tested in sections A, B and C.in relation to diagno-
stic ability tested in section D, for students and practising,
experienced clinicians separately. In addition, the results
of these two groups of subjects may be compared in order to
gain an indication of the effects of medical education and
clinical practice on the relative roles and contributions of
the skills tested. Having parallel questionnaires in two
specialities enables a comparison of all results across differ-
ent content, in order to test the content specificity or
generalisability of findings, this latter point having far
reaching implications for the structure of medical education.
The specialities selected for the comparative study of the
effects of differing task environments were endocrinology and
neurology, both of which are sub-specialities of internal or
general medicine, but only one of which (neurology) is commonly
taught as a speciality in its own right within the medical
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school curriculum (General Medical Council, 1977). Both
specialities are clinically based, although endocrinology
may rely to a greater extent on laboratory investigations of
chemical pathology. However, the greatest difference between
these two specialities, apart from their concern with differ-
ent bodily systems, may, perhaps, be seen as methodological
and pedagogical. Although no evidence can be cited, it is
probably the case that neurology has the reputation of being
one of the most difficult specialities of internal medicine,
and yet in no other speciality is the process of diagnosis
made more explicit or a logical approach more emphasised. The
G.M.C. survey (1977) makes this clear:
"It is hoped that the neurology course will reinforce
students' basic medical science knowledge and
reinforce their appreciation that this knowledge
must be applied consciously and systematically in
diagnosis and investigations ... Great stress is
laid on the need for a full history and a full
description of all findings".
No other sub-speciality of general medicine states such a clear
philosophy. In neurology, students are traditionally taught
to:
a) localise the lesion, i.e. from the symptoms and signs,
decide which precise part of the nervous system has been
damaged;
b) define the general pathology, i.e. define the broad class
of disease - infection, cancer, etc.;
c) define the special pathology, i.e. identify the exact
infectious organism involved, or the nature of the cancer,
etc.
Some key tests in neurology require general anaesthesia and
occasionally have serious complications, therefore students are
normally taught to considr carefully which investigations will
be helpful and to come to as accurate a diagnosis as possible
on the clinical evidence before ordering tests.
The nature of endocrinology does not, routinely, lend itself
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to displaying any of these characteristics, being less
structured and formalised in its diagnostic surface structure
and having clinical manifestations of a more protean type.
The coincidence of similarities and differences makes neurology
and endocrinology appropriate specialities for comparison,
being neither too dissimilar and therefore prone to yielding
unrepresentatively large and possibly ungeneralisable observed
differences, nor too similar and so not evidencing real differ-
ences in test results. In addition, the traditional. teaching
of, at least, the surface structure of neurological diagnosis,
makes this difference a potentially interesting one for this
study.
5.3.2 Description of Format and Structure
Both questionnaires follow the same pattern of structure and
content. Each consists of four sections, three of which are
made up of five-option independent true-false multiple choice
questions. The remaining section requires statement of the
most likely diagnosis for a given case history. The skills
tested in sections A, B and C as described above (5.3.1) are
possible components o the skill tested on section D. See
Figure 8.1 below for a diagrammatic representation of the
relationship between sections of the questionnaire. Appendices
2 and 3 give the precise content of each questionnaire.
5.4	 Accounts by Videotape Stimulated Recall
The study of account gathering by videotape stimulated recall
of the diagnostic thinking process during a clinical interview
is separate from the questionnaire study just described, but
complementary to it, measuring or tapping different aspects of
the process under study.
5.4.1 Rationale	 -
The questionnaire study described above yields a quantitative
indication of the power or weight of the various skills tested
In the first three sections in predicting the scores of subjects
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on the test of making a diagnosis. The study also yields
information concerning subjects' relative mastery of the four
skills tested. However, such data do not and cannot indicate
the manner of cognitive functioning. It is very much of the
'black box' type, such that the experimenter is aware of input
and output, but not of the nature of the mediating, causal or
dynamic process which connects the two. A further weakness of
the questionnaire as a research instrument in this field is
its low-fidelity nature. It cannot be argued that responding
to a written case history is really like interviewing a patient
and forming a diagnostic opinion. The dynamic, contextual
aspects of the clinical interview are entirely missing. The
subject has no control over data presented in a questionnaire,
neither is he subject to the many sources of cues and distrac-
tions, difficulties and facilitatory aspects of the real
clinical interview. And if he were, a questionnaire could not
tap his responses or the dynamic of his thinking. In brief,
the diagnostic thinking process, as such, in its richness,
with all its vagaries will not be reflected in the results of
an objective questionnaire. Therefore,- having achieved
measurement of different skills and their predictive values,
some other reseaxch instrument is required to indicate the
cognitive processes which yield those predictive values.
Given that the diagnostic thinking process occurs only under
conditions where a diagnosis must be made, then a high-fidelity
research instrument was required. The experiences of the
flichigan and McMaster groups described above (sections 3.1.1
and 3.1.2) indicate the usefulness of the method of stimulated
recall and provide a vicarious research experience, demonstra-
ting the strengths and weaknesses of the method. It is
considered that neither group has yet produced an adequate,
reasoned assessment of the method as a research instruinentaM
each has, therefore, introduced sources of invalidity or unre-
liability as described above also (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2).
Given its apparent high-fidelity nature and the possibility
of providing an established validation and reasoned assessment
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of the method, and thus armed with the experience of others,
a form of stimulated recall, was selected as appropriate to
the demands of this study. Chapter Nine below presents the
full discussion and establishment of method validity.
5.4.2 Description
The subject (either student, house officer or registrar)
interviewed a patient in order to establish a diagnosis as
far as possthle and reasonable. The clinical interview was
videorecorded. Immediately following the completion of the
interview the subject and the experimenter reviewed the video-
tape in short sections while the subject commented in detail
upon his own thoughts as they had occurred while interviewing
the patient. The subject-experimenter phase was audio-
recorded and a transcript prepared of the dialogue and content
of each short videotape section replayed. The transcript was
then subjected to content analysis. Chapter Nine below
presents full details of the method,
5.5	 Relationship Between the Questionnaire Study and the Account
Gathering Study
It must be emphasised that the two parts of the present research
are separate, but complementary, and have separate samples of
subjects. It is argued (section 5.6) that the groups of sub-
jects may be treated as samples from the same population where
they are of the same category and as successive samples taken
at intervals of time from the same population where they are
of different categories (see 5.6 below). This accepted, the
two research instruments may be seen as focussing on different
aspects of the same process.
The questionnaires provide a quantitative baseline, against
which the qualitative remilts of account gathering may better
be interpreted. But the questionnaires provide only a static
measure of a dynamic process. The questionnaires approach the
diagnostic thinking process from a more analytical point of
view than the more global approach of the accounting gathering.
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The types of variable which each research method addresses
are also different in that account gathering cannot measure
knowledge, but the greater difference is found in the manner
in which each method approaches its variables. The question-
naires measure absolute levels and highlight relationships
between variables in a manner which fails to reflect the
manner of use of variables and their changing or dynamic
nature. These latter aspects are the domain of account
gathering.
Thus the complementary research methods of this study provide
information about the content and structure of thought, about
its substance and its process. Neither method alone could
achieve this wide spectrum. The two together, hciever, should
facilitate a more full and rounded account of the diagnostic
thinking process than has hitherto been reported. Pool (1959)
summarises this point:
"It should not be assumed that qualitative methods
are insightful, and quantitative ones merely
mechanical methods for checking hypotheses. The
relationship is a circular one; each provides new
insights on which the other can feed". (p.192)
5.6	 Subjects
It has been stated that the subjects of the two studies form
separate samples which can be treated as though coming from
the same populations. This section describes separately the
subjects for each study and their comparability. It closes
with a discussion of the comparability of the subjects of the
two separate studies.
5.6.1 The Questionnaire Study
Table 5.1 shows details of age and sex for each group of
subjects for each questioznaire.
The subjects for each questionnaire are 35 final year clinical
medical students and 35 post-membership (Royal College of
Physicians) registrars. The students were from four London
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Table 5.1 Quetjonnaire in Endocrinology and Neurology:
Age and Sex of Subjects
Number	 Sex	 Age Range Mean Standard
Group	 in Group	 - - in Years Age Deviation
Endocrinology	 35	 21 14 -	 22 - 31 22.97	 1.69
students
Endocrinology 35	 33	 1 1	 28 - 46 30.15
	
3.93
registrars
Neurology	 35	 16 11 7
	 22 - 39 23.5	 3.35
students
Neurology 35	 30	 1	 4	 28 - 42 30.44	 3.21.
registrars
* Refers to subjects who failed to give personal details of
age and sex.
and two provincial medica1 schools and the registrars from an
additional London hospital and many provincial centres. Our
results, then, are based on a wide range of backgrounds and
experiences; within group variation is therefore taken into
account in the validation procedures applied to the questionn-
aires, However, the heterogeneltyof backgrounds and experiences
is considered a positive feature of the research design, likely
to randomize any effects of special environments and to reveal
common features across all subjects.
Since the two groups of subjects are to be treated as though
they are a longitudinal sample when, in fact, they are two
separate cross-sectional samples, we must consider the legiti-
macy of this approach by proving the comparability of the
samples. In essence, it is necessary to show that if any
differences are found between students and registrars these are
due to development of the latter group from a state similar to
that found in the former group. This is a reasonable conten-
tion.
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Although medical education is constantly changing, developing
and improving, the changes which have occurred are not such
as would alter the processes which concern the present study.
Most changes in medical education have occurried in the fields
of medical teacher training, attitude measurement, teaching
methods and assessment, as a brief review of the journal of
the Association for the Study of Medical Education reveals.
Changes in curriculum content or characteristics of entering
medical students are rarely reported. Isolated changes may
occur in individual medical schools, but it cannot be said
that any sweeping and general changes in curriculum content
or student characteristics have occurred during the past dec-
ade. The move towards integration discussed in chapter Four
is probably the most widespread of changes in that most medical
schools now attempt some form of integration, often on a very
small scale. It is argued, however, in Chapter Four that
while transfer of learning may be facilitated by the integra-
ted curriculum and thereby produce a positive, but mediated,
effect upon the diagnostic thinking process, that process
itself is unlikely to be altered and overall curriculum content
does not necessarily change. We would argue, then f
 that it is
a reasonable analytical approach to take our students and
registrars as though they are a longitudinal sample, and att-
ribute differences to the relative effects of medical education
and clinical practice, since no substantial changes have
occurred in the former since the registrars were themselves
students. In addition, all groups of questionnaire subjects
are from both London and provincial areas. W may conclude that
comparison of student sample with registrar sample is quite in
order and that differences may be attributed to the relative
experience of medical education and clinical jpractice. In
addition, we may conclude that comparison of subjects in endo-
crinology with those in neurology is also permissible since no
identifiable group differences exist between the student samples
respectively.
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5.6.2 The Account Gathering Study
The subjects who gave accounts by stimulated recall were:
22 final year clinical medical students
22 pre-registration house officers
22 post-membership (Royal College of Physicians) registrars
The students were taken from one London medical school, while
the house officers and registrars were from a London teaching
hospital and a London district general hospital. Distribution
by sex within each group is as folls:
Students:	 7 female, 15 male
House Officers: 6 female, 16 male
Registrars:	 2 female, 20 male
Details of age are available for students only (in years):
Mean age: 23
S.D.:	 1.8
Range:	 22 - 30
In terms of years of clinical practice, house officers, by def-
inition, have less than one year of experience. The group of
registrars' years of 1inica1 practice are as follows:
Mean:	 5.2
S.D.:	 1.4
Range:	 3 - 7
As with the questionnaire study, the groups of subjects are to
be treated as though they were a longitudinal sample when, in
fact, they are separate cross-sectional samples. The arguments
discussed in 5.6.1 above, therefore, also apply to the account
gathering study. However, an additional point must be made in
order to show the comparability of the group of house offices
and the group of registrars. This is to einphasise that not
only have no substantial changes occurred in medical education
since the clinicians were students, but also that no substantial
changes have occurred in clinical practice since the group of
registrars qualified. In other words, we must point to the fact
that the clinical experience of the house officers matches that
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of the registrars when they were house officers themselves.
This being so, then we may again conclude that our treatment
of our three groups of subjects as a longitudinal, sample is
quite justified.
5.6.3 Comparability of Questionnaire and Account Gathering Subjects
Since the two research methods are to be used in a complement-
ary manner, each to add interpretative value to the other, then
comparability of subjects across research methods must be
established. Groups of subjects are as shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Subjects of the Complementary Studies
Questionnaires
Account
Subjects	 Endocrinology Neurology
	
Gathering
Students	 35	 35	 22
House officers	 *	 -	 22
Registrars	 35	 35	 22
From the point of view of the research design, there are two
parallel research methods but three parallel research samples,
in that the subjects for the questionnaires in endocrinology
and neurology were also separate samples. We have, however,
established the longitudinal. comparability of samples within
methods. considering the comparability of samples across
studies, all students were in their final clinical year, while
all registrars had gained their membership of the Royal College
of Physicians. The only discernible, but minor, difference is
that questionnaire subjects are from both London and provincial
areas, while all account giving subjects are from London only.
However, this difference is lessened in that not all registrars
and house officers had initially trained in London. It is not
considered that this constitutes any jeopardising degree of
variability with regard to the subject matter of this study.
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Neither medical education nor clinical practice varies across
the country to any invalidating extent. It is therefore
argued that conservative comparison of results of the coinpie-
mentary studies is within the limits of the research design.
5.7	 Design Validity
A research design is successful to the extent that it accounts
for such extraneous variables as may bear upon the research,
and to the extent that it allows for "optimal statistical
efficiency" (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). All research is
concerned with the relations between variables and in develop-
ing the design for research Perguson (1966) suggests that:
"... the experimenter must (1) select the values of
the independent variable, or variables, to be com-
pared; (2) select the subjects for the experiment;
(3) apply rules or procedures whereby subjects are
assigned to the particular values of the independ-
ent variable; (4) specify the observations or
measurements to be made on each subject".
In addition, in order to calculate the degree to which results
are generalisable, the research must be designed in such a way
that it lends itself to appropriate data analysis. The precise
method and type of analysis must be carefully chosen - in
effect the methods to be applied in the analysis of the data
and the type of questions which research can answer are deter-
mined by the nature of the variables.
This short discussion, then, has introduced three major areas
to be considered in any research design - internal validity,
external validity and data analysis. This section deals with
the first two of these. Data analysis is discussed in the two
chapters which	 the development of the questionnaires
(Chapter Six) and of the account gathering method (Chapter
Nine).
5.7.1 Internal Validity
A research design is internally valid if the factor to which
results are attributed is the only one possible, and if those
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results themselves are reliable and valid. That is to say
that all extraneous variables which may influence the result
or cause results to be ambiguous must be controlled or
accounted for. Reliability and validity of data are discussed
and established below (see Chapters Six and Nine). We may
determine the extent to which the present design is internally
valid by considering the factors which may jeopardise it.
Campbell and Stanley (1963) cite eight such factors.
The effects of history, maturation and testing are concerned
with designs of the test-treatment- retest type and are not
of relevance to the present design in which each group of
subjects is studied only once, and comparisons made between
groups. Likewise, the effects of statistical regression are
not relevant to the present design. Instrumentation, however,
is a relevant variable. This jeopardising effect occurs when
changes in the calibration of a measuring instrument or
changes in the observers or scorers used produce changes in
the obtained measurement. Multiple choice questions are not
subject to such a factor, scoring being purely objective. Our
discussion of the method of account gathering by stimulated
recall (Chapter Nine), however, indicates that instrumentation
is seen as one of its major potentially jeopardising extraneous
variables, in the sense that slight differences in the impleme-
ntation of the method may cause large differences in the depth
and quality of accounts. For this reason careful attention
was paid to standardisation of the method and the same experi-
menter gathered all 66 accounts. Jeopardising effects of
Instrumentation have therefore been minimised.
A second possibly jeopardising factor is found in biases
concerned with differential selection of respondents for the
comparison groups. Campbell and Stanley (1963) discuss this
variable in relation to groups which are taken as comparable.
The present design, for each of its separate research instruments,
deliberately compares groups of subjects contrasting in their
amounts of experience of medical education and clinicaipractice,
but similar where those experiences overlap as shown in 5.6.1
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and 5.6.2. However, the jeopardy of the selection variable
must be considered in relation to the admissible degree of
comparison between the parallel, complementary studies. This
is discussed in 5.6.3 above and comparability of samples
established. The selection variable, therefore, is not a
j eopardising factor.
Campbell and Stanley's (1963) final two possibly jeopardising
variables, experimental mortality and interactions between the
variables, do not apply to the present research design. It
is, therefore, considered that internal validity is demonstr-
ated.
5.7.2 External Validity
Research has external validity to the extent that its results
are generalisable to other sections of the same population
and also to other populations. If the results are specific
only to the sample studied, for whatever reason, then the
design has no external validity. We may determine the extent
to which the present design is -externally valid by considering
the factors which ma jeopardise it.
There are two possible factors which may jeopardise the external
validity of the present design; these are the representativeness
of the samples and the reactive effects of the research methods.
There would seem to be little reason to suppose that the pre-
sent samples are unrepresentative of British final year medical
students, house officers and medical registrars, although we
may not be justified in generalising to registrars in surgical
specialities.
There are differences in the structure of medical education
from school to school in ritain, for example in the degree of
integration of clinical and pre-clinical curricula or of
separate specialities, and some of our subjects from provincial
schools and hospitals have come from schools which have been
particularly pioneering and innovative in this way. However,
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our validation processes for the questionnaires show a
degree of within group homogeneity which may indicate that
the products of these differing structures themselves differ,
if at all, in areas other than those tested (see Chapter Six).
We may therefore presume adequate representativeness cZ our
present samples of the population of final year medical
students, house officers and medical registrars.
Considering the second possible jeopardising variable, any
reactive effects of the research methods themselves would pre-
clude generalisation of findings to populations not exposed
to those methods. In other words, there may be the possibility
that results are artefacts of the research method,. The
developmental and validation procedures applied to the quest-
ionnaires, and wide use of such methods for assessment in both
undergraduate and postgraduate medical education wouldL suggest
appropriateness of the task and familiarity of the method to
the subjects. These are the only possible precautions to be
taken against reactive effects. It is also shown that the
accounts are based on a considerable degree of realism in a
familiar situation, while Chapter Nine also shows that most
subjects felt that they had experienced no reactive effects of
the research method.
To this extent, then, we may be confident in the vaLiuity of
generalising our findings to the population from which our
subjects are drawn. No conclusions may be stated abouit gener-
alisability to other populations, but comparison of fiindings
with those, for example, of the American and Canadian studies
may give an indication of the feasibility of generalisation.
5.8	 The Acceptable Level of Significance: p..Ol
In deciding the acceptable significance level for any research
study, it is necessary to decide how infrequently a result
should occur before the null hypothesis may be rejected (Jolly
and Gale, 1976). This decision may be based on a number of
factors. In the present study it is considered likely, given
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the differing levels of experience of the three types of
subjects, that differences will occur in the population
relatively frequently. In addition, the results of these
research instruments themselves must be subject to conserva-
tive interpretation, on the one hand because of the low
fidelity nature of one instrument (which is, nonetheless,
both valid and reliable), and, on the other hand, because of
the uncertainties of completion of data collection by means
of the second instrument. Neither of these features is
invalidating providing that data is interpreted conservatively.
For these reasons, the acceptable level of significance for
the results of this study is set at p<.Ol. This more rigor-
ous level than p<.O5 impLies the possibility of relying with
greater confidence on our observed results as real, rather
than as caprices of sampling, research design or instrument-
ation.
Exceptions to this significance level occur with regard to
development of the questionnaires. The reason for exceptions
will be explained in the text. However, for all test results,
the acceptable level	 significance remains at p<.Ol.
5.9	 Summary and Conclusions
A statement of the research hypotheses of the present study
is given. The historical development of the current approach
is described, including initial unsuccessful approaches. A
broad description and discussion of rationale is then given for
each of the two parallel research methods of the study which
are structured questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology
and account gathering by videotape stimulated recall. The
relationship between these two methods is discussed.
The subjects of the studies are described and the rationale
for horizontal and vertical comparability of samples presented.
Finally, both the internal and external validity of the research
design and the acceptable level of statistical significance
are established.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Questionnaire Study 1: Validity, Reliability and Data Analysis
This chapter presentS a discussion of the identification, development
and rationale of the content and structure of the questionnaires in
endocrinology and neurology in terms of their associated validity and
reliability.
In addition, the statistical methods of data analysis are described.
It will be remembered from section 5.3 above that the questionnaires
in endocrinology and neurology have the same components, each comprising
four sections. Each section deals with a different aspect of the
diagnostic process as follows:
A. ?lastery of factual knowledge.
. Interpretation of symptoms and signS.
C. Selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities.
D. Formulating a diagnosis.
Sections A, B and C comprise five option independent true-false multiple
choice questions. For a discussion of the rationale for the selection
of this format, see Appendix 4. Section D requires the subject to write
the most likely diagnosis for each of five given case histories. Quest-
ions in section C are based on the case histories also.
There is some considerable repetition of topics across sections to
enable interpretation of the relationship of scores across sections,
each section testing a different aspect of clinical knowledge and
(cognitive) skill. The content of the questionnaires is reproduced in
Appendices 2 and 3. It will be noted that sections C and D are not
separate within the questionnaires, although they are separated for
purposes of analysis. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarise Appendices 2 and 3,
showing the topics of each section, the total number of questions per
section and the possible range o raw scores per section, for the
questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology respectively. Where a
diagnosis is made up of separate components, each part is awarded a
separate mark. For a description and discussion of the instructions
given to respondents, policy on guessing and the scoring schedule, see
Appendix 5.
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Number of Possible range
Section	 Topics	 questions of raw scores
A	 Juvenile onset diabetes mellitus
	
12	 -60 to +60
Hyperthyroidism
Maturity onset diabetes mellitus
Acromegaly
Hypothyroidism
Primary hyperparathyroidism
ICleinfelter '8 syndrome
Cushing' s syndrome
Autoimmune thyroiditis
Addison's disease
Turner' s syndrome
Phaeochrom cytoma
B	 Hypoglycaemia	 12	 -60 to +60
Hypercalcaemia
Diabetes insipidus
Infertility
Short stature
Gynaecomastia
Delayed puberty
Goitre
Hypopitui. tan sm
Tetany
Virilism
Obesity
C and D Myxoedema	 C - 15	 -75 to +75
Diabetes mellitus
	
0 - 5	 0 to +6
Klinefelter' s syndrome
Bronchial carcinoma with ectopic
ADH secretion
Primary hyperparathyroidism
Table 6.1 Questionnaire in Endocrinology - Topics, Number
of Questions, Range of Raw Scores Possible
Having described the content and structure of the questionnaires, we
may now procede to consider questions of validity and reliability.
Although multiple choice questionnaires are located in the ranks of
testing methods under the broad classification of objective tests,
the actual degree of objectivity associated with any test is largely
dependent upon the thoroughness of its design and development proced-
ures, the appropriateness of its content and instructions to the
respondent and item selection. The method of development and design
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Number cf Possible range
Section	 Topics	 questions of raw scores
A	 Vitamin B12 deficiency	 12	 -60 to +60
Parkinsonism
Migraine
Multiple sclerosis
Intracranial haemorrbage
Cerebral tumour
Epilepsy
Myaesthenia gravis
Meningitis
Skeletal compression syndromes
Aicholism
Drug therapy
B	 Upper and lower motor neuron
lesions	 10	 -50 to +50
Cerebellar lesions
Extrapyramidal disorders
Sensory abnormalities
Cranial nerve lesions
Spinal nerves and roots
Cerebral lesions
Coma
Raised intracranial pressure
Neurological hi story
C and D Metastatic carcinoma in left
cerebral hemisphere from pri-
	
CL5	 -75 to +75
mary focus in lung 	 D 5	 0 to +16
Raemorrhage from aneurysm of
right communicating artery at
base of brain
Multiple sclerosis, lower
thoracic spinal cord, T10 or
slightly higher.
Motor neuron disease, lower
cervical, upper thoracic
spine,
Tumour of 8th nerve,
acoustic neuroma, rigit cere-
bello-pontine angle
Table 6.2 Questionnaire in Neurology - Topics, Number
of Questions, Range of Raw Scores Possible
of the questionnaires took into account each of the above factors.
Both questionnaires were subjected to the same procedure for estab-
lishing validity and reliability.
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6.1	 Validity of the Questionnaires
In constructing any test, the question of its degree of
validity is of great importance. As Gronlund (1971) describes
it:
"Validity refers to the extent to which the results
of an evaluation procedure serve the particular
uses for which they are intended". (p.75)
He qualifies this statement, pointing out that validity refers
to results rather than to the instrument, that its presence is
a matter of degree, and that is is always specific to some
particular use. Guilford (1954) makes a further point that
validity depends upon reliability. The establishment of
reliability of the questionnaires is discussed in 6.2 below.
Validity refers to the extent to which a test actually measures
that which it purports to measure, while reliability refers
to the consistency or repeatability of findings using the test.
Validity may take a number of forms, depending upon the purpose
of the instrument. Cronbach (1960) identifies the three major
types, and the question they each answer, thus:
(a) Criterion oriented validity, answering the question: Uow
do measures of some valued performance (criterion) relate
to test scores 7
(b) Content validity, answering the question: Do the obser-
vations truly sample the universe of tasks or the
situations they are claimed to represent 7
(c)Construct validity, answering the questions: How can
scores on the test be explained psychologically ? Does
the test measure the attribute it is said to measure 7
Let us consider each of these in turn in relation to our present
tests.
6.1.1 Criterion Oriented Validity
This may be of two types: predictive validity, when the second
measure may be obtained at a future date; and, concurrent
validity, when the second measure should be obtained on some
present performance. For our purposes, a measure of concurrent
validity was too difficult to attain. Gronlund (1971) warns
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that problems "in locating a suitable criterion of success
for the purpose of test validation are not unusual. The
selection of a satisfactory criterion is one of the most
difficult problems in validating a test." (p. 89)
Our tests contain four elements of medical skill - mastery of
factual knowledge, interpretation of symptoms and signs,
selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities, and forming a
diagnosis. Our purpose is to discover the contributions of
the first three of these to skill in the fourth. It follows,
that the relationship between these elements has yet to be
established. To use any one of them as the criterion is,
therefore, inappropriate. The only remaining element of
clinical skill is in performing the clinical examination of
the patient. Again, the relationship of this skill to the
four aspects already described is unknown, and valid, reliable
measures of skill in examination of the patient are either
difficult to achieve (Marshall and Ludbrook, 1972) or inappro-
priate to our situation, requiring resources and manpower not
available to us (for example, Harden et al's (1975) combination
of practical and written examinations, or Holmes et al's (1978)
use of videotape, McQ's and simulated patients, or Harden and
Gleeson's (1979) objective structured clinical examination).
Most importantly, however, such a criterion was considered
inappropriate.
With regard to predictive validity of the questionnaires, an
indirect indication of this may be inferred by the simple
inspection of raw scores of students and registrars. For each
questionnaire, the ranges of these scores do not overlap (see
section 6.2.2). It may therefore be assumed that each
questionnaire has a degree of predictive validity sufficient
to assign group membership of a respondent. The analysis of
results attempts to define this function more closely by dis-
criminant analysis. Initially, however, calculation of the
intraclass correlation co-efficient will Indicate the extent
to which each questionnaire discriminates between the classes
of subjects in question. Appendix 6 gives a detailed discuss-
ion of the nature, purpose and formula of the intraclass
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correlation co-efficient (R). Appendix 7 shows the derivatioii
of the present value.
Calculation of the intraclass correlation co-efficient (R)
indicates that both questionnaires are highly successful in
discriminating between the two groups of subjects (p< .01 in
each case). Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give summaries of the findings.
Table 6.3 Intraclass Correlation Co-efficient CR) Summary of
Results for Endocrinology Questionnaire
Source of variation
Total
Between
Withiis
SS	 df.	 MS
71621.3	 69
27909.2	 1	 37909.2
33712.1	 68	 495.8
R
0.68
(p <.01)
Table 6.4 Intrac1ass Correlation Co-efficient (R) Summary of
Results for Neurology Questionnaire
Source of variation 	 SS	 df.	 MS	 R
Total	 50985.8	 69
between	 23442.4	 1	 23442.4
Withia	 27543.4	 68	 405	 0.62
p <.01)
We may conclude, then, that both questionnaires are powerful in
discriminating between the groups in question.
6.1.2 Content Validity
Although our purpose was not either to sample representatively
or cover entirely the subject areas in question, content valid-
ity of the questionnaires is still a matter for consideration,
since it concerns not only the adequacy of the sample but also
- 151 -
the appearance of the test, in other words, the test should
have face validity and be, as Guilford (L'954) says, "palatable
to the examinee" • In terms of having defined four aspects of
the clinician's skill for study, and having allocated each a
section of the questionnaire, adequate sampling of the skills
to be studied became more amenable to control.
Initial selection of content areas was defined on the rather
subjective level of the subject experts' evaluations of dis-
orders which were either common in practice or in teaching,
or important for the student and cliniciani to know, or both.
Their evaluations, of necessity, were based on their experi-
ence of teaching at undergraduate and postgraduate level and
on clinical practice in their respective fields. In addition,
the content of standard textbooks was consulted. Other subject
experts may possibly disagree with the sefl.ection of content
made, but this would not jeopardise the usefulness of the
questionnaires, since our purpose was not either to sample
representatively or cover entirely the s1bject areas in quest-
ion, but was to determine the relatlonship between factual
knowledge, interpretation of symptoms and signs, selecting
and testing diagnostic possibilities, and diagnostic acumen
in those disorders selected from the popuLation of disorders
within each subject area. Selection of content, therefore,
was not a crucial issue, given that it was appropriate to the
respondents (students and registrars). Tlais has been demon-
strated by the process of test analysis by the intraclass
correlation co-efficient and will be further demonstrated by
item analysis.
Face validity of selection of MCQ options for each item, and
of the questionnaire as a whole, was determined by reference
to subject specialists of. at least consultant status for each
questionnaire separately. In total, six consultant neurolo-
gists and nine consultant physicians, specialising in
endocrinology, were asked to ccmiplete the relevant questionnaire
in the way indicated by placing a tick or cross as necessary
after each option and to give the most likely diagnosis for
each case history. Each consultant was given a clear descrip-
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tion of the structure, sections, Intended use and target
respondents for the questionnaire.
Any options on which the subject specialists disagreed were
eliminated and replaced and judged again. By this process,
each questionnaire came to represent the agreed opinion of
the subject specialists consulted. Face validity is thus,
established.
6.1.3 Construct Validity
Since it is not our intention to interpret results on these
questionnaires in terms of any psychological trait or quality,
a measure of construct validity is not necessary.
6.1.4 Validity by Assumption
Gui].ford (1954) mentions validity by assumption, whereby it is
assumed that scores measure what they are intended to measure.
He gives the example of achievement test scores. In order to
justify attribution of validity by assumption, it is necessary
to have a clear definition of the content and of the kinds of
items necessary to indicate mastery of that content. On these
grounds, the content or face validity of the questionnaires,
in combination with the multiple choice question and case
history format may appear to justify assumptions of validity.
6.2	 Validation by Test and Item Analysis
Test and item analysis procedures can be seen as a further,
indirect check on the validity of a scale or questionnaire
by demonstrating the goodness of its individual items and
overall characteristics. Such analyses have been described
as purifying the item pooi (Oppeheim, 1966). In effect, such
procedures occupy a grey area between validation and estima-
tion of reliability, but in the present case we shall take
them as a species of content validation.
The selection of an appropriate method of test and item ana-
lysis for the multiple choice questions presented some special
problems, since the questionnaires were designed to discrimi-
nate between groups, not between individuals. As Lewy (1973)
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points out, some common indices of item analysis are thus
rendered inappropriate, since items which differentiate within
classes of respondent will not necessarily differentiate
between them. This is to be expected, since the basic units
of observation (individual scores as opposed to class averages)
are so different.
Parameters commonly used for selecting items for a multiple
choice questionnaire to discriminate between individuals
include the following:
(a)Correlation of the item with the total test score.
(b)Item difficulty level, customarily obtained by dividing
the number of correct responses to the item by the total
number of responses. A basic principle of test writing,
as Wesman (1971) sees it is to "adapt the level of
difficulty of the item to the group and purpose for
which it is intended". In general, however, items with
either a very high or very low difficulty level are dis-
carded since items that are very easy or very difficult
add little to the effectiveness of a test. An item with
a difficulty levdl of about .5 will yield as many dis-
criminations as possible, and therefore is most desirable.
However, as Wesman (1971) continues, if the respondents
are very heterogeneous, a wider spread of difficulty may
be more appropriate.
It is clear that, having calculated either of the indices
cited, the result could only have meaning for the particular
reference group sample. As Lewy (1.973) points out, two items
of difficulty level at about 50 per cent and having equal
correlation co-efficients with the total test score may be
entirely different in the efficiency with which they discrim-
inate among classes. The intended comparison of groups rather
thar individuals, rendered the three indices, as described,
inappropriate. Our final method of analysis, therefore, was
by test difficulty per group, and calculation of the phi
co-efficient for each test item. We shall consider these in
turn.
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6.2.1 Test Difficulty per Group
Wood (1977) reconmiends calculating an item difficulty index
per group to give indication of the fairness of comparing
the groups. However, in a case such as ours fairness is only
an appropriate concept as a matter of degree. Given that we
are expecting quite large differences between our groups and
that our primary interest is in the relationship between
scores on the four sections of the questionnaire for students
and registrars separately rather than in comparison of the
absolute scores of each group, fairness in this case can only
mean that the test as a whole is neither so easy that all
registrars can respond correctly to all items, nor so difficult
that no student can answer correctly any item. For a brief
description of the calculation of test difficulty, see Appendix
8.
The results of calculating the index of test difficulty for
each group separately are as follows:
Endocrinology Questionnaire
Students	 - 0.18
Registrars	 - 0.49
Neurology Questionnaire
Students	 - 0.30
Registrars	 - 0.62
The above indices may appear to attain only rather low values
which would indicate that the questionnaires were difficult for
the respondents, particularly for the two groups of students.
However, it must be emphasised that these values are extremely
conservative estimates and that the low values may, to some
extent, be an artefact of the method employed. The test mean
was calculated taking only those items for which the respond-
ent had scored +5. Thus, in order for his score to be counted,
the respondent must have answered correctly all five options
of the item. This procedure will artificially lower the test
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mean. Had the index been calculated using scores on each
option of each item separately, the resultant value of the
index would have been considerably higher.
However, the index as calculated is quite satisfactory for the
purpose, that of showing very clearly that the difficulty
levels for each questionnaire separately were different for
the two groups of respondents in the expected manner, the val-
ues being relatively higher for registrars than students in
each case, indicating greater test difficulty for students. In
addition, the indices show that the neurology questionnaire is
slightly easier than the questionnaire in endocrinology for
both groups, but that the difference in difficulty levels
between the two groups is similar for the two questionnaires
(0.31 for the endocrinology questionnaire; 0.32 for the neuro-
logy questionnaire). The fairly wide spread of difficulty
evidenced is quite appropriate in this case of very hetero.-
genous subjects (Wesman, 1971) and the pattern of relative
difficulty is also as expected.
6.2.2. The Phi Co-efficient (4))
This index is obtained by comparing the performances of the
upper and lower scoring halves of a group of respondents, as
described by Hubbard and Clemans (1961). Although this index
is not strictly appropriate to our present case, since it is
designed to identify items which successfully discriminate
between individuals rather than groups of respondents, it was
decided to apply it for a number of reasons. Firstly, we have
no other quantitative index applied to each item separately
and the phi co-efficient can provide us with such an indica-
tion of the behaviour of each item. Secondly, and
conveniently, when taking the upper 25 scoring registrars,
and the lower 25 scoring students for each questionnaire,
their total scores do not overlap. The ranges of total scores
were as follows:
Endocrinology Questionnaire:
Students	 51 to 129
Registrars 141 to 178
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Neurology Questionnaire:
Students	 74 to 130
Registrars 143 to 175
We may therefore consider that comparing these two sets of
individuals is a form of group comparison.
Calculation of phi co-efficient values was performed post hoc,
for purposes of description rather than prescription; and,
since the index is not thoroughly appropriate to our purpose,
it was not intended that any item be excluded from the quest-
ionnaires on the basis of its associated phi co-efficient
value. A value of 4) not reaching a statistically significant
level does not indicate that the item is of positive detriment
to the test, but only that it does not add to its efficiency.
The phi co-efficient was nonetheless considered useful as an
interpretative, descriptive statistic and so was performed.
Appendix 9 gives details of calculation formulae amd Appendix
10 shows results for each item of the two questionnaires.
It is shown that six items from the endocrinology questionnaire,
and two from the neurology questionnaire fail to reach a
statistically significant value of 4. It must be re-emphasised
that these items are not of detriment to the test, but merely
fail to add to its efficiency in discriminating between the
two groups. That being the case, and since values of the phi
co-efficient were determined post hoc, these items are retained.
The items failing to reach a statistically significant value of
4) are not concentrated in any one section of either questionn-
aire.
No other indices of test validity were calculated. It is con-
sidered that satisfactory validity is demonstrated by the
indices discussed. We ma therefore proceed to a consideration
of test reliability.
6.3	 Reliability and Homogeneity of the Questionnaires
Test reliability indicates to what extent scores would be
consistent across different administrations of the test to the
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same sample of respondents. Where this procedure is impractical,
there are alternative approaches to estimating test reliability
which require only one administration of the test. The method
selected here is the split-half technique, whereby a correlation
co-efficient is calculated between two halves of the test,
Appendix 11 gives details of the method and correction factor
applied in this instance.
Results show that the values of r for each group for each
questionnaire separately are statistically significant at the
one per cent level, thus:
Endocrinology students 	 r 0.5597
Endocrinology registrars r 0.5004
Neurology students
	 r = 0.7179
Neurology registrars	 r 0.4672
Each value of r is corrected for the length of the test, using
the Spearman-Brown formula. Although these values of r are
statistically significant, it must be said that they are still
only moderately high and although giving support to the conten-
tion of test homogeneity, that support appears not to be very
strong. However, there may be good statistical reasons for
this. McNemar (1962) points out that the magnitude of the
reliability co-efficient is influenced by the trait homogeneity
of the sample on which it is based. His argument is worth
quoting at length, since establishment of homogeneity of the
questionnaires is important for the other tests and indices
of validity:
• t sd represent the standard deviation for the
restricted range, SD the standard deviation for the
unrestricted range, r the reliability for the
restricted and R the reliability for the unrestrict-
ed. If we may aLume that Se for the smaller range
equals S for the larger range, we may write:
(sd) 2 (1 - r) - (sD) 2 (1 - R)
as a formula from which we can infer r from R
and vice versa. The more homogeneous t group,
the lower the reliability co-efficient." (p.152)
S here refers to the standard error of measurement. Accepting
McNemar's argument, and noting the deliberate homogeneity of
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groups, the otherwise only moderately high values of r become
acceptable indices of test reliability and homogeneity.
6.4	 Conclusions
The process of questionnaire design, construction and analysis
shows instruments which display properties of both validity
and reliability. Were the questionnaires to have been used
for assessment or examination purposes, a different approach
towards development and analysis of the instrumemts would have
been necessary. As it is, the procedures and indices selected
have shown the appropriateness of the questionnaixes to the
research task for which they were designed. We may now pro-
ceed to describe the statistical analyses applied to the
questionnaire data.
6.5	 Statistical Analyses of Data
The questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology are subjected
to separate but identical statistical analyses, and patterns of
results compared. When alternative statistical bests are
available for a given research design, it is necessary to
employ some rationale for choosing among them.
A major decision to be taken is whether to use parametric or
non-parametric tests. The latter are distribution-free, the
assumptions about the parent distribution being fewer in number,
weaker and easier to satisfy than the assumptions underlying
parametric tests. Although this is an obvious advantage, non-
parametric methods are more appropriate for nominal and
ordinal data, whereas parametric methods are better for inter-
val and ratio data. In practice, non-parametric methods are
often applied to data of the latter type but only use part of
the information available, the data bein reduced to a form
such that a nominal or ordinal statistical procedure may be
applied to them. Measurements are often reduced to signs or
ranks, thus in data where parametric and non-parametric tests
have less power, the parametric tests use more of the available
information. Parametric tests were thus decided upon for this
study.
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However, every statistical test is only valid under certain
conditions; sometimes it is possible to test whether the
conditions of a particular statistical model are met, but
often it is necessary to assume that they are met. The fewer
these assumptions, the more generally applicable are the
conclusions. It happens to be the case, however, that the
most powerful tests are those which have the most extensive
assumptions. The power of a test is defined as the probabil-
ity of rejecting B0
 (the null hypothesis) when it is in fact
false. Also to be taken into consideration are the manner in
which the sample of scores was drawn and the kind of measure-
ment or scaling employed in the operational definitions of the
variables involved, that is, in the scores. Parametric tests,
such as those used in this study, have a number of underlying
assumptions. When these assumptions are valid these tests
are the most likely of all to reject H when H is false.0	 0
The conditions which must be satisfied to make the parametric
tests selected the most powerful are as follows (Siegel, 1956):
a) The observations must be independent. This condition is
satisfied in that the selection and score of any one sub-
ject does not bias the selection and score of any other.
b) The observations must be drawn from normally distributed
populations. Each sample i.s taken from the general popul-
ations of final year clinical medical students and medical
registrars. There is no reason to assume that these
populations are other than normally distributed for the
variables tested.
c) These populations must have the same variances. Although
this is not tested, we have no reason to assume that this
is other than the case.
d) The variables involved must have been measured in at least
an interval scale. This condition is satisfied.
We may now consider the statistical analyses applied to test
the associated Hypotheses 1 to 9 (see section 5.1). The tests,
their inter-relationship and associated hypotheses are summar-
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Statistical Analyses	 Hypotheses Tested
Stepwise regression	 1, 5
Two-way analysis
of variance	 2
I	 I
Comparing groups	 Comparing Sections
for each Section 	 for each group
Table of
differences in
mean scores
3
t-tests (F = t2)
+
(Discriminant
analysis)
One-way analysis
of variance
+	 4,6
Scheff test
All tests	 7, 8, 9
Figure 6.1 Statistical Tests and Associated Hypotheses for
Questionnaires in Endocrinology and Neurology Separately
rised in Figure 6.1. The order of tests may be seen as repre-
senting a progressive specificity of analysis. We may now
consider each test in turn.
6.5.1 Stepwise Linear Regression
Hypotheses 1 and 5 concern the relationship between scores on
Section D and scores on the other three sections. In other
words, the relationship between the skills tested in sections
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A, B and C and skill in actually making a diagnosis is analysed.
Free stepwise linear regression analysis was used to determine
the relative importance of each predictor variable (sections
A, B and C) in explaining the variance associated with the
criterion variable (section D). This analysis was performed
using the SPSS sub-programme 'Regression' on the ULCC CDC6600
computer. The programme selects variables in the order in
which they best account for the variation of the criterion
variable, based on the reduction of the error sum of squares.
The variable which makes the greatest reduction in the error
sum of squares is entered next into the regression equation at
each step.
Regression analysis, then, is a general statistical technique
whereby one can analyse the relationship between a dependent
or criterion variable and a set of independent or predictor
variables. The technique may be used either as a descriptive
tool by which the linear dependence of one variable on others
is summarised and analysed, or as an inferential tool by which
the relationships existing in the population are evaluated
from the examination of sample data. The sample size of the
present study is too small to admit of strong inference, and
so this analysis is primarily descriptive. We may, therefore,
find the best linear prediction equation and evaluate its pre-
dictive accuracy. The proper interpretation of regression
summary tables requires recourse to the associate correlation
matrix. For short notes on this and other points in the
interpretation of regression summary tables, see Appendix 12.
6.5.2 Two-Way Malysis of Variance
Hypothesis 2 concerns the reciprocal effects of groups and
sections. Two-way analysis of variance is appropriate when
classification of subjects or scores into groups is made on
the basis of two or more variables - in this instance, student
or registrar and sections A, B, C and D. The resultant anaJ y
-sis of variance is a method for dividing the variation
observed in the data into different parts, each part assign-
able to a known source or factor. The relative magnitude of
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variation resulting from different sources may be assessed to
ascertain whether a particular part of the variation is
greater than expectation under the null hypothesis. The ana-
lysis of variance is thus inextricably associated with the
design of research. The analysis was performed by hand, using
a Casio fx-39 Scientific Calculator.
Two-way analysis of variance yields three values of F (the
ratio of two sample variances or variance estimates) testing
the significance of row 
'r' 
column (F) and interaction (Ft)
effects. In this case, rows are associated with groups of
subjects (students and registrars) while columns are associated
with sections on the quest1onriaire. The design, therefore, is
of two rows by four columns with 35 observations in each cell.
The third value of F is the interaction term (Fi). Where the
value of F. is statistically significant, the interpretation
of the main effects observed must be with some qualification
(McNemar, 1962), the interaction term being a measure of the ex-
tent to which the criterion mean for the combination ab. cannot
ii
be predicted from the sum of the corresponding main effects
(Winer, 1962). Our main focus of attention, therefore, is on
the interaction term:
6.5.3 Table of Differences between Groups in Mean Scores per Section
with t-tests. Supported by Discriminant Analysis
This analysis provides a deeper understanding of the results
of the two-way analysis of variance value of Fri when applied
for each section of each questionnaire separately. In this
instance the value of t is calculated from a one-way analysis
of variance value of F calculated for the two groups (F - t2).
The statistic does not require the initial stages of calculation,
since values derived in the calculation of the two-way analysis
of variance may be borrowed.
Findings from these tests must be interpreted in the light of
the different difficulty levels of the test for each group. The
difficulty levels as derived (section 6.2.1) would imply
statistically significant differences between students and
163 -
registrars on all sections of each questionnaire. However, the
magnitude of those differences, as shown in a table comparing
observed differences between students and registrars in mean
scores on each section, may be of greater interpretative value.
This analysis yields results relevant to Hypothesis 3.
Supporting this analysis is a discriminant analysis which
identifies the extent and nature of the power of the sections
of each questionnaire to differentiate or discriminate between
the two groups of subjects. Appendix 13 discusses this test
in detail.
6.5.4 One-Way Analysis of Variance with Scheff Test, Comparing
Scores on Sections for Students and Registrars Separately
This analysis provides a deeper understanding of the results
of the two-way analysis of variance value of F, when applied
for students and registrars separately. The statistic does not
require the initial stages of calculation,since values derived
in the calculation of the two-way analysis of variance may be
borrowed. Application of the Scheff( method following the F
test allows a complete comparison of pairs of means; that is,
comparing each section with every other section one at a time.
The differences between some pairs of means may be statistically
significant, while other differences may not be so See
Appendix 14 for a description of the Scheff methoa as applied
here. This analysis yields results relevant to Hypotheses 4
and 6.
Note: For all analyses of variance data were normalised,
since the differing ranges of the theoretical maximum
and minimum raw scores preclude the necessairy homogeneity
of within group variance. See Appendix 15 for a des-
cription of normalisation procedures.
6.6	 Summary
A description of the structure and content of the questionnaires
in endocrinology and neurology is given with the number of quest-
ions and ranges of raw scores possible. The validity of the
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questionnaires is discussed in terms of criterion oriented
validity, content validity, construct validity, validity by
assumption and by test and item analysis. Statistical pro-
cedures are reported. The reliability and homogeneity of the
questionnaires are established. All statistical analyses of
questionnaire data are described and discussed and associated
research hypotheses identified.
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CHIPTER SEVEN
The Questionnaire Study 2. Results
This chapter presents only results per se of the statistical analyses
performed. These will be presented in relation to the separate
analyses applied as described in section 6.5 above. Full interpre-
tation and discussion of the results in relation to the research
hypotheses stated in section 5.1 above will follow in Chapter Eight.
7.1	 Stepwise Linear Regression
Four analyses by stepwise regression were performed, for
students and registrars separately, for endocrinology and
neurology, also separately. Before reporting the results of
each of these, an initial perusal and discussion of the
associated correlation matrices is advisable, in order to
assist accurate interpretation of the stepwise regression
values of R2.
Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show the correlation matrices
between all variables for the four stepwise linear regression
analyses. It will lie noted that registrars demonstrate fewer
statistically significant correlations than do students.
Table 7.5 summarises the relative incidence of statistically
significant correlation co-efficients across groups of sub-
jects.
Table 7.1 Correlation Matrix Between all
Variables - Endocrinology Students
Variable	 Section A Section B Section C Section D
Section A	 1.0000	 0.7292
	
0.2641	 0.4558
Section B	 - 1.0000	 0.4377	 0.6162
Section C	 1.0000	 0.4269
Section D	 1 • 0000
Underlined values are statistically significant (p<.01 df.33)I
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Table 7.2 Correlation Matrix Between all
Variables - Endocrinology Registrars
I Variable	 Section A
Section A	 1.0000
Section B
Section C
Section D
Section B Section C Section D
0.4121	 -0.1328	 -0.0830
i.cxoo	 0.0504	 0.1045
	
1.0000	 -0.0671
1.0000
Underlined values are statistically significant (p<.01 df.33)
Table 7.3 Correlation Matrix Between all
Variables - Neurology Students
Variable	 Section A Section B Section C Section D
Section A
	 1.0000	 0.7457	 0.3751	 0.4056
Section B
	 1.0000	 0.6438	 0.5125
Section C	 1.0000	 0.3703
Section 0
	 1.0000
Underlined values are statistically significant (p<.Ol df.33)
Table 7.4 Correlation Matrix Between all
Variables - Neurology tegistrars
Variable	 Section A Section B Section C Section D
Section A	 1.0000	 0.6626	 0.2568	 0.1812
Section B	 1.0000	 0.3125	 0.4839
Section C
	
1.0000	 0.1557
Section D
	
1.0000
Underlined values are statistically significant (p'(.Ol df.33)
- :1.67 -
Table 7.5 Relative Incidence of Statistically
Significant Correlation Co-efficients Across
Groups_of_Subjects
Sections	 Enaocrinology	 Neurology
(Variables)	 Students Registrars Students Registrars
AandB	 *	 *	 *
A and C
AandD	 *
Bandc	 *	 *
BandD	 *	 *	 *
CandD	 *
Registrars show no statistically significant correlations
between sections of the endocrinology questionnaire. The
patterns of statistically significant correlations are more
alike for students and registrars in neurology than in endo-
crinology. In particular, it is interesting that for both
students and registrars section B correlates statistically
significantly with section D for neurology, whereas, for
endocrinology, all sections correlate statistically signifi-.
cantly with section D for students and no section does for
registrars.
Having access to the relevant correlation matrices, we may now
proceed to the results of the four stepwise linear regression
analyses, with section D as the dependent (criterion) variable.
7.1.1 Endocrinology Students
Table 7.6 presents the stepwise regression analysis summary
table. The predictor variables together account for 41 per
cent of the variance on the criterion. We see that the first
variable entered into the regression equation is section B
(interpretation of symptoms and signs). This variable explains
almost 38 per cent of the variance on the criterion variable
{R2 = 0.3797). Table 7.1 shows, as expected,that the corre-
lation between sections B and D is statistically significant
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Table 7.6 Summary of Free Stepwise Regression
Analysis - Endocrinology Students
Variable	 2	 2
Entered	 Multiple R	 Multiple R	 Increase in R
Section B	 0.6162	 0.3797
	 0.3797
Section C	 0.6405
	 0.4102	 0.0305
Section A	 0.6410	 0.4109	 0.0007
(r = 0.4558). The next variable to be entered into the equat-
ion is section C, but this accounts for only about 3 per cent
more of the variance on section D (increase in R2 = 0.0305);
Section A is entered next and repeats this pattern (increase
in R = 0.0007). Since both sections C and A are statistically
significantly correlated with section B (r = 0.4377 and
r 0.7292, respectively), they would be expected to add little
predictive power to the regression equation. We may say, then,
that section B is the best predictor of scores on section D
for students in endocrinology, but unless we consider the pre-
dictive power of each variable separately (that is, as if each
were entered first into the regression equation), we cannot
determIne how much better is this variable than the others.
Table 7.7 shows the values of multiple R and multiple R 2 for
each of the predictor variables when entered first into the
regression equation, thereby exerting its entire predictive
power.
Table 7.7 Values of R and R for Each Predictor
Variable Independently of all Others -
Endocrinology Students
Variable	 Multiple R	 MuitpleI
Section A	 0.4620	 0.2190
Section B	 0.6162	 0.3797
Section C
	
0.3679	 0.1353
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Section A, independently of section B, would account for 22
2per cent of the variance on section D (R = 0.2190), whereas
section C would account for only 13 per cent (R 2 = 0.1353) and
so has least predictive value. Since section A is correlated
more highly with section D than is section C, these are the
expected relative predictive powers.
7.1.2 Endocrinology Registrars
Table 7.8 presents the stepwise regression analysis suninary
table. Again, the first variable entered into the regression
equation is section B. However, this explains only about one
per cent of the variance on the criterion variable (R 2 = 0.0109).
Section A is entered next, accounting for a further two per
cent of the variance (increase in R 2 = 0.0192), followed by
section C which adds only a negligible amount of predictive
power (increase in R	 0.0095), Table 7.2 shows no statistic-
ally significant correlations between any two variables
(criterion or predictors), the lack of predictive power here
demonstrated is therefore to be expected. The magnitude of
that lack, however, may seem surprising. The predictor vari-
ables together account for only four per cent of the variance
on the criterion. Lack of any statistically significant corre-
lation coefficients obviates any possible need to refer to the
predictive power of each predictor independent of the others.
Table 7.8 Suitmary of Free Stepwise
Regression Analysis - Endocrinology Registrars
Variable	 2	 2
entered	 Multiple R
	 Multiple R	 Increase in R
Section B	 0.1045	 0. 0109	 0.0191
Section A	 0.1734
	
0.0301
	 0.0192
Section C	 0.1988	 0.0395	 0.0095
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7.1.3 Neurology Students
Table 7.9 shows that the first variable entered into the
regression equation is, as for students and registrars in
ndocrinology, section B. This variable explains 26 per cent
2
of the variance on section D (R	 0.2627). M expected,
Table 7.3 shows a statistically significant correlation between
sections B and D (r-05125). The next two variables entered
account for only a further 0.5 per cent of the variance on the
2
criterion (increase in R = 0.0050) ,accounting for a total of
almost 27 per cent (R2
 = 0.2677). Since both sections C and
A correlate statistically significantly with section B
(r 0.6436 and 0.7457, respectively), we would not expect them
to add greatly to the value of R 2 established by section B. In
this case, it is worth considering the predictive power of
these variables independently of section B.
Table 7.9 Summary of Free Stepwise Regression
Analysis - Neurology Students
Variable	 2	 2
entered	 Multiple R	 Multiple R -	 Increase in R
Section B	 0.5125	 0.2627	 0.2627
Section C
	
0. 5152	 0.2654	 0.0027
Section A	 0.5174	 0.2677	 0.0023
Section C, independently of section B, would account for 16 per
2
cent of the variance on section D (R = 0.1618), whereas
section A would account for only 13 per cent (R2
 0.1362) and
so has least predictive value. However, these are relatively
small values, and the entire set of variables accounts for only
slightly more than a quarter of the variance on the criterion.
In endocrinology, these predictors account for rather more than
one third of the variance on the criterion.
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Table 7.10 Values of R and R 2 for Each Predictor
Variable Independently of all Others -
Neurology Students
Variable	 Multiple R	 Multiple R2
Section A	 0.3691	 0.1362
Section B	 0.5125	 0.2627
Section C
	 0.4023	 0.1618
7.1.4 Neurology Registrars
Table 7.11 shows that the first variable entered into the
regression equation is, as for all previous analyses, section
B which explains 23 per cent of the variance on the criterion
(R2 0.2341). The next variable entered, section A, accounts
for only a further three per cent (increase in R 2 0.0347),
while the additional predictive value of section C is aegligi-
ble (increase in R2 0.0003), making a total of 27 per cent
(R2	 0.2691).
Table 7.4 shows that sections A and B correlate statistically
significantly, whereas section C does not correlate statistic-
ally significantly with any other variable. Nonetheless,seCtion
A is entered second into the regression equation. It may,
therefore, be useful to consider the predictive value of each
predictor variable independent of all others.
Table 7.11 Summary of Free Stepwise Regression
na1ysis - Neurology Registrars
Variable	 2	 2
entered	 Multiple R	 Multiple R	 Increase in R
Section B	 0. 4839	 0.2341	 0.2341
Section A	 0.5185	 0. 2688	 0.0347
Section C	 0.5188
	
0.2691	 0.0003
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Table 7.12 shows that section C has very little predictive
power (R2 0.0222), whereas section A accounts for 17 per
cent of the variance on the criterion (R 2 0.1740). However,
these, again, are relatively small values.
Table 7.12 Values of R and R 2
 for Each Predictor
Variable Independently of all Others -
Neurology Registrars
Variable	 Multiple R	 Multiple R2
Section A	 0.4171	 0.1740
Section B
	
0.4839	 0.2341
Section C
	
0.1489	 0.0222
7.1.5 Comparison of Groups
Results of stepwise linear regression analyses are similar
across all groups and particularly across registrars and
students separately Ln terms of the relative contributions of
the predictor variables. Figure 7.1 illustrates this point.
For all groups of subjects section B has most predictive value
for scores on section D, but differs in the extent of this
predictive power. For students and registrars in neurology,
the values are similar, 26 per cent and 23 per cent respectively.
For students and registrars in endocrinology, the values
are very different, being higher for students and much lower
for registrars (38 per cent and one per cent, respectively).
For all groups, sections A and C add almost no predictive power
to that attained by section B. The additional predictive value
varies between 3.5 per cent (neurology registrars) and 0.5 per
cent (neurology students). Independently of section B, section
A has some predictive value for endocrinology students (22 per
cent), neurology students (13 per cent) and neurology
registrars (17 per cent) • Section C has some predictive value
for endocrinology students (13 per cent) and neurology students
(16 per cent) and a negligible amount for neurology registrars
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(two per cent).
In terms of the total predictive value of the set; of predictor
variables, the results for endocrinology and neurology are
dissimilar. In turn, the relative results for students and
registrars differ in endocrinology and neurology, being almost
identical for groups in neurology (27 per cent; £2 = 0.2677
for students and
	 = 0.2691 for registrars), and dissimilar
for groups in endocrinology, students' scores having greater
predictive power (41 per cent, R 2 = 0.4109) and registrars'
having less (four per cent, R2 0.0395).
The only remaining point of comparison is seen in the correla-
tion matrices, which reflect and give greater explanatory
power to the results of the regression analyses. In endocrin-
ology, the incidence of statistically significant correlation
coefficients for students and registrars Is very different.
For students, all variables correlate statistically significant-
ly with all, others, with the exception of sections A and C.
For registrars, the picture is entirely different, showing no
statistically signifi,cant correlations between any variables.
In neurology, the patterns of statistically significant
correlation coefficients are similar for students and registrars
(section A with section B, and section B with section D), while
students demonstrate an additional statistically significant
correlation between sections B and C.
7.2	 Two-way Analysis of Variance
Two-way analysis of variance was performed separately for
endocrinology and neurology in order to determine, in particu-
lar, the interaction effects between groups and sections. In
addition, values of F for' rows and columns (groups and sections,
respectively) are obtained.
7.2.1 Endocrinology
Table 7.13 shows the two-way analysis of variance summary
table. We may observe the interaction term is not statistically
significant, while the main effects of row and column both
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reach statistically significant values. The values of
and F will be afforded further meaning by the analyses
described in sections 7.3 and 7.4. The statistically non-
significant interaction term (F = 3.0920) suggests that, in
variance terms, the difference between groups is constant
across all sections. The values of F' and F indicate
r	 C
statistically significant differences between groups and
sections, respectively.
Table 7.13 Two-Way Analysis of Variance Summary
'Table - Endocrinology
Sums of
	
Variance
Source of variation	 squares	 Of	 estimate
Rows (groups
Columns (sections)
Interaction
Within
Total
F. = 3.0920
1
(df 3,272)
NS
7.2.2 Neurology
	
11,689	 1
	
1,846	 3
	
1,230	 3
	
36,069	 272
	
50,834	 279
F = 88.1540
r
(df 1,272)
p< .01
11,689
615
410
133
F = 4.641C
(df 3,272)
p< .01
Table 7.14 indicates a statistically significant interaction
term (F. = 7.7080), as well as statistically significant values
of F (F	 97.6302) and F (F = 18.5424). These latter two
r r	 c c
values are further discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4. The stat-
istically significant interaction term makes precarious the
interpretation of the natUre of the rc and column differences
evidenced. Recourse to further analyses, therefore, is helpful.
The present analysis, however, shows that there is an inter-
action between subjects and skills. In other words, we may say
that the magnitude of difference, in variance terms, between
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Table 7.14 Two-Way Analysis of Variance Summary
Table - Neurology
Sums of	 Variance
Source of variation 	 squares	 Df	 estimate
Rows (groups)	 12,236	 1	 12,236
Columns (sections)	 6,972	 3	 2,324
Interaction	 2,898	 3	 966
Within	 34,089
	
272
	
125
Total
	
56,195
	
279
= 7.7080	 F = 97.6302
	
F = 15.5424
r
	 C
(df 3,272)	 (df 1,272)	 (df 3,272)
p<.Ol	 p<.ol
students and registrars is dependent upon the section (or skill)
being tested, and is not uniformly different as is the case with
endocrinology. The statistically significant main effects,
however, do indicate differences in scores between the group of
students and the group of registrars, as well as overall differ-
ences in the scores on sections. We may now proceed to
elucidate further these differences.
7.3	 One-Way Analysis of Variance, with Table of Observed Differences
in Mean Scores, Comparing Students' and Registrars' Scores on
Each Section Separately
This analysis provides explanatory information concerning the
two-way analysis of variance value of F, when applied for each
section of each questionnaire separately. Of course, the
difficulty levels given in section 6.2.1 would cause us to
expect statistically significant differences between students'
and registrars' scores on all sections of both questionnaires.
It is therefore almost a routine exercise to demonstrate this.
However, the associated observed differences found between
students and registrars on each section of each questionnaire
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may prove more revealing and interesting. A statistically
significant level of difference, after all, tells us nothing
about the size of that difference. As flays (1963) indicates,
"the actual difference obtained is always the best estimate
of the true difference between the population means". In
other words, difference may be statistical, or may have a
meaning which is significant educationally or psychologically.
7.3.1 Endocrinology
Table 7.15 presents the values of mean scores per section for
students and registrars, and the associated value of t ( /F).
It will be noted that all differences between mean scores, as
expected, are statistically significant.
Table 7.15 Observed Differencesin Mean Scores per
Section between Students and Registrars - Endocrinology
Section Section Section Section
A	 B	 C	 D
Students
Raw mean score
Normalised mean score
Registrars
Raw mean score
Normalised mean score
Observed difference
Raw scores
Normalised scores
F value
t value
df (n-2)
	
37.48	 32.48
	
81.24	 76.51
	
46.31	 44.68
	
88.59	 87.23
	
8.83	 12.20
	
7.35	 10.72
	
28.41	 81.45
	
5.33	 9.02
	
68	 68
	
30.60	 4.57
	
69.14	 76.40
	
56.11	 5.51
	
87.40	 91.74
	
25.51	 0.94
	
18.26	 15.34
	
57.83	 12.53
	
7.58	 3.54
	
68	 68
(p(.Ol) (p<.01) (p<..Ol) (p<.Ol)
Registrars have higher scores than students on all sections,
Comparing normalised scores, we see that the greatest difference
is on section C, closely followed by section D. The least
difference is on section A.
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7.3.2 Neurology
Table 7.16 presents the values of mean scores per section for
students and registrars, and the associated values of t and F.
Again, as expected, all differences are statistically signifi-
cant, registrars scoring more highly on all sections.
Comparing normalised scores,the ieatest difference is on
section D (24.29). This is much larger than the next largest
value of 10.55 on section A. Indeed, there is very little
difference (less than two per cent) between the values of the
differences between means on sections A, B and C.
Table 7.16 Observed Differences in Mean Scores per
Section between Students and Registrars - Neurology
Section Section Section Section
B	 C	 D
Students
Raw mean score	 37.03	 31.57	 45.91	 9.06
Norinalised mean score	 79.42	 81.57	 80.56	 61.65
Registrars
Raw mean score
Normalised mean score
Observed difference
Raw scores
Normalised scores
F value
t value
df (n-2)
	
50.88	 40.17
	
89.97	 90.17
	
13.85	 8.60
	
10.55	 8.60
	
60.03	 12.94
	
90.01	 85.94
	
14.12	 3.88
	
9.45	 24.29
	
17.62	 25.80	 29.07	 34.94
	
4.20	 5.08	 5.39	 5.91
	
68	 68	 68	 68
(p <.01) (p<.01) (p<.Ol) (p< .01)
7.3.3 Comparison of Endocrinology and Neurology
Firstly, as expected, for- both endocrinology and neurology,
differences between scores for students and registrars are stat-
istically significant for every section, registrars scores
attaining higher values than those of students.
Secondly, we may consider the relative values of observed differ-
179 -
ences for each section. Here, we see considerable differences
between endocrinology and neurology. For endocrinology,
section C shows the greatest difference between mean scores,
whereas for neurology, section D does. The least difference
is evidenced by sections A and B for endocrinology and
neurology respectively. Table 7.17 summarises these compari-
sons, as well as demonstrating the ratios of differences in
mean scores from section to section. It is clearly shown
that, for neurology, section D is pre-eminent in differentiat-
ing between scores, with sections A, B and C showing very
similar degrees of difference. For endocrinology, however,
both section C and section D show large differences in mean
scores, although even the section C difference does not reach
the magnitude of difference displayed by section D in neurology.
Table 7.17 Relative Magnitude and Ratios of Observed
Differences between Students and Registrars on I4ean
Scores per Section for Endocrinology and Neurology
Section in order of.
magnitude of	 Value of observed	 Ratio of valueS of
observed difference	 difference	 observed differences
Endo-	 Endo-	 Endo-
crinology Neurology crinology Neurology crinology Neurology
C	 D	 18.26	 24.29
	
2.48	 2.82
D	 A	 15.34	 10.55
	
2.09	 1.23
B	 C	 10.72	 9.45
	
1.46	 ll0
A	 B	 7.35	 8.60
	
1.00	 1.00
It may be held that these observed differences are either unre-
liable or invalid because of the different difficulty levels of
the tests for students and registrars, as shown in section 6.2.1
above. However, it will be noticed that the relative difficulty
levels for students and registrars are comparable across
endocrinology and neurology questionnaires. It is, therefore,
permissible to make comparisons of the present nature, and to
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maintain that the student-registrar differences measured are
not constant across the two specialities.
Results of discriminant analysis prove unhelpful in further
elucidating these points. The different purpose of the
analysis yields slightly different results. However, since
they are interesting in their own right, they are reported
and discussed in Appendix 16.
7.4	 One-Way Analysis of Variance with Scheff Test, Comparing
Scores on Sections for Students and Registrars Separately
This analysis, when performed separately for students and
registrars, provides further information about the derivation
of the statistically significant values of	 shown by the
two-way analysis of variance for both endocrinology and neur-
ology. From each of those analyses, we may only say that,
when scores for students and registrars are taken together,
there are statistically significant differences between scores
on the four sections of each questionnaire. However, we
cannot say how those sections interrelate for each group of
subjects separately, or whether or not they relate in the
same way for students and. registrars and for endocrinology and
neurology. This analysis, then, was performed for endocrin-
ology and neurology with students and registrars separately,
in order to understand more fully the meaning of the
statistically significant F values.
7.4.1 Endocrinology Students
Table 7.18 shows the one-way analysis of variance susunary table
and the resulting statistically significant value of F
(F = 4.68, df 3,136). We may conclude that the skill (section)
tested affects the score gained and proceed to analyse the
manner in which scores differ across sections by applying the
Scheff test for comparison of pairs of means (see Appendix 14)
Table 7.19 shows that only one statistically significant
difference emerges, this being between sections A and C. This
Variance
estimate
872
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Table 7.18 One-Way Analysis of Variance Summar1
Table for Scores on Sections - Endocrinology Students
Source of
Variation
Between
Within
Total
Sums of
Squares
	
2,617	 3
	
25,309	 136
	
27,926	 139
F = 4.688 (df 3,136)
p< .01
could have been predicted from an inspection of Table 71.
This value of F (F - 13.7450, df 3,136) arises from comparing
the section with the highest mean score, with the section
with the lowest mean score. No other statistically significant
differences between sections are found.
Table 7.19 Results of Scheff Method of Complete Set of
Comparisons - Endocrinology Students
Sections	 Difference	 Level of
Compared	 between Means	 F value	 significance
A, B
A, C
A, D
B, C
B, B
C, D
	
4.73	 2.0949	 NS
	
12.10	 13.7450	 p(slO; pGOl
	
4.84	 2.1937	 NS
	
7.37	 5,1033	 NS
	
0.11	 0.0011	 NS
	
7.26	 4.9521	 NS
F = 11.79 (p<01); 6.39 (p(.1O) df 3,136
Section means:
	 A=81.24; B=76.51; C=69.14; D=76.40
Standard deviations: A 6.54; B"10.07; C10.40; D=22.32
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7.4.2 Endocrinology Registrars
Table 7.20 shows no statistically significant difference betw-
een scores for sections for registrars in endocrinology. This
finding is also congruent with Table 7.2. Table 7.21. confirms
this finding, demonstrating very small observed differences in
mean scores across all pairs of sections.
Table 7.20 One-Way Analysis of Variance Summary
Table for Scores on Sections -
Endocrinology Registrars
Source of	 Sums of	 Variance
Variation	 Squares	 estimate
Between	 433	 3	 144
Within	 10,877	 136	 80
Total	 11,310	 139
p = 1.8000 (df 3,136)
NS
Table 7.21 Results of Scheff Method of Complete Set of
Comparisons - Endocrinology Registrars
Sections	 Difference	 Level of
compared	 between means	 F value	 significance
A, B
	 1.36	 0.4047	 NS
A, C	 1.19	 0.3098	 NS
A, D
	 3.15	 2.1711	 NS
B, C	 0.17	 0.0063
B, D
	 4.51	 4.4505	 NS
C, D	 4.34	 4.1213	 NS
F' = 11.79 (p<.Ol); 6.39 (p'<.lO) df 3,136
Section means:	 A88.59; B87.23; C .87.4; D91.74
Standard deviations: A 5.00 B 5.95; C 9.88; D= 12.62
Variance
estimate
3,106
177
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7.4.3 Neurology Students
Table 7.22 shows a statistically significant value of F
(F 17.5485, df 3,136), indicating that skills tested affect
scores gained. Table 7.23 adds to this result by showing
that there are statistically significant differences between
section D and all other sections. In this case, the score
on section D is statistically significantly lower than all
other scores.
Table 7.22 One-Way Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Scores on Sections - Neurology Students
Source of
Variation
Between
Within
Total
Sums of
Squares
	
9,319	 3
	
24,073	 136
	
33,392	 139
F17.5480 (df 3,136)
p< .01
Table 7.23 Results of Scheff Method of Complete Set of
Comparisons - Neurology Students
Section	 Difference	 Level of
compared	 between means	 F Value	 significance
A, B
	
2.15
	 0.4570	 MS
A, C	 1.14	 0.1285	 MS
A, 0	 17.77
	
31.2189	 p<.lO; p(.0l
B, C
	 1.01	 0.1108	 NS
B, 0	 19.92
	 39. 2303	 p(.IO; p(.Ol
C, D	 18.91
	 35. 3529	 p(.1O; pçOl
= 11.79 (p<.Ol); 6.39 (pGlO) df 3,136
Section means:	 A79.42; B8L.57; C80.56; D=6l.65
Standard deviations: Al2.55; B 7.45; C 6.78; D2l.1O
Variance
estimate
148
74
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7.4.4 Neurology Registrars
Table 7.24 shows no statistically significant difference
between scores for sections. implying that the skill tested
does not affect the score gained. Table 7.25 confirms this
finding, demonstrating very small observed differences in
mean scores across all pairs of sections.
Table 7.24 One-Way Analysis of Variance SummarTable
for Scores onSectioris - - Neurology Registrars
Source of
Variation
Between
Within
Total
Stuns of
Squares
	
444	 3
	
10,287	 136
	
10,730	 139
F = 2.000 (df 3,136)
NS
Table 7.25 Results of Scheff Method of Complete Set of
Comparisons - Neurology Registrars
Sections	 Difference	 Level of
Compared	 between means	 F Value	 significance
A, B	 0.2	 0.0092	 NS
A, C	 0.04	 0.0004	 14S
A, D
	 4.03	 3. 7576	 NS
B, C	 0.16	 0.0059	 NS
B, I
	 4.23	 4. 1399	 NS
C, D
	 4.07	 3. 8326	 NS
F' = 11.79 (p<.0l); 6.39 (p(.1O) df 1,136
Section means:	 A 89.97; B90.17; C90.O1; D=85.94
Standard deviations: A 7.99; B = 6.71; C 7.09; D=12.06
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7.4.5 Comparison of Groups
Considering students and registrars, clear similarities and
differences arise, in that both groups of students have
associated statistically significant values of F, whereas
neither group of registrars demonstrates any such statistic-
ally significant values. We may conclude that students'
scores differ between sections more than do those of registrars.
Inspection of the differences between means confirms this
interpretation, as does calculation of the ranges of means
across sections (endocrinology students, 12.1; neurology
students, 19.92; endocrinology registrars, 4.51; neurology
registrars, 4.23).
Looking more deeply at the nature of the statistically signi-
ficant values of F for endocrinology students (F = 4.688;
df 3,136) and neurology students (F = 17.5480; df 3,136) by
considering the results of comparisons of pairs of means, it
is clear that the two groups are actually dissimilar. For
neurology students, the value of F seems largely to be related
to low scores on sectLon D only. Inspection of the differences
between other pairs of means (Table 7.23) shows very low values
of 2.15, 1.14 and 1,01. For students in endocrinology, the
picture is quite different. No one section scores consistently,
statistically significantly differently from all other sections.
Indeed, the only statistically significant difference occurs
between sections at either extreme of the range of mean scores;
section A scores most highly (mean = 81.24) while section C
has the lowest mean score (mean = 69.14).
Considering the non-statistically significant results of the
one-way analysis of variance for registrars in endocrinology
and neurology, it is interesting to note that the relative
values of the differences between means (Tables 7.21 and 7.25)
show the same pattern in endocrinology and neurology, in that
the greatest differences are associated with section 1) in both
cases. However, this is due to the relatively high mean
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score on section D for endocrinology registrars, and the
relatively low mean score on section D for neurology registrars..
Standard deviations on these scores are similar (12.62 for
endocrinology; 12.06 for neurology). This information provides
only a vague indication of a possible real difference between
the groups. The lack of any statistical significance attached
to these values precludes strong inference or generalisation
of the observations.
Comparing results on endocrinology and neurology, we find a
greater differentiation of scores between sections for students
than for registrars in both cases, although the nature of those
differences varies in the manner already discussed.
7.5	 Summary
Chapter Seven presents results of the main statistical analyses
of data from the questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology.
Results of the discriminant analysis prove non-contributory an
are dealt with separately in Appendix 16. Results reported
here are from analysis by stepwise linear regression interpreted
in the light of full correlation matrices for each group across
all questionnaire sections, and independent values of R and R2
for each predictor variable. This is followed by results from
two-way analysis of variance, elucidated by means of one-way
analysis of variance and tables of observed differences in mean
scores per section between students and registrars. One-way
analysis of variance, with Scheff tests is also used to com-
pare scores across sections for each group of subjects
separately. All results are reported for neurology and endo-
crinology separately, after which comparisons are drawn between
results in the two specialities.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Questionnaire Study 3: Discussion of Results
In Chapter Seven were presented the results of the statistical
analyses applied to data from students' and registrars' responses to
the questionnaires in endocrinology and neurology. Those results
were presented in relation to the statistical analyses performed.
In this chapter these results will be discussed in relation to the
research hypotheses associated with the questionnaires (Hypotheses 1
to 9, stated in section 5.1 above). Each hypothesis, though stated
only once, applies separately to the results for endocrinology and
neurology. These, therefore, will each be discussed separately before
being considered in relation to one another for each hypothesis.
Where necessary or appropriate, the discussion will commence with an
explanation of the derivation of or reason for that hypothesis.
However, to provide a unifying perspective, we shall preface the dis-
cussion of results with a description of the various questions and
points about which we wish to make inferences on the basis of the
results to be discussed. This will be followed by a brief discussion
of the scope of the questionnaires.
8.1	 Overview of Issues for Discussion
In the process of discussing and evaluating the results of
statistical analyses of data from the questionnaires in endo-
crinology and neurology, it is hoped to make inferences and
reach conclusions about the following points and questions:
T.
(a) The diagnostic thinking process logically may be divided
into two aspects: firstly, the thinking process itself,
which we may refer to as the 'cognitive process' or
'cognitive processes'; and secondly, the content of that
process in terms of the thinker's knowledge and the outcome
of his thinking. This aspect has four identified elements
measured by the questionnaires and reflected in the four
sections. The relationship between scores on these sect-
ions we may call the 'skills structure' of an individual.
This term is preferred to the alternative 'knowledge
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structure' because it reflects that cognitive skills are
measured in the four sections (especially in sections B
and. D) as well as knowledge itself (especially section A).
We therefore hope to be able to infer the nature, relationship
and separateness of these two aspects: 'cognitive processe8'
and 'skills structure'.
(b) Is the nature of cognitive processes different for
endocrinology and neurology?
(c) Are both the skills structures and cognitive processes of
students different in endocrinology and neurology?
Cd) Are skills structures and cognitive processes of students
and registrars similar or different in endocrinology and
neurology, respectively? The answer to this question may
also indicate what are the fundamental pre-requisites for
diagnostic acumen.
(e) Do skills structures alter with clinical practice?
(f) TQ what extent do the skills measured in sections A, B
and C play a part in the cognitive process of formulating
a diagnosis?
(g)What new conclusions may be drawn about the diagnostic
thinking process?
8.2	 Introduction to the Discussion
As an introduction to the discussion of results, it may be
useful to consider the questionnaires as an instrument for ana-
lysis of the diagnostic thinking process, and for identification
of differences between students and registrars. Sources of
such differences may seem self evident, but we may identify
some of then as stemming from amount and type of exposure to
clinical phenomena; contextual aspects of knowledge and skill
development (learning as a student, as opposed to learning as
a clinical practitioner); recency of initial knowledge and
skill acquisition; relative rehearsal of knowledge and skills;
contextual aspects of knowledge and skill rehearsal (rehearsal
in order to become proficient; rehearsal in order to maintain
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proficiency; rehearsal as a response to a particuilar clinical
situation, etc.); relative decay of unrehearsed knowledge and
skills; and changes in the storage structure, inter-relatedness,
use value, meaning or significance and corollaries of knowledge
and skills resulting from practice.
With regard to the sections of the questionnaire, it is
suggested that the skills tested in sections B amd D (interpre-
tation of symptoms and signs, and formulating a dliagnosis
respectively) are those most likely to develop with clinical
practice. Elstein et al (1978) have shown skill in interpre-
tation of cues to be positively related to diagnostic accuracy,
and this latter skill itself is central to clinical practice.
It may be argued on logical grounds that the processes tested
in section C are subsumed under those tested in section D,
thus rendering the differentiation between sections invalid.
However, we would argue that the cueing effects of the multiple
choice questions renders the process of formulation of diagnos-
tic possibilities and, consequently, testing these, less
dependent upon the respondent's own cognition (kmowledge
retrieval, thinking processes, etc.) than would otherwise be
the case. We would argue, therefore, that the cognitive pro-
cesses pre-requisite for correct response to section C multiple
choice questions are of a lower order of cognitie complexity
than would be required for successful completion of section D.
For this reason, sections B and D are selected for special
attention in a number of the research hypotheses..
It might also be useful to give preliminary consideration to
the obvious limitations of the questionnaires. The most
obvious feature of clinical practice not accounted for by the
questionnaires involves the dynamic interactive aspects of
clinical problem solving thinking which enable the clinician
to guide the flow of information from the patient and requires
him to think about information at varying stages of complete-
ness. Section P certainly allows for the generation of
successive and changing interpretations of the imformation
given, but does not allow the respondent to rake an active part
190 -
in testing or following through his interpretations. The
order of information flow is fixed. It is likely, then,
that section D taps a less complex analogue of real. clinical
problem solving thinking.
It is also possible that the multiple choice questions omit a
study of certain types of knowledge. It is a reasonable
contention that changes in storage structure, inter-relatedness,
meaning or significance and corollaries of knowledge may accrue
from clinical practice. In addition, the knowledge gained
from practical, clinical experience, especially from seeing
disease manifest itself in different and similar ways in many
patients, may well be qualitatively different from the knowledge
gained in medical. school. If this is the case, we cannot be
sure that this has been measured.
Raving discussed our preliminary considerations of the possible
effects of clinical practice, the relative roles and nature of
the four sections of the questionnaires and their limitations,
we may proceed to the discussion of results.
8.3	 HypothesIs 1 and Hypothesis S
These two hypotheses are related and so may most effectively
be discussed in conjunction. They are stated as follows:
"Accurate interpretation of symptoms and signs is
the primary pre-requisite for diagnostic acumen,
therefore scores on section B will have more pre-
dictive power than scores on section A or C for
scores on section D."
"Scores on sections A, B and C combined have no
predictive power for scores on section D, either
in endocrinology or neurology."
Hypothesis 1. has the implicit assumption that section D tests
more nearly than any othei' section, the results of a diagnostic
thinking process, and that sections A, B and C test definable
components of that process, which are addressed by undergraduate
medical education. All this, of course, is within the bounds
and context of the low-fidelity nature of the research instru-
ment, which merely isolates and controls aspects of the process
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rather than allowing a broad overview of that process in
practice, as does the gathering of accounts by stimulated
recall.
Section B (interpretation...of symptoms and signs) is selected
as having most predictive value for scores as section D
(formulation of a diagnosis) since the accurate interpretation
of clinical information is assumed to be fundamental to the
process identified as 9iypothesis generationu (see section 3.1)
as well as to the ability to test accurately the feasibility
of those possibilities. In the absence of accurate interpre-
tation of symptoms and signs, the primary data, the other
processes of diagnostic problem solving will be jeopardised.
This interpretation is substantiated by the findings of
Elstein et al (1978). This principle applies to both students
and registrars. Section A (mastery of factual knowledge) is
assumed to have a less direct influence on section D, its
influence, perhaps, being mediated by the skill of section 3.
Likewise, scores on section C (selecting and testing diagnostic
possibilities) are assumed to. be partially dependent upon
acumen in the interpretation of clinical information. In
addition, the section C skill is assumed to relate closely
to the knowledge base tested in section A, without whic1
hypotheses cannot be either formed or tested. Section B,
therefore, is selected as the most directly relevant to section
D. This set of relationships is represented diagrammatically
in Figure 8.1.
It is convenient to discuss Rypothesis 5 at this juncture,
since it is closely related to Iypothesis 1 and is answered
by the same regression analyses.
8.3.1 Endocrinology
It appears that the skills tested in sections A, B and C,
even when combined, play a relatively small part in the cogn-
itive process of formulating a diagnosis. For both students
and registrars in endocrinology the combined predictor
variables account for relatively little of the variance on
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Cognitive processes
"Hypothesis
testing"
A---------------, 
B "Hypothesis
- -	
generation"
Most direct relationship
----4 Mediated relationship
Dependent relationship
Figure 8.1 Diagrammatic Representation of the As'-umed.
Relationships Between scores on Sections A B, C and D
of the Multiple Choice guestionnaires
the criterion. For students this value is about 41 per cent
(multiple	 0.4109), which is quite low; but for registrars
the value is only about four per cent (multiple R 2 0.0395),
which is remarkably low.
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It is reasonable to conclude from these low values that one or
many relevant variables have been omitted from the set of
predictors. Zn other words, we reflect the statements of 8.2
above, that the process of making a diagnosis, even is its
simplified form as measured by section D, has greater breadth,
or more aspects, than are measured in the first three sections
of the multiple choice questionnaires.
This conclusion must be qualified by our second major finding,
that the cognitive processes of students differ from those of
registrars. The results of the regression analyses stow that
registrars rely more heavily on the processes not measured by
the questionnaire than do the group of students. Equivalently,
we may conclude that the students tend to rely more heavily
upon the skills measured by sections A, B and. C. It therefore
appears to be the case that, whatever the nature of t1be skill
relied upon by registrars, it develops, or is more fully
implemented, after the years of undergraduate medical educat-
ion are over. In fact, we cannot be certain either that
students do not possess the same skills or that they possess
them, but are, in som way, encouraged to use others. The
account gathering study clarifies this issue. The fact of 59
per cent of the variance on the criterion being unaccointed
for, however, suggests that final year medical students are
already making considerable use of these other skills.
We may conjecture about the nature of the unmeasured variables
and suggest that cognitive processes of a dynamic, interpreta-
tive nature are applied to the case histories. It womid seem
likely that as the subject reads each successive sentence and
gains each new item of information, his interpretatioss of
the patient's problem may change, as may his ideas about poss-
ible or likely diagnoses.. Yet the subject is still ozIily an
active, thinking observer, rather than a participant in the
clinical encounter. We may consider it likely that the case
histories do require the cognitive skills of combining or
structuring items of information, of selecting from the array,
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or rejecting data, of assessing the relevance of each item and
of interpreting its meaning and clinical significance, in
relation to some current view of the patient's problem. Or
registrars may, possibly, excel over students simply in their
capacity to combine these cognitive skills to make complex
judgments.
In all our discussions of the possible nature of the unmeas-
ured variables, we are merely reflecting, and taking from, the
research findings and suggestions of other workers, as
described in ChaptersTwo and Three above. In particular, we
reflect Elstein et al's (1978) model of cue acquisition,
hypothesis generation, cue interpretation and hypothesis
evaluation. We do not suggest, however, that these form a
complete or necessarily accurate set of possibilities. Indeed,
we question Elstein's formulation and hypothesise other
processes which will be considered further in the study of
accounts by stimulated recall. The present study of responses
to multiple choice questionnaires forms a baseline against
which to interpret those findings.
Our discussions so far, then, has substantiated the broad con-
clusion that the cognitive processes of students differ from
those of registrars. But our discussion has been quantitative
and general, in that it is based on the great difference in
predictive value of sections A, B and C for section D, between
students and registrars. It has only been suggested that the
two groups of subjects rely to different extents upon the
skills tested and those untested. The McMaster comparative
studies of students and physicians (section 3.1.2) do not pro-
vide any useful indications of possible explanations for our
findings, neither in terms of characteristics of hypotheses
(Norman et al, 1977; Neufeld et al, 1976; Barrows, 1976) nor
of questions and amount of information elicited (Norman et al,
1977; Rimoldi, 1964; Barrows and Bennett, 1972).
Consideration of Hypothesis 1 may occasion more specific
enquiry into the similarities (and therefore differences) in
the cognitive processes of students and registrars, and thereby
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enable a deeper discussion of the reasoning which culminates
in the conclusion that the cognitive processes of students
differ from those of registrars. So far, we have shown this
to be so in terms of relative contributions of tested and
untested variables. Hypothesis I states that section B will
have the most predictive value for section D, for both
students and registrars. This is substantiated but does
require some points of qualification. For students, section
B accounts for 38 per cent of the variance on the criterion
(R2 = 0.3797; Table 7.6) while for registrars this value is
only one per cent CR2
 0.0109; Table 7.8). Although statis-
tically the hypothesis is supported, it would be rash to
attach great interpretative value to the registrars' results,
since the entire set of predictors accounts for so little of
the variance on the criterion and the relative contributions
of each predictor are so small and so similar (see Table 7.8).
The second part of Hypothesis 1 states that sections A and C
have less predictive value than section B for scores on
section D. This is also upheld for both students and registrars,
although for the lattr group it is again unwise to make any
strong inferences. For students, we find that the predictive
values of sections A and C, independently of each other and
of section B, account for 22 and 13 per cent of the variance
on the criterion respectively CR2 = 0.2190 and 0.1353, respec-
tively). Factual knowledge, therefore, plays a not
inconsiderable role in the student's diagnostic thinking
processes, while for registrars, this capacity plays a minimal
relative role. For students, also, the skill of selecting and
testing diagnostic possibilities plays the least part. It
would be reasonable to infer from this that students rely on
a process of less cognitive complexity than do registrars.
In stmimary, we may reasonably say that the skills tested in
sections A, B and C of the questionnaire in endocrinology play
a sthstantial role in the students' diagnostic thinking pro-
cesses, although these are heavily over-shadowed by other,
untested, processes for registrars. For students, interpreta-
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tion of symptoms and signs is the most important skill in
terms of formulating a diagnosis. This is followed by mastery
of factual knowledge. Such a pattern of skills contributing
differentially to the diagnoetic process is not at all evident
for registrars. This difference in cognitive processes may
lead us to consider the role of medical education relative to
clinical practice in endocrinology. This question is consid-
ered in more depth in Chapter Thirteen.
8.3.2 Neurology
Hypothesis 5, in essence, asks how much predictive power is
invested in sections A, B and C for scores on section D.
Unlike the endocrinology results, we find that the three pre-
dictors account for- approximately the same proportion of the
variance on the criterion for both students and registrars
CR2 - 0.2677 for students; R2 - 0.2691 for registrars). These
values are relatively small. In both cases the first variable
to be entered into the regression equation is section B, as
hypothesised, which also accounts for approximately the same
proportion of the variance on the criterion for both students
and registrars CR2 = p.2627 and 0.2341, respectively). Also
in both cases, the subsequent contributions of sections A and
C are minimal (increase in R 2 for A and C combined = 0.0050
and 0.0350 for students and registrars, respectively). Con-
sidering the independent predictive value of each variable,
the only appreciable difference between students and registrars
is on section C CR2 - 0.1618 and 0.0222, respectively).
The independent predictive value of section A is approximately
the same for students and registrars (R2
 - 0.1362 and 0.).40,
respectively). But, taken overall, the results for students
and registrars in neurology are very similar.
The similarities in the final multiple R2
 values do not tell
us anything about the natire of the predictors which might
account for the variance remaining on section D. We do not
know whether the same predictors would be necessary for students
and registrars, although the coincidence of the multiple R2
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may suggest that this would be a reasonable hypothesis. Results
of the parallel study of accounts by stimulated recall should
clarify this issue.
It may be reasonable to conclude from these results that the
teaching and learning of neurology is more appropriate to its
practice than was the case with endocrinology. However, this
conclusion may only be drawn with regard to cognitive processes,
and even then only to the extent that the skills of sections A,
B and C are encouraged to contribute to the diagnostic thinking
process to the same extent as they do in an experienced
practitioner. This is not to say that either the manner of
their contribution, or combination, or the eventual outcome is
similar, Indeed, it is shown below (section 8.6.2) that
neurology students are statistically significantly worse at
formulating a diagnosis than at any of the skills of section
A, B and C. It would therefore be unwise to draw any conclusions
about the relative appropriateness of teaching in endocrinology.
and neurology to the practice of those specialities.
8.3.3. Comparison of Endocrinology and Neurology
The most obvious similarity of results is in the greatest
predictive power invested in section B for both groups in both
specialities, although for endocrinology registrars this find-
ing is equivocal. In the case of neurology, however, section
B has the same predictive power for both students and registrars.
The second point of similarity across endocrinology and neurology
is found in the relatively low total predictive power of the
variables tested for all groups, and the subsequent conclusion.
that other skills are necessary and very active in the process
of formulating a diagnosis.
In all other aspects, the results for endocrinology and neurology
are dissimilar. In endocrinology, registrars rely very heavily
on processes other than those measured in sections A, B and C,
whereas students rely to a considerable extent CR2 0.4109)
on those very skills. The potential predictive contribution
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of certain variables, independently of all others, also varies
between students and registrars in both specialities, but the
relationships are different in that endocrinology students
differ greatly from their registrars by relying to a much
larger extent on their ability to interpret symptoms and signs.
In neurology, the major difference is found in the students'
relatively greater reliance on their ability to select and
test diagnostic possibilities. Em both specialities, then,
we see differences in the cognitive processes of stndents and
registrars, but these are more pronounced in endocrinology
groups, and minimal in neurology differing only on the indepe-
ndent predictive power of section C, which is, in both cases,
considerably less important than section B. Our conclusion,
then, must be that the cognitive processes of neurology
students and registrars, as measured in sections A, B nd C,
are similar. Of course, this does not necessarily imply
either that these groups are similar on the untested cognitive
variables, or that they are equally as successful in their use
of the variables tested. Indeed, this latter possibility has
been refuted, and will be discussed below in relation to the
skills structures of students and registrars (section 8.6.2)
and to the relationship between medical education and clinical
practice (Chapter Thirteen). The different values of R2 for
endocrinology and neurology students will also be discussed
in relation to medical education.
The very different values of R 2
 for registrars in endocrinology
and neurology would seem to imply a speciality specific form
of thinking, which may, or may not reflect structural differ-
ences in those specialities. It ltas been argued above (section
3.1.1) that findings of content specificity of thinking are
due to the content dppendent nature of the variables selected
for study. Likewise, it iñay well be the case that speciality
specific cognitive processes reflect speciality specific
structures of either information, or the presentation of dis-
ease.
- 199 -
In considering Hypotheses 1 and 5, then, we have discovered
evidence relevant to points (b), (d) and (f) (section 8.1).
Point (b) concerns whether or not the nature of cognitive
processes is different for endocrinology and neurology, as
evidenced by differences in the stepwise regression analyses
of registrar data. In addition, this speciality specific
thinking may imply different speciality structures for endo-
crinology and neurology. Point (d) considers whether cognitive
processes, as measured in sections A., B and C, differ
substantially between students and registrars in neurology and
endocrinology. We find only a great difference in endocrinology,
but that this does not imply, and is not accompanied by, a
greater diagnostic acumen in neurology students who display
approximately the same cognitive processes, as measured in
sections A, B and C, as their registrars. Point -(f) concerns
the extent to which sections A. B and C have predictive power
for scores on section D. We find relatively little and conclude
that a large area of skill necessary to clinical practice in
endocrinology and neurology is not addressed by undergraduate
medical education in those specialities.
8.4	 Hypothesis 2
"Mastery of the separate skills tested in sections
A, B, C and D is presumed to develop differentially
during medical education and clinical practice.
Therefore, statistically significant interaction
effects will be found between groups of subjects
and sections of the questionnaire".
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that with clinical
practice different dimensions are introduced into any speciality,
and the various aspects or skills wax or wane in relative
importance. We would therefore expect some skills to increase
dramatically while others develop less. In the present study
we would not expect to ob^erve any decline in scores on the
variables tested since these are all subject or practice
related for each individual respondent. The content is there-
for of direct relevance to students about to sit the final
qualifying examinations and to registrars practising the
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speciality in question. Assuming, then, a differential
development in skills tested, we could logically expect to
find a statistically significant interaction term on a two-
way analysis of variance, which would imply that registrars
are relatively better than students on one variable rather
than another, and that the change in scores is, therefore,
not uniform across all skills tested.
8.4.1 Endocrinology
Table 7.13 shows an interaction term which is not statistically
significant (F
	
3.0920; df. 3,272), Our hypothesis is
therefore rejected in this instance. Thus, the expected
improvement in certain areas based on the different emphasis
which clinical practice, of necessity, has in relation to med-
ical education, is not evidenced. We must recall, however,
that we are currently considering the skills structures of
students and registrars, and not their cognitive processes,
which have already been shown to be different. Our conclusion
must be that, although registrars score statistically signif i-
cantly higher than students (Fr = 88.154; df. 1,272), they
share a similar skilrs structure. We have already seen,
however, that a similar skills structure does not imply similar
use of those skills, similar cognitive processes or similar
diagnostic acumen.
8,4.2 Neurology
In this case, hypothesis 2 is upheld. Table 7.14 shows a
statistically significant interaction term (F1 7.7080; df.
3,272), which suggests that the difference between students
and registrars, in variance terms, depends upon the section
(or skill) being tested. We can be certain that the statisti-
cal significance of this term is due to the effect of very low
scores on section D for students (see Table 7.16), since,
as for endocrinology, there are no statistically signflicant
differences between any two sections for registrars (see Table
7.25). We must conclude, then, that not only do neurology
registrars score statistically significantly higher than stu-
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dents (F
	
97,6302 df. 1,272), but they also have a different
skills structure. This must be seen in the light of similar
use of those skills (that is to say, similar cognitive processes)
between students and registrars, as demonstrated by the regress-
ion analyses which yielded similar values. This is relevant to
point (d) above (section 8.1).
8.4.3. Comparison of Endocrinology and Neurology
The finding of one statistically significant interaction term
(neurology) and one term which is not statistically significant
(endocrinology) has occasioned a discussion of the relation-
ship between skills structure and cognitive processes in relation
to diagnostic acumen. This relationship is best suimnarised in
Table 8.1, although it must be noted that 'different' and
'similar' are relative, not absolute, terms. It would appear
that the successful formulation of a diagnosis, as measured in
section D, requires both a certain skills structure (in this
case, homogeneity at a certain level across the skills tested
in sections A, B and C), as well as certain cognitive processes,
about which we cannot yet be specific.
Table 8.1 The Relationship Between Students' and
Registrars' Skills Structures, Cognitive Processes
and Diagnostic Acumen (in relative, not absolute,
terms).
Skills	 Cognitive	 Diagnostic
Structure	 Processes	 Acumen
Endocrinology	 Similar	 Different	 Different
Neurology	 Different	 Similar	 Different
Our incidental reference to homogeneity of registrars' scores
across all sections (see Tables 7.20 and 7.24) refutes the
rationale for Hypothesis 2. It was suggested that some of the
skills tested improve dramatically with clinical practice,
while others develop less. This is the case for neurology,
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where medical education leaves specific skills deficits. It
appears that clinical practice requires each of the skills
tested to a similar extent, but that the use of these skills,
combined into complex cognitive processes, is a separate
question and is also a necessary pre-requisite for the formu-
lation of diagnoses. A complementary interpretation of the
findings is that, given a necessary minimum threshold of
skills and knowledge, diagnostic acumen depends upon factors
which have not been tapped by the questionnaires and which,
being dependent upon clinical experience, are difficult to
teach.
Having rejected the rationale for Hypothesis 2, the same argu-
ment cannot be rejected for untested skills, particularly in
the case of endocrinology in which the total contribution of
those skills tested to the diagnostic process declines markedly
with clinical practice, as shown by the results of regression
analyses. This is relevant to point (d) above.
8.5	 Hypothesis 3
Given the presumd greater development of skill in
sections B and D with clinical practice rather than
medical education, observed differences between
students' and registrars' scores on these sections
will be greater than those observed on sections A
and C. However, the greater experience and post-
graduate learning of the registrars will canse
groups' scores on all sections to be statistically
significantly different in favour of registrars.
The first part of this hypothesis is based on the assumptions,
defined in section 8.2 above, concerning the relative develop-
ment of different skills with clinical practice. The second
part of the hypothesis is based on the reasonable assumption
of continued learning at postgraduate level, and continued
rehearsal. of learning acquired at undergraduate level.
However, although this rationale is quite acceptable and feas-
ible, it will be shown that the present analyses are not
adequate in testing the hypothesis based on it. Gain scores,
or the differences shown between students an registrars on
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any one section of the questionnaire, are primarily a function
of the scores obtained by students. These scores are not
constant across sections. Registrars' scores, therefore, can
only be interpreted as improvement upon scores achieved at the
end of undergraduate medical education. Given the homogeneity
of registrars' scores across sections, then, gain scores will
be largely a function of medical education, rather than clini-
cal practice. The present hypothesis and analysis is, therefore,
partially spurious. Its usefulness is really limited to
demonstrating that registrars score statistically significantly
more highly than students on all counts. This is relevant to
point (e) above.
8.5.1 Endocrinology
The two-way analysis of variance yields a statistically signi-
ficant value of Fr (Fr - 88.lS4O df. 1,272) indicating a
constant difference between students and registrars across all
sections of the questionnaire. Table 7.15 shows that students'
and registrars' scores on each section separately are statist-
ically significantly different. The greatest observed
differences, however,' are on section C (18.26 per cent) and
section D (15.34 per cent). Sections B and A show smaller
observed differences (10.72 and 7.35 per cent, respectively).
Our hypothesis is, thus, partially falsified and partially
upheld.
9.5.2 Neuroloqy
Two-way analysis of variance, as for endocrinology data, shows
a statistically significant value of Fr r 97.6302; df.
1,272), while Table 7.16 shows that students' and. registrars'
scores on each section are statistically significantly differ-
ent, registrars scoring more highly. The greatest observed
difference is on section D (24.29 per cent), due to the low
mean score of students on this section. The remaining three
sections show approximately the same degree of observed
difference (10.55, 8.60 and 9.45 per cent for sections A, B
and C, respectively). Our hypothesis, again, is partially
upheld and partially falsified.
2O
8.5.3 Discussion of Endocrinology and Neurology Results
It has been stated in 8.5 above that the present hypothesis
and analyses are partially spurious because of the effect of
medical education in yielding disparate scores across sections,
while the effect of clinical practice is to equilibrate these
scores. Comparison of students' and registrars' scores on
each section, therefore, tells us rather more about medical
education than clinical practice and, given the homogeneity
of registrars' scores, this evidence about the effects of under-
graduate medical education would be better gleaned from the
direct comparison of students' scores across sections.
Our only conclusion must be that registrars show improvement
in all the skills tested to the extent that their scores are
statistically significantly higher than those of students for
all sections. This may scarcely need proof, but it is worth
noting, and is relevant to point Ce) above. Again, we may
suggest that some necessary minimum threshold of skills and
knowledge is reflected.
8.6	 hypotheses 4 and 6
"Sections A, B, C and D test different skills which
may be rehearsed in medical education and clinical
practice respectively to disproportionate degrees.
Therefore, for each group separately, statistically
significant differences will be found between scores
on the four sections.'
TM N0 differences will be apparent between students and
registrars in the relationship between scores across
sections A, B, C and D either in endocrinology or
neurology".
Hypothesis 4 is based on the assumptions defined in section 8.2
above, concerning the relative development of skills with
clinical practice and the additional assumption that under-
graduate medical education does not make provision for rehears-
al of these skills in the same manner or proportions as required
by clinical practice. As yet, we make no argument about the
appropriateness or not of such a relationship between education
and practice, but merely seek indication of the truth or fals-
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ity of the hypothesis. Hypothesis 6 is related to this same
point and will be answered by the same analyses. The discuss-
ion is relevant to point (e) in section 8.1. above, which asks
whether skills structures alter with clinical practice.
8.6.1 Endocrinology
One-way analysis of variance has shown that scores across
sections are statistically significantly different only for
students, and not for registrars (Tables 7.18 and 7.20). This
would suggest a differential development and rehearsal during
undergraduate medical education of the skills here testd, with
a compensation during the years of clinical practice for those
less well developed. Our previous findings and discussion
would lead us to expect such an observation.
Our hypothesis, then, is only partially substantiated. Results
of the Scheff test for students indicate that the statistic-
ally significant value of F is due to the comparison between
sections A and C which show the highest and lowest mean scores
attained, respectively. This lone statistically significant
difference seems to iiply a less differentiated approach to
the teaching of endocrinology than the teaching of neurology,
one result of which appears to be that students in their final
year are as adept at actually making a diagnosis in endocrin-
ology as they are at mastering factual knowledge and interpret-
ing symptoms and signs. Even the specific weakness demonstrated
in scores on section C (selection and testing of diagnostic
possibilities) is only statistically significant in relation
to the strength of scores on section A (mastery of factual
knowledge), but neither of these is statistically significantly
different from scores on sections B orD. The hypothesis for
students, then, is substantiated, but weakly so. For registrars
it is firmly rejected, since the effect of clinical practice
is to equalise, rather than further differentiate between
scores across sections.
In dealing with Hypothesis 6, we can state that the relation-
ship between scores across sections is different f or students
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and registrars 1 but only in terms of comparing extreme mean
scores. Students do show less equality of scores than do
registrars but the observed mean values of these differences
only reach statistical significance when the highest and
lowest scores are compared. The statistically non-significant
interaction term reported in 8.4 allows us to accept the
relative similarity of skills structures.
8.6.2 Neurology
As for endocrinology, one-way analysis of variance shows that
scores across sections are statistically significantly
different for students, but not for registrars (Tables 7.22
and 7.24). This again suggests an interpretation of differ-
ential development and rehearsal during undergraduate medical
education of the skills here tested, with a compensation
during the years of clinical practice for those less well
developed. Again, Hypothesis 4 is only partially substantiated.
However, the neurology results show one very great difference
from those in endocrinology, and this is in relation to the
derivation of the statistically significant variance ratio
for students' results.
The Scheff test for neurology students reveals that scores
on section D (formulating a diagnosis) are statistically
significantly lower than scores on any other section. The
lack of differentiation weakly indicated in the endocrinology
results is therefore strongly deniet by the neurology
results. The implications of this finding will be fully
discussed be'ow (Chapter Thirteen). This conclusion is made
more ac1te when it is recalled that sections A, B and C
account for 27 per cent of the variance on section D for
neurology registrars and only approzimately four per cent for
endocrinology registrars.
In considering Hypothesis 6, it has been shown that the rela-
tionship between scores across sections is different for
students and registrars, due, almost entirely, to students '
low scores on section D.
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8.6.3 Comparison of Endocrinology and Neurology
The major point of similarity between findings in endocrinology
and neurology is found in the statistically significant differ-
ence in scores across sections for students, but not for
registrars and the concomitant conclusion that clinical
practice in each case compensates for any deficiencies left
by undergraduate medical education, rendering scores across
sections approximately equal.
The specialities differ considerably in the relative strengths
and weaknesses of skills displayed by final year students.
Endocrinology yields a less differentiated set of scores,
while neurology demonstrates a particular weakness, in formu-
lating a diagnosis, which is statistically significantly
different from all other skills tested.
Given the clearly articulated philosophy of teaching in neur-
ology, and its conspicuous absence in endocrinology, it seems
likely that the differences between students are a function
of the differences between teaching strategies. This is
further discussed b4ow (Chapter Thirteen). However, the
possibility that these differences are actually due to some
fundamental contrasts between the specialities themselves
cannot be totally discounted.
8.7	 Hypothesis 7
"No major differences will be observed between results
for endocrinology and neurology".
This hypothesis has been answered in the third part of each of
the above sections. These findings may be summarised as
follows.
Firstly, the homogeneity..of registrars' scores suggests that a
major difference between the specialities considered is in the
associated skills structure of students and so is of pedagogic
origin.
Secondly, for registrars, sections A, B and C have much greater
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predictive power for scores on section I) in neurology than in
endocrinology (total R 2
 - 0.2691 and 0.0395, respectively). In
addition, for endocrinology very different values of R2 are
observed for students and registrars (0.4109 and 0.0395,
respectively), while for neurology these values are similar
(0.2677 and 0.2691, respectively). Different values of R2
suggest different degrees of reliance on the skills tested in
formulating a diagnosis. The greater the R2 value, the greater
the reliance.
Thirdly, in making a diagnosis, in endocrinology students
differ greatly from registrars in their reliance on their abil-
ity to interpret symptoms and signs (R2 0.3797 and 0.0109,
respectively), while neurology students differ greatly from
registrars in their reliance on their ability to select and
test diagnostic possibilities (R2 0.1618 and 0.0222, respect-
ively). In both cases, the students' reliance is greater.
This difference would seem to reflect differences in teaching
strategy.
Fourthly, in endocrinology, the teaching strategy appears less
differentiated, or perhaps less analytical of component skills
or processes, than in neurology. This is reflected in the
students' relative scores across sections.
Fifthly, in endocrinology the total contribution of the skills
tested in sections A, B and C declines markedly with clinical
practice. In neurology, that total contribution remains
constant, although its component parts may alter in role or
importance.
8.8	 Rypothesis 8
"No developmental pattern will be apparent, such that
differences in scores between students and registrars
will not be interpretable in terms of differences
between medical education and clinical practice".
The existence of some developmental pattern may be inferred
from a comparison of results of students and of registrars. It
has already been suggested that the relative scores of students
across sections are primarily a function of medical education.
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So far as any developmental pattern is apparent, we may really
only make one point on the basis of this part of the study. It
is intended that the results of the accounts gathered from
stimulated recall will furnish us with more direct evidence.
Our only possible conclusion from the questionnaires, however,
must be that, whatever the process of development is, it is
distinguished by one characteristic, which is the tendency to
equalise skill in each of the sections tested, regardless of
the starting point of each. In endocrinology, there is the
added characteristic of an increasing development of, reliance
upon or use of skills not measured by the sections of the
questionnaire. We thus interpret the differences in scores
between students and registrars in terms of differences between
undergraduate medical education and clinical practice. We
contend that different teaching strategies in endocrinology and
neurology give rise to different patterns of scores but that,
with clinical practice, these different-patterns evolve into
similar ones. Let us consider the effects of medical educat-
ion a little more deeply. Our discussion will be relevant to
conclusion (d) below (section 8.10), which states that the
process of medical education yields different patterns of
characteristics (skills structures and cognitive processes) in
its recipients than does the process of clinical practice in
its executors, and that this unequal relationship between
medical education and clinical practice manifests itself
differently in endocrinology and neurology.
Endocrinology as a speciality has no clearly articulated phil-
osophy of or approach towards teaching which can be found either
in the literature or by observation of its practice. No clearly
similar teaching strategy would predictably be observed in all
teachers of endocrinology. No one skill or set of skills
seems to be singled out for particular attention. This we may
term an undifferentiated, unanalytical or holistic approach
to teaching, and we have found that this results in a similar-
ity of scores across sections (only the comparison of highest
and lowest yielding any statistically significant difference).
In turn, this results in a constant improvement across all
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sections with clinical practice and a non-statistically signi-
ficarit interaction term, We therefore postulate similar skills
structures in endocrinology students and registrars. However,
we have shown that similar skills structures are not necessar-
ily accompanied by similar cognitive processes (see section
8.4.3 above). This is particularly the case in endocrinology,
where students rely on the skills tested to a far greater
extent than do registrars.
Turning to neurology, this speciality has a clearly articulated
philosophy of teaching (see 5.3.1 above) which is differentiated
in its approach, paying attention to particular aspects of the
speciality. In turn, this approach produces greater differ-
entiation of scores across sections. In particular, scores on
section D (formulation of a diagnosis) are statistically
significantly lower than scores on all other sections. Relating
this finding to the structure of neurology teaching, we may
consider whether or not it is reasonable to expect diagnostic
acumen to develop in parallel with learning to:
1) localise the lesion;
2X define the general pathology;
3) define the special pathology;
4) make as accurate a diagnosis as possible on the clinical
evidence; and
5) consider carefully the investigations required. (See 5.3.1).
The crucial point is surely the fourth one. This teaching
strategy seems likely to make the student consciously aware of
the tools of his trade as a diagnostician, and of the logical
relationship of these tools. However, an awareness and understand-
irig of the tools of the trade is not a sufficient condition for the
practice of a craftsman, who is defined by his skillful manipula-
tion of those tools in shaping the final form of his work. The
statistically significantly lower scores on section D for students
may imply a need for such skill in manipulating and using those
elements of his trade so identified for him.
Undergraduate medical education in neurology, then, yields a
skills structure in students unlike that of registrars. However,
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dissimilar skills structures are not necessarily accompanied
by dissimilar cognitive processes. Indeed, in neuro]ogy, the
cognitive processes of students and registrars are shown to
be similar.
It is clear, then, that, as conclusion Cd) below (section 8.10)
states, the unequal relationship between medical education and
clinical practice manifests itself differently in endbcrinology
and neurology. In the former only the skills structures of
students and registrars are similar, whereas, in the latter,
only the cognitive processes are similar. Thus the different
teaching strategies yield different skills structures and
different cognitive processes in students. It is also clear
that clinical practice in each speciality requires similar
skills structures but different cognitive processes and that
whatever is deficient in the final year student is compensated
for by clinical practice. It would be inappropriate to con-
sider whether one form of teaching strategy appears at better
preparation for clinical practice than does the other. We
may only make three comments. The first is that they are diff-
erent and yield diffprent results. The second is that neither
directly addresses itself to the area indicated by the large
proportion of variance on section D left unaccounted for by
scores on sections A, B and C. In addition, education in endo-
crinology has a greater distorting effect on this value than
does education in neurology. It may well be that the more
differentiated and analytical approach of the latter at least
enables students to begin to develop and use cognitiwe pro-
cesses similar to those evidenced by the practitioner, even
though the results of those similar cognitive processes are not
as good as those of the registrars. This may be due to the
processes thnselves or to lesser knowledge and skills (that
is, lower scoring on sections A, B and C), since cognitive
processes require some content on which to operate. Meanwhile,
in endocrinology, it is possible that the students initially
can identify only the content aspects of the holistic approach
to teaching and learning and rely on these rather than apprec-
iating the structural aspects of the speciality and thereby
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relying more heavily on their own cognitive operations on the
given content. This would seem a plausible explanation of
the very different predictive values of sections A, B and C
for endocrinology students and registrars (multiple R2
0.4109 and 0.0395, respectively).
Finally, despite the apparent deficiencies of undergraduate
education in the two specialities, it seems that, at least for
some, that education provides a suitable basis on which to
build improvement and amendment as necessary when clinical
practice ensues.
8.9	 Hypothesis 9
"Results will have no interpretative value for
current descriptions of the diagnostic thinking
process".
Although we cannot expect that such a method as multiple choice
questionnaires will yield any detailed or specific indications
of the nature of the diagnostic thinking process, it does
furnish us with some broad indices.
Firstly, and most importantly, our results indicate the extent
to which the diagnostic thinking process is dependent upon
skills other than those of mastering factual knowledge, inter-
preting symptoms and signs and being able to select and test
diagnostic possibilities. That this is the case has long been
the reasonable contention of many workers, but the great
extent of the use of these other skills has not before been
shown.
Our present results demonstrate most clearly that the skill of
cue interpretation is primary in predicting skill in formulating
a diagnosis for all groups of subjects, although the value of
that variable in predicting endocrinology registrars' scores is
remarkably low. This latter finding is somewhat at variance
with the findings of Elstein et al (1978) whose own results
suggest that diagnostic accuracy in clinicians is related to
both thoroughness of cue acquisition as well as accuracy of
cue interpretation, despite these two variables being uncorre-
lated. They present no results for students. Both cue
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acquisition and cue interpretation are seen by Elstein et al
(1978) as acquired processes stored in memory until needed,
with cue acquisition depending heavily on "routinised know-
ledge of history taking and physical examination, which
permits a physician to select smoothly from a battery of
questions and tnanoeuvres stored in memory". Our main interest
is in cue interpretation, since the case histories' provision
of information ensures thoroughness of cue acquisition. We
Concentrate, therefore, on the different findings concerning
cue interpretation. A number of explanations for this
apparent difference in findings may be forwarded.
Firstly, Elstein et al's (1978) results are based on high-
fidelity patient simulations, whereas ours are from low-fidel-
ity multiple choice questions and written case histories.
There is, therefore, the possibility of incomparability.
Secondly, Elstein et al's subjects were required to think
aloud and give episodic reviews during the clinical interview.
This may well have spuriously elevated scores on either of the
independent variables under consideration. The researcheis
do, themselves, mention the possibility of unreliability of
measurement.
The most feasible explanation, however, is that the difference
found between our results and those of Elstein et al (1978)
is due to different statistical analyses. The Michigan con-
clusions are based on univariate analysis of variance,
comparing diagnostically accurate and inaccurate groups on a
number of variables.separately. The only two variables which
were found to show statistically significant differences were
cue acquisition and cue interpretation, the accurate group
scoring more highly in each case. We also find this result
(see Table 7.15). We therefore question Elstein et al's
(1978) interpretations of their results. Univariate analysis
of variance can tell us about differences between groups on
one variable at a time. But to extrapolate from there to
suggest that there is a causal relationship between the
characteristic which defines the groups and a number of vari-
ables on which those groups are found to be statistically
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significantly different is fallacious and inadmissable. The
most that Elstein et al's (1978) data and analysis admits of
is recognition of the demonstration that groups which differ
in diagnostic accuracy, also differ in cue acquisition and
cue interpretation. Our own results are ir accord with this
finding. We therefore accept the results of our regression
analyses, and note that the students appear to place consider-
able reliance on their ability to interpret symptoms and signs,
whereas registrars appear to rely on other skills, not here
measured. Our findings also suggest that the cognitive skill
of formulating a diagnosis is rather greater than the two
important elements identified by Bistein et al (1978).
With regard to the contentious area of content specificity of
thinking, our current results give relevant information.
Section 3.1.1 indicated that there are opposing views about
this aspect of the diagnostic thinking process. Elstein et
al (1978) find indication of case related thinking, or, at
least, case related effectiveness (which may seem hardly sur-
prising), while Berner and Bligh (1974) seriously question
the concept of and eyidence for content specificity. Our own
interpretation of the conflicting viewpoints suggests that
some processes measured are content dependent (for example,
the nature and number of hypotheses) while other processes are
not (for example, the psychological process of actually gener-
ating hypotheses) and, depending upon to which of these processes
the researcher addresses himself, he will elicit results that
appear to support or refute allegations of content specificity
of thinking processes. In some ways, therefore, the question
when put at the level of cases, is a spurious one. It seems
more reasonable to consider the matter at the level of special-
ities, so long as it is permissible to argue that there
actually are differences between the content, structure and
presentation of information as well as in matters of investi-
gation.
Given the apparent large effects of teaching and learning, we
may only refer to the results for registrars in order to gain
indications of content specificity of thinking. We have
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already noted (section 8.3.3 above) that the very different
values of B2 for registrars in endocrinology and neurology
would seem to imply some important differences in speciality
structure and, more importantly, in ways of thinking about
those specialities, These results only enable statements to
be made about the relative contribution of the skills tested
to the overall process and do not provide any indication of
how they are used or what other untested processes are invo].-
ved. It is possible to conclude, however, that the gross
difference in the predictive values of the combined variables
(four per cent for endocrinology registrars; 27 per cent for
neurology registrars) gives clear indication of fundamental
differences in diagnostic thinking processes.
What novel conclusions may we draw, then, about the nature of
the diagnostic thinking process? Firstly, we have identified
two aspects of that process, here cafled "skills structure"
and "cognitive processes", and we have been able to define
some relationship between them, although that definition is,
as yet, still incomplete and imprecise. Secondly, we have
been able to demonst,rate the extent of the influence and role
of the skills structure and cognitive processes respectively.
Thirdly, we have been able to demonstrate the necessity for
diagnostic acumen of both an adequate skills structure and
appropriate cognitive processes. Fourthly, we have shown that
both are amenable to shaping by educational processes as well
as by clinical experience. Finally, we have shown that cogn-
itive processes, but not skills structures, are, in these
instances, speciality specific, a formulation preferred to
that of case specificity which is rejected.
8.10 Summary and Conclusions
The discussion of result has been structured around the nine
relevant research hypotheses. We may now sumniarise that
discussion by drawing it together in terms of more broad con-
clusions.
(a) The results of regression analyses provide information
concerning the subjects' thinking processes in formulating
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acli.agnosis. These are here referred to as "cognitive
processes". The results of analyses of variance and
associated tests provide information concerning the sub-
jects' levels of knowledge and cognitive skills. These
latter results, which concern absolute scores, variances
and the relationship between these across sections, are
here referred to as "skills structures".
(b)The nature of cognitive processes in formulating a diag-
nosis seems to be different for endocrinology and neurology,
as evidenced by the results of regression analyses on
registrar data. This may also imply differences between
these specialities in the structure of content matter
(here, referred to as "speciality structure").
(c)The results of regression analyses and analyses of variance
are different for students in endocrinology and neurology.
It may be inferred that medical education as delivered in
each speciality has a determining effect for the structure
of knowledge and cognitive skills (the skills structure)
as measured in sections A, B C and D and shown by the
inter-relationship of scores on these sections. In
addition, the manner in which students use or combine these
skills in formulating a diagnosis differs according to the
structure of education delivered.
(d) In neurology, students and registrars evidence relatively
similar cognitive processes, but relatively different
skills structures. In endocrinology, students and regist-
rars are relatively similar in skills structures but
relatively different in cognitive processes. In both endo-
crinology and neurology, registrars' skills structures
demonstrate the property of homogeneity. In both endocrin-
ology and neurology, students' and registrars' scores are
statistically significantly different on section D
(formulation of a diagnosis) in favour of registrars. In
both endocrinology and neurology, registrars' scores are
statistically significantly higher than those of students
on sections A, B and C also. Thus, the fundamental pre-
- 217 -
requisites for diagnostic acumen include homogeneity of
skills, appropriate levels of skills and appropriate cog-
nitive processes. En addition, it seems that the process
of medical education yields different patterns of
characteristics in its recipients while the process of
clinical practice tends to make its executors more
homogeneous; and this unequal relationship between medical
education and clinical practice manifests itself differ-
ently in endocrinology and neurology.
(e)Although the skills structures of students at the end of
their period of undergraduate training shows statistically
significant differences in scores across sections, clinical
practice equilibrates the absolute levels (and variances)
of the skills measured in sections A, B, C and D, is such
a way that registrars show no statistically significant
differences between scores across sections in either endo-
crinology or neurology, while scoring statistically
significantly higher than students in all sections. This
may indicate a necessary threshold of skills and knowledge.
(f)For students and 'registrars in endocrinology and neurology,
the skills tested in sections A, B and C, even when com-
bined, play a relatively small part in the cognitive
process of formulating a diagnosis. This is most marked
for endocrinology registrars. It is concluded that under-
graduate medical education in the two specialities
considered fails to address itself to a large area of skill
and knowledge necessary in the clinical practice of those
specialities. This has not previously been quantified.
(g)A number of novel conclusions may be drawn about the nature
of the diagnostic thinking process. Firstly, we have
identified two aspects of that process, here called skills
structure and Ncognitive processes", and we have been
able to define some relationship between these two elements
which together form the cognitive structure s . Secondly,
the extent of the influence and role of the skills struct-
ure and cognitive processes is demonstrated. Thirdly, is
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demonstrated the necessity for diagnostic acumen of both
an adequate skills structure and appropriate cognitive
processes. Fourthly, is shown that both are amenable to
Bhapiflg by educational processes as well as by clinical
experience. Finally, we have shown that cognitive processes
but not skills structures, are for endocrinology and neur-
ology, speciality specific, a formulation preferred to that
of case specificity which is rejected.
The implications of these conclusions for medical education
will be discussed in Chapter Thirteen.
a
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CHAPTER NINE
The Account Gathering Study 1: Description, Validity, Reliability
and Data Analysis
This chapter presents a detailed description of the method of account
gathering by videotape stimulated recall of a clinical interview.
Comparisons with the McMaster and Michigan uses of the method will be
made. This is fo]Jlowed by a discussion of issues concerning the
validity and reliability of the method and analysis of the data.
9.1	 Description and Discussion of the Implementation of the Method
The method is, clearly, closely related to those of the
Michigan and, more particularly, the McMaster groups as des-
cribed in Chapter Three above. H pwever, the present study did
not require subjects to think aloud as the Michigan studies
did, neither were the McMaster complexities of observers'
interpretations and analysis of interpersonal behaviours
included, the latter not being the domain of our study. The
probable jeopardising effect of thinking aloud has been dis-
cussed above (section 3.1.1) and was omitted for the reasons
given. Observers' subjective interpretations were considered
unhelpful, in that a lack of congruence between observers' and
subjects' reports of the diagnostic process would largely be
uninterpreta&ble, or, at best, would present severe judgmental
problems.
The present study has also omitted many of the quantitative
parameters applied by the Michigan and McMaster groups, or,
where these are included, has used them only as an approximate
guide. It is considered that oral accounts from untrained
subjects do not represent data amenable to detailed quantifi-
cation or quantitative analysis. This matter of potentially
spurious quantification has been discussed earlier (see 3.1.1).
Our use of the method is primarily to give a qualitative, not
quantitative account of the diagnostic thinking process, com-
plementing the quantitative results of the questionnaire study.
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Our data is therefore primarily derived from the actual accounts
given by subjects in response to the videotape stimulus. The
methodology used to elicit these accounts is more standardised
and rigorous than the methodologies applied in the Michigan and
McMaster studies.
The preparation for each stimulated recall, account gathering
session began with the selection of a suitable patient (see
9.2.3. below). Our use of real patients rather than simulators
represents a fundamental difference from the Michigan and
McMaster approaches. The patient was advised that he/she would
be interviewed by a doctor and that the interview would be
videorecorded, but the recording would only be viewed by the
doctor and one other person. The subject was invited to take
part in a project concerned with the way in which doctors make
diagnoses. Each subject was told that the session would invo-
lve interviewing a patient, but not performing a physical
examination, and then watching and discussing a videorecording
of that interview. Instructions were given to the subject to
take a normal history. No time limit was given, but if the
subject pressed for scpe indication, then 20 minutes was given
as an average length of time, with the promise that he could
take as little or as much time as would be normal. In the
cases of both patients and subjects, the opportunity was given
to decline involvement in the study. No person took up this
opportunity.
The interview took place in a side room. The camera was in
evidence, but the videotape recorder was in an adjacent room
with a monitor screen for simultaneous viewing by the experi-
menter. The subject and patient, therefore, were alone in the
interview room, while the experimenter viewed the encounter
simultaneously, noting the. content of the interview as it pro-
gressed, in terms of the questions asked and information
either elicited or given spontaneously. These notes were
used to guide the experimenter during the stimulated recall
- 221 -
sessions and as part of the final transcript.
An example of the experimenter's notes taken during the
simultaneous viewing of one encounter between a patient and a
house officer is given in Appendix 17. The basic information
content of the interview, and all questions asked by the sub-
ject are recorded. These notes are not intended as a complete
suimnary of the interview, although often they could have been
used as such. Their main purpose was to assist the process
of stimulated recall by allowing a reasoned assessment of where
the videotape should be stopped to allow discussion, instead
of relying entirely on stopping at fixed intervals.
Upon completion of the subject-patient interview, the patient
returned to the ward, the videotape was rewound, and the
subject came into the adjacent room to view the recording with
the experimenter. No other person was present. At this stage,
the subject was given the following information by the experi-
menter:
"I'm going to replay for you the videorecording of
that interview. I'll stop the tape at intervals,
and when I do, I .'d just like you to say why you were
asking the questions you asked in that section, what
line of enquiry you were following, what you were
thinking about the patient' s problem at the time and
so on. You might find that I stop the tape in all
the wrong places for you. If I do, then just tell
me, or if you want to stop it yourself to say some-
thing, then just say so".
Having ascertained that the subject understood these instruct-
ions, an audiotape recorder was switched on and the videotape
playback commenced.
The identification of points at which the videotape was to be
stopped to gather the subject's account of his thinking
processes was based on th application of a number of criteria.
Experience of practice runs had shown that to stop the tape
according to either set time intervals or the number of
exchanges between subject and patient resulted in contextual
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difficulties for the subject, often interrupting the flow of
a series of related questions, or failure to stop when one
group of questions had obviously ended. Likewise, the length
of the replay was best determined in relation to its content.
While frequent stops may be necessary when the subject is
enquiring into the history of the present complaint, a routine
family or social history which yielded nothing pertinent
whatsoever would not require many stops. It often occurred
that, as the interview progressed from specific to routine
enquiries, the length of replay also increased. However, a
delicate balance had to be maintained throughout the session
between holding the subject's interest and motivation for
giving the account by allowing frequent occasions for comment,
and inducing a set for unthinking responses by causing the
subject to have to reply 'just routine, nothing important'
too often. Stopping the tape, therefore, was very much a
matter of the experimenter' s judgment of a balanced application
of the following non-quantifiable criteria:
1. Replay periods should not be so short, that the context
of the content is obscured.
2. Each replay period should have an information load appro-
priate to the nature of that information; as information
is progressively more non-contributory (as with routine
questioning which yields routine answers), the length of
the replay may increase.
3. The replay period should not be so long that the subject
becomes a passive viewer of the process rather than its
active interpreter.
Tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.3. and 9.4. show comparisons between the
three groups of subjects on the length of patient interviews,
length of replays, numberof stops made during the account
gathering sessions, and total number of utterances from sub-
ject and patient made during each replay period. An utterance
is defined as a statement or question made by either patient
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or subject, apart from those serving no purpose other than the
specific communication of a request for information. This
excludes such utterances as "I see", "Uh-huh", etc.
Table 9.1 Accounts by Stimulated Recall. Length
(in Seconds) of Patient Interviews for Students,
House Officers and Registrars
Group	 Number	 Mean	 SD	 Range
Students	 22	 1098.2	 321.6	 395 - 1566
House Officers	 22	 974.3	 383.2	 347 - 1880
Registrars	 22	 1076.5	 577.2	 384 1888
Table 9.2 Accounts by Stimulated Recall. Length
(in Seconds) of Replay Periods for StudentsL
House Officers and Regi5trars
Group	 Number	 Mean	 SD	 Range
Students	 22	 73.7	 38	 15 - 219
House Officers	 22	 86.7	 49.7	 8 - 285
Registrars	 22	 73.9	 45	 6 - 247
Table 93 Accounts by Stimulated Recall. Number
of Stops Made for Account Gathering for Students,
House Officers and Registrars
Group	 Number	 Mean	 SD	 Range
Students	 22	 14.4	 4.2	 6 - 26
Rouse Officers 	 22	 11.1	 5	 8 - 29
Registrars	 22	 12.4	 8.1	 6 - 38
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Table 9.4 Accounts by Stimulated Recall. Total
Number of Utterances Made During Each Replay Period
for Students, House Officers and Registrars
pup	 Number	 Mean	 Range
Students	 22	 21.4
	
9.2	 2-36
House Officers	 22	 20.4
	
10.6	 2-38
Registrars	 22	 15.3
	
9.4	 3-38
The videotape playback having commenced, the first stop invari-
ably was made after the first couple of exchanges or less,
when the patient had given his first response to the subject's
enquiry: "What brought you in to hospital?" or "What's the
trouble, then?" or some similar question, designed to elicit
the patient's main complaint. Having stopped the tape for the
first time, the experimenter then said:
"I won't normally stop the tape this often, but that
was the beginning of the interview and the fix st
piece of information you really got. Do you usually
begin your interviews in that way?"
The purpose of this remark was merely to establish rapport
between experimenter and subject and to ensure that the subject
would direct his comments along the required lines. Especially,
it was often found necessary to reassure the subject that his
interpersonal handling of the patient, and the doctor-patient
relationship, were not of any interest to the experimenter.
Having established these points, the subject was then asked
what he had thought on being given the first piece of inform-
ation by the patient.
The account gathering session then continued with regular
replay periods and stops. Wherever necessary or helpful, the
experimenter reminded the subject of the content of the replay
period just viewed or stimulated the account with non-direct-
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ive questions or conunents. The experimenter's interventions
were of the order: "What about his shortness of breath?",
"What were you thinking about here?", "So you got 'No' to cough.,
'No' to sputum, 'No' to bringing up blood, and 'Yes' to smoking".
The entire process was as non-directive as possible, merely
prompting and encouraging. The only deviation from this
pattern involved either a brief review of what the subject had
just said, or, occasionally, an enquiry about how the subject's
current stage of thinking related to previous thoughts about
the patient. These enquiries were of the order: "What about
your previous ideas of ...... ?", "Row's all this fitting in
with your previous picture?".
At the end of the account gathering session, the experimenter
asked three final questions:
1. "Please could you give a review or stmary of this patient?"
2. "If you could have examined this patient and ordered invest-
igations and tests, what would you have done; and what might
you have expected to have found?"
3. "Row typical of you was that interview in its general
structure?"
After each session, the audio-cassette was transcribed with the
experimenter's notes inserted at the appropriate junctures. The
audio-cassettes were retained for the stage of data analysis,
since they also provided an audio-recording of the videotape
replay periods themselves. For examples of final transcripts
with the experimenter's notes from account gathering sessions
with a student, a house office and a registrar, see Appendices
18, 19 and 20 respectively.
9.2	 Validity of the Method
Problems for the establishment of validity and reliability of
the method of account gathering using videotape stimulated
recall, are related to both practical and theoretical questions,
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some of which have already been discussed. A primary question
relates to the completeness and quality of the accounts given.
Do the accounts reflect an actual thinking process or a
mediated, rationalised interpretation of a thinking process?
How complete are the accounts? To what extent may the exper-
imenter quantify the accounts given? To what extent is there
a need, or justification, for inference of further, unreported,
underlying cognitive processes? Other questions are related
to the mechanics and design of the method itself. To what
extent are the patients comparable? Will incomparability,
and the uncontrolled nature of their contributions, jeopardise
the research design? To what extent may videorecording inter-
fere with behaviour? Finally, we must consider in what ways
it is actually possible to establish validity and reliability
of the method and the data. It is to such questions and
problems as these that the following discussion is addressed.
9.2.1 The Method of Introspection
In order to set the current research method in its appropriate
context, it may be useful. to consider what type of process we
are initiating in eliciting accounts or verbal report protocols
by a method of stimulated recall.. The present method is
unquestionably related to the classical forms of introspection
which are typified by the work of Wundt during the latter part
of the nineteenth century (see Miller, 1962). Introspection
has been defined as: "Observation by an individual of his own
mental processes; systematic self observation; as employed in
psychological experiment, it is most frequently immediate
retrospection, rather than introspection in any strict sense"
(Drever, 1952). The present method differs from this slightly
in that the retrospection is assisted and guided by agents
other than the subject himself and is not immediate in the
sense of providing an account of a small portion of the thought
process or of psychological responses to stimuli as they have
just occurred. The method of stimulated recall allows the
entire problem solving or thinking process to occur without
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interference before the subject gives an account of any part
of it. Despite such differences, however, the method may be
described as introspective and its theoretical validity may
be evaluated, in part, with reference to general discussions
of introspection as a generic method.
Radford (1974) provides a wide discussion of the role of
introspection in psychology. He distinguishes between
'introspections as data' and 'introspection as a method'.
Considering the former, he suggests that verbal reports can be
recorded in the same way as we would record lever pressing or
test scores, but that the data must be subject to such checks
as may usually be applied to experimental data and must yield
satisfactory levels of significance. Ii addition, he suggests
that the data be not taken at its face value, but rather
should have its relationship to some other variable established
empirically. These two conditions make certain assumptions
about the nature of introspective data, which are difficult,
if not impossible, to substantiate. It appears to be assumed
that the data is inherently quantifiable, and that, if this
were so, quantification would be a reasonable and meaningful
course of action. Neither assumption is universally true.
Introspective data is primarily qualitative, eminently suited
to process tracing research. Although this does not exclude
the possibility of quantitative measures, neither does it
always admit of forms amenable to statistical analysis. In
addition, it is indisputably the case that the researcher
cannot know what proportion of thought is being reported.
Quantification is, therefore, not necessarily a meaningful
course of action in all cases. We would suggest that intro-
spective data should primarily be treated as qualitative and,
where quantification is possible, interpretation of results
should be conservative. Lack of adherence to these tenets is
seen as a severely limiting factor in the Michigan and McMaster
research. The present study, however, applies these principles
throughout.
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Radford's 119741 second category has been identified as 'intro-
spection as a method' and he defines three sub-groups within
this category. Firstly, there is self observation, in which
the subject aims to observe his own mental events as a
behaviourist observes responses. Secondly, there are self
reports, in which the subject tells of his experiences without
trying to be objective. Thirdly, there is thinking aloud.
The present method seems not to be adequately described by any
of these three categories, but is like Peel's (1971) method of
assessing judgments by the subject's explanation of them. The
current method elicits the subject's explanation of his own
observed behaviour, in terms of its determinant, preceding and
subsequent cognitive operations. Such explanation is unlike
the verbalised self awareness of Radford's first and second
categories. The present method, in addition, has no elements
of any thinking aloud technique which has been discussed and
criticised above (section 3.1.1) in relation to the Michigan
studies. It is interesting to note In passing, however, de
Groot's (1965) report that Duncker (1945) did not consider
thinking aloud to be an introspective technique at all, but
merely a verbalisaticn of mental activity.
Despite Radford's consideration of methods of validating
'introspections as data', he does not recommend any similar
processes for 'introspection as a method'. From the point of
view of research design, however, validation of the method is
surely as important an issue as validation of the data. The
current study, therefore, has paid considerable attention to
standardisation of procedures on the basis of a theoretical
rationale and validation of the method of account gathering as
put into practice. Validation procedures are, of necessity
given the nature of the method and the data, less rigorous
than those described for the questionnaires in endocrinology
and neurology (see Chapter Six), but this does not imply any
diminished degree of adequacy or credibility of the data. The
greatest potential sources of invalidity are inappropriate
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manipulation or interpretation of data, and unstandardised
methodology. We have assiduously attempted to elude both
these pitfalls. As Radford (1974) concludes, introspective
techniques yield data about experience which would otherwise
be inaccessible. It may illuminate facts that might other-
wise be overlooked, or it may stimulate new questions. His
borrowed aphorism that wje
 prends sian bien Ol& je le trouve"
is surely too casual an approach to the use of a positive
and positively productive research method.
Before reviewing other uses of introspective techniques
related to the present study, one major criticism and four
less serious potential defects of the method must be discussed.
Initially, let us consider the four potential defects dis-
cussed by Osgood (1953) in his classical text on methodology.
Firstly, he maintains that data from introspection are
"patently unverifiable". This criticism, however, is less
strong than it appears, particularly in cases of repeated,
independent reports of responses to similar stimuli, or of
repeated responses of the same subject to a controlled stim-
ulus. In other words, veracity of introspective data may be
established in some circumstances in the same way as with other
kinds of data. For cases where only one subject gives a
response, the data are unverifiable, but this is not the case
in the present study which includes large numbers of subjects
(in relation to the more usual small scale of introspective
studies). In addition, the content area is strictly circum-
scribed for the subject, and has the external concomitant of
an objective recording of the subject's behaviour of which Ms
introspections provide an explanation. Theoretical consider-
ation of the nature of the problem solving process also allows
an estimation of the veracity of subjects' reports.
Osgood's second criticism is that many relevant data are
unavailable to the method, yet this criticism can be levelled
at any research technique and requires only that the experi-
menter be aware of the limitations of his method, since
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reliability and validity of research method does not attach
to the method per se, but also to its use, implementation,
application and the manner of interpretation of ensuing data.
Our dual research methodology, standardised technique and
conservative interpretation of accounts, is based on awareness
of such possible limitations of the method of introspection,
even when used in conjunction with a stimulus to memory and
reconstruction of mental events.
Osgood's third point is that language is not a mirror of
thought, and is only as fine a tool as the discriminations it
contains. Although this criticism surely applies to the
verbal description of emotions, feelings or sensations, It
would seem less Likely to be a jeopardising factor in such a
subject matter as making a medical diagnosis. Finally, Osgood
suggests that only the effects of thought, not the process
itself, can be observed. But this question of 'observing what
is doing the observing' is largely presented as a philoso-
phical one. It will be shown to be clearly the case in this
study that subjects can explain their own problem solving
thinking processes t9 a degree unavailable by mere observation
of their problem solving behaviour. For our purposes, the
effects of thought are seen on the videotape recording, while
clues to the underlying process are given in the accounts
prompted by stimulated recall.
Related to Osgood's four points is a major criticism of the
method of introspection put forward by Evans and Wason (1976)
on the basis of a dual process model of thinking. One pre-
diction of the model is that subjects' introspective justifi-
cations of their reasoning behaviour (Type 2 process) do not
reflect insight into the underlying thought processes (Type I
processes), but are essentially rationalisations. It is
postulated that subjects are unaware of Type 1. processes,
while the conscious Type 2 process is obtainable through intro-
spection. Thus a Type 2 process may rationalise the behavioural
outcome of a Type 1 process (evans, 1976). Fellows (1976>
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rejects this viewpoint on two grounds; firstly, if the
subject's reports are to be dismissed on such grounds, then
logically the experimenter must dismiss his own explanations
in the same way; and, secondly, a subject cannot be taken as
'hapless' or 'a fool' while the ecperimenter is seen as 'all
wise'. However, the apparently opposing viewpoints are not
irreconcilable in all circumstances. Certainly, where there
is no corollary evidence other than a subject's own self
reports, it cannot be established that those reports are not
merely rationalisations. But where external concomitants are
available, and the content of reports is guided and circum-
scribed, as in the present study, some proper estimation of
the worth of the data is possible.
The above controversy is in relation to the 'thinking aloud'
technique about which we have already expressed serious
reservations. In essence, the Evans' (1976) viewpoint is that
the processes underlying problem solving behaviour can only be
discovered by an experimental inferential procedure. We would
agree with that viewpoint. In addition, Radford's (1974)
evaluation of introspective data as being of the same order as
lever pressing or test scores, to be subject to checks and
validation procedures, and our own standardised approach and
large numbers of subjects, would certainly permit use of those
data as a basis for inferences about unreported processes.
They also have validity in their own right. It must be
emphasised, however, that this conclusion cannot automatically
be extended to introspective studies in other subject areas or
to those which lack the elements of circumscription and
stimulated recall here present.
The method of introspection has been widely used in studies
of judgment in clinical psychology (see Goldberg, 1968) and
in other psychological research. Newell and Simon (1972)
describe the analysis of verbal report protocols for theory
verification as "a sort of hallmark of the information process-
ing approach". Verbal behaviour as data is particularly valued
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for its high output rate. Elstein et al (1978), who, like the
NcMaster group, use introspective data themselves, point out
that Piaget's clinical method has rendered verbal reports
"legitimate data", and, reflecting Evans (1976) and Evans and
Wason (1976) refer to the data as reporting "the contents of
consciousness". De Groot (1965) provides an historical over-
view of the uses of introspection, while Valentine (1978) also
provides an account of its historical development and the use
of the method by different schools of psychological thought.
In addition, he discusses the theoretical problems, reviewed
above, of the infallibility or not of introspections and the
practical problems of inaccessibility of unconscious thinking
processes and mnemonic distortortion of reports. Although
Valentine's discussion is largely related to thinking aloud
techniques, his conclusions reflect the current evaluation of
the method. We may summarise these conclusions as follows;
1. The method is subject to a number of problems, in particu-
lar inaccessibility and distortion, but these are not
different in kind from those that beset other scientific
methods. All can be improved by extending the empirical
and theoretical ntworks, and are ultimately judged by the
same criteria of plausibility and consistency.
2. Introspection provides the primary method for data about
the experience of thinking, which may be used directly or
as a means for making inferences about the process of
thinking.
3. The process of thinking may largely be unavailable to con-
sciousness, but introspection can enable a macroscopic
description of the structure to be inferred and can suggest
hypotheses about the underlying operations.
With regard to the last point, we may bear in mind Nisbett and
Wilson's (1977) opinion that verbal reports are based on impli-
cit causal theories about the extent to which a particular
stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests
233 -
that although people may not be able to observe directly
their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to
report accurately about theni, when influential stimuli are
salient and plausible causes of the response they produce.
Finally, we may refer to some of de Groot's (1966) principles
which characterise his introspectively based work. It will
be noted that the same principles may be said to apply to the
current work. Firstly, the work is directed towards system-
atic description of cognitive phenomena rather than to strict
hypothesis testing; secondly, the experimental settings are
more like real life than strictly controlled artificial labor-
atory conditions; thirdly, protocol coding and interpretation
are of crucial importance; fourthly, outcomes will be valuable
to the extent that they provide adequate systematic process
descriptions. In his 1965 book, de Groot had also specifically
addressed the question of reliability. Re contends that
introspective behaviour is elicited "whenever a person tries
to give a truthful answer to the question of what he thinks he
is doing, or how, or why he thinks he is doing it"7 in
addition, the information yielded is generally "quite reliable,
in the sense that we actually do rely on it in daily coemiuni-
cation and interaction with others". Only if we doubt a
person's seriousness or sincerity do we question the reliability
of his answers. Bloom (1953) checked the reliability of the
method by asking for overt events to be recalled. He found 95
per cent accurate recall of overt, checkable events within
two days of the original situation.
Our conclusion must be, then, that, given standardised techni-
ques of implementation and a framework for the subjects'
responses, the data elicited from introspective, retrospective
techniques (excluding thinking aloud) are reliable and valid.
The data, however, may be incomplete to an unknown degree and
therefore require inferential responses and conservative inter-
pretation on the part of the experimenter.
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9.2.2 The Method of Stimulated Recall
Our particular form of introspection as account gathering by
stimulated recall, as already discussed, demonstrates a number
of characteristics which will tend to increase reliability and
validity of data. These characteristics include standardised
implementation, circumscribed content, and external agencies
for guidance and stimulating recall (non-directive questioning
and videotape playback). In addition, the technique has the
great advantage of not interfering in any way with the subject's
problem solving thinking process as it occurs.
The first recorded use of a method of stimulated recall in the
recent past was by Bloom (1953) who used the technique to un-
cover students' thoughts during discussions and lectures. He
gave the rationale as follows:
"The basic idea underlying the method of stimulated
recall is that a subject may be enabled to relive
an original situation with vividness and accuracy
if he is presented with a large number of the cues
or stimuli which occurred in the original situation"
As the stimulus to recall (within 24 hours of the teaching
session) Bloom used an audiotape recording. Although the rich-
ness of the report protocols indicated great promise for the
method, Siegel et a). (1963) identify at least three methodolog-
ical difficulties. Firstly, the period of delay (up to 24
hours) between initial event and playback increases the
likelihood of subjects forgetting or suppressing their thoughts
during that event. Secondly, the audiotape produces only a
portion of the original classroom experience. Cues other than
auditory ones could be introduced to stimulate more complete
recall. Thirdly, the technique of collecting data from sub-
jects individually is laborious.
While agreeing with Siegel et al's first two points, and having
designed the present study to overcome these difficulties by
using immediate playback of videotape, as have other workers
more recently (Peterson and Clark, 1978), we accept that the
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third point is, of course, a problem of time, but not an
insurmountable one. Siegel et al (1963) overcome this point
in their own research by administering the stimulatedi recall
session to their subjects as a group, stopping the tape at
critical points and eliciting written responses. But this
technique has two jeopardising factors. Pirstly, the
identification of critical points should be in terms aot
only of knowledge conveyed but also of subject activity. Thus
true critical points may vary from subject to subjecL
Secondly, verbal report protocols have the considerable advan-
tage of a high output rate. Having subjects record t1tieir
accounts in writing is likely to decrease that rate consider-
ably and lose much valuable information. At the same time
there is no opportunity to encourage the subject to deepen his
account or to prompt responses to special aspects of the
stimulus. Stimulated recall sessions with individual subjects
are time consuming and laborious, but any diminution of these
factors is accompanied by a parallel loss of data.
Apart from the Michigan and McMaster work already described
(see section 3.1), another major application of the method of
stimulated recall has been in the field of counselling and
interpersonal processes. )agan and Xrathwohl (1967) report
that it is difficult for a person to introspect and imteract
with another person in a normal manner simultaneously. They
therefore needed "a way of permitting the mind to interact
with a situation at one time and to introspect conceraing the
reaction at another". They concluded that "if we could give
a subject enough clues and cues to help him relive th experi-
ence, we could explore in depth at a later time various points
in the interaction, the thoughts, feelings, changes im thoughts
and feelings, and the meaning of various gestures and express-
ions".
Our current method is closely related to that of Kagam and
Krathwohl (1967), who videorecorded the client-counsellor
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interview, viewed simultaneously by the experimenter who could
then note places of special interest. The client and counsellor
were then interrogated separately but simultaneously, watching
the same video replay. The interrogations were audiorecorded
and transcribed with the original interview. This basic method
has been called Interpersonal Process Recall (Kagan, 1977) and
it has been shown that "the person is able to recall thoughts
and feelings in amazing detail and in depth ... usually a wealth
of understanding about some of their underlying motives,
thoughts and feelings during the interpersonal transaction
could be verbalised by them". It was also found that "the
phenomenon could be counted on to work more reliably ... in the
presence of a third person who encouraged the viewer.to verbal-
ise and elaborate on that which is recalled". It was found
that the third person was most effective when actively encour-
aging the subject by indirect questioning, in the manner of
the current study.
Only one methodological problem remains unresolved and unresol-
vable in any empirical sense. It cannot be established to what
degree the subject's retrospective account is distorted by his
knowledge of the data subsequently available. If retrospective
distortion occurs, to what extent may it be discounted? This
problem of retrospective distortion is also addressed by
Elsteln et al (1978). It is only possible to estimate the true
answer to these questions. It is clear that to provide a
plausible but inaccurate and distorted account of the thinking
processes underlying a complex and lengthy line of medical
enquiry which is recorded and available on videotape, would be
a complex and skilled operation of rationalisation. The method
of stimulated recall allows a check on the plausibility of the
subject's account. In addition, the very cognitive complexity
and demand on short term nd long term menry make a consistent
and sustained rationalisation or distortion improbable. Our
experience of data collection has shown that subjects have pro-
bably not yielded implausible accounts. Neither has there
been evidence of attempts to hide errors in thinking or to fail
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to differentiate between the thought process as it occurred
and a current appraisal of those thoughts in the light of
subsequent information. We conclude that distortion of
accounts to any jeopardising degree does not occur in the
current study. The only identifiable tendency among a small
number of subjects is to present their own theoretical
interpretation of their thinking processes, in addition to
the account itself. This, however, does not jeopardise the
validity of data at all and, indeed may be of positive
interest.
Baying discussed the theoretical validity and reliability of
the method of account gathering by stimulated recall, we may
now consider our own implementation of that method, including
the quantitative means available for establishing practical
reliability and validity.
9.2.3 Selection o Content (Patients)
The current study is based on the use of real patients taken
from the hospital wards at the time of each encounter and
recall session. Real patients, rather than simulators, were
used for a number of reasons. Firstly, our study is primarily
a comparison of the performance of three groups of subjects -
students, house officers and registrars - rather than a study
of the repeated performance of individuals across different
content. For this reason, we have relatively large numbers
of subjects in each group (22). Secondly, and closely related,
our study seeks to identify the generalities of the process
of diagnostic problem solving rather than its content specific
aspects. A variety of content is appropriate to this aim.
That content may vary, within each group of subjects, in terms
both of complexity and actual subject matter, although, of
course, greater variationbetween groups of subjects would be
considered prejudicial. Thirdly, the use of simulated patients
is not yet connnon in British medical education, although it is
certainly known (Maguire et al, 1977). It was considered that
the unfamiliarity of a simulation might initially interfere
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with the subjects' approaches to the problem. The hospital
grapevine would also, almost certainly, transmit news of the
simulators' "diagnoses" to prospective subjects. Since each
subject saw only one patient, these additive effects might
well have been considerable.
Having decided, then, to use real patients, criteria for
their selection were determined, remembering that subjects
would only be required to take the history. Our criteria
were quite simple. The patient should be an in-patient on
the given day, on a general medical ward and able to give a
comprehensible history (i.e. having no gross communication
defect) • The patients were not necessarily selected because
their disease was especially amenable to diagnosis on the
history alone, our study being primarily concerned with the
definition of a process and only secondarily with its theore-
tical, rather than actual endpoint.
Rigorous comparison of cases across groups of subjects is not
possible. Appendices 21, 22 and 23 show all diagnoses given
in each patient's medical record for cases seen by students,
house officers and rgistrars respectively. Perusual of
these shows a wide variety of disorders and systems involved
within each group and a spread across groups of cases of car-
cinoma, endocrinological and haematological disorders, respir-
atory disease, cardiac problems, gastro-intestinal disorders
and so on. Associated tables in Appendix 24 show that the
total, range and mean number of diagnoses are not statistic-
ally significantly different across groups. This is important
since any one patient might have multiple diagnoses. In
addition, Table 9.1 has suggested similar patterns across
groups in terms of range and mean length of patient iilterviews
- which may suggest similar distributions of case difficulty,
or complexity across groups.
Finally, one other form of approximate validation of compara-
bility of case content across groups is possible. We may
- 239 -
compare apparent difficulty of cases by comparing subjects'
success in reaching the correct diagnosis. If similar
success rates are evident, then comparability of difficulty
of case content may be inferred. Appendices 21, 22 and 23
show the actual diagnoses given and indicate those which
probably cannot be made fran the history alone. Appendix 24
(Table 3) shows the numbers of diagnoses which could be made
for each group, and the number actually made. Table 4 of
that Appendix shows that no statistically significant differ-
ences exist between groups on this variable. We may infer
valid comparability of case content across groups of subjects.
9.2.4 Other Methodological Aspects: Videorecording and Account
Gather
Possible sources of diminished reliability and validity may be
found in the implementation of the research method itself.
Firstly, we may identify aspects of the use of video technology,
both during the patient interview and the stimulated recall
session. On the one hand, the subject is aware of being video-
taped, and on the other, he must watch himself on a small
screen. Either circumstance may affect the reliability and
validity of his responses. In addition, the patient may also
be adversely affected by the presence of a camera.
In the event, neither subjects nor patients seemed at all non-
plussed by the use of videocamera or playback. Perhaps the
domestic television, the cinema, security cameras and
photographic equipment have dispelled effects of both fear
and novelty. Many patients are quite used to being filmed (or
videotaped) and photographed, both in hospital and outside.
For whatever reason, most patients displayed no interest what-
soever in the camera or Lu being 'filmed'. As for the
subjects, it is likely that most of them had already had
considerable contact with video equipment which is used exten-
sively in both undergraduate and postgraduate medical education,
particularly in teaching aspects of interviewing skills (see,
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for example, Vaughan and Marks, 1976; Connally and Bird, 1977;
Maguire et al, 1977; Freer, 1978) as well as more clinical
skills (Sturgeon, 1979). The experience was therefore unlikely
to have been novel for most subjects.
The second methodological aspect concerns the possible invali-
dating effect of varying treatment of subjects by the
experimenter during the account gathering session. This may
cause variability in subject responses which, in turn, could
invalidate comparison of groups of subjects. Section 9.1 has
described the standardised method used for all subjects in all.
groups. En particular, however, variability of replay periods
may contribute to invalidity or unreliability of data. But
Tables 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 suggest that there were no great
differences between the three groups of subjects in this aspect
of method implementation.
Each subject was asked whether or not the interview with the
patient was typical of his normal performance. Out of the 66
subjects only three suggested that it was not typical, in each
case due to patient variables. Only four subjects mentioned
being aware of the camera, while five said that they normally
took less time although the general structure of the interview
was typical. Twelve subjects were unable to make a judgment
on the matter. These findings are summarised in Table 9.5 and
give further support to our evaluation of the data as valid.
Table 9.5 Subjects' stixnates of the Relationship of
Videorecorded Interviews to Usual Performance
(22 subjects per group)
Typical Typical
but more but self- Don't Not
Typical lengthy conscious know typical
Students	 1.5	 0	 1.	 4	 2
Eouse Officers	 14	 3	 1	 4	 0
Registrars	 13	 2	 2	 4	 1.
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9.2.5 Omission of the Physical Examination
It is well recognised that in most cases history taking from
the patient is the most important diagnostic tool (Royal College
of General Practitioners, 1972). In an analysis of 80 new
patients coming to a medical outpatients clinic, Hampton et al
(1975) found that the diagnQsis could be made after reading
the referral letter and taking the history in 66 cases. The
physical examination was useful in only seven patients and the
laboratory investigations in a further seven. Rimoldi (1961)
using card packs (as described In Chapter Four above) to trace
pathways to diagnosis, found that junior students selected
more cards (i.e. requested more information) than did senior
students who, in turn, selected more cards than did physicians.
These differences were due to questions relating to the history
and patient interview, not to either the physical examination
or laboratory investigations. Rimoldi concludes that "this
seems to be in agreement with the suggestios commonly made
that, in general, the most significant part of a diagnosis is
related to the interview section 4 and takes this as "evidence
that the most striking change in the diagnostic process with
increased clinical experience is found in the interview phase".
In addition, there is no reason to suppose that data obtained
from the physical examination is of a different cognitive
order from that elicited as history. Of course, data from the
physical examination is of a different quality and nature from
that elicited as history,, not leastbecause of its direct nature
being, at most, mediated by an instrument (stethoscope, ophth-
almoscope, sphygmomanometer, etc.) and not via the patient's
own cognitive processes. There may be occasions when an item
of physical examination is irreplaceable in the diagnostic
process, but this may apply to all other types of data also.
It was therefore decided to limit the current study to the
central part of the enquiry process and the main diagnostic
tool - the history. It is suggested that the findings may be
generalised to those situations where the physical examination
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also occurs. In terms of the diagnostic thinking process
per se, it would seem unlikely that data from different
sources should be used in different ways. Likewise, being
deprived of the data from a physical examination is unlikely
to alter the structure of that basic thinking process, and,
in many cases, as the work cited above shows, will not alter
its eventual outcome either. Appendices 21, 22 and 23 show
that only 21 out of 195 possible diagnoses are identified
as being unreasonably difficult to establish on the basis of
the history alone. In the event, four of these 21 actually
were established by the subject.
92.6 Conclusions
Determination of validity and reliability of the method of
account gathering by stimulated recall does not present insur-
mountable problems, although the nature of the proof is
largely dependent upon theoretical argument and inference on
the basis of theory, unlike the statistical analyses which
have been applied to the multiple choice questionnaires in
endocrinology and neurology. For such a research instrument,
based on untrained introspection, the manner of implementation
of the method and a standardised approach towards subjects
becomes crucial. Such aspects of the design of the instrument
as are amenable to empirical study have been discussed, but,
again, the order of analysis is less exacting than that applied
to our complementary research instrument. It is, nonetheless,
appropriate and reasonably sufficient.
The validity and reliability of data have been discussed and
determined. It is incumbent upon the experimenter not to
push interpretation of that data beyond its point of reasonable
parsimony and caution.
We may now proceed to discuss the methods of data analysis
applied to the transcrthed accounts.
9.3	 Data Analysis
Transcripts were initially analysed by a process of content
2L13
analysis. The results of this process are frequencies of
defined categories of response. These were subjected to
various non-parametric statistical analyses. The interpre-
tation of protocols, such as the accounts of the present
study, involves certain considerations. These are discussed
in Appendix 25. The method of content analysis itself and
the derivation of the categories and indicators for this
study are described in Appendix 26. The categories and
indicators are described later in section 10.1. The cate-
gories and raters using them must be subjected to tests to
establish their reliability and validity. Appendix 27
describes the methods applied in this study and presents
results which show that reliability and validity of categories
and raters are established.
The types of statistical analysis which are necessary and
possible from hypothesis to hypothesis are very similar, by
virtue of the similar nature and structure of the data across
all hypotheses. Therefore, instead of describing the precise
statistical analysis for each hypothesis separately, we shall
discuss the two stat1stica]. tests used and describe the purpose
of that use. Section 6.5 above presents a detailed discussion
of the criteria for selection between parametric and non-
parametric tests. Although the data from content analysis
meet many of the necessary criteria for justified application
of parametric statistical tests, there is one characteristic
in particular of those data which has determined the use of
non-parametric statistical tests. This characteristic is the
often very small numbers which must be analysed. On occasions
(where, for example, N<3) these figures have become even too
small for non-parametric statistics and data is assessed by
inspection and tabulation only. Hypothesis 10 is the only
exception, providing data amenable to parametric analysis.
However, two non-parametric tests are used; these are the
X. 2 (chi square) test for K independent samples, and the
Kiuskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. Table 9.6 shows
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which hypotheses and categories are subjected to which of
these tests, We may consider in turn the rationale for
application of each of these tests as applied to the present
data.
Table 9.6 Hypotheses and Categories Subjected to the
Test for k Independent Samples and the lCruskal-Wallis
One-Way Analysis of Variance, Respectively
Hypothesis	 Categories	 Kruskal-Wallis
10	 a, b	 Parametric two-way PNOVA
11*	 a,b,c
12	 a,b,c
13	 a,b	 '1/
14	 a,b,c	 I
1,2 or 3 of a,b,c
15	 a,b,c	 I
16	 a,b	 I
* Parametric one-way analysis of variance also performed on
data of length of first replay periods.
9.3.1 The X 2 Test for Independent Samples
When data are ranged in the form of contingency tables, 2
provides an appropriate test of independence of the two varia-
bles (Ferguson, 1966). When categories per hypothesis are
ta)cen as levels of one variable and groups of subjects as levels
of the other so that data may be seen as paired observations,
the independence of these may be determined. The . 2 test may
be used satisfactorily when frequencies constitute the data of
research (Seigel, 1956).
2 may only be used where fewer than 20 per cent of cells have
expected frequencies of less than 5 and no cell has an expected
frequency of zero. ) applied to data from Hypothesis 16
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would have violated the former of these conditions. 	 was
calculated according to the formula:
(o-E)2
9.3.2 The Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks
This test is useful for deciding whether k imdependent samples
come from different populations. It tests t null hypothesis
that the samples come from the same population or from
identical populations with respect to averages. The test may
be applied either for small (k 3, n<5) or large (k>5, nf.5)
samples. The value of H (the test statistic)is defined by the
formula:
12
N(N+l)	 - 3(N+1)
where R is the sum of ranks in the th sample. The statistic
has k-i degrees of freedom and is based on the conversion of
scores to ranks (see seigel, 1956 for a detailed account).
In the present analysis the Xruskai-Wallis H Statistic is used
to test the hypothesi,s of no difference between groups, or no
difference between categories after having shown . independence
of groups and categories by means of the 2 statistic.
No other statistical test was necessary.
9. k Summary
The implementation of the account gathering research method in
this study is described and discussed. The validity of the
method is established by means of theoretical analysis of the
rationale of introspectionist methods and the Lethod of stim-
ulated recall as a special case of introspection. The
selection of content (patients) for the preseint study is des-
cribed and discussed and the validity of that content for the
three groups of subjects established. The methodological
validity of videorecording and this special imstance of account
gathering is established and the rationale for omission of the
- 
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physical examination described and discussed. The two stages
of data analysis are discussed. Firstly, the method and
rationale of content analysis is described including establish-
ment of methodological and content validity and reliability.
Statistical analysis of the results of the content analysis
is described.
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CHAPTER TEN
The Account_Gathering Study 2: Results
This chapterpresents the results of analyses applied to the transcripts
derived from the videotape stimulated recall sessions with students,
house officers and registrars. These will be presented in relation to
the process of content analysis and the research hypotheses, described
in Chapter Nine. Full interpretation and discussion of the results in
relation to the research hypotheses stated in section 5.1 above is
reserved for Chapter Eleven.
10.1 Content Analysis Categories and Indicators
Appendix 26 describes the method of deriving categories and
indicators for the content analysis of transcripts. The figure
in Appendix 26 represents the circular, repeating process which
begins with the research hypotheses and ends any number of cycles
later when the system of categories eventually proves itself
suitable to hypotheses and data alike. Two of the categories
(pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations) have already
been mentioned because of the particular form of reliability
study which was applied to them. We may now define these and
all other categories, with their indicators, as they emerged
from the process of content analysis. The categories nd mdi-
cators define the research hypotheses from which they are
ultimately derived; the relevant hypothesis is therefore identi-
fied by number for each set of categories. It will be remembered
that only Hypotheses 10 to 16 were treated in this manner.
Hypotheses 17 to 20 do not have results which can be presented
separately for discussion. These hypotheses, therefore, will
not be considered again until Chapter Eleven. Categories and
indicators for each of hypotheses 10 to 16 emerged and were
defined as follows.
10.1.1 Hypothesis 10 Categories and Indicators
Category (a) Pre-diagnostic interpretation of clinical information
Definition Any term, phrase or statement which indicates that
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S has made some active interpretation of the
clinical information available to him WHERE the
result of this activity is not sufficiently
specific to constitute a possible diagnosis.
Indicators (i) The resultant interpretation may be at a
relatively undefined level, where no clearly
specified pathological process is mentioned
in terms of descriptive, clinical, metabolic,
morbid anatomical, infective, inflammatory,
biochemical, genetic or psychiatric patho-
physiological processes:
e.g. "Something wrong with ....".
"Myocardial problem".
"Psychiatric disturbance".
(ii) The resultant interpretation may be at a
relatively defined level where a pathophysi-
ological process is indicated in the above
terms, but the interpretation would require
further specificity before constituting an
acceptable final diagnosis:
e.g. "A metabolic abnormality".
"Anaemia caused by blood loss".
"Acute hepatitis".
Category (b) Diagnostic interpretation of clinical information
Definition Any term, phrase or statement which indicates that
S has made some active interpretation of the inform-
ation so far available AND where a pathophysiological
process is indicated with a greater degree of
specificity than for Category (a) sufficient for a
diagnosis.
Indicators This need not be the greatest degree of specificity
possthle but should seem to be sufficient as a
diagnosis in a normal clinical context:
- 249 -
e.g. "Carcinoma of the pancreas.
"Acromegaly".
"Steroid induced Cushing's".
io.1.2 Hypothesis 11 Categories and Indicators
N.B. All categories are with reference to S's interpretative
or evaluative response to information elicited from the
patient duxing the first replay period only (which
response may be reported either during the first stop or
more retrospectively during a later stop).
Category (a) as Category (a) for Hypothesis 10
Category (b) as Category (b) for Hypothesis 10
Category (c) Judgment of need for further general or c1arify
ing enquiry, not stemming from either pre-diagnos--
tic or diagnostic interpretations
Definition Where S enquires further about the patient's
synatoms, signs, etc. for clarification OR where
S seeks to clarify the patient's statement.
N.B. Not, where S is seeking a particular piece of
information based on his own expectations.
Indicators "1 was asking how the pain affected him".
"1 asked her how she didn't feel well".
"... find out whatthepatient means ..."
".. trying to get him to tell me what was the
matter with his ankle ..."
10.1.3 Hypothesis 12 categories and Indicators
Category (a) as Category (a) for Hypothesis 10
Category (b) as Category (b) for Hypothesis 10
Category (c) Expecting, searching for or planning to search for
specific features (symptoms, signs, tests, etc.)
of disease or treatment of disease
Definition Where S shows expectation of certain clinical
information or considers certain features of dis-
ease likely or possible in the patient; given the
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information already elicited.
N.E. Exclude specific questions which form part
of the routine, systematic review.
Indicators "If we investigated the patient, I'd imagine we'd
find X".
"I'm asking these questions because the patient
may have X as part of her syndrome".
"I was thinking it might be diagnosis Y, so I went
through other things typical of that".
"I wanted to know whether the pain was due to X or
Y, so I'm asking those questions".
"1 asked questions about other possible diagnoses
and conditions".
10.1.4 Hypothesis 13 Categories and Indicators
Category (a) Reinterpretation of clinical information, when no
new information has been added
Definition Where an array of clinical information which has
already been interpreted in some way becomes amen-
able to new (altered or additional) interpreta-
tion because of a change in S's own thinking and
not because new information has been added to the
array. The new interpretation may or may not be
related to the old one(s), I.e. it may be a pro-
gressive refinement or specification of the old
interpretation(s) or it may be a completely new
interpretation.
Indicators "It was creeping into my mind/struck me/flashed
through my mind that he may have diagnosis IC"
(when no new information has prompted this).
"I suddenly saw that symptoms X and Y were related!
separate".
"I had finished, but I just asked that question
because I suddenly thought she might have diag-
nosis X".
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"I started thinking again why it had all started
and I thoughtof diagnosis K".
Category (b) Reinterpretation of clinical information arising
from the addition of new information
Definition Where an array of clinical information which has
already been interpreted in some way becomes
amenable to a new (altered or additional) inter-
pretation because of the addition of new
information to the array. The new interpretation
may or may not be related to the old one(s), i.e.
it may be a progressive refinement or specification
of the old interpretation(s) or it may be a com-
pletely new interpretation.
Indicators "Symptom X now suggests that it may be diagnosis
Y..
"Then the patient told me he had symptom X, which
made me think it might be something completely
different from what I'd been thinking of".
"I'd thought of diagnosis K, but when 1 asked fur-
ther questions, I realised that diagnosis Y was
the case".
10.1.5 Hypothesis 14 Categories and Indicators
Category (a) Active confirmation of an interpretation
Definition Where S feels that the selected interpretation is
confirmed as an actual diagnosis.
Indicators "My conclusion is that she's suffering from diagno-
sis X".
"I'm convinced by now that it's diagnosis X".
"I know one diagnosis - she probably had X".
"Be's describing syndrome X, which is A + B + C
due to E".
Category (b) Active elimination of an interpretatlofl*
Definition Where S eliminates an identified interpretation
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because of contrary evidence or positive lack of
necessary evidence.
* The complementary category "passive elimination" where inter-
pretations decay, are forgotten or eliminated by implication
cannot, by definition, be determined from the data with any
reliability. It is therefore omitted.
Indicators "I'd pretty well dismissed diagnosis X because he
-	 hadn't got symptom Y".
"I asked about X because it can cause diagnosis Y,
but she hasn't got x".
"I realised it wasn't diagnosis X".
"If she'd had symptom X it would have been diagnosis
X, but I think it was diagnosis Y".
Category (c) Postponement of either confirmation or elimination
of a possible interpretation with or without stated differential
likelihoods
Definition Where an identified possible interpretation is
neither confirmed nor eliminated by S, but is left
under postponed judgment with or without S giving
an estiimate of its likelihood.
N.B. This category can be designated only after
having read the entire transcript since inter-
im postponements of judgments are not
indicative of this category.
Indicators Where the following are S's final opinion:
"It was disease type X, with diagnosis I high on
the list".
"She's the right category for disease X, but I
don't know any questions that could diagnose
that".	 -
"I'd put my money on diagnosis Z if I had to, but
I couldn't really say with a great deal of certain-
ty that that's what happened to her".
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Note: The above categories cannot be seen as absolute.
Categories (a) and (b) may be subject to reversal given
new information. These categories merely describe
cognitive operations which may be present during the
whole thinking process. It is psychologically unten-
able to suggest that a possible interpretation, once
made, can be totally expunged or confirmed without
chance of later doubt or is not capable, when elimin-
ated, of being later reidentified. Our interest is
in the presence or not of the cogitive operation.
10.1.6 Hypothesis 15 Categories and Indicators
Category (a) Patient - determined interview structure
Definition Where the course of the interview as directed by
S is determined by, or follows on from, the flow
of information as presented by the patient.
Indicators (1) NOT where S merely allows the patient to
talk without interruption, which is stylis-
tic rather than structural.
(ii) NOT where S merely seeks clarification or
elaboration of information given to the
patient.
(iii) "If a system came up, I dealt with it there
instead of waiting fo the systematic
enquiry".
"I decided to do the CVS there because it
was relevant to what she just mentioned".
"I went on to the gut because that's what
he seemed interested in".
Category (b) Subject - determined interview structure
Definition Where the course of the interview is determined
by the subject's requirement actively to test his
interpretations of the clinical information.
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Indicators wI was thinking in terms of diagnosis X, so I asked
about symptom X".
"I was looking for symptoms X, I and %".
"I'u still plugging along the thyroid side".
"I'm excluding some of the pointers".
Category (c) Logically - determined interview structure
Definition Where the subject conducts, or attempts to conduct,
the interview according to a routine format as
defined by the standard (taught) clinical history
or any of its canponent parts. Exclude the pre-
senting complaint since all subjects begin with
this area. Define the standard (taught) clinical
history as follows;
1. Presenting complaint.
2. History of the present complaint.
3. Symptomatic survey (by systems):
a) Cardiovascular
b) Respiratory
c) Locomotor
d) Genito-urinary
e) Gastro- intestinal
f) Neurological
g) General.
4. Past medical history.
5. Family history.
6. Social history.
7. Drug survey.
Indicators "This is just routine/general enquiry".
"He (the patient) was getting my systems mucked up,
so that had to wait".
"I suspected X right at the beginning, but I stored
it away because it had to be asked later in the
systematic enquiry".
1 knew all, about the history of the present corn-
plaint, so I started on the old list".
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Note: Xn essence, the course of the interview is always
subject determined, the above categories identify the
factors which influence S's decisions about the course
of the interview at various points during its progress.
10.1.7 Hypothesis 16_Categories and Indicators
Category (a) Failure to make specific enquiry
Definition Where S identifies, in vetrospect, his own failure
to make relevant, specific enquiry concerning the
patient's problem, symptoms, signs, etc.
Indicators "I should have gone into that symptom in more
depth, but I forgot",
"Symptoms kept cropping up all over the place that
I hadn't thoughtto ask about".
"I should have asked X (with regard to the patient's
complaint)".
Category (b) Failure to make general enquiry
Definition Where S identifies, in retrospect, his own failure
to make •sufficient routine, general or screening
enquiry.
Indicators "This is just a superficial social history, it might
be worth pursuing it a bit more".
"I could have asked a lot more questions about this
system, but I tend to forget them unless they seem
necessary".
"That's a terrible GI history. I hadn't got my
thoughts marshalled sufficiently to rap out all
the direct questions".
"(Under neurological system) I didn't ask about
headache".
Note: These categories indicate S's failure at the time, not
a failure of knowledge generally, but a failure to
"think in action".
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10.2 Statistical Analyses
Section 9.3 above discusses the two major statistical tests
applied to tbe results of content analysis. These results
are frequencies representing the number of subjects per group
who displayed evidence of a given category, with the exception
of categories 10(a) and 10(b) which concern the total number
of responses of each category made by each subject. The two
major statistical tests applied are the)L 2 test for k
independent samples and the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis
of variance by ranks. It will be noted from Table 9.6 that
Hypothesis II is also subject to a parametric one-way analysis
of variance. Since results are presented hypothesis by hypo-
thesis, these matters will be discussed further below.
Because of the essential interrogative nature of Hypotheses
17 to 20, these are not subject to any form of statistical
analysis and will not be considered again until Chapter Eleven.
A1l).. 2 results will be presented as contingency tables, with
observed and expected frequencies, marginal totals and the
derived value of j 2
Kruskal-Wallis' H will be presented with values of all n's, k
and N, degrees of freedom and correcting factors where
necessary. Because of the limited nature of this information,
Appendix 29 presents the raw data of content analysis in terms
of frequencies of incidence per group per category.
10.2.1 Hypothesis 10 Parametric Two-Way Analysis of Variance
Appendix 30 presents the raw data of content analysis using
categories 10(a) (pre-diagnostic interpretations) and 10(b)
(diagnostic interpretations). It nay readily be seen that
these data are amenable to parametric statistical analysis not
contravening any of the ciiteria for such analyses discussed
in section 6.5 above. Accordingly, a two-way analysis of
variance was applied. Table 10.1 presents the summary of that
a1culation. It may be observed that the interaction term is
not statistically significant, suggesting independence of the
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Table 10.1 Two-Way Analysis of Variance Summary Table
Hypothesis 10 categories (a) and (b)
Sums of	 Variance
Source of variation 	 squares	 Df	 estimate
Rows (groups)	 13.6	 2	 6.8
Columns (categories)	 251.3	 1	 251.3
Interaction	 3	 2	 1.5
Within	 1583.9	 126	 12.6
Total
= 0.1190
(1f. 2,126)
NS
1851.8	 131
F = 0.5397	 F = 19.9444
r	 c
(df. 2,126)	 (df. 1,126)
NS	 p<.01
groups and categories dimensions. In other words, relative use
of categories does not alter with status of the subject. The
main effect of rows (groups) does not reach a statistically
significant value either, indicating, as we may expect on the
basis of the non-sigiificant interaction term, that groups of
subjects do not differ in their relative use of the categories.
However, the main effect for columns (categories) does achieve
statistical significance, from which we infer a difference in
relative use of category (a) and category (b) responses. Table
10.2 summarises the raw scores on each of these for each group.
It is clear that category (a) responses (pre-diagnostic inter-
Table 10.2 Summary of Raw Results for CatgorieS 10(a)
and 10(b) (n 22 for each group)
	
10(a) _____	 10(b) _____ Difference
in totals
Group	 Total Mean S D Total Mean S D 10(a)-10(b)
Students	 154	 4.56	 91 4.1 2.05	 +63
House Officers 164 7.4 3.87
	 96 4.4 3.05	 +68
Registrars	 165 7.5 4.57 114 5.2 2.28	 +51
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pretations of information) predominate over category (b}
responses (diagnostic interpretations of information) for all
groups.
10.2.2 Hypothesis 11 Parametric One-Way Analysis of Variance and 2
This analysis concerns subjecta' responses to information
elicited during the first replay period only. It is therefore
necessary to establish the length of that period for each group
and the lack of statistically significant differences between
groups on this variable before we may interpret the results of
content analysis on the basis of the three associated categor-
ies. Parametric one-way analysis of variance is quite
appropriate for this purpose since the data do not violate any
of the criteria set out in 6.5 above.
Table 10.3 summarises the length (in seconds) of the first
replay period for each group. No indication of whether or not
the main complaint was elicited during this time is given
because of the difficulty of defining exactly what constitutes
the main complaint in any one case, and the illogicality of
disregarding informatibn to which the subject must respond.
Should any symptom relevant to one of the major diagnoses be
accepted as a main complaint? Should any symptom or sign or
piece of clinical information relevant to any of the patient's
diagnoses be accepted? What reason is there to discount any
information which the patient gives, regardless of its status
with regard to the patient's diagnoses, since the subject must
evaluate all information in order to decide what to disregard
and what to retain? Barrows et al's (1978) formulation is
therefore eschewed as inappropriate. It is hypothesised here
that all information must receive response from the subject,
regardless of its relationship to the actual. diagnosis, for
it is that relationship which the subject must determine. We
therefore provide only information concerning the length of
the first replay period and not its content which may or may
not have been relevant to the actual diagnosis. It can be
seen from Table 10.3 that the first replay period varied in
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Table 10.3 Length (in seconds) of the First Replay
Period (n = 22 for each group)
Group	 Mean	 Rang	 SD
Students	 49.05	 15 - 73	 16.82
House Officers	 41.12
	
13 - 82
	
22.02
Registrars	 48.89
	
24 - 75
	
14.39
mean length from 4]. to 49 seconds and actually ranged from 13
to 82 seconds.
Table 1.4 shows a non-significant value of F, indicating no
statistica1l' significant difference between length of first
replay period for students, house officers and registrars.
Having established these features, we may go on to consider
the groups' responses in relation to categories (a), (b) and
(c).
Table 10.4 One-Way Analysis of Variance Summary Table
for Length of First Replay Period
Source of	 Suns of
variation	 squares
Between
	 731
Within	 19542
Total
	
20273
Variance
	
Of	 estimate
	
2	 365.5
	
63	 310.19
65	 F = 1.1783
(df. 2,63)
Table 10.5 summarizes the observed frequency of response in
each category. Inspection of this table reveals that some
responses were made in each category. However, from this
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Table 10.5 Observed Frequency of Response in Categories
11(a), (b) and (c)_for Each Group (n 22 per groupj_
Group
Students
House Officers
Registrars
Total
Category
11(a)	 11(b)	 lit
10	 7	 9
17	 8	 4
1.5	 7	 6
42	 22	 19
Total
26
29
28
83
table alone, we cannot tell whether all subjects made a
response in at least one of the categories, which is our con-
cern. Table 10.6 gives this information, showing how many
members of each group made rio such responses, a response in
one of the categories only, or in two or in all three. In
other words, responses of more than one type may be made to
the same information.' It can be seen from Table 10.6 that only
two students and one house officer failed to make a response
in any of the three categories, while most subjects made a
response of one type only (Table 10.5 would suggest that cate-
gory (a) responses were more common than category (b) ones).
However, almost one third (19) of the subjects made responses
of two types, while only one subject actually made responses
in all three categories. It will be noted that the values of
the frequencies in each cell preclude any useful statistical
analysis.
The precise nature of the single and dual responses is not of
great value in illuminating the subjects' cognitive processes,
since their responses are more likely to be dependent upon
the information elicited rather than their own tendencies to
think in certain ways. What is of generalisable importance is
that a subject can and does respond to clinical information
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Table l0..6 'requency of Single and Multiple Responses
to Information Elicited During the First Replay Period
(n 22 per group), Categories ll(a),_(b) and (c)
Group
Students
House Officers
Registrars
Total
Number of Categories of Response
o	 1	 2	 3
2	 15	 4	 1
1	 13	 S	 0
o	 15	 7	 0
3	 43	 19	 1
on one or many levels as reflected by the categories. However,
remembering the possibly partially information-determined
nature of responses, it may be interesting to consider what
these actually were. Table 10.7 gives this information. It
will be seen for all groups that category (a) alone is the most
common single response, while category (b) responses are the
least common. Of the combined categories, (a) plus (b) form the
only pair used to any appreciable extent. It must be emphasised
that no strong conclusions can be drawn from Table 10.7, but it
may be useful in supporting inferences made on more solid grounds.
Table 10.7 Frequencies of Subjects' Responses in Single and
Combined Categories 11(a), (b) and Cc) (n 22 per group)
Groups	 Categories
None (a) (b) Cc) (a)+ (a)+ (b)+ (a)+(b)
	(b 	 Cc)	 (c)	 + (c)
Students	 2	 6 - 3	 6	 2	 1	 1	 1
House Officers 1.
	 9	 2	 2	 7	 1	 0	 0
Registrars	 0	 8	 2	 5	 5	 2	 0	 0
Total	 3	 23	 7	 13	 14	 4	 1	 1
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Inspection of Table' 10.7 seems to suggest that the pattern of
responses is similar for all groups, but the data are not
amenable to statistical analysis. iowever, a 2 test may be
applied to determine whether or not Ithe variables (group mem-
bership and response category) are independent. Table 10.8
demonstrates that this is the case. We may conclude that
category of response to initial information is not determined
by status of the subject responding.
Table 10.8 Szmiaxy of . 2 Test to Determine the
Independence of the Variables: Status and Response
Category for 11(a), (b) and Cc)
Group	 category
11(a)	 11(b)	 11(c)	 Total
Students	 10	 7	 9	 26
(13.1)	 (6.9)	 (5.9)
House Officers	 17	 8	 4	 29
(14.7)	 (7.7/)	 (6.6)
Registrars	 15	 7	 6	 28
(14.2)	 (7.4)	 (6.4)
Total	 42	 22	 19	 83 -
= 4.1349 (df.4) MS
10.2.3 Hypothesis 12
Although a 2 test is applied to Hypothesis 12 data, this is
really a matter of formality since, as Table 10.9 indicates,
frequency of response in each category is 100 per cent in seven
of the nine cells and only one count is missing in each of the
remaining two cells. It is not surprising, therefore, to find
that the variables are independent.
10.2.4 Hypothesis 13 Kruskal-Wallis
Table 10.10 shows the frequency with which different types of
reinterpretation of clinical information are used by each
group of subjects. It will be noted that the figures are not
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Table 10.9 Summary of	 Test to Determine the
Independence of the Variables: Status and Frequency
of Response per Category for 12(a), (b) and (c)
Group	 Category
	
12(a)	 12(b)	 12(c)	 Total
Students	 22	 2].	 22	 65
	
(21.5)	 (21.5)	 (21.9)
House Officers	 22	 22	 22	 66
	
(21.9)	 (21.9)	 (22.2)
Registrars	 21	 22	 22	 65
	
(21.5)	 (21.5)
	
(21.9)
Total	 65	 65	 66	 196
0.0666 (df.4) NS
Table 10.10 Frequency of Responses per Group in Categories
13(a) and 13(b) Separately and Conjointly and Number
of Subjects Making Responses in Neither Category
(n 22 per group)
Group	 Category	 Total
Neither 13(a) 13(b) Both
Students	 10	 0	 9	 3	 22
(per cent)	 (45)	 (0)	 (41)	 (14)	 (100)
Rouse Officers	 6	 2	 10	 4	 22
(per cent)	 (27)	 (10)	 (45)	 (18)	 (100)
Registrars	 10	 0	 8	 4	 22
(per cent)	 (45)	 (0)	 (37)	 (18)	 (100)
Total	 26	 2	 27	 11
(per cent)	 (39)	 (3)	 (41)	 (1.7)
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amenable to statistical analysis. Inspection of the data
reveals that the most common response is represented by
category 3.3 (b) which indicates reinterpretation of clinicaJ.
information on the basis of new information being added to
the array. It is much less common in the sample for reinter-
pretation to occur in the absence of new information (13 out
of a possible 66 occasions which is approximately 20 per cent
of occasions). It is important to note, however, that 26 (39
per cent) of subjects make no reinterpretations of the
clinical information at all. This allows us to make the
important inference that the first interpretation of any piece
or pieces of clinical information which the subject makes is not
necessarily subject to alteration or modification. This primary
interpretation may or may not be correct, but in 39 per cent
of the samples it persisted throughout the diagnostic thinking
process. Given this finding, it is worthwhile determining
whether or not the response pattern is similar across all
subjects. We may, therefore, apply a Kruskal-Wallis one-way
analysis of variance by ranks to the raw data of Table 10.10.
The results of this test are unequivocal. Where k = 3, n 1 = 4
and n2 = 4 and n3 4 and N 12, H = 0 with 2 df. This,
clearly, is not a statistically significant value. We may
conclude that the three groups of subjects do not differ in
their response patterns as measured by categories 13(a) and (b).
10.2.5 Hypothesis 14	 2 and Kruskal-Wallis
Hypothesis 14 suggests that no difference will be found
between students, house officers and registrars in frequency
of response for each of the three categories which reflect
strategies for selection among competing interpretations of
clinical information. We may therefore commence by testing
this hypothesis directly, by the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analy-
sis of variance by ranks comparing groups. Where k z 3,
= 3,	 3 and n3 3, and N = 9, B = 0.7923, corrected
for ties, this value becomes 0.8126. This value is not stat-
istically significant. We may therefore conclude that groups
of subjects do not differ in frequency of use of each of the
categories of Hypothesis 14 (see Appendix 29 for raw data).
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However, although frequency of use of categories does not
differ from group to group, it may be, as with Hypotheses 11
and 13, that groups differ in their use of conibinations of
categories. It would be be a reasonable contention that in
the present case such differences or similarities are less
dependent upon the information elicited and more dependent
upon the subjects' own cognitive styles ("self-consistent and.
enduring indi'cridual differences in cognitive organisation and
functioning, ... in general principles of cognitive organisa-
tion ... and ... various self consistent idiosyncratic
tendencies ...". Ausubel et al, 1978). This is unlike the
case of Hypothesis 11 categories, where style of use is
presumed to be primarily dependent upon the clLinical inform-
ation presented. To test this aspect of Hypothesis 14, we
may count the frequency of use of one, two or three of the
categories in subjects of each group and deterrine whether
or not groups and strategies of category use are independent
variables by means of a 	 test. Table 10.11 presents
results of this test and demonstrates that, imdeed, these
variables are independent (X. 2 - 1.6674, d.4,, NS).
Table 10.11 Summary of 2 test_to Detennine the
Independence of the Variables: Status and Strategies of
Use of Categories 14(a), (b) and (c) (n 22 per group)
Group	 Number of Categories Used!	 Total
Students
House Officers
Registrars
	
5	 12
	
(6.3)	 (12.3)
	
7	 13
	
(6.3)	 (12.3)
	
7	 12
	
(6.3)	 (12.3)
5	 22
(3.3)
2	 22
(3.3)
3	 22
(3.3)
19	 37	 1G	 66
2 = 1.6674 (df.4) NS
- 266
Such independence of variables suggests that all groups
adopt the same strategy, however, it does not tell us
whether or not the possible strategies are differently
used. We may, therefore, apply a Kruskal-Wallis test to
determine whether or not such differences are apparent.
Where k = 3, n1 = 3, n2
 = 3 and n3 = 3, and N = 9, H = 6.8,
when corrected for ties, B = 6.9772. For this value
p< .01. We may therefore conclude that there is a statis-
tically significant difference between subjects' use of
either one, two or three categories. Inspection of Table
10.11 shows that the use of two categories is the most
common strategy. Table 10.12 may assist discussion of this
finding by presenting the actual observed frequencies of
subjects' responses in all single and combined categories.
However, inspection of this Table does not yield any immedia-
tely interpretable finding.
Table 10.12 Frequency of Subjects' Responses in Single
and Combined Categories 14(a), (b) and (c)
In = 22 per group)
Groups	 Categories
(a) (b)
	
(c)	 (a)+ (a)+ (b)+	 a)+(b)
(b)	 (c)	 Cc)	 +(c)
Students	 3	 1	 1	 7
	
3	 2
	
5
House Officers	 2	 1	 4	 5
	
2	 6
	
2
Registrars	 2	 0	 5	 5
	
2	 5
	
3
Total
	
7	 2 10	 17	 7	 13	 10
2
It is untenable, given the non-significant value of L for
comparing groups, to suggest that strategy of category use is
dependent upon the sub)ect's knowledge base. It may, however,
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be inadmissable to suggest that logical considerations are at
work, since although the use of more than one category by any
one subject does not imply that the subject has a dual or
triple evaluation of the same interpretation of the clinical
data, he may be dealing with two or three interpretations of
the same data and evaluate each differently, but his interpre-
tation of one may have logical consequences or be dependent
upon his interpretation of others. Results relevant to
Hypothesis 14 thus demonstrate flexibility of thought in all
groups of subjects.
10.2.6 HypothesiS 15: Kruskal-Wallis
This hypothesis suggests that no differences will be observed
between groups in their use of categories 15(a), (b) and (c).
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks indicates
the validity or invalidity of this hypothesis. Where k 3,
Ill = 3, n2 = 3 and n 3 = 3, and N = 9, H = 0.6051, when
corrected for ties, H = 0.5501. This value is not statistic-
ally significant. We may therefore conclude that Hypothesis
15 is substantiated. However, although groups do not differ
in their use of categ'ories (a), (b) and (c), the relative
frequency of use of each category may differ across all groups.
A iIkal-Wa1lis analysis can also illuminate this possibility.
Where k, n's and N are as above, H = 31.41, when corrected for
ties H 34.5811. This value is statistically significant
(p < .01). Inspection of the observed frequencies per category
(see Table 10.13) shows that this significant value derives
from the infrequent use of category (a) and very frequent use
of categories (b) and (c). This significant value of H, given
its derivation and the non-significant value of B for compari-
son of groups, indicates that all, subjects conduct the
clinical interview accord.ng to the demands of either their
own interpretations of the information or the requirements of
some standard form of interview structure and content or, as
is usually the case, according to some combination of both
criteria. The value of 6 for students in category (a) probably
only reflects either a lack of current expertise in the
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Table 10.13 Observed Frequenc3r of Use of
Categories 15(a), (b) and (C) (n	 22 per group)
Groups
Students
House Officers
Registrars
Total
Categories
(a)	 (b)	 (c)	 Total (max. 66)
6	 2].	 21	 48
1	 20	 21	 42
1	 21	 18	 40
8	 62	 60	 130
interpersonal aspects of interviewing or a lack of sufficient
command of knowledge to maintain the pace and direction of the
interview throughout. However, the results indicate quite
clearly the subject's need to control the flow of information
according to his own designs. The Baconian ideal of thorough
data collection followed by interpretation would appear not to
be fo1lowe 'by these subjects and to be qiaestionable in the
light of these results.
10.2.7 Hypothesis 16: Kruskal-Wallis
Table 10.14 shows the frequency of observed response in cate-
gories (a) and (b). It can be seen that the incidence of these
responses is not very great, ranging from four per cent to 54
per cent across all cells. Application of Kruskal-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance by ranks where k 3, n1 = 2, n2 = 2
n3 2 and N = 6, B - 0.2857, when corrected for ties 1! 0.2941.
This value is not statistically significant. We may therefore
conclude that the three groups do not differ in their use of the
two categories. Although no statistical test is available, it
is clear that category (a) responses are more cc*muon than
category (b). In other words, all groups retrospectively iden-
tify failure to make a specific enquiry more often than they
3
(14)
12
(54)
1
1 4)
8
(36)
Groups
Students
(per cent)
House Officers
(per cent)
Registrars
(per cent)
Total
(per cent)
Categories --
(a)	 (b)
	
4	 4
	(18)	 (18)
	
24	 8
	
(36)	 (12)
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Table 10.14 Frequency of Observed Responses in
Categories 16(a) and (b) for all Groups (n = 22 per group)
identify failure to make a general or routine enquiry. However,
the values of the observed frequencies in each cell are rela-
tively low. Even when compared with an arbitrary theoretical
frequency of 14 (approximately 64 per cent frequency) the
values are statistically significantly lower than this (see
Table 10.15).
Table 10.15 Comparison of Observed Frequencies in
Categories 16(a) and (b)with Arbitrary Theoretical
Frequency of 14 (c. 64 per cent) (n = 22 per group)
Category	 0	 £	 0-E)2 (O-E)2
(a)	 12 14	 4	 0.2857	 28 14	 36	 2.5714 L	 9.9999 df.2
4 14	 100	 7.1428	 p< .01
(b)	 3	 14
1 14
4 14
121	 8.6428	 2169	 12.0714 j = 27.857 df.2
100	 7.1428	 p<.O].
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Our conclusion must be, then, that while some subjects fail
to "think on their feet", the total number of these is not
statistically significant even when compared with a relatively
low arbitrary figure. The largest frequency occurs for
students, in category (a), reflecting, possibly, that an
easily manipulable or retrievable knowledge structure has, as
yet, to be developed.
No other statistical tests or tables are considered necessary
for Hypotheses 10 to 16.
10.3 Summary
Categories and indicators are described which emerged from
the process of content analysis in relation to Hypotheses 10
to 16 which they define and from which they are ultimately
derived. Statistical analyses of the results of content
analysis are described for each hypothesis and results of those
2
analyses presented. The major tests applied are the ) and
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks, both of
which are non-parametricq, The essential interrogative nature
of Hypotheses 17 to 20 renders statistical analysis inapprop-
riate. Discussion of results for Hypotheses 10 to 16 and of
findings relevant to Hypotheses 17 to 20 follows in Chapter
Eleven.
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C1II½PTER ELEVEN
The Account Gathering Study 3: Discussion of Results
In Chapter Ten were presented the results of content analysis and
subsequent statistical analysis pertaining to Hypotheses 10 to 16.
A discussion is now presented of those results and of findings
pertaining to Hypotheses 17 to 20 also. Where hypotheses are sub-
stantlally related, they are discussed in conjunction with one
another. The discussion in this chapter is limited to the results
of the account gathering study alone. In Chapter Twelve this and
the discussion of results of the questionnaire study are combined
to form a unified view of the diagnostic thinking process, drai'ing
upon the psychological literature for its explanatory power. 4ean-
while, the discussion of the present chapter is limited to Hypotheses
10 to 20, and considers each in turn in the light of the Michigan and
Ncl4aster studies as appropriate (see 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), and culminates
in a discussion of the interpretative value of the present study for
such current descriptions of the diagnostic thinking process.
11.1 Overview of the Issues for Discussion
The discussion of results of the account gathering study is
intended to define more closely both previously identified
and new variables within the diagnostic problem and thinking
process. In addition, a more useful and complete analytical
framework than hypothesis generation and testing is sought
to explain in psychological terms the cognitive processes of
the clinical problem solver.
11.2 Hypothesis 10
(a)"Students, house officers and registrars will make
multiple pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpre-
tations of clinical information as it is progressively
elicited during the clinical interview.
(b) No differences will be observed between students,
house officers and registrars in the relative use
of pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations
of clinical information during the entire diagnostic
thinking process."
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Barrows et al (1978), Barrows (1976) and Neufeld et al (1976)
refer to 'broad' or 'general' and 'specific' hypotheses,
although despite giving examples no definition of these terms
seems to be available. Barrows and Bennett (1972) suggest
that students and house officers generate precise and speci-
fic hypotheses, whereas good clinicians tend to keep theirs
broad and vague, allowing them to be shaped by the data.
Bowever, Barrows et al (1978) report that physicians' early
hypotheses may be either specific or general. Overall, the
current McMaster view is somewhat unclear (see 3.1.2 above).
Elstein et al (1978) report that physicians generate diagnos-
tic hypotheses early in the clinical encounter and that these
may be either specific or general. But, again, no definition
of these terms is given.
The process of defining categories and indicators for content
analysis has yielded a definition and examples of two forms
of interpretative response to clinical data which are evident
in the present accounts of students, house officers and
registrars. These two forms of response may be analogous to
the general and specfic hypotheses discussed above, yet
closer examination will indicate that 'hypotheses' may not be
the most productive term to apply to them. It has already
been suggested that 'hypothesis generation and testing' is a
needlessly limiting conceptualisation of the diagnostic
thinking process (see Chapter Three). The categories of this
study refer to 'pre-diagnostic' and 'diagnostic' interpretations
of clinical information.
A pre-diagnostic interpretation could not be described as a
'diagnostic hypothesis', not even as a 'broad or general dia-
gnostic hypothesis'. Instead, it appears to represent the
subject's clearly interim, working and flexible identification
of the general location of the piece or array of information
in some segment or section of his own cognitive structure of
knowledge and experience. In other words, it may be seen as
a working interpretation, not an hypothesised diagnosis. It is
the beginning of the process of trying to make sense of the
information elicited by referring to other information stored
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in memory. This can be done in general terms by locating
broad areas of relevance which could not be a diagnosis, or
in specific terms by locating a precise, unambiguous meaning
which would be acceptable as a diagnosis. Thus the interpre-
tation refers to an extrapolated context or array of
information of which the information already elicited could
be an exemplar if accompanied by certain other items of
information.
Considering the first part of Hypothesis 10 which refers to
multiple interpretations in all groups of subjects, this is
substantiated as Table 10.2 indicates. Students, house officers
and registrars each reported approximately seven pre-diagnostic
interpretations of the information and four or five diagnostic
interpretations. Reference to Appendix 30 shows that the
range across all groups of pre-diagnostic interpretations is
from zero to 18, and for diagnostic interpretations from zero
to 11. It is certainly the case, then, that mi1tip1e inter-
pretations at both levels of specificity are made by all groups.
This reflects the findings of Elstein et al (1978) and the
McMaster group (see 3.1.2) who also point out that students
and physicians do not differ in the number of hypotheses they
generate. Our findings substantiate this conclusion and add
house officers to the list. All groups appear to have equal
interpretative capacity.
The Michigan group find that the average number of hypotheses
held at any one time ranges between four and seven, while the
McMaster group identify a range of three to nine with an
average of 5.5. Table 10.2 shows that our subjects made an
average of approximately 11 or 12 interpretations during the
course of the clinical interview. It has already been
suggested (3.1 above) that both the Michigan and McMaster
groups have tended to overinterpret their data and attribute
to it an accuracy, completeness and rigour which is unjusti-
fied. In the present instance this tendency, together with
the inclination to quantify which the formulation of hypothesis
generation and testing has encouraged, has yielded a misleading
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and limiting view of the diagnostic thinking process.
Let us first consider what it might mean when physicians or
students are described as holding a certain number of hypoth-
eses 'at the same time', disregarding for the moment oux
contention that account gathering methods are not sufficiently
accurate to allow statements of such specificity. It must be
presumed that the hypotheses under discussion are seen as
being 'held' in short term memory as though they were, in a
sense, ideas to remember and test out in the real world by
establishing the presence or absence of their concomitants.
This is surely a description which lacks the dynamism of the
actual process, and fails to consider the context of antece-
dent and subsequent thinking. It is only a partial argument,
dealing with a part of the diagnostic thinking process which
has become generalised and expanded to usurp the description
and definition of an entire process. We have evidence of
multiple hypotheses or, as we prefer, interpretations, but
instead of stopping our analysis with that finding, we must
ask how such a cognitive phenomenon can arise. What happens
as a result of it is discussed in relation to later research
hypotheses.
In essence, for a number of different interpretations to be
made of the same Information array, or of subsections of
that array, or intersections of that array as it gradually
increases or changes in certain ways, it is necessary for the
interpreter to have as many different perceptions of the
information array as he has interpretations. Different per-
ceptions, logically, can arise in two ways. Firstly, the
same items of information, where they constitute a complete
array, can be rearranged cognitively in some manner to have
different inter-relationships, roles, relative dominance and
so on (see 4.1.2 above for the discussion of the forceful
feature). In other words, the array can itself be structured
in different ways by the interpreter, so that it has different
meanings for him. Secondly, the array of information can be
rearranged cognitively in the same way as described but in
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an extrapolated context of information which might be present
but, as yet, is not proved to be so. In other words, the
information can be given structure and meaning by fitting it
in to or relating it to a wider set of information already
structured and stored by the Interpreter. We may see here a
parallel with Pee1s (1971) describer and explainer thinking.
The multiplicity of pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpre-
tations suggests that information as it is elicited from the
patient can be and is structured as part of many possible
extrapolated contexts of learned, memorised or otherwise
stored information.
It is clear from the discussion so far that Eistein et al1s
(1978) differentiation between cue interpretation and hypo-
thesis generation is not considered tenable. Instead, it is
suggested that these constitute two aspects of the same
process.
Given the derivation of interpretations (or hypotheses) as
suggested, it is clearly inappropriate to contend that a cer-
tain number of these may be held at any one time. A certain
number may be dealt with at any one time, but that number is
probably as dependent upon the clinical information itself and
its relationship to the various potential interpretations, as
upon the needs of the student's or clinicians own thinking
processes. This echoes a point already made (3.6 above) that
multiple hypothesis formation is less likely to be for reasons
of economy of cognition than a simple function of the multi-
plicity of potential extrapolated contexts in which the given
information can be embedded.
Raving considered the possible cognitive processes antecedent
to the hypotheses or interpretations, we may consider the sub-
sequent processes. Neither the Michigan nor McMaster studies
provides information concerning the fate of hypotheses once
held but now discarded. It is shown later in this chapter
that the capacity of the interpreter to structure information
in inappropriate ways is not always severely limited by either
fact or logic. The accounts also demonstrate that interpre-
tations may wax and wane in relative importance and currency
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or may be not mentioned between the beginning of the account
and the review of the case at the end. Yet during this time,
all interpretations are potentially current and present, or,
rather the interpreter has the ability to structure the
information in many ways other than those he is currently
discussing and evaluating. It is this potential which is surely
the important aspect of the diagnostic thinking process. The
ill defined problem potentially can beccme well defined in
many different ways which have varying degrees of congruence
with reality. This provides another strong reason for reject-
ing the hypothesis counting approach towards describing
diagnostic thinking. Such an approach obscures the dynamism
and creativity inherent in the process.
The final point to be made in relation to Hypothesis 10 concerns
its second part, which suggests that no differences will be
observed between students, house officers and registrars in
their relative use of pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpre-
tations of the clinical information elicited. The non-statist-
ically significant interaction term of !rable 10.1 suggests that
this hypothesis is accurate in its assumption. The value of F
for columns (categoriesY, adds to this finding by showing that
the incidence of pre-diagnostic interpretations is statistically
significantly more frequent than the incidence of diagnostic
interpretations. We may consider reasons for this finding.
Firstly, it is not the case that pre-diagnostic and diagnostic
interpretations appear during the clinical interview or
diagnostic thinking process in any particular order. That is
to say that the diagnostic thinking process cannot be character-
ised as being one of gradual specification and definition. The
making of either type of interpretation primarily must be
dependent upon the information elicited. If that information
is specifically diagnostic of one disease, the clinician will
not think pre-diagnostically simply because the interview has
only just ccimnenced. It is possible that in some circumstances
he would be well advised to do so, but that is not the point
under discussion.
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Secondly, given that information is elicited linearly,
frequently needs clarification, and that the clinician is
constantly responding to the flow of information, it would
seem reasonable that he could not be specific as often as he
could make interim judgments. In terms of structuring the
information, or relating it to stored, structured information,
it may be that the structures of information which can be
labelled with the name of a diagnosis are olE a different
order from the structures of information which can be labelled
with a pre-diagnostic interpretation. It is possible that the
content may or may not have features in common. These are all
matters of pure speculation and would require further investi-
gation and research. We may only state at present that
relative use of pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations
does not differ across the groups of subjects of this study
who all favour the former over the latter. It is also worth
noting that a pre-diagnostic interpretation can be just as
correct or just as incorrect as a diagnostic one in relation
to the patient's actual diagnosis.
11.3 Hypothesis 11
"(Elstein et al (1978) find that, in terss of tine of
onset, the first diagnostic hypothesis is generated
by ten per cent of the way through or within the
first five minutes of the clinical interview. Barrows
et a]. (1978) find that the first diagnostic hypothesis
is advanced, on average, within 28 seconds of the
appearance of the main complaint).
The present study will show that studemts, house
officers and registrars make immediate interpretat-
ive or evaluative response to initial items of
clinical information received whether or not these
constitute the patient's main complaint."
This discussion concerns subjects' responses to information
elicited during the first replay period which varied in mean
length from 41 to 49 seconds and actually ranged from 13 to
82 seconds. For reasons explained in section 10.2.2 above,
revelation or not of the patient's main complaint is not
considered a relevant factor.
The intended aims of Hypothesis 11 are threefold.. Firstly, it
might provide a basis for informed discussion of theories of
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pattern recognition as an element in the diagnostic thinking
process. Secondly, it might reinforce previous criticisms of
the theory of hypothesis generation and testing as inadequate,
misleading and limiting because of its tendency to divert
attention to one aspect and section of the process only and
generalise those findings to other parts of the process not
seriously analysed. Finally, it might deepen our own inter-
pretation of the thinking process under consideration.
Although theories of the diagnostic thinking process as pattern
recognition have been discussed and rejected (3.2 above) they
must again be considered in their role of explaining the
student's or clinician's cognitive activity prior to genera-
tion of the first hypothesis. Barrows et al (1978) and
Scadding (1967) suggest that. generation of the first hypothesis
(although, apparently, not others) occurs as a result of
pattern recognition. We still reject this Interpretatk,fl, but
must forward an alternative one if the criticisms made are to
be other than destructive.
It will be remembered that the content analysis categories of
Hypothesis 11 are as for Hypothesis 10 (pre-diagnostic and
diagnostic interpretations). In addition, however, is one
concerning the subject's judgment of the need for further
clarifying enquiry not stemming from either pre-diagnostic
or diagnostic interpretations (see 10.1.2 above). esults
indicate that only two students and one house officer failed
to make a response which could be classified into one of
these categories. Of these,one student had experienced
difficulty in hearing what the patient had said, the other
had discussed the patient's holiday location, and the house
officer had been informed by the patient that she had chronic
lymphatic leukaemia and he only commented during the first
stop that he had thought it was a pity that she had told him
that. These three subjects, then, are exceptional for
particular reasons and cannot be taken as invalidating the
following discussion in any way.
It was found that almost two thirds of the subjects made a
response in one of the categories while almost one third made
— 279 -
responses in two categories and one student actually made
responses in all three categories (Table 10.6). Pre-diagnostic
interpretations were the most common response (almost half of
all responses were in this category) while diagnostic interpre-
tations and a judgment of need for further clarifying enquiry
were almost equally frequent in the remaining half of responses
made. As discussed in 11.2 above, we cannot draw any conclu-
sions about the subjects thinking processes from this relative
distribution of responses across categories because the effects
of information content cannot be determined. This point i-- -
also made in section 10.2.2 itself, where attention is drawn
to the major lesson of these findings which is that subjects
can and do make active, interpretative or evaluative response
to clinical information as soon as it is elicited. As Rypoth-
esis 11 suggests, this is so for all groups of subjects. In
addition, Table 10.8 shows that the relative distribution of
responses across categories (a), (b) and (c) is not statistic-
ally significantly different according to status of the
respondent. Listein et a] (1978) suggest that hypotheses are
generated by associations from clusters of a few cues. We
would suggest that even a single piece of information can be
structured in an extrapolated context and interpreted.
Although the point made is a small one, it is of considerable
importance. We have shown that if clinical information is
available, the student and the clinician make active response
to it. This is substantiated in the Piagetian viewpoint "that
human beings are not blank slates which passively receive the
wor1d rather that they actively structure it" (Case, 1973).
In 77 per cent of instances (64 out of 83 responses) the
response is in the form of an interpretation. In other words,
the subject has located an appropriate (or inappropriate, but
nonetheless possible) extrapolated context of information and
has cognitively structured (or interpreted) the information
elicited accordingly. We would therefore reject with even
greater certainty theories of pattern recognition which imply
the passive reception of information until it is recognised
as matching some other array. The unlikelihood of this as
either a logical or cognitive phenomenon has already been dis-
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cussed in section 3.2 above. We now have presented evidence
to support that theoretical argument. In principle, arguments
of pattern recognition can adequately be refuted by the
assertion that the human brain is not a passive receptor of
information but is, even at its least complex level, an active
assimilator, or, as Neisser (1967) asserts, "seeing, hearing
and remembering are all acts of construction, which make more
or less use of stimulus information depending upon circum-
stances". So it must be with pattern recognition as proposed
in the field of theories of the diagnostic thinking process.
Reminding us of a previous discussion, Neisser (1967)
points out that	 111 defined categories are the rule,
not the exception, in daily life". This being so, he reminds
us also of Bruner's emphasis "that pattern recognition depends
on the identification of specific features or attributes of
the stimulus". This must surely be the case if, as according
to Barrows and Scadding, a process of pattern recognition
leads to an hypothesis rather than an identification The
contention seems to be a logical, and psychological, fallacy;
for if it is such a process of identification of specific
features and does, which is more important, lead to an hypo-
thesis rather than an identification, then surely the process
is one of interpretation by structuring. It would seem that
again, perhaps, concentration on the formulation of hypothesis
generation and testing has precluded useful analysis, direct-
ing attention to the search for the first hypothesis and not
to explaining how that hypothesis is derived.
The process of content analysis has revealed three possibilities
in relation to the derivation of meanings. Two of these are
the formation of pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations
of information, respectively, which we suggest is by comple-
mentary cognitive operattons of structuring and extrapolation
to other structured contexts. However, the third category
requires some discussion since its congruence with our overall
interpretation of the diagnostic thinking process is not
immediately clear. Section 10.1.2 names this third category,
called category Cc), as "Judgment of the need for further
general or clarifying enquiry, not stemming from either pre-
- 28]. -
diagnostic or diagnostic interpretations". It is defined as:
"Where S enquires further about the patient's symptoms, signs,
etc. for clarification OR where S seeks to c1arify the
patient's statement NOr where S is seeking a particular piece
of information based on his own expectations".
	 indicator
of this category may be "I was asking how the pain affected
him" or "I asked her how she didn't feel well". Table 10,5
shows that 23 per cent (19 out of 83) of all responses were
in this category but that it was the least frequently used of
all response categories identified.
aypothesis 11 suggests that all subjects make either (or both)
interpretative or evaluative response to initial items of
information elicited. Category (c) clear:Ly represents an
evaluative response which reflects the subject's inability
to structure or interpret the information to his own satis-
faction without further clarification of the patient's meaning.
It is important to note that we say "to his own satisfaction".
It would be untenable to suggest that a subject, if presented
with the information that the patient "didn't feel well" or
"had a pain", could not extrapolate from that to many contexts,
both pre-diagnostic and diagnostic. But to do so wu1d be
grossly inefficient. It would seem, therefore, that the subject,
perhaps, makes a judgment about how well defined the problem
should become before what the Michigan and McMaster groups call
'hypothesis testing' can usefully begin	 By 'well defined'
in this context, we must thin]c in terms of structures or
extrapolated contexts which the subject can identify with suf f-
icient subjective certainty or from which he can work effectively.
Identification of category 11(c) concerning the need for further
enquiry suggests some evaluation of the interpretative process
itself or of its initial outcome and a greater or less willing-
ness or ability to work within one structure rather than
another (see 11.12 for further discussion of this point). No
grounds or evidence are available which indicate whether or
not this is a person or personality dependent phenomenon, or
whether all subjects would respond to information as vague as
"didn't feel well" or "had a pain", in the same way..
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Ultimately, as Peel (1971) indicates "the decision turns on
what the judger wants to fulfil". The question, here, is
whether or not every judger wants to fulfil the same object-
ive in the same way.
In conclusion, Hypothesis 11 has given rise to further con-
sideration of the process of interpreting clinical information
and has thrown some light on the conditions of that process.
In addition, the previous rejection of pattern recognition in
the diagnostic thinking process which was on theoretical
grounds, has received empirical support.
11.4 Hypothesis 12
"Accounts given by students, house officers and
registrars wifl, indicate that the dignostic think-
ing process involves working within a cognitive
context or contexts extrapolated from the clinical
information available. '
Results and discussion relevant to Hypothesis 12 should clarify
the meaning of "interpretation" as it has been used in
categories 10 and 11(a) and (b), which refer to pre-diagnostic
and diagnostic interpretations. These two categories are also
used for content analysis relevant to Hypothesis 12 but are
augmented by a third category identified as "expecting, search-
ing for or planning to search for specific features (symptoms,
signs, tests, etc.) of disease or treatment of disease". This
category excludes enquiry which forms part of the routine or
systematic review. Its close relationship to the concept of
hypothesis testing as promulgated by the Michigan and McMaster
groups should be quite obvious. Indeed, the results and dis-
cussion of Hypothesis 12 will substantiate the findings of
those workers.
Much of the potential discussion has already been presented in
relation to Hypotheses 10 and 11. The concept of structuring
and its relationship to the extrapolated context has already
been explored. Table 10.9 shows that in only two of 198
instances is no response made in any of the three categories..
of Hypothesis 12, but that all subjects made response in at
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least two of these categories and 64 out of the 66 made responses
in all three categories. The present findings, then, surely
reflect those of the Michigan and Mcl4aster studies which those
groups characterise as hypothesis testing. It is intended,
here, that category 12(c) which concerns expecting or searching
for specific items of clinical information, will enable us to
be more specific about the nature of this cognitive process.
De Groot (1965) refers to "the omnipresence of anticipations"
and states that, in chess playing, "practically every operation
in the thought process serves to find out whether things
specifically anticipated are or are not confirmed". De Groot,
like the Michigan and McMaster groups, coeceptualises his
subjects' behaviour as hypothesis generation and testing.
Elstein et a]. U978) use this same framework precisely, stating
that clinical data are evaluated in terms of their fit to
anticipated findings. They add that each cue is designated as
positive, non-contributory or negative with respect to a part-
icular hypothesis. Bowever, this conclusion would appear to be
a paramorphic one, and an artefact of their research methods
rather than actually reflecting their subjects' thinking processes.
The present study strongly reinforces the explanatory concept of
searching for anticipated findings as the 100 per cent frequency
of response in category 12(c) shows. As an example of a sub-
ject's account of this type of thinking, we may quote from a
house officer:
"Well, with that kind of history I was immediately
thinking of myocardial infarction. I was trying to
keep an open mind and at the same time thinking: I
must go through these first. I must go through the
typical things for an infarct". 01.0. 04)
In other words, having located a possible structure, the sub-
ject needs to define whether or not the 'fit' which he has
achieved extends to the rest of the information. If so, then
a diagnosis is made. If not, then the information elicited
must be compared with other structures in the same way until
one is found that does fit. We may quote from the account of
a student, talking about the same aspect of his thinking
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processes:
"You always expect other symptoms. If he's got a
cardiac complaint like that, especially coming on
for no apparent reason, you have to think of pain
or anything else or whether he felt dizzy, fainted,
nausea,or anything which may be associated with
his chest complaint, and, in fact, I found out
that he did have dizzy spells, so I pursued that
a bit further.
(And what were you thinking at the time?)
Well, trying to work out the differential diagnosis
of the various heart conditions that he might have".
(S. 20)
This account is interesting in that it hints at a more precise
meaning of both structuring and interpreting. In this case,
the subject is anticipating some subset of a possible range of
concomitants. Perhaps we may perceive here, a point of differ-
entiation between pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations.
S.20's pre-diagnostic interpretation 'cardiac complaint'
clearly subsumes a large range of symptoms, signs and other
clinical information. When S.20 has established the presence
or absence of some or all of these, then he may have worked
out the differentialdiagnosis (or diagnostic interpretations)
he was trying to achieve. In other words, more information of
a precise type might enable him to designate a number of
possible structures of the information elicited and eventually
determine which of the extrapolated contexts is the most likely
one.
This, then, would appear to be a more precise, cognitive, des-
cription of the process of hypothesis testing when seen in the
context of structuring and interpretative activity. It remains
an interesting point, however, to speculate upon how much or
what types of information give rise to pre-diagnostic and
diagnostic interpretations, respectively; what types of inform-.
ation are stored in these structures; whether they are the
same or different and similarly or differently organised; and
whether there are individual differences in these features
across subjects within and between groups. The present data
can throw no light upon these dark areas.
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11.5 Hypotheses 13 and 17
" It will be observed for students, house officers
and registrars that re-interpretation of clinical
information occurs during the course of the
clinical interview due to:
(a) New thoughts occurring about already inter-
preted clinical information when no new
information has been added.
(b) New clinical information being elicited to
facilitate re-interpretation of clinical
information already elicited and interpreted."
" Results will not indicate the mechanism of inter-
pretation and re-interpretation of the array of
clinical information as it is accumulated throughout
the clinical interview."
Hypotheses 13 and 17 are complementary and so are discussed
together. In sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 above are defined
questions which the Michigan and McMaster studies did not
appear to address. Hypotheses 13 and 17 attempt to make good
some of these omissions by initiating discussion of the follow-
ing questions: How are cues cognitively manipulated ? What
process of structuring generates hypotheses 7 flow do new
hypotheses arise 7 ow are relationships between cues
allocated and re-allocated ? The categories of Hypothesis 13
which should facilitate discussion of these questions are
identified as: "Re-interpretation of clinical information,
when no new information has been added". This is category (a)
and it reflects part (a) of Hypothesis 13. Category (b),
reflecting part (b) of Hypothesis 13 is identified as:
"Re-interpretation of clinical information arising from the
addition of new information". For both categories, we are
considering only the restructuring or re-interpretation of
information which has already been structured or interpreted
in some way by the subject. Thus, original or primary inter-
pretations of information are not the subject of content
analysis. This is because the data are not sufficiently rigor-
ous to enable us to say precisely at what point an interpretation
actually aose. For example, during the first replay period
H.O. 01 elicited (1) that the patient had experienced pains
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across her chest and stomach area; (ii) that these had led
to sickness with meals; (iii) that she vomits mucus during
the second course of the meal; (iv) that she had suffered
from this complaint for four to five months. H.O. 01 inter-
preted this as ta gastrointestinal problem'. However, from
these data, we cannot identify at what point in the actual
interview this interpretation was first made by H.0. 01. We
only can say that it was made at some point during the flow
of information which presented these four points. Thus, the
original stimulus or stimuli to structuring or interpretative
response cannot be identified precisely. However, changes in
structure or interpretation can be identified since subjects
invariably pinpoint the cause of their change in thinking.
Categories 13(a) and (b) therefore concern restructuring and
re-interpretation only. It follows from this that if a sub-
ject does not display responses in categories 13(a) or (b),
we may Infer that new information elicited either gave rise
to entirely new interpretations or was relevant to interpre-
tations already made and was structurally congruent with the
structural frameworks selected by the subject already. In
this case, new information would not cause the subject to
re-interpret. Thus, if frequencies of response in categories
13(a) and (b) are low, we can justifably infer that re-inter-
pretation or restructuring of information is not a cognitive
skill often used and that the alternative-skill of selecting
among primary interpretations is more in evidence. The
effectiveness of this would depend upon the accuracy and
appropriateness of primary interpretations.
Table 10.10 shows that 39 per cent of subjects did not make
any re-interpretations of information during the clinical
interview. Of the remaining 61 per cent of subjects, 58 per
cent made re-interpretations on the basis of new information
being added to the array and 20 per cent made re-interpretations
in the absence of new information. Of these, 17 per cent made
both types of re-interpretation. The non-statistically signi-
ficant value of the Kruskal.Wallis H indicates that re-interpre-
tative response patterns do not differ across groups of
- 287 -
subjects. We therefore find Hypothesis 13 substantiated.
Subsequent discussion indicates that Hypothesis il, as hoped,
is not substantiated in that the data provide useful inform-
ation about mechanisms of interpretation and re-interpretation
of clinical information.
Before considering the nature of re-interpretative responses,
let us first consider the relative frequency of re-interpre-
tation and lack of re-interpretation, and the implications of
this for our understanding of the diagnostic thinking process.
It is worth reiterating that there is no intrinsic merit in
either form of cognitive process. We could suggest that
re-interpretative behaviour indicates a flexibility of thought,
lack of tendency to rapid closure and field independence.
These qualities would usually be considered desirable. However,
this judgment cannot be made in the present circumstance since
it may be the case for the 39 per cent of subjects who did not
display re-interpretative responses that their primary inter-
pretations were sufficiently accurate not to warrant it, or
that the clinical information was elicited in an order and
manner that located it easily within the appropriate stored
structure. On the other hand, in some cases failure to re-inter-
pret could cause diagnostic errors to be made (see 11.9 below).
The same types of argument, in inverse form, can be applied to
the 61 per cent of subjects who displayed re-interpretative
responses.
In summary of this argument, we cannot state whether or not
the categories of thinking here under consideration are, in
absolute terms, desirable or not, or appropriate or not. Such
judgments can only be made in terms of individual diagnostic
problems and thinking processes. Either type of thinking (re-
interpretative and non re-interpretative) could be inappropriate
or appropriate depending upon the circumstances of the case.
However, it can be said that both types of thinking occur in
the solution of diagnostic problems, during the clinical inter-
view. It can, therefore, also be concluded that the diagnostic
problem solver should have both types of response in his
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repertoire of potential cognitive processes to be applied to
the diagnostic problem. It can also be suggested that the
diagnostic problem solver should be aware of his capacity to
think in these ways and his manner of application of such
thinking processes.
Let us now consider the two types of re-interpretative behav-
iour identified. Re-interpretation in the absence of new
information is less common in the samples of subjects than is
re-interpretation in the presence of new information. Nonethe-
less, 20 per cent of subjects made responses in the former
category. These are spread across the three groups of subjects
relatively equally (three students, six house officers, four
registrars), therefore explanations based on experience,
knowledge, skill, etc. would seem untenable. All we can infer
with certainty is that, for some reason, the subject did not
extrapolate from the information to all possible contexts at the
time of initial presentation, but made new extrapolations later
in the process. From the indicators (10.1.1 above) it can be
seen that either the new interpretations seemed to occur quite
suddenly, for no apprent reason, or they occurred as a result
of a conscious effort to find new possible explanations of the
given information. In both cases we must suppose that the
problem solver is in the process of manipulating and working
with the information, such that new structures or interpreta-
tive contexts are located. Most subjects gave no explanation
of the phenomenon, but merely reported it:
"I think, probably, I thought about PBC when she was
a middle aged woman who complained of generalised
itching ... I thought of Hodgkin's when I was, sort
of in the odd moments, in the gaps in the session.
Sort of racking my brains for other causes of
generalised itching". (11.0. 02)
"While I was going through the routine stuff, it
came into the back of my mind that she might have
some polyuria or polyd.ipsia associated with the
basal condition". (H.0. 05)
It may well be that the trigger to 11.0. OS's restructuring
or re-interpretation was his reaching the part of the routine
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history that made him ask about the patient's genito-urinary
system. Thus the stimulus to restructuring was not new
clinical information, but a new area of enquiry and so a
possible new context for seeking relevant interpretations.
Uses of the routine history are discussed below (11.7) but
stimulation to new perceptions of the information and new
contexts for interpretation may be a useful spin-off.
Having considered re-interpretation in the absence of new
Information to the extent that the data will allow, let us
consider the nature of re-Interpretation In the presence of
new information. Figures 11.1, 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4 provide
schematic representations of four instances of re-interpreta-
tion of information. The caption for each provides a des-
cription of the process of restructuring involved. Figure 11.1
Information Elicited
Shaking
Diarrhoea
Gastrectomy
SOB with meals
Stomach operation
Sweating
Palpitations
Diarrhoea
ject's Response
Infective cause
N	 U
Dumping syndrome
Side effect of gastrectomy
Figure 11.1 Example of Re-interpretation (Cognitive Re-
structuring) of a Symptom (Diarrhoea) in the Presence of
New Information.	 Category: 13(b)
	
Subject: S. 02
shows a simple instance of new information giving a completely
new context and facilitating extrapolation to a context which,
in the first instance was not considered. The subject's initial
response (infective cause of diarrhoea) is tied very closely
to the information given and does not separate the two pieces
of information to allow very wide interpretation. However,
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Information Elicited
Nose-bleed
High blood pressure
Subject's Response
Nasal tumour/naso-pharyngeal/
tumour/nose-picking/hypertension!
uraemia/nephriti s.
Nose-bleed due to hypertension.
Inhaler	 Appearance caused by steroids.
Cushingoid appearance 	 Steroids for asthma. Steroids
Asthma	 affect immune response, therefore
Steroid treatment	 infection. Steroids affect blood
Infection	 pressure, therefore nose-bleed.
Problem: to adjust steroid regime.
Figure 11.2 Example of Cognitive Restructuring of a Symptom
(Nose-bleed) by Embedding in a New Context. With Complex Re-
structuring of an Information Cluster. 	 Category: 13(b)
Subject: S.0. 4
However, When a new, and crucial, piece of information is
presented (gastrectomy) the subject does not restructure his
interpretation. This occurs only after more new information is
elicited which itself gives rise to a new context.
Figure 11.2 shows an instance of restructuring complicated by
apparent confirmation of one possible interpretation and a
refinement of this by means of a complex disentangling, re-
ordering and restructuring of an array of information which
yields a further precise context and a problem solution. Figure
11.3 presents a relatively less complex instance of restruct-
uring where the information seems gradually to lead the subject
away from an incorrect interpretation and towards the approp-
riate context. Figure 11.4 presents an instance in which the
subject was unable to extrapolate to the correct context from
the information given and even characterised it as outside my
experience"until a forceful feature(1)which waa also the
("pacemaker") allowed him to identify the appropriate extra-
polated context.
Footnotes (1) and (2) - see end oi' chapter
Information Elicited
Collapsed lung
Cardiac lung
Collapsed two years ago
Bronchitis prior to
collapse
No chest pain
Breathing trouble
Information Elicited
Aged 82
Three blackouts
First blackout lasted
four hours
After each attack:
No confusion
No weakness
Normal immediately
No other illnesses
Good general health
No palpitations
Active
Climbs stairs
Pacemaker
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Subject's Reponse
Need to elaborate
Heart attack/stroke
Fallen/breathing trouble/heart
trouble
Acute attack of something res-
piratory, not cardiac/acute
chronic respiratory disease.
Figure 11.3 Example of Cognitive Restructuring From Cardiac
to Respiratory Context.
	
Category: 13(b)	 Subject: S.12
Subject's Response
Atherosclerosis/transient
ischaemic attacks/vertebro-bas-
liar drop attacks/minor CVAs
Not transient ischaemic attack!
not drop attack
Not recognised
Outside my experience"
N	 N
Stokes Adams attacks/heart block!
after silent infarct.
11.4 Example of Initial Failure to Find the Appropria
Extrapolated Context, Followed by Rejection of Inappropriate
Interpretations and Final Restructuring After New Information
Facilitates Correct Interpretation. Diagnosis: Stokes Adams
Attacks due to Ischaemic Heart Disease. 	 Category: (13)b
Subject: S.19
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From these four examples alone we see a wide range of structur-
ing and restructuring mechanisms operating. The subjective
experience was described in one account as follows:
"Cough and shortness of breath immediately tells you
which part of the body you're dealing with. And
then the cogs start going in your head, asking what
causes cough and shortness of breath. Is it chronic
bronchitis or is it something else?".
	 (H.O 16)
But 'the cogs start going' covers an apparent multitude of
processes. For example, a single item of information alone
can cause a re-interpretation of information, or it may take
multiple new items of information before an array becomes
amenable to re-interpretation (as in Figure 11.1). Sometimes
the very interpretation itself gives rise to other new inter-
pretations of the same information. For exale:
"I wondered at that time if he'd had superior vena
cava obstruction as well. There was a lot of
swelling in the arm. That was just something that
came flying through. When you think of carcinoma
of the lung you wonder whether it might have some
exciting non-metastatic complication". (S. 17)
Occasionally, two previously separate interpretations become
associated or linked to form one, integrated superordinate
interpretation. For example, subject R. 12 had pursued liver
disease and renal failure as two separate phenomena until it
"struck" him that in the particular patient they may both be
part of the same disease (Well's disease). Likewise subject
S. 05 had interpreted a stroke, shortness of breath and fits
as three separate problems until he extrapolated to the con-
text of arrhythmia and concluded that
"I suppose it's possible that an arrhythmia threw
off an embolus that went to the brain. It might
not have been an artery snapping, it might have
been a throzubotic or embolic episode". (S. 05)
Thus, three separate interpretations became two: arrhythmia
with cerebral embolus and epilepsy.
It is possible that each diagnostic problem solving process
differs from every other in its details of mechanism and
thinking. It therefore would seem unwarranted to characterise
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individual cases further, except, perhaps to indicate that
different types of information may be differently amenable to
interpretation, as the identification of pre-diagnostic and
diagnostic interpretations may cause us to believe. One
subject's account illustrates this phenomenon quite vividly:
"Yes, talking about the weakness. Can't get away
from it, can I? It's the most difficult, vertigo
and weakness. If a patient comes in and says "I
feel dizzy and weak",	 S the syndrome that makes
an internist go "Ugh and cringe and crumble.
Then he let me into this gem that he had discomfort
in his belly .., and I elaborate on this". (R. 02)
"Discomfort in his belly" was information from which R. 02
could easily extrapolate; "weakness" was not.
In suary, we may consider what general principles can be
inferred from our discussion of results relevant to Hypotheses
13 and 1.7 which concern the cognitive processes of interpre-
tation and re-interpretation of the changing array of clinical
information. It has been shown that re-interpretation may
occur either in the presence or absence of new information
being added to the array, and it is suggested that in each
case re-interpretation occurs as a result of cognitive restr-
ucturing of information and consequent embedding of that
information in a new extrapolated context of possibly related
information. It is suggested that re-interpretation and lack
of re-interpretation may each be either appropriate or
inappropriate depending upon the particular diagnostic problem
in relation to which it occurs. Consequently, the diagxzostic
problem solver must be aware of these cognitive processes,
have them in his repertoire of thinking processes and be able
to monitor and apply them appropriately.
No differences are found between the three groups of subjects
in incidence of re-interpretative responses and so these cannot
be related to other variables such as knowledge, clinical
experience and so on. However, this does not preclude the
content of these processes varying in appropriateness from
group to group, while the structure of the processes themselves
Is common to all groups. The nature of stimuli to interpre-
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tation is considered and found to be heterogeneous. It is
concluded that the Vast range of clinical problems, presenta-
tion of those problems, and potential interpretations
precludes useful classification of cognitive processes or
mechanisms from the point of view of content. Instead, it is
suggested that the general cognitive activity of interpretation
and re-interpretation with its difficulties and facilities and
its relationship to the stored, structured knowledge of the
subject, must be part of the conscious and serviceable know-
ledge of the diagnostic problem solver. From the point of view
of teaching and learning, the relationship between the structure
of information as it is elicited from the patient and responded
to by the clinician is an important aspect of this special
knowledge. Why should some types of information cause the
clinician to respond 'Tight0 and 'cringe and crumble' when other
types of information give rise to multiple interpretations and
a clear line of enquiry? Such questions as this reflect upon
the appropriateness and usefulness of the structure of stored
information and upon the subject's means of gaining access to
that store. Awareness of such problems is a necessary pre-
requisite for their golution.
11.6 Hypothesis 14
No differences will be observed between students,
house officers and registrars ilt use of strategies
for selection between competing interpretations of
clinical inforination.'
We have so far considered the factors antecedent to the inter-
pretative response of the diagnostic problem solver. Hypothesis
14 concerns the eventual fate of those interpretations. We
are, therefore, considering an activity analogous to that of
Elstein et al's (1978) 'hypothesis evaluation' stage.
The content analysis categories of Hypothesis 14 (see 10.1.5
above) are identif led as 'Active confirmation of an interpre-
tation' (category (a)) and 'Active elimination of an interpre-
tation' (category (b)). The logically complementary category
of 'passive elimination' is omitted since the data do not
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allow determination of whether acceptance of one isterpretation
actually implies rejection of another as its corollary. The
final category is identified as "Postponement of either confirm-
ation or elimination of a possible interpretation with or
without stated differential liklihoods'. It is noted that these
categories cannot be seen as absolute. Categories (a) and (b)
may be subject to reversal, given new information. Thus the
categories describe cognitive operations which may be present
during the diagnostic thinking process. It is considered
psychologically untenable to suggest that an interpretation,
once made, can be totally expunged or confirmed without chance
of later doubt or is not capable, when eliminated, of being
later re-identified. We are interested only to establish the
presence or not of the thinking processes represented by cate-
gories 14(a), (b) and Cc) in each group of subjects.
The results reported in 10.2.5 above show that the three groups
of subjects do not differ in their frequency of use of each of
the categories of response identified for Rypothesis 14.
Neither do they differ in their use of multiple or combinations
of categories (Table 10.11), although we find that there is a
statistically significant difference across all groups, in use
of either one, two or three categories. The use of two catego-
ries is more common than the use of either one or three,
although no particular combination of categories seems to pre-
dominate. It is particularly interesting, in the light of the
discussion of section 3.3 of the predominance of tendencies to
verification rather than refutation and to use confirming rather
than refuting evidence, that there is no tendency for category
(a) responses to predominate. These findings may be attributed
to a number of possible causes, but not to any variables which
differentiate between groups. They cannot be attributed, there-'
fore, to factors such as knowledge, skill or clinical experience.
Of course, the outcome or content of the thinking processes
under consideration may be correlated with such variables as
these, but not the processes themselves. It may be reasonable
to suggest that differences in strategy for selection among
competing interpretations of information are dependent, to some
degree, upon individual differences in personality or cognitive
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style. For example, the nature of acceptable 'proof' may vary
from subject to subject. Ilternatively, the finding that sub-
jects tend to apply two selection strategies more often than
either one or three may be due to logical characteristics of
the problem itself. When multiple interpretations are made of
the same information or of overlapping sets of information,
then these interpretations cannot be independent. Thus a
decision about one (for example, actively to eliminate it)
must have repercussions for the others (they may become stronger
and more prone to deferred decision or active confirmation).
However, the discussion must remain at a level of speculation
or theory only, since the data do not provide information con-
cerning the fate of each interpretation made by each subject.
Indeed, it is doubtful that such information is attainable.
The final possibility to be considered must be that the strat-
egy used by a subject for selection between competing inter-
pretations of clinical information is dependent, to some extent,
upon that information itself. There are cases in which
important information is not available or is unclear and so,
unless extremely reckless, the student or clinician must defer
judgment. There are cases in which the symptoms and signs
(for example, a pacemaker, a recognised syndrome, or a special
treatment) cannot be mistaken as indicative of more than one
condition and are sufficient to diagnose that condition with
the maximum degree of certainty possible.
We must conclude, therefore, that an array of factors may be
operating to determine any subject's strategy for selection
among competing interpretations of clinical information. These
factors may derive from the characteristics of the problem
solver or the content or structure of the problem itself, or
the logical relation ship between competing interpretations.
These factors may vary in relative prominence and importance
from case to case and subject to subject. For reasons such as
this Elstein et al's (1978) identification of rules for diag-
nostic decision making based on the numbers of positive and
negative cues must be rejected, not primarily for their probable
artefactual nature, but for their implicit simplistic model of
the variables inherent in the diagnostic problem and process.
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Likewise, Barrows et al's (1978) finding that any piece of
clinical information elicited by his physician subjects was
relevant to about three hypotheses, ignores the logical
characteristics of the diagnostic problem and process. This
point has already been discussed in 3.1.2 above.
Elstein et a]. (1978) contend that clinical data are evaluated
in terms of their fit to anticipated findings. Our discussion
of the nature of interpretation and structuring would reinforce
this viewpoint. Subjects are prone to discuss their thinking
processes in terms of establishing 'fit'. For example:
"By that stage it was getting very unsatisfactory
because, firstly, I presumed, as I had done from
the start, which is a bad thing, that the big
episode was an infarct. Yet everything I've
elicited about it, there's something unsatisfactory
about. It doesn't quite fit in with that. Second,
the giddiness attacks which I automatically pre-
sumed were some kind of angina. But they don't
seem to fit. And they weren't vertigo, so they
involve something else. So I haven't tied the
two things together and I haven't really made a
satisfactory diagnosis. And then I'm getting a
history of diabetes which would also fit in
ischaemic heart , disease. But it's not really
adding up." (11.0. 04)
Elstein et al (1978) also suggest that cues are designated as
positive, negative or non-contributory with respect to any
particular diagnostic hypothesis. Although this may be over-
stating or over formalising the precision of the diagnostic
problem solver's thinking, it would seem likely that some
similar, but less conscious, process occurs. For example:
"Well, I was thinking of general things that could
be wrong with his heart. I mean, he hadn't had a
coronary almost certainly, because the symptoms
weren't right. He hadn't had chronic angina - the
symptoms definitely weren't right for that. It
didn't sound as if he was having any arrhythmias.
Well, he did actually mention palpitations, but
they were very regular palpitations, just as if
the heart was beating hard and normal rather than
irregularly. I was coming on to he must have a
valvular defect and I was going to come on to his
past medical history to see if anything was in
that which I was expecting to find, really". (S. 20)
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If S. 20 had been asked to rate each piece of clinical Inform-
ation as positive, negative or non-contributory, he could
undoubtedly do so. However, such an exercise would not
demonstrate that his usual thinking process involved such a
tactic. It must also be noted that, as with the palpitations
in S. 20's case, the information has to be evaluated in its
cwn right before it can be judged is relation to any wider
interpretations of the patient's problems. The mechanisms of
confirmation, elimination and deferred judgment of interpre-
tations are illuminated further below in relation to ideas of
psychological probability (see 11.11).
In summary, we have shown that cc*peting interpretations of
information are dealt with in at least three different ways;
by confirmation, elimination and postponement of judgment,
Incidence of these does not differ across groups of subjects,
although we cannot infer whether more interpretations are dealt
with in one way than anOther. It is shown only that all groups
of subjects have these strategies for selection among competing
interpretations of clinical data at their disposal to equal
degrees. Implementation of one or a number of these strategies,
it is suggested, may be dependent upon a number of factors
operating at the time of decision. These may derive from the
problem solver, his interpretative response, or the problem
situation itself, It is agreed that, ultimately, selection,
rejection or postponement of judgment must be on the basis of
congruence between observed and expected information, but def-
inition of the specificity of this process is deferred. It
may be suggested, however, that the decision to accept,
eliminate or postpone is the ultimate judgmental component of
the diagnostic thinking process, involving evaluation of data,
acceptance of the established approximation to the expected
findings, the final "intellectual resolution of possibilities
and actualities" discussed by Peel (1971), and the decision
based, in the end, on the clinician's own estimation, according
to his own criteria. These will differ since, as Peel mdi-
cates, "the decision turns on what the judger wants to fulfil".
Pervading this entire process must be the inferential thinking
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of the problem solver when establishing whether the observed
information is actually an example of that which may be
expected from the interpretations and extrapolated contexts
identified, and whether or not information which has not
actually been observed can be expected to be present nonethe-
less. Thus the three strategies of confirmation, elimination
and postponement cloak a wide range of cognitive activity,
but express its final dnouement.
11.7 Hypothesis 15
"Given that all subjects commence their clinical
enquiry with a question intended to elicit the
patient's presenting complaint, the course of the
clinical interview can be determined by the
following factors:
a) The flow of information as presented by the
patient.
b) The flow of information as elicited by the
subject according to his interpretations of
the clinical information.
c) The logical structure of the standard (taught)
clinical history.
No differences will be observed between students,
house officers and registrars in their use of (a),
(b) and (c) in determining the course of the
clinical interview.
Hypothesis 15 is intended to provide information and discussion
relevant to the structure of the clinical interview. The
Michigan four stage general model of medical enquiry is entirely
hypothesis orientated, not accounting for the routine or stan-
dard aspects of the process of clinical enquiry, and so does
not provide any insight into the broader issues related to the
traditional structure of the clinical history. The McMaster
studies do tackle this aspect of the enquiry process, finding
that 61 per cent of physicians' questions are not routine
while 50 per cent of physicians' and students' questions are
specifically for hypothesis testing (Barrows et al, 1978; see
3.1.2 above). The McMaster group find that routine questions
are used for scanning, building rapport and to gain thinking
time. The differentiation between routine and non-routine may
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be spurious in many instances, since questions may
be identified as routine or not in relation to the inteation
of the poser. But it is, nonetheless, a useful frame of
reference.
The categories derived from the process of content analysis for
Hypothesis 15 are defined in section 10.1.6 above, as follows:
category (a) is "Patient-determined interview Structure",
defined as "where the course of the interview as directed by S
is determined by or follows on from the flow of information as
presented by the patient"; category (b) is "Subject-determined
interview structure", defined as "where the course of the inter-
view is determined by the subject's requirement actively to
test his interpretations of the clinical information"; and
category (a) is "Logically-determined interview structure",
defined as "where the subject conducts, or attempts to conduct,
the interview according to a routine format as defined by the
standard (taught) clinical history or any of its component
parts. Exclude the presenting complaint since all subjects
begin with this area". The standard history is defined in
10.1.6 above. It must be noted that, despite the category
titles, by definition of role and practice, the structure of
the clinical history is always determined by the interviewer,
not the patient, although the patient, clearly, plays a role
in determining content of the interview. Given that the inter-
viewer determines interview structure, the three categories of
Hypothesis 15 define factors which influence his decisions
about that structure. In other words, the interviewer will
decide (however actively or passively) on the course of the
interview on the basis of the elements identified in categories
15(a), (b) and (c).
Results of statistical analysis of categories show that Hypo-
thesis 15 is substantiated and no statistically significant
difference is found between the three groups of sub)ects in
their use of the responses indicated in categories (a), (b)
and (a) to determine the course of the clinical interview.
This is not to say, of course, that each student interview
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might not be predominantly determined by category (a) or
category (c) responses, while registrar interviews might be
predominantly determined by category (b) responses. The data
do not indicate results of this order, but they do show that
all three categories of response are in the student repertoire
of behaviour as much ' & the house officer or registrar
repertoires. Relative use of categories by each individual
may change with experience, but the potential behaviour is
evident during the final year of undergraduate medical school.
The second finding of Hypothesis 15 is that, although groups
do not differ, their relative use of the three categories of
response does do so to a statistically significant degree
(see 10.2.6 above). Inspection of frequencies per category
(Table 10.13) shows that category (a) (Patient-determined
interview structure) is very infrequently used. Only six per
cent of all responses (or 12 per cent of all subjects) allowed
the course of the interview to follow on from the flow of
information as presented by the patient. Examples of such a
response, where it did occur, are: "If a system came up, I
dealt with it there jnstead of waiting for the systematic
enquiry", "1 decided to do the CVS there because it was
relevant to what she just mentioned" and "I went on to the
gut because that's what he seemed interested in". In contrast,
62 subjects made category (b) responses and 60 subjects made
category (c) responses. Ninety four per cent of all responses
were in these two categories. We conclude that all subjects
conduct the interview according to the demands of either
their own interpretations of the information or the require-
ments of some standard form of interview structure and content
or, as is usually the case, according to some combination of
both criteria. These results indicate quite clearly the
problem solver's need to control the flow of information
according to to his own designs and, by implication, the stre-
ngth of the active processes of interpretation and structuring.
Elstein et al (1978) find that diagnostic accuracy is related
to thoroughness of cue acquisition and accuracy of cue inter-
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pretation. On logical grounds alone, this would seem likely,
but the present results add to this finding the important
feature that manner of acquisition and interpretation is a
prominent aspect of the process of clinical enquiry determined
by the structure and content of the diagnostic thinking pro-
cess. We may infer that thoroughness of data acquisition
alone, in the absence of active direction by the subject's
interpretative needs, may not be an efficient and effective
strategy. The active role of the problem solver seems to be
the most important feature of the findings relevant to Hypo-
thesis 15.
However, having established this active, determining role, it
should be considered further, since, after all, it is the
patient who presentethe information and, ultimately, determines
its precise content even if its frame of reference is deter-
mined by the problem solver, whether clinician or student. Thus
there would appear to be a reciprocal relationship between the
subject's interpretative, structuring and controlling activities
and the structure of the information as it is presented in a
certain order, with certain degrees of clarity and specificity.
This information, in turn, will effect some response in the
subject and will alter his interpretations accordingly. In
summary, there is a reciprocal. relationship between, on the
one hand, the subject's cognitive activity of structuring and
interpreting the field of information, of attempting to
uncover expected or suspected features or of trying to locate
interpretable features, and, on the other hand, the changing
field of information which, in turn, is structuring the sub-
ject's thinking processes and content by presenting new
information for interpretation. Thus, the problem solver may
ask a question designed to elicit a certain response, but he
cannot control the answer given. That answer may confirm his
interpretation of the situation, but it may also cause re-
interpretation and restructuring as we have already shown in
section 11.5 above. The cognitive processes of the clinical
problem solver are therefore simultaneously responsive and
determinative. This is so, regardless of whether the subject
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chooses to conduct the interview according to the needs of his
interpretative and structuring responses or the elements of a
routine enquiry.
To conclude the discussion of Hypothesis 15, we may return to
Barrows et al's findings concerning subjects' perceptions of
the routine history as a device for scanning, building rapport
and gaining thinking time. No content analysis was presently
performed in relation to this point since subjects were not
encouraged to voice their thoughts about it. It was therefore
a matter of chance if it was discussed in more specific terms
than merely identifying that routine enquiry was being made
which was, in principle, the only requirement for a category
(C) response to be recorded. In the event, 13 subjects comm-
ented more fully on their use of the routine history and their
comments reflect the findings of Barrows et al (1978). Figure
11.5 suinmarises their comments. These do not purport to be
representative or generalisable, but merely relevant and
interesting.
Figure_il .5
Subject	 Comment
5. 02	 "1 was just going through the standard
list of diseases which ... must be asked
about ... It's a bit robot-like, but if
you don't ask these ort of questions,
people tend to forget about them."
"He was getting my systems all inucked up.
I tried to talk to him about his lungs
and things and he came up with something
to do with his gu11et. Be was getting
my systems inucked up. That had to wait.
S. 06	 1'd got the idea of what the pain was, so
I'd start on the old list. In the rou-
tine ... I see if I can pick up anything
I might have missed.w
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Figure 11.5 continued
Subject	 Comment
S. 17	 "Weight loss and appetite loss are basic
questions I would ask anybody ... that's
an automatic ... The other thing about
general questions is that they can be
helpful in that they give you time to
think, and they provide you with a reason
for asking more questions that you would
have forgotten about."
S. 20 "... routine enquiry in case there was
anything else in the history he might
have had."
11.0. 01	 "1 didn't actually go through all those.
It depends on how lost you are."
0.0. 02	 "Screening questions we usually run
through ... That's tradition."
0.0. 12	 "That's just a general screening. It's
what the houseman's job is to do - pick
up the incidental things. If you were
±n a clinic and you were a consultant
cardiologist or something, you wouldn't
ask half those things."
11.0. 16	 "I'm just doing a general search. It's
part of the general screening for the
registrar and S.H.0."
H.0. 17	 "I was stuck, When I run out of questions
I go on to routine ones. It gives me
time to think.,M
R. 07 "I was just filling in, really, the medi-
cal clerking details which we routinely
do in the notes."
R. 09 "These are routine questions. Not one to
be caught napping, I just wanted to make
sure there wasn't any associated problem."
R. 15
	 "Just general background knowledge. Coll-
ecting my thoughts."
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Figure 115 continued
Subject	 Comment
R. 16
	
"Just systematic questions to make sure I
didn't miss anything. Its just a sort of
net to put everything in".
Figure iLS Subjects' Comments on their Use of the Routine
Clinical History
11.8 Hypothesis 16
'On review of the clinical interview, students, house
officers and registrars will identify areas of
omission in the information elicited fr the patient.
Such omission may be in two areas:
a) Specific enquiry directed at the patient's problem,
symptoms and signs or arising from the subject's
interpretation of the clinical information elicited.
b) General or routine enquiry."
Elstein et al (1978) report that diagnostic accuracy is related
to thoroughness of cue acquisition. At the same time, they
report that errors arise in the clinical problem solving pro-
cess due to excessive data collection. Barrows et al (1978)
report that their sample of final year medical students elicited
69 per cent of available clinical information with a diagnostic
accuracy rate of 67 per cent; while their sample of physicians
elicited 64 er cent of the available information with a diag-
nostic accuracy rate of 100 per cent. These findings would
allow the reasonable inference that a certain threshold of
information is required for diagnostic accuracy, but is not a
sufficient condition. Clearly, the interpretation of that
information, as Bistein et al (1978) also point out, is an
equally important factor. The purpose of Hypothesis 16 is not
to analyse further the relationship between information elici-
ted and diagnostic accuracy (which came within the domain of
the questionnaire study) but rather to consider the efficiency
of the active process of data collection during the clinical
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interview. An indication of efficiency in practice can only
iDe guaged by reference to the subject's own theoretical
potential efficiency. We are not here comparing the absolute
theoretical efficiency of the perfect clinical problem solver
with the actual efficiency of the subject. Instead, we are
comparing the subject with himself, in practice and in theory,
by noting his own judgments of his data collection during the
clinical interview. If, in his account, a subject indicates
that he failed to make a relevant enquiry of the patient1 we
may attribute that failure to variables associated with having
to "think on his feet during the clinical interview. The
failure may not be attributed to his general level of know-
ledge, since this will not have changed between interview and
account giving. We may therefore compare students, house
officers and registrars on equal terms.
The categories of Hypothesis 16 are identified as: (a) Failure
to make specific enquiry; and (b) Failure to make general en-
quiry. These categories reflect parts (a) and (b) of the
hypothesis. The definitions and indicators are given in 10.1.7
above. Results given in 10.2.7 above show that incidence of
responses by any group in either category is not great, ranging
from four to 54 per cent. The greatest frequency is seen in
the students' failure to make specific enquiry. However, the
groups do not differ statistically significantly in frequency
of response per category. All groups retrospectively identify
failure to make a specific enquiry more often than they
identify failure to make a general or routine enquiry. However,
frequencies in all categories are small for both groups.
Although it is not statistically significant, the 54 per cent
frequency of students in category (a) (failure to make specific
enquiry) requires consideration. This does indicate a tendency
to have difficulty in thinking of the correct questions to ask
during the interview in relation to the patient's symptoms and
signs or the subject's own interpretation of these features.
It may be justifiable to infer a difficulty in retrieving the
appropriate knowledge, or, as Elstein et al (1978) describe it,
"to select smoothly from a battery of questions and manoeuvres
stored in memory". This, in turn, may have implications for
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the way in which students have learned and stored information
and for its relationship to the structure of information elicited
during the clinical interview and the structure of interpreta-
tions made of that information. If students fail, to snake
relevant specific enquiries during the clinical interview which,
upon review in less pressing circumstances, they can identify
this may we].] suggest retrieval difficulties related to storage
structure. With clinical experience these structures may
become more practically relevant and retrieval difficulties may
therefore wane.
11.9 Hypothesis 18
'Results will not indicate mechanisms of actual or
potential error in the diagnostic thinking process:'
Elstein et a]. (1978) identify possible errors in the clinical
problem solving process as premature closure, inappropriate
selective information gathering, biased interpretation of data,
mistakes in combining evidence, mis-interpretation of single
cues, faulty hypothesis generation, over-interpretation, under-
interpretation and uninterpretation of cues, and excessive data
collection. Barrows et a]. (1978) cite specifically the tendency
to favour some hypotheses as a source of potential error. How-
ever, despite the current hypothesis and subsequent discussion,
the usefulness of identifying such sources seems limited and
prone to cause attribution of undue prominence to rare phenomena.
More importantly, however, there appears to be an associated
logical difficulty which is that any aspect, process or strat-
egy of clinical problem solving is inherently a potential source
of error. Similar processes may result in accurate or inaccurate
conclusions, depending upon the knowledge and experience of the
problem solver as well as the efficiency of implementation of
the process itself. However, se processes may be identified
which appear to be more error prone than others. One such has
already been discussed as Hypothesis 16 which concerned failure
to make certain enquiries. The following discussion identifies
and gives examples of other errors identified in the thinking
of the students, house officers and registrars of this study.
The findings of the Michigan and McMaster grips are substantia-
ted and augmented. However, it must be stressed that the errors
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to be discussed are not systematic and often are rare. Some
indication will be given of the number of subjects who are
identified as making the error in question. It must also be
stressed that, although the errors discussed were identified
in the sample of subjects, in many cases they were also
rectified during the course of the interview. Finally, the
discussion considers potential as well as actual error and,
again, some instances (for example, designation of irrelevance)
may be sources of accuracy and efficiency of thinking as well
as inaccuracy, depending upon the knowledge, skill and cogn-
itive processes of the problem solver.
Rather than attempt to classifythe errors made by the present
subjects according to the definitions of the Michigan and
McMaster groups, we shall discuss them in their own right and
relate them to the Michigan and KcMaster findings.
11.9.1 Set
?n error inherent in the process of interpreting information,
relating it to an extrapolated context, structuring it in a
certain way and coridqcting further enquiry according to this
structure is that all information will be seen in the light of
the interpretation made and flexibility to re-interpret,
restructure and find new contexts will be lost. This phenomenon
or aspects of it, have been identified by the Michigan and
McMaster groups as inappropriate selective information gather-
ing, biased interpretation of data, other interpretative
errors and the tendency to have favoured hypotheses. Ten of
the present 66 subjects made this error; these were six students,
two house officers and two registrars. Figures 11.6, 11.7 and
11.8 give examples from each group. The phenomenon is well
documented in the psychological literature and is usually
referred to as 'set' which may be defined as "an organising,
controlling and directive influenc&' or, more specifically to
this case, "the tendency to go on performing an activity beyond
its proper task-situation - a'fixity' or over-persistence in
a general direction", (Thompson, 1959). The psychological.
context is more fully discussed in Chapter Twelve (see section
Information Elicited
- Evidence of myocardial
infarct
Dyspepsia
Gastric ref lux
Indigestion
Vomiting
Stiffness in left arm
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12.2.2). However, the effect in the present context is chara-
cterised by a tendency to rationaJkise, ignore or find explanation
for incongruent information so that the array elicited fits the
identified extrapolated context.
Sickness, vomiting
Subject's Response
Myocardial infarct
Not cardiovascular "Might be
something else". Not pursued
Indigestion/early signs o
ischaemia
Not pursued
'Nat relevant to the patients
current problem "
Niggling feeling that the sic:
ness and indigestion might be
due to his heart pain rather
than straight indigestion
Figure 11.6 Example of Set for Cardiovascular Disease after
Diagnosing Myocardial Infarct with Consequent Failure to Pur-
sue ymptonis in Other Systems or Identify Them as not Cardio-
vascular. Actual Diagnoses: Myocardial Infarct, Duodenal
Ulcer, Cervical Spondylosis.	 Subject: S. 06
Information Elicited
Bladder trouble
Frequency, pain
Blood in urine
Stone removed from mouth
of bladder, three years
ago
Incontinence
Sharp. burning pain
Jelly in urine
Subject1s Response
Recent? Long term?
Stone and tumour
Chric problem.
Tumour and stones.
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Figure 11.7 continued
Information Elicited
Tests show pernicious
anaemia
Not usually tired
Weight loss
Poor appetite
Subject's Response
Anaemia secondary to malignancy
"This is just about the blood. I
was thinking what to ask her
next when she started telling
me about the tests which didn't
really fit in anywhere. But it
was helping her feel that she
was talking about what she
wanted to talk about. What you
are interested in is very often
not what the patient is inter-
ested in "
Weight loss suggests tumour,
although poor appetite could
explain it
15 minutes 29 seconds of routine history,
giving no relevant information.
Subject's Conclusions
"This is a 78 year old lady with a long standing history of
frequency of micturition, pain and, more recently, pain on
micturition and blood in her water. She's passing very
small amounts of urine very frequently during the day and
night. The pain is mainly terminal. She says she's anae-
mic and seems to have some constitutional disturbance in
that she does seem to have been tired and weak, more
recently so than in the past. The differential diagnosis,
I think it's most likely to be a tumour (carcinoma) ."
Figure 11.7 Example of Set for Bladder Tumour (Carcinoma)
Causing Failure to Accept Significant Information (Pernicious
Anaemia) and Make Relevant Inquiry (Heart Failure). Actual
Diagnoses: Recurrent Urinary Tract Infection with Calculi,
Mild Heart Failure Secondary to Pernicious Anaemia.
Subject: H.O. 21
Information Elicited
20 months diarrhoea
First Intermittent, now
continuous
Tense looking patient 37
years old
Originally, 3 motions daily
No pattern
Worse in morning
Now, 3-4 motions at night,
3-4 motions during day
Weight loss
Normal appetite
Brown, offensive motions
Flush away easily
No slime
Blood in motions occas-
ionally
Stomach pains, but not
with diarrhoea
No foods affect pain
Not previously unwell
Blood in motions
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Subjects' Response
1. Functional diarrhoea because
patient looks tense
2. Inflammatory bowel disease
Coeliac disease
Anything from carcinoma on.
Functional diarrhoea occurs in
the morning
N.B. S ignores motions at night
Against steatorrhoea, inflamm-
atory bowel disease, ulcerative
colitis.
Moving away from small bowel
towards colon.
N.B. Blood in motions and
weight loss ignored
FunctionaL diarrhoea because
pain can accompany it, but
blood should not
Blood could be haemorrhoids.
N.B. Explains blood as not
related to the main com-
plaint. Ignores abdominal
pains
Gets up at night 	 Not usual with functiona].djarr-
hoea but "it could mean he
started off with functional
diarrhoea and has developed
something else
N.B. Information not accepted
as excluding functional
diarrhoea
No migraine
No tablets
No worry with job
Worry outside work, not
associated with diarrhoea
Bran and neouiycin helped
"I've learnt that somebody else
thought it was functional and
has given him bran
Worries outside work is "a
little more evidence on one
side of the balance "
N.B.. Response to antibiotics
ignored, effect attributed
to bran alone
Figure 11.8 Example of Set for Incorrect Diagnosis (Functional
Diarrhoea) Causing Misinterpretation and Ignoring of Signif i-
cant Information.	 Actual Diagnosis: Crohn's Disease
Subject: R. 14
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Figures 11.6, 11.7 and 11.8 illustrate a range of cognitive
processes which enable the subject to maintain his current
interpretation in the face of apparently qpposing information.
These examples do not indicate the psychological reason for
such strength of interpretation or resistance to flexibility
of interpretation. However, it may be said that in these
cases the identification of an extrapolated context and con-
sequent expectancy of specific concomitant information
precludes the subject from evaluating each item of new
information in its own right. Instead, all information is
evaluated solely for its relationship to expected findings.
If it does not fit in, then it is either ignored or an elab-
orate explanation is constructed for the finding. Evaluation
of information in its own right may, therefore, be an
important cognitive skill to be taught at both undergraduate
and postgraduate levels of education and training.
Some subjects do show awareness of this potential error, and
make special efforts to avoid it. For example:
"I was trying to making myself think of other
possibilities, because I do tend to get a rather
fixed idea about one thing, and exclude every-
thing else, and to pursue that partienlar idea
without thinking of a differential diagnosis."
(S. 17)
"You can't ask them unbiased objective questions.
You find you're looking for specific answers
so you put more emphasis on some questions and less
on others because you've already presnpposed the
answer." (H.O. 2O
However, successful avoidance of the error of set requires a
number of cognitive operations: evaluation of information both
within and independently of the extrapolated context already
identified; stored information structures which permit easy
and appropriate access at a variety of points; cognitive
flexibility in interpretation and re-interpretation of inform-
ation; self-awareness.
11.9.2 Failure to Make the Correct Interpretation
Failure to make the correct interpretation of information may
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be for one of two reasons: either the problem soiLver does not
have the pre-requisite know1e&e and therefore cannot make
the correct interpretation of information; or, he fails to
find the correct extrapolated context for some reason other
than lack of knowledge. It is this latter case which concerns
us here since we are interested in errors of thinking, not
inadequacy of knowledge per se. Figures 11.9 and 11.10 give
examples of unexplained failure to make the appropriate inter-
pretations of information elicited. In each case the actual
diagnosis (asthma and tuberculosis) s not obscure and we may
be certain that the subjects possessed sufficient knowledge to
make the correct diagnosis. In both cases, also, it would
appear that sufficient information was actually elicited to do
so.
In explanation of the subjects' error (which occurred in six
of the sample of 66 subjects), we may again refer to the
gure 11.9
Information Elicited
Cattarrh
Can't breath properly
Intractable cough
Doctor said bronchitis
Not productive
Blood once or twice
Breathlessness
Cough for 6 months
Three pillows
Stopped smoking
Tailor
Subject's Response
Need to clarify cough
Respi ratory/cardiovascular/
carcinoma in Lung/primary
cardiac failure/left vent-
ricular failure
M
Several visits to GP
Two hospital admissions
No operations
No other illnesses
GP said rheumatism
(No question relevant to
asthma)
Probably not carcinoma
a
No TB
No diabetes
No relevant family history
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Figure 11.9 continued
Information Elicited
Left-sided chest pain
Coughing
Breathing difficulty
Many treatments
Allergic (N.B. does not
pursue this)
GI tract normal
Subject's Response
Cardiogenic cause/myocardial
infarct/angina
Cardiac/pulmonary cause of
cough which is the main com-
plaint
Subject's Conclusions:
"Be's a man with a cough which is from time to time associ-
ated with left-side chest pain, and he's short of breath,
sometimes in the middle of the night. There are many causes
of shortness of breath, largely, they're either pulmonary or
cardiovascular. Having been through the whole lot of sym-
toms with him, I would have plumped for cardiovascular
cause."
Figure 11.9 Example of Failure to Extrpo1ate to the Correct
Context. (Asthma). Actual Diagnoses: Intrinsic (late onset)
Asthma, Acute Bronchitis and Allergic Aspergellosis.
Subject: R. 09
related concepts of interpretation and information structure.
It can be seen from the two examples given that the set effect
is not operating to cause a persistent misinterpretation, yet
the subjects' response to information still does not enable
them to make the correct extrapolation. We may only speculate
about reasons for this, but may state quite certainly that,
since all necessary information would appear to be available,
it is the process of structuring that information appropriately
which fails. But what could 'structuring' mean in this context?
Structuring in the diagnostic thinking process almost invariably
requires the problem solver to select significant items of
information from among an array of relevant and irrelevant items
and to inter-relate them appropriately according to some criter-
ion or criteria. The hazardous effects of large quantities of
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Information Elicited
Swollen feet
Shortness of breath
Fits
SOB for 6 to 7 months
Aged 56
Fit before SOB
Decorator
No chest pain
No stomach pain
Lost appetite
Dry cough
Two pillows
No SOB at night
No abdominal swelling
No bronchitis
Used to smoke 10-12 daily
Guinness most days
Ankles better
SOB gone
Previous month in
isolation ward
No water tablets
No varicose ulcers
No other illnesses
Married
Angular stomatitis
Subject' s Response
Heart fai1ureeplrotie syn-
drome.
Heart failure
Heart failure/chronic bronch-
itis/bronchitic disease giving
heart failure
All against heart disease
No ascites/no liver disease!
no cirrhosis/renal disease/
no lung disease
Varicose ulcer 1 badly infected
"I really can't think of any
associates that would give him
ankle oedema and being on an
isolation ward "
Not varicose ulcers
Down and out
But married
Figure 11.10 Example of Failure to Extrapolate to Correct
Context. Actual Diagnosis: Pulmonary Tuberculosis with
ypoa1buminaemic Oedema.
	 Subject: R.21
irrelevant information have been discussed in 3.3 above. However
Figures 11.9 and 11.10 do not seem to suggest that information
overload or irrelevance is the problem. Rather, it would appear
to be a failure to identify the true forceful feature and
structure the related information accordingly. In rectifica-
tion of this error, then, we are brought back to the set of
necessary cognitive operations identified at the conclusion of
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11.9.1 above concerning evaluation of information, cognitive
flexibility and self-awareness. Information being elicited
can only be interpreted and structured according to the limit-
ations of the subject's own information store in both its
structure and its content, which, in turn, have direct
implications for its accessibility (or transferability). It
is the flexibility of access to the stored structure which will
eventually determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the
diagnostic thinking process, given an adequate knowledge base.
Such flexibility may be partially related to a preliminary
structure which enables identification of forceful features
from among an array and extrapolation from there to possible
embedding contexts.
11.9.3 Designation of Irrelevance
It has already been pointed out (see 11.9 above) that design-
ation of items of information as irrelevant may or may ot be
appropriate, since in most clinical histories it is likely that
some information actually is irrelevant to the diagnosis.
However, in some cases, information may be designated irrele-
vant when it is, in fact, of diagnostic significance.
Inappropriate designation of irrelevance may be for one of two
reasons; either the subject has inadequate (incorrect or
insufficient)knowledge, or his problem solving thinking process
is at fault. It is the latter case which is of primary inter-
est for the current discussion. Examples of this may be taken
from the subjects of the study:
"I didn't ask her why she fell over ... because it
didn't seem that relevant to what she's in and
being treated for." (S. 04)
"I couldn't make anything of that symptom, so I
completely pushed it out of my consciousness.
Intuitively, I suppose, I assumed that it wasn't
anything particularly relevant." (H.0. 02)
"I find it rather difficult to evaluate all his
different pains. There's nothing much you can
do except accept that he's got them ... I shall
leave them there." (fl.0. 03)
-317-
"The shoulders were a bit puzzling. I didn't
expect that. Referral through to the back was
fine. I didn't know what to make of it, so I
dismissed it."	 (H.0. 08)
"... but the deafness; I'm not a neurologist;
I can't remember what's nerve deafness and
what's bone deafness. I just discarded it
straight away." (R. 02)
"There are lots of bits that just don't fit in,
so I just had to skate over them." (R. 05)
"oust going along with the red herring of
thyrotoxicosis to see if she's got any diarrhoea
or heat intolerance, which she has. But it's
over the last 18 years, so it's pretty irrele-
vant really."	 (R. 04)
These examples show a variety of reasons for designation of
irrelevance which each may be classified as either failure
to incorporate into an extrapolated, structured. context, or
failure of immediate knowledge. In some cases these two may
be inter-related or may even appear to be the same thing.
In summary, however, it may be said that, as with previous
errors, structuring and interpretative aspects of the diag-
nostic thinking process are heavily implicated where the
knowledge base is adequate. Where the knowledge base is
Inadequate, and recognised as such, the routime history pro-
vides a framework for thorough data collectioxn, at least.
However, where the problem arises from inability to locate the
appropriate context in whicb the information elicited may be
found embedded, then solutions can only be found in terms of
the same factors as those identified in the conclusion to
11.9.1 above.
The error here identified as designation of irrelevance is
comparable with Elstein et al's error of uninterpretation.
Related to this are errors of over-interpretation and mis-
interpretation. It would seem reasonable to suggest that
these complementary errors may all be attributed to the same
structuring mechanisms of tkinking as those here associated
with the designation of irrelevance. This latter is a potent-
ially useful skill, unlike the complementary ones, but it is
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a skill which should be employed consciously and in a reasoned
manner. The alternative mechanism must be, as the McMaster
students are advised (Learning Resources Design Project, 1975),
to generate a 'net' of hypotheses that will encompass all items
of information. Such a process would result in the generation
of irrelevant hypotheses, thereby overloading and decreasing
the efficiency of the hypothetico-deductive system itself.
Designation of irrelevance is a useful skill and one which
potentially enhances efficiency.. It must be applied, however,
with conscious caution.
11.94 Conclusions
The review of actual and potential error in the diagnostic
thinking process (which must include the discussion of Hypoth-
esis 16) admits of one main, generalisable conclusion of
practical value to either medical education or clinical pract-
ice. The conclusion must be that potential errors in the
process, apart from unpredictable, idiosyncratic ones, arise
from either inadequate knowledge or error of the cognitive
process itself. If lack of knowledge is the cause, then the
problem solver can recognise this and compensate accordingly.
If he is misinformed and unaware of being so, then no self-
monitoring system of error avoidance is possible. However, it
would seem that most potential error arises from features of
the diagnostic thinking process itself. In particu).ar, error
arises either from failure to gain appropriate access to the
stored structures of information and thereby failure to make
correct (or any) interpretation of the elicited information,
or, error arises from the comparison of elicited and expected
information where flexibility of interpretation and facility
of restructuring are absent. In both cases, error may be
more frequently avoided by attention to strategies of evalu-
ation of items of information both within and independently
of the extrapolated contexts already identified; stored
information structures which permit easy and appropriate access
at varied points; cognitive flexibility in interpretation and
re-interpretation of arrays of information; and, self-aware-
ness in the dynamic diagnostic thinking process.
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11.10 Hypothesis 19
Results will not indicate any categories or types
of information other than those of the standard
(taught) clinical history, used to assist either
in pre-diagnostic or diagnostic interpretation of
clinical information or in selection of the most
likely diagnosis."
Hypothesis 19 enquires whether or not subjects use information
other than the direct clinical information indicated by the
headings of the standard history (see 10.1.6 above). In
particular, it enquires whether such information is gathered
for diagnostic, rather than informative, purposes. If it is,
then attention should be paid to the skill of estimating
reliability of information.
Evidence from the accounts of the 66 subjects of this study
indicate that types of information other than those indicated
in the standard history are routinely used for diagnostic
purposes. Four categories of such information may be identi-
fied: tests and procedures; treatment; circumstantial evidence;
and, other clinicians' opinions.
As an example of useof information about tests and procedures,
subject S. 08 restructured his interpretation of the patient's
problem to encompass TB because he discovered that the patient
had been investigated for this problem. Subject S. 10 extra-
polated to the context of cardiac problems, despite lack of
evidence, upon discovering that the patient had been investi-
gated by echocardiogram. Subject S. 12 made the interpretation
of 'pneumothorax' upon discovering that the patient had been
"breathing through a bucket of water" despite lack of other
confirmatory findings:
"He denied ever • having any pain in the chest at all,
which is a bit unusual. But at that point I thought
he might have had a spontaneous pneumothorax. I
think I was fairly sure about that because I can't
think of anything else that you treat like that".
As one subject explained:
"It's a technique doctors use when we're not sure of
the diagnosis. If you find out what tests were done,
you can find the diagnosis much easier." (H.0. 05)
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Treatments were enquired about in the same way: names of
antibiotics given, "definitive therapy", treatment in a
coronary care unit, special diets, operations. All were used
as diagnostic information: "I wanted to know what cleared it
up, because that tells you what caused it" (S. 15). Likewise,
circumstantial evidence of ward, special unit, the surgeon's
name, the consultant's name, knowledge of the clinician's
special research interest or style of patient management were
all treated by students, house officers and registrars as
valuable, diagnostic information. One subject explained:
"You have to get every single item of evidence out,
particularly what other doctors told him, what his
GP told his wife, what medicines he was given and
what his response was to it." (R. 06)
The category of other clinicians' opinions was treated with
caution only by a registrar who discouraged his students from
believing such reports and by a house officer who felt that
you really could not believe patients' reports of what other
doctors had said.
In conclusion, it appears that information other than that
indicated by the headings of the standard history is used by
all three groups of subjects. The frequency of that use cannot
be determined, although 35 of the 66 subjects of this study
made some reference to use of such information. This being so,
it would seem reasonable to suggest that consideration be given
at some point in the teaching and learning process to factors
in the reliability and validity of information, in relation to
its relatively direct or mediated nature.
11.11 Hypothesis 20
"Results will provide no indication of the nature
of psychological probability in the diagnostic
thinking process."
Chapter Two presents a discussion of mathematical and logical
models of the diagnostic process and concludes that these are
paramorphic at best, and certainly not isomorphic. A number
of these models are probabilistic and ideas of numerical pro-
bability as part of the diagnostic thinking process are
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questioned and rejected. However, in rejecting numerical
probability, the concept of psychological probability is not
also eschewed. Indeed, the associated concepts of diagnosis
as an ill defined problem, of judgment and inference and of
partial knowledge lead to the inescapable conclusion that
uncertainty is endemic in the diagnostic process. Uncertainty
in medicine is the proper study of some workers (Cohen, 1972;
Clouser, 1977). By definition of process, each clinical
problem is unique yet to be identified as a special case of
a general principle. Clinical information is often indirect,
relying on reports of subjective experience. The question of
how a diagnosis is finally selected, therefore, not only con-
cerns the categories discussed in relation to Rypothesis 14
which concerns selection among competing interpretations
(section 11.6 above) but also presupposes a judgmental compo-
nent which may be considered in terms of psycholOgiCal
probability. In the event, the present data present little
information of explanatory or descriptive value.
Subjects tend to weigh up and balance data, assigning relative
importance to contradictory items and reaching a conclusion
with some degree of definiteness. We are reminded of Histein
et al's (1978) 'judgmental rules' (see 3.1.1. above) which balance
positive and negative items and reach a conclusion accordingly.
For an example of the process, we may cite a student:
"The picture's slightly atypical for angina. The
pain described is a shooting pain not a constrict-
ive pain. But it does radiate down the arm, and
she's known to have heart disease. So t think it
is angina. And it's also related to exercise. So
it is angina. I think so." (S. 16)
A registrar gave an account of the same type of thinking pro-
cess:
-
"... the one point in his history that makes me
think it's ischaemia of the small bowel over
every other diagnosis, is that he has his symptoms
relieved very promptly by posture. This is some-
thing which is, perhaps, not in keeping with
hiatus hernia or a duodenal ulcer. And remember,
he had a duodenal ulcer in the past and he says
- 322 -
his present symptoms axe like that. But his
other symptoms ... It's not precisely clear,
I don't think, as to what it is. One might
expect to see some abnormality of the bowels
.. but not necessarily so. So, primarily I
think it's ischaemia of the gut. Why? How
could we relate this to his other symptoms of
palpitations, chest pain, dyspnoea? Well, he
could have had an embolus from his left vent-
ricle or left atrium which would have settled
in his gut and caused ischaemia. Out of the
two-paroxysmal atria]. fibrillation and paroxy-
smal sinus tachycardia, I would favour the
latter because of his history of polyuria after
his attacks. Although polyuria is seen after
paroxysmal atrial fibrillation •...' (R. 03)
Thus the information is weighted, balanced, fitted with an
expected array, explained and considered and a judgment made.
The two accounts quoted are not untypical. But they do not
permit inference to the underlying process. It is clear that
subjects could be asked to rate numerically or positively or
negatively the items of information so considered and some
formula such as Elstein et al's may accrue. Yet this does
not demonstrate the isomorphisin of the model, only the sub-
ject's ability to perform the rating task. For the moment,
the process must remain only partially illuminated.
11.12 Conclusions: Interpretative Value of the Present Study for
Current Descriptions of the Diagnostic Thinking Process
Current descriptions of the diagnostic thinking process are
reviewed in Chapter Three above. The major model is that of
hypothesis generation and testing. This model is elaborated
in a number of ways, which are summarised in section 3.5.
The only other model of any currency is that which interprets
the diagnostic thinking process in terms of pattern recognition.
This model is rejected as inappropriate. The current discuss-
ion, therefore, wi].1 relate only to the'hypothesis generation
and testing'mode]. of the diagnostic thinking process and the
elaborations of that model put forward by the research studies
at Michigan and McMaster. The models are criticised in part-
icular for leaving unanswered a number of fundamental questions.
These are also summarised in section 3.5. The discussion of
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Hypotheses 10 to 20 has addressed these questions and although
the relevant findings and discussion do not purport to answer
them fully, it is considered that useful frameworks have been
built. Rather than reiterate the discussion alreadly presented
we may simply indicate the questions and particular sources in
this chapter of relevant discussion, thus:
How are cues cognitively manipulated? See 11.5
What process of structuring generates hypotheses?
See 11.2 and 11.5
How can multiple hypotheses be generated? See 11.2
What cognitive mechanism enables multiple interpre-
tations of cues? See 11.2 and 11.4
How do new hypotheses arise? See 11.5
What cognitive processes occur before generation of
the first hypothesis? See 11.3
How are relationships between cues allocated mnd
reallocated? See 11.5
According to wht tactic or strategy is the clinical
interview conducted prior to generation of the first
hypothesis? See 11.3
How is information designated as irrelevant? Lee 11.9.3
We say now consider the elaborated model of hypothesis generat-
ion and testing in the light of results and discussion of the
current account gathering study. The Michigan and lMcMaster
models are only slightly different, but such diffeDences as
there are will be made clear.
Elstein et al (1978) postulate a four-stage general model of
medical inquiry which consists of cue acquisition, Ibypothesis
generation, cue interpretation and hypothesis evaluation. The
present results and discussion question the differentiation
between the second two stages (see 11.2 above). It is sugges-
ted that these are two aspects of the same process and that
the process which is referred to as hypothesis generation is,
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in fact, a process of cue interpretation. This conclusion
derives from a consideration of the cognitive process which
allows the problem solver to attribute meaning to the inform-
ation elicited. Such a process must involve acting upon the
information, structuring or organising it, in the process of
which it is identified as potentially being an instance of
X, Y or Z where X, Y or Z might represent undefined pathology
of an organ ("something wrong with the liver"), undefined
pathology at a certain level of specificity ("something meta-
bolic"), a functional abnormality ("left ventricular failure"),
a symptom ("paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnoea"), a disease ("chronic
lymphatic leukaemia") or any other classification, disease,
process, procedure and so on. Any of these will be based on
the same cognitive process of, somehow, relating the information
given to information stored. Whether it is a complex process
of selecting, weighing up and relating symptoms and signs and
identifying a differential diagnosis of some specificity, or
whether it js translating "I have to have four pillows, doctor"
into "paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnoea", the cognitive process
must be the same, varying only in complexity. It therefore
seems untenable, in psychological terms, to differentiate
between hypothesis generation and cue interpretation.
In considering the cognitive process of interpreting, stzuct-
uring or organising information and relating it to stored
information thereby extrapolating to specific expected inform-
ation or, at least, being enabled to identify questions the
answers to which should allow such extrapolation, the real
difficulty lies in identifying the beginning of the process.
Barrows et al (1978) resort to theories of pattern recognition
but this merely begs the question, since for the information
array to be recognised as a 'pattern' it would have to be
organised as a pattern. According to what criteria would the
problem solver embark upon that process? It can surely oniy
be done with reference to informatibn not present, which
returns us to the question of how that information is first
located. As far as such location goes, the present results
(see section 11.3) indicate that either pre-diagnostic or dia-
gnostic interpretations, or both, may be made as a primary
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response to clinical information elicited, This clarifies
the somewhat confused McMaster findings concernimg relative
initial use of broad and specific hypotheses (see 3.1.2 above).
The Michigan findings are no more helpful than the McMaster
ones in identifying the origin of the interpretative process.
They define this as attending to initially available cues,
identifying cue clusters and associating to long term memory.
But such a process is as logically inconsistent as 'pattern
recognition' and for the same reasons. A 'cue cluster' is
only such in the mind of the clinician, when he has responded
to the stimuli presented by the patient and formed 'cue clus-
ters' for himself. Unless the problem solver acts upon and
cognitively organises the information given by the patient he
would in many cases, be unable to relate it tO aiuything in his
long term memory other than dealing with it item by item.
This argument may lead us to consider that information is not
stored in the problem solver's memory simply as a series of
arrays each of which represents a pre-diagnostic interpretation,
but rather that information is also stored such that the problem
solver may recognisea forceful feature and make his connections
from there. In other words, perhaps the process begins with
identification of the item or items of information with the
greatest payoff in terms of facilitating interpretative or
structuring responses which will change the ill diefined problem
into a well defined one. Such identification of the valuable
information may change with experience, as the process is
reinforced or not.
Having discussed how the diagnostic thinking process begins, it
is necessary to discuss the related question of where it begins
also. Elstein et al (1978) state that diagnostic hypotheses
are generated early in the clinical interview, and may be broad
or specific. The McMaster group reach the same conclusions
and add that students and physicians do not differ in time of
generation of the first hypothesis. The present study shows
agreement that interpretations may be broad or specific at any
point during the process and elaborates on reasons for this
(see 11.2) in the light of cognitive processes of structuring
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and extrapolation to related contexts. In addition, the
present study indicates that the diagnostic thinking process
is in constant, responsive, organising and determining activity.
The loose identification of 'early' hypothesis generation is
inadequate in describing the initiation of the process. This
inadequacy would appear to arise from the search for character-
istics of hypotheses rather than a broader and more flexible
analysis of a thinking process more refined, complex and varied
than the characterisation of hypothesis generation and testing
has allowed.
The present study shows (section 11.3) that subjects can and
do make active, interpretative or evaluative response to all
clinical information as soon as it is elicited. Such a process
does not occur 'early', but immediately. Elstein et al's
(1978) contention that hypotheses are generated from clusters
of a few cues may well be correct in their terms, but it is
inadequate, ignoring the cognitive activity of the clinician
prior to eliciting sufficient cues to form clusters. The pre-
sent study has indicated that even a single piece of clinical
information can be and is structured in an extrapolated context
and accordingly interpreted. We therefore refute the implicit
assumption of the Michigan and McMaster groups that, at some
points during the diagnostic process, the problem solver's
mind can act merely as a passive register. The details of this
argument are presented in section 11.3 in refutation of theories
of pattern recognition in the diagnostic thinking process.
Instead, it is suggested that information is responded to as
soon as it is elicited and that response might be something
which the Michigan or McMaster groups would recognise as TM hypo-
theses" or it might not be. For example, it might be a
judgment of need for further enquiry before satisfactory inter-
pretation or structuring of the information is made possible.
This illuminates an aspect of the interpretative cognitive
processes which we suggest, concerning the problem solver's
preferred methods of working or subjective judgment of method-
ological efficiency or effectiveness or familiarity with the
extrapolated contexts. Thus it is likely that the problem
solver could extrapolate from any given piece of information,
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but the evaluative category of judgment of need for further
clarifying enquiry, suggests that he is more or Less willing
or able to work within the resultant structure than another
possible, alternative one.
Theories of the diagnostic thinking process as hypothesis
generation and testing do not account for such cognitive phen-
omena as this. We therefore prefer a broader, psychological
definition and explanation of the diagnostic thinking process
in terms of structure and extrapolation on the basis of assigned
and stored information structures. Such a definition subsumes
within a broader and more precise context the activities ident-
ified as hypothesis generation and testing. This is discussed
in section 11.4.
We have, therefore, identified and described the manner and
point of origin or initiation of the diagnostic thinking process.
The dynamic of the process, once underway, is not specifically
addressed by the Michigan and McMaster groups, but is discussed
here in section 11.5 in terms of the mechanism of interpretation
and reinterpretation of the changing array of clinical informa-
tion throughout the interview and diagnostic process. However,
the North American groups do identify numerical "rules for
the termination of the process, that is, for selection of the
most likely diagnostic hypothesis. These our results and dis-
cussion have led us to reject (section 11.6), not for their
probable artefacthal nature, but for their implicit simplistic
model of the variables inherent in the diagnostic problem and
process. However, we would agree that the problem solver does
work by comparing observed and expected findings, but that this
process, again, is not as simple as Elstein et al (1978) seem
to imply. Information is often evaluated in its own right
before being compared with an expected model (see the example
given in 11.6) and it seems unlikely that final selection of
the most likely diagnosis is made on the basis of numerical
pre-dominance of items of information related to one rather
than another. It is suggested (11.11) that numerical and psyc-
hological probability are very different phenomena.
The present findings occasion some reconsideration of the
assumption of the hypothesis generation and testing model that
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the latter activity (hypothesis testing) determines the course
of the clinical interview. It must be recalled that the
McMaster group do discuss the role of the routine history and
section 11.7 indicates our own agreement with their findings.
However, to return to the determinants of the course of the
clinical interview, we find that hypothesis testing is too
undifferentiated and nebulous a description. The course of
the interview may be determined by the subject's response to
the flow of information as presented by the patient, or the
logical structure of clinical histories as epitomised by the
routine history, as well as by the problem solver's own inter-
pretations of t)informat1on. In addition, there is a subtle
and complex reciprocal relationship between the problem solver's
cognitive activities and the information as it is presented
with order, clarity and specificity uncontrolled by the enquirer.
This is discussed fully in 11.7.
Elstein et al (1978) and Barrows et al (1978) identify errors
in the clinical problem solving process as described in section
11.9. Their findings are substantiated by the present results
in terms of the set effect, failure to make the correct inter-
pretation of the information, designation of irrelevance and
failure to make an appropriate enquiry. However, the appropriate
context of such errors is defined in the current discussion by
drawing attention to the logical inference that any aspects,
process or strategy of clinical problem solving is inherently
a potential source of error depending upon the thoroughness and
rigour of its implementation and the accuracy and completeness
of the problem solver's knowledge.
Finally, two points must be mentioned. Firstly, the hypothesis
generation and testing model has given rise to specific numbers
of hypotheses being attributed to subjects at any one time.
This is questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds
(see section 11.2) as misleading and limiting to analysis of
the cognitive process which facilitates such multiple interpre-
tations of the same information. Secondly, it is worth noting
that in this entire study, no differences have been found
between the range of cognitive processes of students, house
officers and registrars. This is not to say that within any one
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person one may dominate over another or be preferred for some
reason related to experience and practice. Despite this
possibility, the finding of no differences is something which
must be dealt with in the light of criticisms of medical
education for its lack of teaching in the area of diagnostic
thinking skills and which suggest that such skills develop
only with clinical practice (Barrows and Bennett, 1972; see
also Chapter One).
In conclusion, the interpretative value of the present study
for current descriptions of the diagnostic thinking process
may be summarised. Although theories of pattern recognition
are rejected on both theoretical and empirical grounds 1 the
pre-dominant theory of hypothesis generation and testing cannot
be dismissed quite as summarily. As a complete and accurate
description of the clinical problem solver's thinking processes,
it is clearly inadequate. It is also assessed as unnecessar-
ily limiting and misleading. Given the small part of the
diagnostic thinking process to which it is addressed, it may
seem a reasonable description of that portion of the clinician's
behaviour. However, if the wider process is considered and
serious questions asked about the nature, derivation and fate
of hypotheses, about the psychological rationale and meaning
of such a process, its origin and mechanism, the inadequacy and
inaccuracy of the formulation becomes apparent, as does its
tendency to deflect attention to superficial features of think-
ing rather than underlying processes. Likewise, the variables
or identifiable aspects of the diagnostic problem and thinking
process have not been assigned a role in the theory. For
example, we may Cite variables of information flow, determinants
of interview structure, characteristics of elicited and stored
information and so on. We therefore suggest that the more
psychologically precise explanatory concepts of structure, in-
terpretation and extrapolation be employed instead of the bland
and generic theory which hypothesis generation and testing seems
to be. Such concepts have the necessary characteristic of
giving rise to testable research hypotheses and questions and,
as is discussed in Chapter Thirteen, associated specific princ-
iples from which to develop appropriate teaching and learning
strategies.
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11.13 Summary
The conclusions of this chapter may be suninarised in point
form as follows:
1. Two forms of interpretative response to clinical data are
identified. These are pre-diagnostic and diagnostic
interpretations. The former may be seen as working inter-
pretations only, not hypothesised diagnoses.
2. Multiple interpretations of both types are made by all
groups of subjects who appear to have equal interpretative
capacity.
3. Multiple interpretations of the same array of information
can arise only if that information is either cognitively
rearranged to have a variety of possible internal struct-
tires and inter-relationships or if it is related to many
different extrapolated contexts of information structures
and stored in the subject's memory.
4. The number and nature of interpretations possible must be
limited and detezmined by the information elicited as well
as the structure, content and accessibility of the subject's
store of knowledge.
5. The problem solver has the ability to structure and inter-
pret information in ways other than those which he is
currently considering at any one time. Thus, the diagnostic
thinking process is both creative and dynamic.
6. Students, house officers and registrars do not differ in
their relative use of pre-diagnostic and diagnostic inter-
pretations.
7. Pre-diagnostic interpretations are statistically signifi-
cantly more frequent than diagnostic interpretations for
all groups, but the diagnostic thinking process is not one
of progressive specification. The linear only partially
controlled nature of the information flow from patient to
clinician may pre-dispose him towards initially extrapola-
ting to pre-diagnostic interpretations rather than
diagnostic ones.
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8. Subjects in all groups can and do make active, interpre-
tative or evaluative response to clinical information as
soon as it is elicited. Theories such as pattern
recognition which imply passive reception of information
are untenable. All information is structured and inter-
preted in some way and not merely gathered.
9. All groups of subjects show evidence of evaluating either
their own interpretative processes themselves or their
outcomes and of greater or less willingness or ability
to work within one structure rather than another.
10. For all subjects, the diagnostic thinking process involves
working within extrapolated cognitive contexts and defin-
ing the 'fit' of observed and expected findings. Whether
the context is pre-diagnostic or diagnostic depends upon
the information elicited and the structure of the subject's
stored knowledge.
11. Desirability of re-interpretative and interpretative
thinking cannot be judged in absolute terms, but only in
relation to specific cases. However, the ability to think
in such ways is desirable in the diagnostic problem solver.
12. Re-interpretation in the absence of new information is
less common than re-interpretation in the presence of new
information for all groups. Stimuli to each of these
processes are varied.
13 Re-interpretatiOflOCCUrsas a result of cognitive restruct-
uring of information and consequent embedding of the
information in a new extrapolated context of possibly
related information.
14. Students, house officers and registrars do not differ in
their strategies for selection between competing inter-
pretations of clinical information. Subjects tend to use
a combination of strategies, with a more common use of
confirmation rather than elimination or postponement of
judgment. Strategy may depend upon personal factors or
upon characteristics of the information.
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15. Clinical data are evaluated in terms of the fit to anti-
cipated possible findings.
16. Competing interpretations are dealt with by confirmation,
elimination or postponement of judgment. Such decisions
represent the ultimate judgmental component of the diag-
nostic thinking process.
17. Differentiation between routine and non-routine questions
is hazardous.
18. All groups show a similar range of strategies for deter-
mining the course of the clinical interview, although
some may pre-dominate in some groups. All subjects
conduct the interview according to the demands of either
their own interpretative responses or the requirements of
some standard form of interview structure and content, or,
more usually, both.
19. Thoroughness of data acquisition alone, in the absence of
active direction by the subject's interpretative needs,
may not be an efficient and effective strategy.
20. There is a reciprocal relationship between the subject's
interpretative, structuring and controlling activities
and the structure of the information as it is presented.
The subject's cognitive processes are simultaneously
responsive and determinative.
21. Barrows et al's views of the routine history are substant-
iated.
22. All groups retrospectively identify failure to make a
specific enquiry of the patient more often than failure
to make a general or routine enquiry. Fifty four per cent
of students identify failure to make specific enquiry,
indicating failure to think in action. This may be attr-
ibuted to the structure and accessibility or organisation
of stored information,
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23. Any aspect, process or strategy of clinical problem
solving is potentially a source of error. Special errors
are identifed as the set effect, failure to make the
correct interpretation, and designation of irrelevance.
24. Information other than that indicated by the headings of
the standard clinical history is used by all groups to
assist either in pre-diagnostic or diagnostic Interpre-
tation or in selection of the most likely diagnosis.
Such information may concern tests and procedures, treat-
ments, circumstantial evidence (ward, consultant, etc.)
or other doctors' reported opinions.
25. Psychological probability involves processes of weighing
up, balancing and fitting observed evidence to expected
possible information.
26. Psychological concepts of information structure and inter-
pretation based on extrapolation to possible contexts are
considered more helpful and accurate than the pre-dominant
interpretation of the diagnostic thinking process as
hypothesis generation and testing.
1aving reached these conclusions on the basis of the account
gathering study, we may now proceed to unite them with the con-
clusions of the questionnaire study in order to make a more
complete definition and description of the diagnostic thinking
process in students, house officers and registrars. We may
also now relate these findings to general psychological theory.
This forms the discussion of Chapter Twelve.
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Footnotes on Page 290
(1) Defined as the feature (or features) of a stimulus
situation which, above all other features actually
does evoke the response.
(2) Defined as the actual characterising feature (or
features) of a stimulus situation, as opposed to
some other feature (or features), which might or
might not be attributed force by the observer,
but which characterises some other actual stimulus
situation.
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CHAPTER IWELVE
The Diagnostic Thinking Process: A Psychological Perspective Relating
the Results of the Two Parallel Studies
The results and findings of the two parallel studies which comprise
this enquiry have been described and discussed separately. This
chapter relates and unites these separate elements in order to derive
a unified and consistent explanation of the diagnostic thinking pro-
cess in undergraduate medical education and clinical, practice. Section
5.6.3 above establishes the comparability of the subjects of the two
separate studies. We may therefore conclude that it is both reasonable
and justifiable to unify the findings of the two parallel studies and
so derive one theory of the diagnostic thinking process.
However, before proceeding, it is necessary to consider whether it is
justifiable to compare a study which recognises specialities (the
questionnaire study) with one which does not (the account gathering
study). Could it not be that concealed beneath the results of the
latter are gross speciality differences in the thinking processes
revealed? The refutation of such an assertion must be of two types:
a priori and a posterioii.The a priori argument derives from the
design of the account gathering study which includes a wide range of
clinical material and diagnoses and therefore yields information
about general characteristics of the diagnostic thinking process. In
addition, the work of the Michigan and McMaster groups had already
concerned different specialities and revealed similar cognitive pro-
cesses of a general type, while findings of speciality specificity
have been shown to involve variables other than those of the type
which could be expected to result from the account gathering study.
The a posteriori argument concerns the nature of the cognitive
processes demonstrated in the account gathering study data. These
are processes which are referable to general cognitive development
and are not particular to the diagnostic thinking process per se
(see 12.3 below). it is therefore reasonable to consider that these
processes are apparent regardless of the speciality concerned,
although the relative contrthutions of those processes, as is shown,
may vary. It is therefore considered justifiable to unify the
results of the two parallel studies from the points of view of both
the subjects involved and the content.
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The theory to be presented defines the characteristics of the diagn-
ostic thinking process and problem. The description of the stages
of that process is in the broadest of terms. The unpredictability,
individuality, vagaries and indirection of each clinical problem
and process preclude linear or ordered description or prescription
of absolutes. The following sections, then, present, firstly, a
discussion of the fundamental psychological processes identified.
This is followed by discussions of special features of the stages of
initiation, progress and resolution of the diagnostic thinking
process. A discussion of developmental and comparative aspects is
then presented.
12.1 Fundamental Psychological Features: Structure and Extra-
polat ion
The discussions of the results of the account gathering study
(Chapter Eleven) and of the principles and practice of teach-
ing the diagnostic thiniUng process (Chapter Four) have
introduced and substantiated the centrality of the explanatory
concepts of structure and extrapolation. Aith 6h closely related,
each of these may be discussed separately in relation to the
results of the two parallel studies and to wider psychological
thco y.
12.1.1 Structure
It is our contention that the diagnostic thinking process
involves the active assignment of some structure to the clin-
ical information as it is elicited. In psychological theory,
the search for structure has been presented as inherent in
human behaviour (earner, 1962). Section 4.1.1 discusses the
psychological and pedagogical meaning of structure, at
length. In principle, however, we are referring to the ways
in which pieces of information are or may be related either
in reality or in the clinical problem solver's mind.
In section 8.2 are identified some sources of differences
between students and registrars. These may best be understood
in the light of the concept of structure. For example, the
different contextual aspects of knowledge and skill, relative
rehearsal of knowledge and skills and the various contextual
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aspects of that rehearsal may differentiate between the
diagnostic thinking processes of students and registrars
primarily because of the different effects of these experi-
ences on the structure and accessibility of stored knowledge.
In turn, such differences in structure and accessibility of
stored knowledge may yield differences in the structure
assigned to the clinical information elicited. Results of
the questionnaire study give substance to this argument.
It is shown, for example, in section 8.3.1 that in endocrin-
ology factual knowledge plays a not inconsiderable role in
the students' diagnostic thinking processes, while for
registrars this capacity plays a minimal relative role. This
difference may be attributed to differences in the contexts
of acquisition and use of knowledge. The account gathering
study substantiates this conclusion by demonstrating a
tendency in students to find difficulty in gaining access to
or using the stored knowledge structures during the clinical
interview (section 11.8). We may infer from this difficulty
that these structures may not be wholly appropriate to that
situation. It is reasonable to presume that students' know-
ledge is primarily acquired in a context other than that of
the patient presenting a flow of clinical information, and that
the experience of a fairly formal learning process predominates
over the experience of acquiring information in the active
clinical problem solving context. It is therefore to be
expected that the context of a formalised knowledge structure
will play an important part in the diagnostic thinking process.
As that knowledge is used in more and more clinical contexts
to serve the diagnostic thinking process, it is reasonable to
infer that its structure alters and that the nature of the
diagnostic thinking process alters accordingly. The same may
be said of the role of interpretation of symptoms and signs
in endocrinology as tested in section B of the questionnaire.
In both endocrinology and neurology, it is shown that the skills
taught during the undergraduate course are those which play
important roles in students' diagnostic thinking processes, and
that these may or may not be the same as those of the experi-
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enced clinician, depending upon the pedagogical approach of
the speciality. In both cases it is also clear that there is
development and change in the diagnostic thinking process
with clinical practice. It is reasonable to infer from such
similarities and differences that one aspect of change is in
terms of the structure of relevant knowledge as well as in its
patterns of use. This is particularly so, given the results
and discussion of the account gathering study.
It will be recalled that pre-diagnostic and diagnostic inter-
pretations of clinical information are described in terms of
the clinical problem solver locating the piece or array of
information elicited in relation to some segment or section
of his own cognitive structure of knowledge and experience.
Evidence is presented to substantiate this description. It is
also shown that this is an active response to all information
(section 11.3) but that information may be differently amenable
to interpretation, as the identification of pre-diagnostic and
diagnostic interpretations and the need for further clarifying
enquiry indicate. It is also indicated (section 11.7) that
there is a reciprocal relationship between the subject's acti-
vity of assigning structure to clinical information as it is
elicited and his reception of further information which may
alter those assigned structures. Thus structuring of inform-
ation is not a single cognitive act but a process in itself
of dynamism and change. The discussion in section 4.1.3
substantiates this conclusion. Structuring is more often
restructuring than the primary interpretation of information.
The account gathering study demonstrates this quite clearly.
It is shown that all groups of subjects make multiple inter-
pretations of the clinical information of both types (section
11.2). Thus information can be structured in many ways by
one clinical problem solver. It is also suggested that the
problem solver often has the ability to structure the inform-
ation in many ways..other than those he is considering at any
one time. In section 11.5 it is shown that restructuring can
occur either in the presence or absence of new information and
that there are many mechanisms which can give rise to the
cognitive operation.
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It is clear, then, that both the questionnaire study and the
account gathering study substantiate the centrality of the
concept of structure in the diagnostic thinking process.
Reference to the general psychological literature may enable
us to understand this concept and its tole more fully. Dart
and Smith (1974) provide a useful and relevant discussion of
the concept of cognitive structure which, they indicate, has
no definition shared by all psychologists. Rowever, their
definition of the term is as it is used in the present study:
"A cognitive structure reflects the organisation of thought
of an organism ... for some interval of time". Such a defin-
ition encompasses the changing structures which have been
inferred when comparing the results of students and registrars
in the questionnaire study, and the three grops of the
account gathering study. Such changes in structure have been
attributed, largely, to the changing contexts of knowledge
acquisition and rehearsal. Bart and Smith's (1974) formulation
emanates from a structuralist and logico-algebraic approach
to cognitive psychology and so, riot surprisingly, defines the
two parts of cognitive structure as elements which are the
input and output, orcontent, and processes which are "the
representational actions performed on the elements; they are
defined in terms of the elements they act on and the elements
they produce". Such definitions reflect our differentiation
between skills structures and cognitive processes.
Ausubel et al (1978) discuss the role of the cognitive struct-
ure in problem solving. This clearly relates to the current
context:
"That existing cognitive structure plays a key note
in problem solving is evident from the fact that the
solution of any given problem involves a re-organis-
ation of the residue of past experience so as to fit
the particular requirements of the current problem
situation."	 (p. 571)
This statement surely explains further the results of the
questionnaire studies which indicate that the problem solving
process develops and changes with clinical practice, either
in terms of the skills structure or of cognitive processes or
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both. It particularly would appear to give support to the
inference made earlier that the contextual aspects of clinical
practice, being different from those of medical education, give
rise to changes in the diagnostic thinking process or, as it is
here put, in the eiementsW and processes of the cognitive
structure. Further indication is given of the mechanism of
change:
"... cognitive structure is related to problem solving
in a repository as well as in a determinative sense.
The substantive or methodological product of a prob-
lem solving process is incorporated into cognitive
structure in accordance with the same principles that
are operative in reception learning." (ibid. p. 572)
It would seem reasonable that both elements and processes can
be substantive products. Our results surely suggest this con-
clusion. The endocrinology questionnaire study shows that
students and registrars are very different in the extent to
which their diagnostic thinking processes rely on cognitive
operations not measured by that questionnaire. However, the
account gathering study shows quite clearly that in all the
categories identified for all research hypotheses, no statist-
ically significant difference is found between students, house
officers and registrars. It must, therefore, be concluded
that students have in their repertoire of cognitive processes
the same operations as registrars but that the extent, manner
and relative use of those operations in the diagnostic thinking
process differ very greatly between the two groups. Thus,
the substantive product incorporated into the cognitive struct-
ure in the new context of clinical practice in endocrinology
is one of process as well as substance.
	 The results of the
neurology questionnaire study indicate that such a substantive
product can be in terms of elements in that the difference
between students and registrars here is primarily in skills
structure not in cognitive processes.
Cross referencing of the findings of the two parallel studies
and general psychological theory has yielded a picture of the
nature of cognitive structures and of their constructive,
mutating quality. The next stage in the discussion, therefore,
Footnote (1) - see end of chapter.
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must turn to the mechanism of change itself and so to the
nature of the reciprocal relationship between the problem
solver's activity of assigning structure to clinical
information as it is elicited and his reception of further
information which may alter those assigned structures. To
these are now added the further dimension of consequent
change in the very structures to which the received informa-
tion is referred and from which assigned structures are
selected.
The account gathering study yielded much evidence of a pro-
cess of multiple interpretation and re-interpretation of the
changed or unchanged array of clinical information. This
evidence is discussed in detail in sections 11.2 and 11.5.
Bruner l957) discusses the cognitive activity of structuring
information in terms of hypothesis generation and testing,
which frame of reference has been rejected in the present con-
text. He also uses 'theory construction' and coding systems as
explanatory concepts and in his discussion describes the pro-
cess of structuring and restructuring information:
"If it is a good theory - a good formal or probabilistic
coding system - it should permit us to go beyond the
present data both retrospectively and prospectively.
We go backward - turn around on our own schemata -
and order data that before seemed unrelated to each
other. Old loose ends now become part of a new
pattern". (p. 221)
Bruner defines a coding system as "the person's manner of
grouping and relating information about this world, and it is
constantly subject to change and re-organisation". It is
difficult to appreciate wherein this differs from the elements
and processes of the structures which are used as the current
explanatory concept and frame of reference.
However, theory construction is a useful concept since Bruner
sees it as a creative, inventive process. It is not merely
one of referring to a stored structure, but results in new
structures to explain the given events and predict their con-
comitants. Thus existing structures become re-organised in
the face of new arrays of information with which to deal. Such
- 3k2 -
a concept, then, relates the reciprocal assignment and recep-
tion activity identified in the account gathering study and
the additional developmental dimension of altering stored
structures through the process of using them. Bruner also
identifies cases of coding processes (or structuring) which
could not necessarily result in alterations to stored struct-
ures. These are simple placement of the given information in
an identity class and learning the probability texture or
redundancy of the environment. This latter process, however,
would seem to be akin to developing new stored structures
such that the problem solver can predict the likely concomit-
ants of a given event.
The concept of theory construction may be seen as related to
the classical gestalt theory of productive problem solving
which is also described as a creative and inventive process
relying heavily upon the problem solver's capacity to restruct-
ure the problem in different, progressive ways and to see the
inner structure of the situation (Hilgard, 1964). Solutions
are therefore based on cognitive re-organisation. Since this
is clearly the operationhere postulated as a defining
characteristic of the diagnostic thinking process, it is worth
exploring it further.
Vinacke (1952) points out that productive problem solving is
conceived to be a dynamic, fluid process, depending upon a
grasp of the inner relations of the problem and an orientation
to its structural requirements. A mechanical application of
rules and principles is excluded. Past experience is important
but what matters is now, and what one recalls and how one
applies what is recalled. The concept of productive problem
solving originates from the work of Wertheiiner (1945).
Although the gestalt context of the concept is not without its
important critics (Piaget, 1968) the centrality of the operation
of restructuring would appear to be a fundamental cognitive
process, regardless of context. It is one of the major pro-
cesses for which the present account gathering study provides
evidence. Maier (1931) suggests that cognitive reorganisation
is experienced suddenly and often inexplicably, but that a
-change in the perception of one element may organise Other
elements into a new structure. The results of the account
gathering study indicate that sources of restructuring are
many and varied (see section 11.5) and may occur either in
the absence or presence of new information.
The differences between restructuring as the classical gestalt
psychologists meant it in holistic terms and as it is demon-
strated in the present study may not only derive from the
theoretical framework itself, but also from the nature of the
problem under consideration, and the psychological derivation
of the restructuring process. A problem of the order "How
can solution X be achieved?" where a, b and c are the elements
and constraints of the problem, is not of the same type as
"What disease, if any, does this person have?" The former is
circumscribed, although within broad limits, whereas the
latter has no prescribed boundaries or parameters or solution
and no specified criteria against which to judge whetiher or
not a solution is acceptable. Barrows (1976) describes the
clinical problem as an 'unknown problem'.
Problems exhibiting such characteristics as these have, been
termed ill defined (Reitman, 1964) as opposed to well defined
problems associated with which is some systematic way of
deciding when a proposed solution is acceptable. Reitmnan
(1964) considers that most research in the area of problem
solving concerns the well defined type and cites, for example,
formal bodies of problem solving methods such as linear pro-
gramming, and information processing approaches towards human
problem solving. We may add such classical work as th,at of
Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960), or a list of component
problem solving skills identified frcei a literature survey for
the development of a problem solving test (Speedie et al, 1973)
which does not differentiate between ill defined and well
defined problems. In addition, we may cite the problems on
which the gestaltists mentioned based their theories of pro- -
ductive problem solving.
-Duncker's (1945) definition of productive problem solving
was as follows:
"The final form of a solution is typically attained
by way of mediating phases of the process, of which
each one, in retrospect, possesses the character of
a solution, and, in prospect, that of a problem".
Here, Duncker is referring to the problem solver's progressive
restructuring of the probl and at each stage the suggested
solution must be examined for its viability and accepted or
rejected according to objective criteria. However, given
the ill defined diagnostic problem, structuring and restruct-
uring would seem to serve a different psychological and
problem solving purpose.
Reitman's (1964) discussion concerns the transformatiom of
the lU defined problem into one sufficiently well defined to
admit of solution; this may be done by addition of appropriate
constraints, assumptions, or identifying statements. In
information processing terms, this has the effect of reducing
or closing the problem space. In the terms of the present
discussion, the constraints, assumptions and identifying
statements are derived from stored, structured knowledge arid
have the effect of structuring the information in ways analo-
gous to those identified by the gestaltists but in an entirely
different context. Relevant discussion has been presented by
Elstein et al (1972) who cite Bartlett's (1958) paradigm of
the open system in which the problem solver moves from a known
starting point to an unknown terminal point. The processes of
structuring and restructuring can relate such an open system
to a series of closed ones and test their relative fits. The
interpretative processes discussed in sections 11.2, 11.3,
11.4 and 11.5 above may be seen in these terms. However, it
must be remembered that, unlike the gestaltist problemse the
field of information in the clinical interview changes through-
out the problem solving process, thus restructuring may be in
the context of an extending field rather than being a process
of recentring in a fixed field of information.
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The cognitive process of structuring and restructuring arrays
of information has been noted by many workers and interpreted
within many theoretical frameworks other than those of Bruner
and the gestaltists. Ability to structure and restructure
has been interpreted in relation to the field dependent/field
independent dimension of cognitive style (Shaps n, 1977; Witkin
et al, 1974). Figure 11.2 for example, may be seen as demon-
strating field independence. Such an ability is also defined
as distinguishing Piagetian formal thought from prior stages
of development (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958; Lunzer, 1968) while
the reciprocal relationship between the responsive and deter-
miAistic functions of structures and the consequent changes in
the diagnostic thinking process (section 11,7 above) may also
be discussed within the Piagetian assimilation-accorsuodation
model (Furth, 1968). Relevant extensions of this model
(Riegel, 1973; Youniss, 1974) also suggest that problem finding
characterises certain forms of mature adult thinking as much
as does problem solving (Cropper et al, 1977). The ill defined
diagnostic problem could be seen in such terms, although its
deliberate and formal nature may invalidate the comparison.
However, such discussions of Piagetian theory indicate that
the full propositional logic of the stage of formal operations
may not always be applied to all problems by those who have the
ability (Nixon, 1973). Such a distinction between competence
and performance seems to give support to the current preference
for a broad psychological, explanatory framework based on
concepts of structure and extrapolation rather than the narrower
one based on hypothesis generation and testing with its impli-
cit assumptions of cognitive operational method. Despite
this, the concepts of structure and extrapolation do not
exclude, but rather enccpass, the major features of the Piag-
etian approach. Indeed, the general hypothico-deductive
nature of adult thinking is pre-supposed if structure and
extrapolation are to make sense. Inhelder and Piaget (1958)
state that objectivity pre-supposes a decentring or a continual
refocussing of perspective and a differentiation and co-ordin-
ation of perspectives and points of view. The results of the
account gathering study and the subsequent dicussion of struct-
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uring and restructuring are in accord with these postulates.
Likewise, the current interpretative framework is accepting
of the Piagetian definition of a cognitive operation as a type
of action which can be carried out either directly in the
manipulation of objects, or internally when it is categories
or, in the case of formal logic, propositions which are
manipulated. An operation is thus a means for mentally trans-
forming data about the real world so that they can be
organised and used selectively in the solution of problems.
No incompatability is perceived between this and the explana-
tory framework of structure and extrapolation which appears
best to describe the essence of the diagnostic thinking
process.
We may now attempt to summarise the argument and conclusions
as follows:
1. The diagnostic thinking process involves the assignment
of structure to arrays of clinical information.
2. The structure, and therefore accessibility, of stored
knowledge varies with relative experience of medical
education and clinical practice.
3. Structuring clinical information is not a single cognitive
act, but a reciprocal process of dynamism and change.
Cognitive structures have both repository and determinative
aspects.
4. Cognitive structures comprise both elements (content) and
processes (operations on content). This reflects the
differentiation between skills structures and cognitive
processes.
5. The diagnostic thinking process yields a substantive
product which may be J.ncorporated into the cognitive
structure of the thinker, and may be either element or
process.
6. The cognitive processes of structuring and restructuring
are incorporated into a wide range of theories: coding
systems and processes and theory construction (Bruner)
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productive problem solving (Wertheimer, Duncker and other
gestalt psychologists); the field dependent/independent
dimension of cognitive style theorists (Witkin); and
Piagetian theory.
7. The process of assigning structure to the array of clinical
information renders the ill defined diagnostic problem
potentially well defined.
The specific meaning and application of these points are
returned to later in this chapter when the three stages (initi-
ation, progress and resolution) of the diagnostic thinking
process are considered in a psychological perspective. Mean-
while, the concept of structure having been sc*ewhat clarified
we may turn to the second fundamental psychological feature of
that process to which the current studies have pointed.
12 • 1.2 Extrapolation
In section 11.2 above the diagnostic thinking process is
described as one of "trying to make sense of the information
elicited by referring to other information not present". Thus
a pre-diagnostic or diagnostic "interpretation refers to an
extrapolated context or array of information of which the
information already elicited could be an exemplar if accompanied
by certain other items of informatio&'. The whole of section
11.4 elaborates on this by discussing the evidence of the
account gathering study that clinical problem solvers do work
within an extrapolated cognitive context or contexts. The
process which others have identified as hypothesis testing by
definition requires such reference to features not yet shown
to be present, whether these are items of information or
relationships.
The process of extrapolation is closely related to that of
structuring and together these two operations form the inter-
pretative cognitive activities of the diagnostic problem
solver. Indeed, it is reasonable to contend that the operation
of extrapolation is contemporaneous with the process of
structuring the elicited information and is dependent upon the
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appropriateness, completeness and accessihiuity of the stored
structures of information. This is discussed further im
section 11.8 above in terms of students' difficulties im
retrieving relevant information during the process of tbe
clinical interview.
The importance of the operation of extrapolation is also re-
flected in the predominant role of the interpretation of
symptoms and signs in predicting diagnostic acumen in t1e
questionnaire study for both endocrinology and neurology,
although it will be recalled that this importance is somewhat
equivocal for endocrinology registrars. Interpretation is
clearly normally only possible by reference to stored informa-
tion. The account gathering study indicates that such
interpretation and reference may be more or less satisftory
to the interpreter and, if unsatisfactory, further information
is sought to facilitate other interpretations or extrapolation
to other contexts (section 11.3). This study also indicates
the multiplicity of extrapolated contexts which may arise from
an array of clinical information which may or may not alter
(sections 11.2 and 11.5), This, again, indicates a close
relationship between structure and extrapolation, since JLocation
of a range of extrapolated contexts also must imply a similar
range of structures assigned to the information array. Section
11.9.2 (figures 11.9 and 11.10) indicates that failure t
extrapolate to the appropriate context is one source of error in
the diagnostic thinking process and it is suggested that this,
in essence, is due to failure of structure. The concept of the
forceful feature is discussed and is returned to in later sections
of this chapter.
Perhaps the process of extrapolation as discussed here is
analogous to the process which others have identified as clinical
inference. hammond (1966) defines the process of inference as
"making a judgment about an object or event on the basis of more
or less insufficient data". Clinical inference might be of the
inductive type, involving reasoning from a particular event to
the general case. Engle (1964) conceptualises diagnosis in
these terms. As an example of this, Hammond describes tine case
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where "if one observes a regular relation between symptom 'a
and disease 'A' in one hundred cases, we may reason that all
patients who exhibit symptom 'a' have disease 'A'. Deductive
inference, on the other hand, refers to a process of relating
"phenomena to general principles or events tied by a necessary
relationship with those being investigated" (Peel, 1971).
Hammond (1966) considers inductive inference to be most fre-
quently displayed in clinical situations and to be of an
imperfect and uncertainty geared type because of the imperfect
and uncertain nature of clinical information itself. Cohen
(1972) refers to this type of uncertainty as "intrinsic
uncertainty", a definition "pertaining to the imprecision,
ambiguity or other limitation of the data on which a medical
judgment is to be based".
Sarbin et al (1960) consider that the nature of clinical
inference varies considerably among persons and that conclusions
are not invariant; characteristics of the inferring person
influence both the choice of data and the manipulation of terms.
The degree of similarity or difference between the stored
structures of individuals would surely render this opinion more
or less true if inference is taken to mean extrapolation to
undemonstrated but possible concomitant features.
It is important to note, that any process of inference, whether
inductive or deductive, involves a hypothetical aspect, since
characteristics inferred are, by definition, not directly
observed and require some form of proof or substantiation.
Medawar (1969), in his discussion of intention in scientific
thought(as an example of which he cites the diagnostic process),
describes scientific reasoning as "a kind of dialogue between
the possible and the actual". In other words, it is hypoth-
etico-deductive. It may appear that the process of inference
thus described resembles the process of "formulation of possible
explanations", described by Peel (1971) as a capability called for
when making a judgment. It may reasonably be concluded from this
brief discussion that the processes of inference and. extrapolation
are closely related in respect of the diagnostic thinking process.
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We may now turn to the meaning of extrapolation as it is used
in the psychological literature, and in contexts other than
the present one in order to achieve a more accurate interpre-
tation and understanding of this aspect of the diagnostic
thinking process.
The work of Bruner has already been discussed in relation to
principles of teaching and learning (Chapter Four) and to the
psychological meaning of the concept of structure (section
12.1.1). His work is also relevant to the psychological con-
cept of extrapolation. Its theoretical emphasis ha been upon
the construction of internal models or generic coding systems
by means of which an individual might predict, extrapolate or
go beyond the information given (Bruner, 1973). The cognitive
activity of extrapolation can, according to Bruner, take a
number of different forms. For example:
"Given the presence of a few defining properties or
cues, we go beyond them to the inference of identity.
Having done so, we infer that the instance so
categorised or identified has other properties
characteristic of membership in a category ... The
act of rendering some given event equivalent to a
class of other things, placing it in an identity
class, provides then one of the most primitive forms
of going beyond information given". (p. 219)
A second form of extrapolation occurs when an individual learns
the probability texture of the environment and therefore can
predict the likely concomitants of a given event. A third
form of extrapolation Bruner identifies as "the learning of
certain formal schemata that may be fitted to or may be used
to organise arrays of diverse information". This process
Bruner calls coding (Bruner, 1973) and it amounts to the methods
and rules which an individual may apply to data in order to
understand them. One may see this activity as more structural
and less content based than the first two forms of extrapolation,
in that the same coding process may be applied to entirely
different forms or content of information arrays.
The final form of extrapolation which Bruner identifies as
theory construction enables retrospective and prospective extra-
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polation, This is discussed in section 12.1.1. above.
It is clear that the hypothesis generatioA and testing model
of the diagnostic thinking process adheres very closely only
to the first of Bruner's forms of extrapolation; to that
which he designates the most primitive form. Given the range
and variety of clinical problems, their manifestations,
patients' reports, interview structures, ai types and struct-
ures of knowledge, it seems inappropriate to confine .Ahat
de Groot (1.965) terms "the omnipresence of anticipation" to
such an approach which is element dominated. In sectiLon 12.1.1
it is pointed out that the cognitive structure is made up of
both elements and processes. For example, the mechanism of
locating possible appropriate extrapolated contexts or
structures is discussed in section 11.9.2 in terms of identi-
fication of tI forceful feature of an array. It woulti be
reasonable to suggest that such identification concerns some
knowledge of the probability texture of the clinical eaviron-
ment such that some items of information have fewer potential
meanings or extrapolated contexts.than others and so are
perceived as more reliable. This is discussed in terms of
the selecting operation. As examples, chest pain on exertion
or pain in the calves on walking may have fewer potentLa1
interpretations than headache or weakness of the legs. Many
different processes of extrapolation which Bruner identifies
could reasonably be inferred in such a manner from resa1ts of
the account gathering study. however, the utility and validity
of such an exercise is questionable. Likewise, the gemeral-
isability of the discussion would be severely limited in the
absence of close analysis and identification of the variables
of the separate contexts and their characteristics. The
present discussion is intended only to demonstrate that extra-
polation, like structuring, is not a unitary process. The
clinical problem solver has a choice of modes of extrapolation
which may sometimes conflict with each other and sometiimes
operate to the same effect. To characterise this stage of
the diagnostic thinking process simply as hypothesis generation
is surely to obscure or deny the potential complexity and
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range of the cognitive operations which the problem solver
may apply.
Consideration of Bruner's work has caused us to conclude that
the approach and results of the account gathering process may
conceal a rich variety of cognitive function.
Other workers who have contributed to the explanation of the
cognitive process of extrapolation or going beyond the inform-
ation given include Peel (1968, 1971) who distinguishes
between describing and explaining:
"Description ... merely involves an account of the
phenomenon and a relating of its parts without
reference to other ideas, analogies, similarities
and antecedent or contiguous circumstances.
Explanation ... entails referring the phenomenon
causally to previous phenomena and independent
generalisations". (1971, p. 26)
Peel considers it "realistic to think of merest description
and fullest explanation at the bottom and top end respectively
of a scale of ascending power of explanation". But this
reservation is. presented as a function of the necessary use of
language which is itself often conceptual. However, Peel
points out that predictions can be made on the basis of either
describer or explainer thinking, although prediction from
the former are more limited. This reflects our previous con-
clusion that extrapolation may take different forms at varying
levels of complexity. Peel's approach and analysis are very
closely associated with the Piagetian model of cognitive
development. Such a model, in particular, characterises
mature thinking in terms of hypothetico-deductive processes
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958; Lunzer, 1968) which are based on
the construction of hypotheses which "entails an abstraction
from the attributes of reality as experienced and a reconstru-
ction of reality as the manifestation of a lawful system"
(Lunzer, 1968). The most fundamental characteristic of formal
thought is the reversal of direction between reality and
possibility such that the former becomes merely a special case
of the latter (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958).
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Thus formal thought is characterised by a process of extra-
polation from current information to possible hypothetical
explanations. It is particularly salient to the present
discussion that such extrapolation is described En terms of
a process of cognitive structuring and restructuring (Lunzer,
1968). Indeed, it would be reasonable to infer that even
Peel's (1971) describer thinking, which involves selection
and relating of parts of a phenomenon, can only occur with
recourse to the cognitive structure of the thinker which all-
ows such analysis and construction.
This brief discussion enables us to appreciate the currency
of the concept of extrapolation in terms of certain schools
of psychological thought and certain psychological theories.
It also provides some indication of the close relationship
between extrapolation and structure. We return to these con-
cepts, their inter-relationship and possible mechanisms in
the diagnostic thinking process in the subsequent sections of
this chapter which deal. with the three stages of that process:
initiation, progress and resolution. Meanwhile, the concept
of extrapolation as it applies to our material may be
summarised as follows:
1. The account gathering study provides ample evidence that
all subjects work within a context or contexts extra-
polated froi the given information.
2. The interpretative cognitive activity of the diagnostic
thinking process may be explained in terms of the two
contemporaneous processes of structuring and extrapolation.
3. The importance of the process of extrapolation is reflected
in the predominant role of the interpretation of symptoms
and signs in predicting diagnostic skill in the endocrin-
ology and neurology questionnaire studies.
4. An extrapolation may be more or less satisfactory to the
clinical problem solver.
5. Multiple extrapolations are made by all three groups of
subjects in the account gathering study, regardless of
whether or not new information is added to the array.
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6. Multiple extrapolations imply multiple structurings of
the information.
7. Failure to extrapolate to the appropriate context occurs
as an error in the diagnostic thinking process.
8. Extrapolation may be seen as analogous to the process of
clinical inference.
9. Hypothesis generation and testing is only one of many
possible mechanisms of extrapolation, and appears limiting
and element dominated and may require prior processes of
greater complexity for its operation.
10. Extrapolation is not necessarily a unitary process.
12.2 Stages of the Diagnostic Thinking Process - A Psychological
Perspective
This section discusses, in turn, the three stages of the
diagnostic thinking process. It must be noted that these have
been identified logically rather than psychologically. There-
fore, no overall phases of the process are suggested. Instead,
it is suggested that the three stages of initiation, progress
and resolution should more usefully be applied to the process
of interpretation of the changing array of clinical inform-
ation, and therefore to the processes of structuring and
extrapolation. Results of the account gathering study show
quite clearly that many interpretations of the clinical inform-
ation are made throughout the course of the interview and that
these are assessed for their appropriateness and dealt with
accordingly. Thus, at any point in the diagnostic thinking
process, the clinical problem solver may be at the stage of
initiation of one interpretation, of progress with another and
resolution with yet a third. These three stages, then, are
not mutually exclusive and, indeed, the same piece of inform-
ation may give rise to two stages of thought (for example, a
piece of information which causes resolution of one interpre-
tation may also cause initiation of another). Thus, the three
identified stages are aspects of the diagnostic thinking
process, but are only consecutive stages in the process of one
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train of thought based on one interpretation. Since many
interpretations are made in concert,it is reasonable to asse
that at any one time the diagnostic thinker ay display the
characteristics of any one,or two or all three stages of think-
ing and that these may or may not be systematically related
depending upon the relationship between interpretations. Thus,
the following three sections should answer these questions:
What does psychological theory have to contribute to the dis-
cussion of research results about (a) how interpretations of
clinical information are initiated; (b) how they are cognitively
manipulated while still current; (c) how they are resolved or
lose currency?
12.2.1 stage One: Initiation of Interpretations
In this section we may draw together our conclusions concerning
the mechanism which gives rise to an initial interpretation of
an array or piece of clinical information. We may further
relate such conclusions to relevant psychological theory. The
importance of such interpretative activity is clearly not to be
underestimated. Section 8.3. (above) points out that, with
regard to the resu1t of the questionnaire studies, "In the
absence of accurate Interpretation of symptoms and signs, the
primary data, the other processes of diagnostic problem solving
will be jeopardised... This principle applies to both students
and registrars". Thus the effects of knowledge and selecting
and testing diagnostic possibilities appears, from those stud-
ies, to be mediated by the interpretation of symptoms and
signs. Such a conclusion seems self-evident. Likewise,
section 11.7 points out the extremely and consistently active
and organising nature of the clinical problem solver's involve-
ment.
Section 11.5 concerns the implications of the account gathering
study for the mechanism of cognitive restructuring or re-
interpretation. It is stated that the research method is not
sufficiently rigorous to allow identification of original or
primary interpretations of clinical information. However,
although it Is the case that the data do not allow such ident-
ification in terms of a specific time or place in the interview,
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it is reasonable to infer the nature of primary interpretative
processes from the conclusions related to mechanisms of
re-interpretation. Section 11.12 makes such inferences. It
is suggested that the clinical problem solver can only embark
upon the interpretative process by means of reference to
information not present or, it may be added, to a stored
structure of similar information where all, necessary inform-
ation is simultaneously present but requires structuring in
order to become meaningful. For example, the simultaneous
presentation in a female patient of a history of an apparently
serious symptom, such as paralysis, given in an snconcerned
manner would admit of the diagnostic interpretation of
hysteria Cia belle indiffrence). However, the question of
how such reference is made is the central one for the present
discussion.
The results of the account gathering study show that either
pre-diagnostic or diagnostic interpretations, or both, may be
made as a primary response to clinical information and that
the selection of either is primarily a function of the information
elicited rather than the propensities of the thinker. It is
suggested that information is not stored in the problem
solver's memory simply as a series of discrete arrays each of
which represents a pre-diagnostic or diagnostic interpretation,
but rather that information is also stored such that the
problem solver may recognise a forceful feature and make his
connections from there. This mechanism for identification of
the forceful. feature of an array, we may term the selecting
operation. Such a forceful feature may be the item or grouped
items of information with the greatest payoff in terms of
facilitating productive interpretations or structuring responses.
Further, such identification of the valuable information may
change with experience as the process is re-inforced or not.
For example, given a history of breathlessness and swelling of
the hands and ankles, the less experienced problem solver may
extrapolate to cardiac failure having identified breathless-
ness or ankle swelling (or both) as the forceful feature.
However, the more experienced clinician may identify the
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swelling of the hands as the forceful feature and extrapolate
to a diagnostic interpretation of systematic cirrhosis. It
will be recalled that Thyne's (1966) concept of the forceful
feature is discussed in section 4.1.2 above and we may pursue
its relevance further in our discussion of the origin of inter-
pretative response..
In section 11.9.2 it is suggested that structuring or inter-
pretation in the diagnostic thinking process almost invariably
requires the proklem solver to select significant items of
information from among the array of relevant and irrelevant
items and to inter-relate them appropriately according to some
criterion or criteria. Failure to identify the true forceful
feature and structure the information accordingly may be one
source of error. It is pointed out that informaticn can only
be interpreted and structured according to the limitations of
the subject's own information store in both its structure
and its content. These features have, in turn, direct impli-
cations for accessibility of the store. It is such ease and
appropriateness of access which must eventually determine the
efficiency and effectiveness of initial interpretations and,
by implication, of the entire diagnostic thinking process.
We suggest that access to the stored structure is achieved by
means of some preliminary structure which enables identif i-
cation of forceful features from among an array and extrapol-
ation from there to possible embedding contexts.
To understand the niature of a forceful feature, we may remind
ourselves of subject R. 02, whose response to vertigo or
WeakneS8 was to "cringe and crumble", whereas "discomfort in
the belly" was "a gem". R. 02 demonstrates very clearly that
different pieces of information are differently amenable to
interpretation (See 11.5), That is to say, they have differ-
ent forcefulness. We may also refer to the discussion of the
set effect (section 11.9.1) which illustrates quite clearly
that sometimes information may be designated as a forceful
feature when it is not, in fact, the cue of the array (see
4.1.2). The cue, here, is the feature or features which
enable extrapolation or access to an appropriate (but not
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necessarily correct) stored structure of information which is
the pre-diagnostic or diagnostic interpretation. In the case
of R. 02 it may be inferred that vertigo and weakness do not
constitute the forceful feature of any or many arrays of
information. They are not cues from which he can readily
extrapolate to possible embedding contexts even though, with-
out doubt, such information is located in a number of struct-
ures stored in his memory. But these are not the pieces of
information which allow either easy access to those structures
or access to structures of sufficient definition and use value.
In the case of the set effect, it is clear that an incorrect
forceful feature or features may sometimes be identified
which, in turn, directs the problem solver to an inappropriate
embedding context where his thinking remains locked unless a
reappraisal of the array of information and re-identification
of the forceful feature occurs. Thyne (1966) discusses the
correct identification of the forceful feature (that is,
identification of the cue) and its relationship to understand-
ing. His context is with regard to learning rather than
problem solving, but the same principles apply to both situat-
ions:
"If understanding is to take place, not only must
the learner see the cue, and see it within the
material to be understood, but he must already be
familiar with the cue - he must already know it.
The cue he has to see in this particular material
is something he will recognise once he does see
it". (p. 132)
In these terms, then, we may interpret seeing the cue as
identifying the forceful feature, and understanding as extrapo-
lating to a possible embedding context. Such extrapolation
Thyne (1966) also conceptua].ises in terms of the forceful
feature and the cue:
"If the forceful feature of the present situation is
indeed the cue of some established instance of
learning, of necessity the learner will respond to
the present situation as he responds in that
established instance, for the reason that the pre-
sent case is a case of that very instance". (p. 224)
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Again, we must transpose the framework of learning into that
of problem solving. In essence, Thyne is saying that one
relates new and stored arrays of information in terms of their
forceful features or cues. With regard to the diagnostic
thinking process, it is being suggested similarly that in the
first instance a forceful feature is identified and from there
the problem solver can extrapolate to the arrays of inform-
ation which are structured by means of their forceful features.
Such a mechanism might possibly explain the finding that some
subjects respond to information by judging that they need
further clarification before extrapolating to an embedding con-
text in which they are happy to work (section 11.3). Thus
features of the array are identifiable, but none of them
attains a sufficient threshold of force to be useful In an
effective or efficient or otherwise satisfactory problem sol-
ving process.
One related inference must be made with regard to this dis-
cussion of the relationship between the forceful feature and
extrapolation. It is noted in 11.3 that a subject, if
presented with any piece of clinical information, could almost
certainly extrapolate from it to many contexts, but to do so
in some instances would be grossly inefficient, therefore
further clarification is demanded. However, this very infer-
ence must in turn imply that stored structures of information
can be located not only via the forceful feature or cue of
the array, but via other features which are not either the
forceful one or the cue. It would seem reasonable to suggest
that the latter manner of access is likely to be less efficient
and effective than the former. For such reasons, we have
inferred that forcefulness is not a relative but an absolute
value for any one thinker, and that a sufficient threshold of
force must be attained before any item of information is use-
ful for extrapolation. However, this further illumination of
the role of the forceful feature does not explain the mechanism
whereby that feature (whether it be one or a number of items
of information) is identified from among the array of inform-
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ation presented. As Thyne (1966) indicates, the learner (or
problem solver) must"see the cue, and see it within the
material to be understood". However, he offers no explanation
of how this perception occurs. We must, therefore, turn to
other theorists.
It has already been suggested that flexibility in the origin
of interpretations may be related to some preliminary struct-
ure which enables identification of forceful features, or
features with the greatest interpretative payoff, within an
array and extrapolation from there to possible embedding
contexts. For the moment this must remain a hypothetical
construct only, but one which is, nonetheless, amenable to
objective testing. Before pursuing such a concept further,
however, it must be noted that it is not being put forward as
a necessary stage in the diagnostic thinking process but an
available one where an array of information makes some select-
ive assessment and possible identification of a subset of
information necessary. For that reason we may refer to the
suggested mechanism as the "selecting operation".
Crutchfield (1972) refers to the first stage of problem
solving as problem discovery and considers that:
".... to attack the problem effectively requires
that it then be formulated in a meaningful way
by the individual; he must state the problem to
himself in a form which points up the crucial
issue to be solved and which avoids a misleading
set". (p. 193)
Thus the problem solver must, in essence, organise the field
of information appropriately and must select from among the
information available that which is most productive. To
discover the problem in a clinical setting must be to identify
what is actually wrong or is not as it ought to be (that is,
to discover the actual symptoms and signs) and to follow on
from that to identify why this is so and how it may be
corrected. Ausubel et al (1978), in a pedagogic context,
use the concept of advance organisers. These constitute a
strategy for:
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••• deliberately manipulating cognitive structure
so as to enhance proactive facilitation and to
minimise proactive interference ... These organ-
isers are normally introduced in advance of the
learning material itself and are used to
facilitate establishing a meaningful learning
set. Advance organisers help the learner to
recognise that elements of new learning materials
can be meaningfully learned by relating them to
specifically relevant aspects of the existing
cognitive structureTM . (pp 170 - 171)
If we transpose this into the problem solving context it is
clear that a process similar to our selecting operation is
being discussed. Enhancement of proactive facilitation may
surely be achieved by identification of appropriate pre-
diagnostic or diagnostic interpretations to be measured against
reality. This may be achieved directly by immediately identi-
fying the congruence between given information, as it is
presented, and information stored in memory. Or it may be
achieved indirectly by firstly selecting certain information
from among the given array and extrapolating from there to the
stored structures. Minimisatiom of proactive interference may
be achieved by ensuring that the resp'onse to the given array
of information does not yield extrapolation to inappropriate
contexts. Thus proactive interference in the diagnostic
problem solving process may occur if a given array of inform-
ation is accepted without selection of an appropriate subset
and extrapolation occurs on the basis of objectively unpro-
ductive information. In other words, proactive interference
may occur where a forceful feature is identified only by
default and where this is not actually the cue. The hypoth-
esised selecting operation allows active identification of
the forceful feature by the problem solver, rather than passive
acceptance of force on the basis of order or emphasis of
information as it is given. It must be noted, however, that
the concept of a selecting operation refers to a cognitive
process. The content of that process need not, necessarily,
be correct or appropriate in any given case. Thus a selecting
operation may yield a forceful feature which is not a cue.
However, it has already been pointed out (section 11.9 above)
that any aspect, process or strategy of clinical problem solv-
-ing is inherently a potential source of error depending upon
the knowledge and experience of the problem solver as well
as efficiency of implementation of the process itself. Ekwo
and Loening-Baucke (1979) using videotape and simulated
patients, show very clearly for example, the inhibiting
effect which lack of knowledge alone can have in the diagnos-
tic process.
Ausubel et al (1978) describe advance organisers as being used
to facilitate establishment of a meaningful learning set by
helping the learner to recognise that elements of the new
array can be related to specific relevant aspects of the
existing cognitive structure. This is precisely the function
proposed for the selecting operation in enabling identification
of the forceful feature from among the array and consequent
efficient extrapolation to appropriate embedding contexts.
This function of selection from among the array of information
and the opposing concept of acceptance of the relative force
assigned to items of information by the order or emphasis
with which it is given leads us to ccThsideration of the concepts
of field independenc and dependence.
Dickstein (1968), in discussing field independence, stresses
the capacity to differentiate complex stimulus fields and to
deploy attention selectively toward those aspects of the field
that are task relevant while ignoring those aspects of the
field that are task irrelevant. The selecting operation is
suggested as a mechanism which enables such selective atten-
tion in the first instance, the relevant task being efficient
extrapolation to appropriate embedding contexts. Thus task
irrelevant aspects may be so only emphemerally and become
task relevant as the probleii solving process continues. Witkin
et al's (1974) less qualified definition of field independence
as the ready ability to overcome an embedding context and to
experience items as discrete from the field in which they are
contained" seems to be more directly generalisable to the
present context. The concepts of field dependence and inde-
pendence,of course, initially arose out of research in visual
perception. However, Witkii et al (1974) maintain that the
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dimension "pervades the individual's perceptual, intellectual,
emotional, motivational, defensive and social operations".
Field independence Witkin et al (1974) term "analytic field
approach". Such a tendency to experience analytically they,
in turn, relate to the ability to structure experience.
Other workers have also commented upon the ability to select
special features from an array of information. Bartlett (1958)
for example, comments upon this phenomenon in relation to
the same initial stage of a thinking process as we are here
considering. His context, however, was of sectional map
reading:
"As the thinker takes up his search in the more
open type of syst, in the early stages directional
features, belonging to the structure, or to an
assigned structure, of the system in which he is
working, but themselves of a general character,
are predominantly effective".
Bartlett's directional features may be interpreted as analo-
gous to Thyne's (1966) forceful features. Abercrombie (1960)
calls these clues. Neither Bartlett "(1958) nor Thyne (1966)
nor Abererombie (l96O indicate the mechanism whereby these
features are located. The concept of a selecting operation
is, however, advanced in the present discussion to explain
the initiation of the diagnostic thinking process. It will
be noted that Bartlett (1958) is considering an open
system of which the diagnostic problem is an example and that
he identifies the directional features as belonging to either
the actual or assigned structure of the system in which the
thinker is working. This latter point, in particular, is
interesting since it may assist the further definition of
the hypothesised selecting operation and its consequences.
Rather than belonging to either the actual or an assigned
structure of the system or, as in the present case, the array
of information with which the thinker is working, our own
interpretation of the initiation of the diagnostic thinking
process would cause us to conclude that the forceful or
directional feature must belong to both the actual and the
assigned structures, which may or may not differ. The sel-
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ecting operation enables identification of that feature in
the array of given information and location of extrapolated,
embedding contexts or structures which also display the same
forceful feature. In addition, they are effective to the
extent that they allow the thinker to work within those
systems. As we have seen, on some occasions, no piece of
information is accepted as a satisfactory forceful or direct-
ional feature in those terms (section 11.3 above). Bartlett
considers that, as thinking progresses, these features become
less independently important as empirical features and then
clusters of features gain predominance. Plthough Bartlett's
sectional map reading context was very particular, the
parallels between his conclusions and the present discussion
are clear. Once the directional or forceful feature is
identified, extrapolated or embedding contexts may also be
located and specific features sought in the presenting array.
It is worth noting, however, that our evidence of multiple
interpretations (section 11.2) may lead us to infer that more
than one forceful feature may be identified in any one array
of information, and that the same item may be the forceful
feature of many different structures or arrays of information.
Before leaving the discussion of the initiation of interpre-
tations we may further relate the selecting operation to other
theoretical constructs for their further explanatory power.
To begin with, we may usefully return to our consideration of
models based on Piagetian formal operations. Lunzer (1968)
points out that the solution of a problem in terms of formal
reasoning depends upon the analysis and reconstruction of a
system perceived in a way that permits its consideration as
a determinate system. This process entails abstraction of
relevant portions of the situation itself, abstraction from
the thinker's potential actions to bring out a possible order,
and the construction of a closed system on the basis of a
mental model of the events conceived. Again, the analogy
between this description and the processes of the selecting
operation and extrapolation to a possible embedding context
is clear. The role of the selecting operation is made even
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more pertinent by tunzer's (1968) pointing out that an object-
ive stimulus complex may be presented to a thinker, but that
his schemata (or structure or selecting operations) actually
determine what will function as a stimulus for him, what he
will attend to and what he will retrieve from memory in
response. Cohen (1972) also makes the point that information
transmitted is not necessarily the information received,
although he is considering communication from doctors to
patients which is the reverse of the present situation. Thus,
the example given in section 11.9.3 above of information being
either appropriately or inappropriately designated as irrelevant,
may be seen in these terms. Such a selective function of consc-
iousness is not a recently recognised phenomenon, as Miller's
(1962) reference to the lS3 work of William James reveals.
Our reference to psychological theory, then, has advanced our
understanding of the possible mechanisms operating at the
stage of initiation of interpretations of clinical information.
Many of our conclusions can be only reasonable inferences and
must remain to be tested. However, e may summarise the
argument as follows:
1. Interpretation of clinical information is a sine qua non
of the diagnostic thinking process, mediating between
information elicited and diagnosis made.
2. Interpretation of clinical information can only be made
either by reference to other stored knowledge which is
not present or by seeking a stored structure of knowledge
which will facilitate meaningful structuring of the
information elicited without reference to other knowledge.
3. Information may be stored in memory in terms of pre-diag-
nostic and diagnostic interpretations and in terms of
a comparative selecting operation which enables identif i-
cation of the forceful feature of an array.
4. The forceful feature or features identified by the
selecting operation will have the greatest payoff in terms
of facilitating interpretations or structuring responses.
by means of extrapolation to stored contexts.
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5. Efficient and effective structuring or interpretation in
the diagnostic thinking process requires the thinker to
select significant items of information frcn among the
array and extrapolate fxcmi there to possible embedding
contexts.
6. Different pieces of information have different interpre-
tative value or forcefulness.
7. Items of information may be inappropriately identified as
forceful features if they are not actually the cue
(characterising feature or 'correct' forceful feature) of
the array.
8. The forceful feature of an array is that information which
facilitates extrapolation or access to an appropriate (but
not necessarily correct) stored structure of information
which is the pre-diagnostic or diagnostic interpretation.
Thus, elicited and stored arrays of information are related
in terms of their forceful features.
9. It is possible to extrapolate from or interpret any piece
of clinical information, whether or not it is identified
as a forceful feature, but only with greater or lesser
degrees of efficiency, effectiveness, facility or personal
satisfaction. In some cases the thinker is unwilling to
work with any of the extrapolations which he can make.
Thus, items of information must attain a satisfactory
threshold of force before being perceived as useful in the
efficient or effective problem solving thinking process.
10. Forcefulness of a feature is probably not a relative, but
an absolute value for any one thinker since evidence
suggests that a sufficient threshold of force must be
attained before any item of information is useful for
satisfactory extrapolation.
11. The concept of the selecting operation is suggested not
as a necessary, but rather an available stage in the diag-
nostic thinking process where the characteristics of the
presented or elicited array of information make it necessary.
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12. The selecting operation allows active identification of
the forceful feature by the problem solver, rather than
passive acceptance of force on the basis of order or
emphasis of information as it is given.
13. The selecting operation should facilitate field independ-
ence and application of selective attention.
14. The forceful feature must belong to both the actual and
the assigned structures.
15. Multiple interpretations of information allow the
inference that more than one forceful feature may be
identified in any one array of information and the same
item or items may be the forceful feature of many extra-
polated structures or arrays of information.
16. The concept of the selecting operation is congruent with
the characteristics of formal reasoning.
12.2.2 Stage Two: Progress of the Diagnostic Thinking Process
This section concerns the cognitive operations applied to the
interpretations of the array of clinical information after
their initiation and prior to their resolution (or final
selection). This stage has two defining characteristics:
restructuring and assessment of interpretations by working from
the extrapolated context. The discussion is presented in
general terms, not noting differences between endocrinology
and neurology, or between students, house officers and regist-
rars. This approach can be adopted since such differences
are largely quantitative and not qualitative (see section 12.3
below) • Thus the discussion applies to greater or lesser
degree to all subjects in both specialities. The differences
of degree which do exist between subjects and specialities,
as well as their similarities, are discussed below (section 12.3)
against the background of the present discussion.
One of the major features of the second stage of the diagnostic
thinking process to emerge from the account gathering study is
the restructuring or re-interpretation of clinical information.
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Figure 11.2 gives an illustration of this phenomenon. Section
11.2 shows that many interpretations may be made of the same
information array or of subsections of that array or inter-
sections of a slightly changing array. It is pointed out that
these different interpretations, logically, can arise in two
ways. Firstly, the same array can be structured in different
ways (for example, if different elements can be identified as
the forceful feature, the other items of information may
arrange themselves around that feature in different ways).
must remember, however, that the forceful feature is a
psychological construct and in many instances may only be
identified by psychological testing and inference. Secondly,
the thinker can extrapolate to a variety of contexts from the
information given. The latter would seem to be the more
usual process and is compared to Peel's (1971) explainer
thinking. It is suggested in 11.2 that multiple hypothesis
formation is less likely to be for reasons of economy of
cognition than a simple function of the multiplicity of pot-
ential extrapolated contexts in which the given information
can be embedded. It is also suggested that the thinker has
the ability to structure the information and extrapolate from
it in many ways other than those which he considers at any one
time. This gives added weight to our conclusion (9) in the
previous section that some extrapolations are more satisfactory
to the thinker than others.
It has been shown that progressive specification is not a
characteristic of restructuring. Either pre-diagnostic or
diagnostic interpretations may be made at any point during the
diagnostic thinking process and in any order. This must
largely be a function of the nature of the information elicited.
It is worth remembering that the clinical information itself
is an interactive variable in the diagnostic thinking process.
Section 11.5 shows that restructuring of the array can occur
either in the presence or absence of additional clinical
information. The re-interpretative cognitive activities of
every subject of the account gathering study may itself be
interpreted in terms of the usually positive qualities
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of flexibility of thought, lack of tendency to irapid closure
and field independence. However, it is pointed out that neither
form of re-interpretation, nor re-interpretation, itself
necessarily has any intrinsic merit in the solution of any
one clinical problem.
Having thus reminded ourselves of the major salient features
of restructuring or re-interpretation of the clinical inform-
ation during the diagnostic thinking process and clinical
interview, we may consider their psychological interpretation.
In section 12.1.1 Bruner's (1957) view of structuring and
restructuring is given, but other workers have also presented
theories to account for this general cognitive Iprocess. Duncker
(1945) exnphasises that the process of problem solution can be
described either as development of the solution or as develop-
ment of the problem. His definition of productive problem
solving, which espouses the latter approach, has already been
cited (section 12.1.1) but it is worth quoting !kim further,
particularly since his ideas o phase succession are echoed
very closely by de Groot (1965). Heis here considering the
case where a problem solver must try a completely new approach
to the problem:
a transition to phases in another line takes
place typically when some tentative solution does
not satisfy, or when one makes no further progress
in a given direction. Another solution, more ox:
less clearly defined, is then looked for ... In
the transition to phases in another line, the
thought process may range more or less widely.
Every such transition involves a return to an
earlier phase of the problem; an earlier task is
set anew; a new branching of f from an old point
in the family tree bccurs. Sometimes a S returns
to the original setting of the problem, sometimes
just to the immediately preceding phase".
De Groot (1965) adds to this the concept of successive trans-
itional phases through which "we assume that there is an
undercurrent, a practically continuous development of the main
problem". Although we may see similarities between the app-
roaches of Duncker and de Groot, they nonetheless, are not
satisfactory descriptions of the clinical problem solving
operation of restructuring. This would seem to be due to the
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inappropriateness of the concept of phase succession and the
associated assumption of productive problem solving as pro-
gressive U sharpening and specialising of the problem setting"
(Duncker, 1945). De Groat's (1965) related transitional
phases are seen as the process of integration of results
already achieved which yields problem transformations. Although
it is quite possible that a search of the accounts of the
present study might show examples of such phase succession,
it is nonetheless not a satisfactory general description of
the diagnostic thinking process which does not progress through
stages of increasing concteteness of specificity, but rather
is characterised by an increasing array of information which
is either newly structured from time to time or which is con-
gruent with existing interpretations. In addition 1
 such a
process involves recourse to learned knowledge, stored and
structured in memory. It is therefore unlike the problems
upon which Duncker based his theory (for example, the X ray
problem or the abcabc division problem) or de Groot's (1965)
games of chess. It may well be that the necessary role of a
body of knowledge in the diagnostic thinking process is a
major characteristic which differentiates it from many of the
otherwise relevant theories of problem solving. The potential
simultaneity of extrapolation from the given information to
many different embedding contexts either of the pre-diagnostic
or diagnostic type precludes phase succession of the type
described by Duncker and de Groot. Likewise, Duncker's trans-
ition to phases in another line is inappropriate if it
necessarily involves a return to an earlier phase of the pro-
blem rather than a simple re-interpretation of the current
position. Despite this, however, the conceptual approach of
development of the problem rather than the solution is useful.
In addition, we have shown (section 11.3) that subjects do,
as Duncker (1945) notes, seek other possible interpretations
when "some tentative solution" (or interpretation) "does not
satisfy". In these terms, development of the problem Implies
transforming it from ill defined to well defined by means of
extrapolation to a possible series of embedding contexts.
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The possibility of explaining restructuring or re-interpreting
in terms of theories of field dependence and independence is
mentioned earlier. Shapson (1977), in these terms, suggests
that "for effective coding (or recoding), a subject must
break down the stimulus array into all, its component parts".
For example, headache, visual deterioration, lethargy and
increased frequency of micturition may be structured as visual
problems (headache plus visual deterioration) and urinary
problems (frequency of micturition). At the same time, leth-
argy may be taken as indicating general ill, health. The
pre-diagnostic interpretations of visual and urinary problems
accompanied by general ill health may facilitate extrapolation
to the diagnostic interpretation of multiple sclerosis. Upon
re-interpretation, the four initial symptoms may facilitate
direct extrapolation to a context of pituitary tumour with
concomitant hypopituitarism and diabetes insipidus. Thus,
the ability to dissociate and relate separate items of inform-
ation is an important one and is a defining feature of field
independence. We shall see later that this ability is import-
ant not only in manipulating information as it is elicited,
but also in restructuring information which is already inter-
preted. Inappropriate dependence upon the field of the
extrapolated embedding context may result in the error of the
set effect, just as failure to overcome the embedding context
of information as it is elicited (Witkin, et al, 1q74) may
result in failure to extrapolate to the correct context in the
initial instance (see 12.2.1). Lunzer (1968), in a formal
reasoning context, perhaps surprisingly, presents restructuring
in problem solving in a similar way, suggesting that the
solution of problems entails the construction and reconstruct-
ion of objects and events out of their abstracted constituents.
The concept of abstraction may clearly be related to the con-
cept of overcoming an embedding context.
Perception of separate constituent elements or items of
information, however, would seem to be only a necessary but
not a sufficient condition of the diagnostic thinking process.
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It will be recalled that the selecting operation is hypothesised
as a mechanism preliminary to extrapolation. Thtxs, the forceful
feature (or features) may be identified and extrapolated con-
texts located.
We must now extend this theory to the stage of restructuring.
Thyne (1966) describes this process as a shift of force. He
suggests that "when I misunderstand something I see not the
cue, but some other feature ... the change-over from misunder-
standing to understanding entails the cue's appearing ... in
plate of some other feature ... 2½nd the shift from seeing
some irrelevant feature to seeing the cue, is in effect a shift
of force to the cue". Although Thyne's theory is shown to be
thoroughly relevant to the stage of initiation of interpre-
tations (section 12.2.1) this description of restructuring
calls it into question with regard to the second stage of the
diagnostic thinking process. Thyne's description would only
apply if any one piece of information could be the cue of only
one structure or interpretation. However, a symptom such as
chest pain or diarrhoea can be the cue of many interpretat-
ions. Thus the corrqct forceful feature of an array of
elicited information may be identified and a range of inter-
pretations made, only one of which is actually correct. It
is also logically true that the same item of information may
be the cue of many of these interpretations. Therefore,
understanding (that is, diagnosis) does not necessarily arise
out of either identifying the cue of the elicited array or
out of extrapolating to stored structures of which that item
is also the cue. T1-e stage of progress must also involve
checking to determine whether or not the other features of the
stored array are also present in the elicited history. In
summary, identification of the forceful feature facilitates
interpretation by structuring and extrapolation. It does not
establish the actual validity of the interpretation made.
Restructuring can occur by means of a shift of force to a new
feature of the elicited array, or by means of extrapolation
to multiple contexts on the basis of the same identified
forceful feature. Either type of restructuring may occur in
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either the presence or absence of new information being added
to the array (see section 11.5).
In the discussion of restructuring, the failure to restructure
when such an operation would have been appropriate is also
mentioned. This phenomenon is discussed in section 11.9.1 as
the set effect. As this phenomenon manifests itself in the
diagnostic thinking process, it is defined in 11.9.1 as "a
tendency to rationalise, ignore or find explanation for in-
congruent information so that the array elicited fits the
identified extrapolated context". The phenomenon, therefore,
is not necessarily a failure to make other interpretations,
but rather a tendency to favour one. This is also Elstein et
al's (1978) interpretation. Figures 11.6, 11.7 and 11.8 give
examples of the set effect in a student, a house officer and
a registrar. Although a range of cognitive processes or
tactics is demonstrated which enables thesubject to maintain
the inappropriate set, the generalisahie conclusion is drawn
that the clinical information elicited is not evaluated in
its own right, but rather exc1usivel in relation to expected
findings suggested by the extrapolated context which has
become the set. In section 12.2.1 it is suggested that an
inappropriate forceful feature may direct the problem solver
to an inappropriate interpretation or extrapolated context
where his thinking may remain locked unless the information
is reappraised and the correct forceful feature identified.
However, our argument has since developed to add that identif-
ication of the cue may still allow extrapolation to inapprop-
riate contexts. The question for psychological theory to
illuminate must concern why such a phenomenon occurs.
With regard to the process of perception Bruner (1951) suggests
that the concept of an hypothesis is best likened to such a
term as set and that it is "a highly generalised state of
readiness to respond selectively to classes of events in the
environment". He suggests that the strength of an hypothesis
increases with greater frequency of past confirmation, with
smaller numbers of competing hypotheses, with a larger system
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of supporting hypotheses and beliefs, with greater personal
or motivational involvement and with greater agreement of the
hypotheses of others. While any of these cases may be true
for a given instance, the model lacks apparent generalisability,
and relies on individual differences and tendencies for its
explanation, as does that of Duncker (1945). Luchins' work
(quoted in Manis, 1968) cites the reinforcing effects of pre-
vious experience in fixing method.ologicalapproaches to problem
solving, while Wason (1968) considers "dogmatic thinking
and the refusal to entertain the possibility of alternativest1.
Peel (1971) mentions the tendency to "try to hold on" to a
view as a characteristic of both sophisticated and immature
thinkers and observes that "new explanations may be obstructed
by the directive and selective influence of the accepted theory
upon the subsequent collection of observations and results".
He adds that neglect of contrary evidence may be either con-
scious or unconscious.
Shapson (1977) suggests that field independent individuals can
overcome an embedding context and exprience items as discrete
from their surroundings. The phenomenon of set seems related
to this, in that the subject appears to be dependent upon the
psychological or hypothetical field created by his own extra-
polation and interpretation and unable to extrapolate the other
embedding contexts. Witkin et al (1974) in field dependency
terms, suggest that the set breaking process may be conceptua-
used in terms of the ability to overcome embeddedness. For
a set to be broken, the elements must be considered apart from
their previously adopted organisation and arranged into a new
organisation. Within et al (1974) therefore expect subjects
with an analytical field approach to display a greater capacity
for set breaking than those who have a global field approach.
Ohnmacht (1966) provides evidence in support of this expect-
ation, demonstrating that relatively field independent subjects
deal with both reversal and non-reversal shifts in card sorting
tasks better than do relatively field dependent subjects.
Our discussion of the concept of set in psychological theory
does not seem to provide any great degree of explanation of
the phenomenon as it is manifested in the diagnostic thinking
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processes of the subjects of the present account gathering
study. In essence, the theories cited either state that the
phenomenon occurs in a variety of contexts and offer partic-
ular theoretical frameworks for the description, or explain
the phenomenon in terms of particular individual differences
and tendencies. We therefore must leave this particular
error of the diagnostic thinking process without proper explan-
ation. We have shown that the set effect does not result from
failure to restructure information, therefore explanations in
terms of field dependency or fixedness are inappropriate.
Instead, we may only say that the phenomenon is characterised
by a tendency to favour a certain interpretation of information
and to rationalise or ignore contrary evidence. It is not
necessarily a failure of structuring and interpretation or
extrapolation, but may be a failure to test adequately the
congruence of interpretation and reality. Thus an inability,
for whatever reason, to differentiate expectation and obser-
vation is evident. The present study does not allow
identification of the conditions of the error. It seems rea-
sonable to suggest that the uncertain and incomplete nature
of clinical information and the concomitant necessity for the
clinical problem solver to make judgments rather than provide
proofs, make an ideal environment in which the error of set
may occur. This is discussed further in 12.2.3.
The account gathering study indicates other features which
may occur during the second stage of the diagnostic thinking
process, but these, like the set effect, are not characteris-
ing qualities but variations on the central theme of restruct-
uring and assessment of interpretations by working from the
extrapolated context. For this reason we find that psydholo-
gical theories have little interpretative value here, since
the conditions which give rise to these variations are not in
any way defined or indicated. We therefore cannot add to the
explanations provided in Chapter Eleven. Many of the vairia-
tions identified take the form of specific errors. For
example, failure to make either specific or general enquiry
identified in retrospect by the subject is attributed to
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retrieval difficulties related to storage structure (section
11.8). Failure to make the correct interpretation where
there is no inadequacy of knowledge (section 11.9.2) may also
be related to accessibility of the stored information. Our
earlier discussion of the forceful feature, the cue and their
identification in both the elicited and stored arrays of
information adds considerable explanation to this inefficiency
of the diagnostic thinking process. The error of inappropriate
designation of irrelevance (section 11.9.3) is attributed
either to failure of structuring and extrapolation or failure
of immediate knowledge. Logically it would seem that all such
errors should arise from either inadequate knowledge or
inadequate structuring of stored or elicited knowledge. These
features might give rise to failure to identify the cue, extra-
polation to inappropriate contexts, failure of extrapolation
or failure to test the appropriateness of extrapolation. It
does not seem possible to make a more generalisable statement,
since it would appear that, in adult thinking, systematic errors
do not occur. Instead, where errors are identified, as here,
they are particular to specific problems or occasions and not
even necessarily to specific individuals. Since their condi-
tions of occurrence are not identified, they are also unpredict-
able. A more productive way of considering them, therefore,
may be to identify the conditions which preclude their
occurrence rather than encourage it. Such conditions are
identified in section 11.9.1.
Having thus considered restructuring and its related processes,
we may now move to the second of the two features identified
earlier as characterising the second stage of the diagnostic
thinking process. This is the assessment of interpretations
by working from the extrapolated context which is analogous to
the stage of hypothesis testing mentioned by Elstein et al
(1978) and central to the work of Barrows et al (1978). We
are not here concerned with the manner in which interpretations
are finally evaluated, confirmed or rejected, but rather with
the effects on the information gathering process of having
made the interpretation in the first place.
-377 -
Section 11.7 provides a discussion of the determinants of
the interview structure. It is found that the course of the
interview may be determined by the flow of information
presented (called patient determined), by the subject's
requirement to test his interpretations (called subject deter-
mined) or by the logical structure of the standard interview
(called logically determined). It is noted that 4 ultimately,
the structure is determined by the interviewer, who will
choose to follow one of the three identif led courses. The
major finding and conclusion is that the problem solver has
an overriding need to control the flow of information and that
he actively does this. However, this active, determining role
is tempered by the reciprocal activity of responding to the
information elicited which is unpredictable in its content
and so may cause restructuring or some other additional, respon-
sive cognitive activity in the problem solver. Thus information
collection, based on the expectations which arise out of the
extrapolated context (see 11.4> is a further characteristic
of the second stage, but it is qualified by the subject's
responsive activity of reinterpretation. It is argued above
ections 11.7 and 1l.8) that a certain threshold of data
acquisition is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of
the successful diagnostic thinking process. This is echoed by
the homogeneity of registrars' skills structures which are
demonstrated in the questionnaire study (see section 8.6) and
the primacy of the predictive power of scores on interpretation
of symptoms and signs (see section 8.3).
In conclusion, then, we may suggest that the second stage of
progress of the diagnostic thinking process is dharacterised
by the cognitive operations of restructuring and assessment of
interpretations by working from the extrapolated context.
These operations presuppose and necessitate active, determin-
ative involvement of the problem solver in controlling the
flow of information yet, simultaneously, responsive analysis
of the areas of content which cannot be controlled. Restruct-
uring and assessment are both, therefore, determinative and
responsive cognitive operations. it is contended that all
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other operations of the second stage are variants of these
central characteristics. Before considering the final stage
of the diagnostic thinking process, we may suimnarise the
argument of this section as follows:
1. Multiple interpretations of the same or the changing
array of clinical information may be made. Therefore,
restructuring and re-interpretation by extrapolation to
a variety of embedding contexts are characteristic of
the second stage of the diagnostic thinking process.
2. Progressive specification is not a necessary characteris-
tic of restructuring. The pre-diagnostic or diagnostic
nature of re-interpretation is largely a function of the
nature of the information elicited.
3. Restructuring is the first characteristic of the second
stage of the diagnostic thinking process. It has, per
Se, no intrinsic merit in the diagnostic thinking process
in all circumstances.
4. Neither Duncker's (1945) concept of phase succession, nor
de Groot's (1965) , concept of successive transitional
phases provides a satisfactory description of the diagnos-
tic thinking process of restructuring because of their
associated assumptions of progressive orderliness and
specificity. This is inconsistent with the changing and
increasing array of clinical information and the potential
simultaneity of extrapolation to different embedding
contexts which precludes phase succession.
5. The necessary role of a learned body of knowledge differ-
entiates the diagnostic thinking process frcn many other
forms and theories of problem solving.
6. Restructuring may be explained in terms of field indepen-
dence and the associated ability to dissociate and relate
separate items of information.
7. The concept of restructuring is recognised in a formal
reasoning context in terms of abstracted and reconstructed
constituents.
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8. Perception of separate constituent elements is a necessary
but not sufficient condition of the diagnostic thinking
process.
9. Restructuring in the diagnostic thinking process cannot
be interpreted as a shift of force from an irrelevant
feature to the cue, since any one feature may be the cue
of many extrapolated contexts.
10. Understanding (or diagnosis) does not necessarily arise
out of either identifying the cue of an elicited array
or out of extrapolating to stored structures of which that
item is also the cue. Diagnosis arises out of establish-
ing the congruence of elicited and extrapolated information.
11. Restructuring can occur either by means of a shift of
force to a new feature of the elicited array or by means
of extrapolation to multiple contexts on the basis of the
same forceful feature. Either type may occur in the pre-
sence or absence of new information.
12. The set effect in the diagnostic thinking process is a
tendency to rationalise, ignore or find explanation for
incongruent information, so that the array elicited fits
an identified, favoured extrapolated context. Thus
clinical information is not evaluated in its own right,
but only in relation to the expected, extrapolated find-
ings of the set.
13. The inappropriate set may be extrapolated from either
the cue or an inappropriate forceful feature.
14. Bruner compares hypothesis and set. Each is character-
ised by selective response to classes of events in the
environment.
15. The work of Duncker, Luchins, Wason and Peel in reference
to the set effect is cited. it is concluded that these
descriptive and specific approaches preclude generalis-.
ability to the current context.
16. The set effect may be interpreted as resulting from
dependence upon the psychological or hypothetical field
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created by the thinker's own interpretative activity,
rathex' than dependence on the field as elicited. Set
breaking involves the capacity to overcome embeddedness.
17. Psychological theory seems to offer no useful explanation
of the set effect in the diagnostic thinking process
since it is not necessarily a failure of structuring and
interpretation or extrapolation. It appears to be a
failure to establish the objective degree of cogruence
between observed and expected findings (or elicited and
extrapolated arrays).
18. The conditions of the error are not identified in the
present study, but the nature of the diagnostic probleni
seems an ideal environment in which the error of set may
occur.
19. Many features identified in the account gathering study
are variations on the central characteristics of the
second stage of the diagnostic thinking process, and do
not themselves characterise that stage. Such variants
are the specific errors of set, failure to make specific
or general enquiy, failure to make the correct interpre-
tation and inappropriate designation of irrelevance.
Such errors arise from either inadequate knowledge or
inadequate structuring of elicited or stored knowledge.
Errors are not systematic, but arise unpredictably. It
may be more productive, therefore, to identify conditions
which preclude rather than encourage them.
20. The second characterising feature of the second stage of
the diagnostic thinking process is the assessment of inter-
pretations by working from the extrapolated context. This
is analogous to the stage of hypothesis testing of the
Michigan and McMaster theories.
21. The need to assess interpretations causes the problem
solver actively to determine the course of the interview.
Information collection is based on the expectations which arise
out of the extrapolated contexts. This is the determina-
tive role.
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22. The determinative role is tempered by the reciprocal
activity of responding to the sometimes unpredictable
and partially uncontrollable information elicited as a
result of interpretative and. re-interpretative operations.
23. A certain threshold of data acquisition is a necessary
but not sufficient condition of the diagnostic thinking
process. Homogeneity of registrars' skills structures
substantiates this inference.
24. The second stage of progress of the diagnostic thinking
process is characterised by restructuring and by assess-
inent of interpretations by working from the extrapolated
context. The problem solver displays recriprocal deter-
minative and responsive cognitive operations which reflect
assessment arid restructuring, respectively. Other cog-
nitive operations of the second stage are variants on
these central characteristics.
12.2.3 Stage Three: Resolution
The third stage of the diagnostic thinking process concerns
the final selection, rejection or not of the interpretations
and re-interpretations of the first two stages. It does not
concern an unalterable endpoint, but only the point of
greatest specificity and certainty which the thinker is will-
ing to reach on the basis of the available, elicited
information. At this stage, therefore, the thinker makes
his judgment. Hoffman (1960) expresses this quite clearly:
"The primary task of alinical diagnosis is that
of collecting, evaluating and assimilating
information with respect to the patient. The
starting point is the information itself
The end result is a judgment".
The need for judgment rather than objective manipulation of
indubitable data arises from the nature of the task and the
problem. Armstrong (1977) considers that:
"The task of diagnosis is essentially the approx-
imation of the patient's pathology to an
established disease category. This process
relies on sampling the manifestations of pathology
- 382 -
through examination and laboratory investigations
and also through the patient's experience. But
the patient's experience will rarely correspond
directly with the formal indicators of internal
pathology it must be interpreted".
Cohen (1972) quotes Osler's dictum that "Medicine is a
science of uncertainty and an art of probability" and specifies
two categories of uncertainty which necessitate judgment rather
than allowing objective data manipulation. These two categories
of uncertainty Cohen (1972) calls intrinsic and extrinsic:
"Intrinsic uncertainties are those pertaining to
the imprecision, ambiguity or other limitation
of the data on which a medical judgment is to
be based ... Extrinsic uncertainties, often
misleadingly called "observer error", make their
appearance in the interpretations given to a set
of data. Here the interpretation may vary from
one assessor to another, while one and the same
assessor may, on a second occasion, give an
interpretation which differs from the one he
gave on the first". (p . 93)
Extrinsic uncertainty is, therefore, our main concern when con-
sidering the nature of the diagnostic thinking process from a
psychological point of view. Selection among interpretations
and its judgmental nature may be seen in the light of Peel's
(1971) work. He considers that situations which call for "the
intellectual resolution of possibilities and actualities" and
which are "open in that several explanations may be possible"
require the thinker to select by a process of judgment. He
clearly defines and elaborates on themeaningof judgment in
the following way:
"Judging is a form of thinking and is therefore
invoked whenever we are in a situation for which
we have no readymade answer learned off pat. But
in addition, judgment refers to a situation for
which there is no single final correct response
to be discovered, but rather a spectrum of responses
satisfying different numbers of different criteria.
Some decisions, therefore, may be better than
others - on certain grounds - but in extreme con-
ditions none is outstanding and the decision turns
on what the judger wants to fulfil". ( p. 19)
The psychological nature of this phenomenon in the third
stage of the diagnostic thinking process is the subject matter
of this section.
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The account gathering study provides data and discussion
relevant to the third stage. Section 11.6 notes that
selection among competing interpretations of clinical inform-
ation is made either by active confirmation, or active
elimination, or passive elimination (although this cannot be
studied by the account gathering method), or selection is
postponed because of insufficient or unreliable information.
However, although each of these choices may represent the
resolution of the thinking process, none is irreversible.
Each, therefore, may be a resolution or a point of progress.
The changing array of information may determine the nature of
resolution as much as the thinker's own cognitive processes
or style. In addition, the logical characteristics of the
diagnostic problem ensure that a decision made about one inter-
pretation will have consequences for the fate of other
interpretations of the same or an overlapping array of inform-
ation. This is discussed fully in section 11.6. It is also
mentioned that, like Elstein et al (1978), we consider that
clinical data are evaluated in terms of their fit to anticipated
findings. The nature and origin of these anticipations and
the mechanism whereb? information is elicited are discussed
in the previous two sections. However to describe the process
merely as one of fitting or comparing observed and expected
findings seems to reduce it to a somewhat oversimplified form.
This is particularly so given our preliminary discussion of the
meaning and necessity of judgment in the diagnostic thinking
process and the differences in criteria that may exist between
judges.
De Groot (1965) terms the decision to reject a proposition the
exhaustion point. His study of chess playing enables him to
state that "rejection is a last resort which is only called
upon when the means of strengthening run dry", although he
also mentions the process of "negative proof" or deliberate
hypothesis refutation. Where the exhaustion point is reached
is, for de Groot's subjects, dependent upon the phase of the
thought process. The earlier the phase, the sooner the
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exhuastion point is reached. However, our data and the nature
of the diagnostic problem indicate that such specificity of
description is inappropriate. The descriptive framework of
the phase succession has already been rejected (section 12.2.2)
and the multiplicity of interpretations makes unlikely the
evaluation of interpretations singly. Such a process as this
may occur in a particular individual on a particular occasion,
or for a particular hypothesis, but it is only one of many
possible tactics or cognitive operations, as our data show.
Other workers define other operations and approaches which may
be, on any one occasion, of equal validity or descriptive
accuracy.f or the diagnostic thinking process.
Bruner et al (1956) speak of the "inability or unwillingness"
of their subjects to use negative information and suggest that
this must usually be transformed into positive information
resulting in risk of error. Altlxugh Donaldson (1959) does not
accept this explanation in all circumstances, she also notes
the phenomenon. Bruner et al (1956) describe four ideal
strategies in concept attainment. The simultaneous scanning
strategy assimilates all information and successively rejects
impossible hypotheses. Successive scanning tests only one
hypothesis at a time. Conservative focusing and focus ganb1ing
concern attribute changing which is not appropriate to the
structure of the diagnostic problem. Again, either simultan-
eous or successive scanning may be descriptive of tbe diagnostic
thinking process of one individual at one time. But neither
necessarily describes the overall tendency of that individual.
As is noted earlier, the logical characteristics of the diag-
nostic problem and the necessary inter-relatedness of
hyotheses makes some forms of interpretation evaluation
objectively impossible.
As with the discussion of the second stage of the diagnostic
thinking process, we find the psychological literature helpful
in identifying variants of the process, but not its central
characteristics. We have so far identified only that observed
and expected findings must be compared. Interestingly enough,
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de Groot (1965) rejects such a formulation:
"A psychologically interesting question is whether
we must think of this process as one of 'comparing'
the two values, expectancy and outcome. Such a
description does not appear adequate though: it Is
too intellectualistic. We can rather say that the
subject is analysing variations with an anticipated
degree or level of satisfaction in his mind".
(p . 259)
This subjective feature is discussed above and examples given
of subjects' feelings of satisfaction (see section 11.6).
Yet such satisfaction is often expressed precisely in terms of
judgment of the 'fit' of observed and expected findings. Such
judgment might be explained in terms of the central concepts
of structure and extrapolation, yet these seem tied particularly
to the first two stages. The third stage concerns the thinker's
activity after structuring, restructuring and extrapolation
are complete, if only ephemerally so. Failure to fit implies
incongruence of the observed and extrapolated structures.. This
may arise, for example, if information elicited subsequent to
the initial identification of the forceful feature or cue
throws doubt upon that identification, but is not sufficient
to cause restructuring. Thus observed and extrapolated struct-
ures no longer are potentially the same, but no new extrapolated
context Is yet identified. One could invent by speculation
and theory many such circumstances which may cause the subject-
ive impression of lack of fit. However, the only generalisable
statement which may be made is that feelings of dissatisfaction
which are not sufficiently defined to allow rejection of an
extrapolated context imply an inability to restructure, for
whatever reason, while the increasing array fails to replicate
the extrapolated context.
A major problem for the third stage of the diagnostic thinking
process is to define how much of the expected information must
be observed before an extrapolated context is accepted as the
true explanation of the observed information. A second
problem is to define how, or according to what criteria, the
thinker selects among extrapolated contexts which intersect.
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Elstein et al (1978) have defined a series of judgmental rules
(see 3.1.1) but these are not generalisable. Examples of such
rules are: "At least three out of the following five features
must be present to make a diagnosis of Y" or "X is diagnosed
if and only if, all of the following features are present".
These may be applicable in certain instances but, unless every
extrapolated context is accompanied by such a rule, they can
be only a variant on a central characteristic. The present
study provides no specific data to resolve these possible
features of the diagnostic thinking process. In this, we echo
Elstein et al (1978) that:
"Unfortunately, this seems to be about as far as
cognitive psychology can take us at the moment.
A set of generalisations that indicates when each
rule is, or should be, employed is not yet
formulated".
The broadest generalisation we may make is that subjects con-
firm, eliminate or postpone judgment on their competing inter-
pretations of the clinical information, and they do so with
greater or lesser degrees of subjective certainty and
satisfaction. We may add that subjects seek certain features
and items of informatLon not in isolation, but in relation to
others. Thus, the reputed configurational ability of the
clinician (see section 2.1) is reflected and substantiated in
the present structuralist approach.
Finally, we must return to question of judgment. Section
11.11 discusses the implications of the account gathering
study for our understanding of the nature of psychological
probability. The data do not permit any more specific con-
clusion than that subjects tend to weigh up and balance data,
assigning relative importance to contradictory items and
reaching a conclusion of some degree of definiteness. The
indirect and mediated nature of clinical evidence, the imper-
ceptibility of symptoms and the vagaries of language ensure
that absolute certainty of a complete clinical picture is a
rare phenomenon.
The argument of this section may be summarised as follows:
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1. Judgment of congruence of observed and expected inform-
ation even though the observed array is less complete than
the expected (or extrapolated) one in apparent.
2. Such judgment is amenable to reversal.
3. Resolution occurs by active confirmation, active or passive
elimination or postponement of judgment.
4. Characteristics of the changing array of information and
of the thinker's cognitive processes and structure deter-
mine the nature of reeolutlon.
5. Resolution occurs within an extrapolated, structural con-
text.
Psychological theory is not found very helpful in illuminating
further the nature of these characteristics.
12.2.4 The Central Characteristics of the Three Stages of the Diagnostic
Thinking Process
Crutchfield (1972) summarises in clear terms the complexity of
the problem solving process, and the dangers inherent in des-
cribing it:
"... the problem solving process is not a cut and
dried sequence of steps executed in. the orderly
manner of the pre-established programme of a
computer ... the process of solving problems is
highly complicated, involving a great number
of separate but inter-related cognitive skills.
Whether or not the individual succeeds in solving
the problem depends heavily upon his ability to
marshal these skills in an effective co-ordinated
way. He must know which step to take at a given
point, which plan of attack to adopt. He must
know how to employ sensible 'stop strategies',
for instance, to be able to decide when it is
time to stop collecting information and to start
generating ideas, when it is time to stop gener-
ating ideas and to start evaluating them, and
when it is time to abandon one direction of
thought and to embark on another. Se must be
able to balance and harmonise the often contra-.
dictory demands which arise in the problem".
(p. 195)
Although these processes may not be as discrete or conscious
as Crutchfield seems to imply, his statement reflects that
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(1.2.
made at the beginning of hio ohapthr. The differentiation
of Stages is merely a device for description and understanding.
In reality an individual may be at all three stages simultan-
eously in the different threads of his thinking process. The
boundaries between the stages are blurred and the same cognit-
ive operation may be identified as belonging to more than one
stage, depending upon its meaning for different interpretations
of the clinical data.
Bruner (1951) also addresses the problem of describing psycho-
logical processes. His context is perception, but his argument
is relevant to the present discussion:
"The reader may object that our model of the inform-
ation confirming cycle seems too saccadic, too jumpy,
that perception seems to work more smoothly than our
model indicates. There are two legitimate answers
to this objection. The first is that only under
well practised conditions of perceiving is the pro-
cess so smooth ... But this rejoinder is trivial
in the light of the second one. There need be no
phenomenal resemblance, we would insist, between
the feeling tone of a psychic process and the con-
ceptual model used to predict or describe it.
Nobody would seriously object today, for example,
that the atomic 'theory of matter is an inadequate
theory because matter, a rock for instance, does
not look or feel like an amalgam of whirling atoms".
Such is our evaluation of and approach towards the present
theory and description of the diagnostic thinking process. But
such qualifications must not be taken to imply that the model
is paramorphic. We contend that it is isomorphic and descrip-
tive and that the features and characteristics which are
identified are real. The qualification refers only to the
necessary formalised presentation of those characteristics which
are suggested as follows:
Stage One: The Initiation of Interpretations is a sine qua non
of the diagnostic thinking process, mediating between inform-
ation elicited and diagnosis made.
Interpretation of information is achieved by extrapolation from
the given information to arrays of knowledge stored in the
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thinker's memory. This enables the thinker cognitively to
structure (or arrange) the given items of information in one
or many meaningful, and possibly correct, ways. Some form
of cognitive selecting operation is hypothesised which enables
the thinker to identify the piece or pieces of information in
the elicited array which have the greatest payoff in terms of
facilitating interpretation by extrapolation to useful stored
embedding contexts. The operation is suggested as an avail-
able rather than necessary stage. The piece or pieces of
information identified by means of the selecting operation
are called the forceful feature. Different pieces of inform-
ation have different interpretative value or forcefulness in
terms of facilitating extrapolation to useful embedding
contexts. The selecting operation may yield identification
of a forceful feature which is not actually the cue (or true
forceful feature) of the array, in which extrapolation to an
inappropriate embedding context may occur since elicited and
stored arrays of information, it is suggestied, are most effi-
ciently and effectively related in terms of their respective
forceful features. Despite this, it is possible to extrapol-
ate from any given piece of clinical information, whether or
not it is identified as the forceful featune, but only with
a greater or lesser degree of efficiency, effectiveness, facil-
ity and personal satisfaction. Thus, items of information
must attain a certain threshold of force before being perceived
as useful in the efficient or effective diagnostic thinking
process. Threshold of force may thus be an absolute, not
relative, value. The selecting operation facilitates active
identification of the forceful feature by selective attention
rather than passive acceptance of force according to the
features of the presentation by field dependence. More than
one forceful feature may be identified in any array of inform-
ation and the same information may be the forceful feature
embedded in many extrapolated contexts of stored, structured
information. The major characteristics of the first stage of
the diagnostic thinking process, then, may be summarised as:
- 390 -
Different degrees of forcefulness of items in the array.
Application of a selecting operation to identify the forceful
feature of the array.
Interpretation by extrapolation.
Structuring elicited information.
Relating elicited and stored arrays by means of respective
forceful features.
Possible extrapolation from any item in the array.
Degrees of efficiency, effectiveness, facility and personal
satisfaction of extrapolated contexts.
Absolute threshold of force.
Identification of multiple forceful features in one array.
Multiple extrapolations from the same forceful feature (also
characteristic of Stage Two when occurring over extended time).
Stage Two: Progress of the Diagnostic Thinkin Process concerns
the cognitive operations applied to the interpretations of
Stage One. The stage is characterised by restructuring and re-
interpretation of the same or the changing array of information
from which the initial, Stage One, interpretations were made.
Progressive specification is not a necessary characteristic of
restructuring. Restructuring requires perception of separate, con-
stituent elements of the information array as a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition of the diagnostic thinking process.
Restructuring can arise by means of shift of force or by extra-
polation from the forceful feature to multiple embedding
contexts. The occasional tendency has been noted to rationalise,
ignore or find explanation for incongruent information in order
to maintain a favoured extrapolated context. This is termed
the set effect. Further error might arise if an inappropriate
set is extrapolated from either the cue or an inappropriate
forceful feature. The possible appropriateness of interpre-
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tations is assessed by the thinker working from the extra-
polated context and playing a determinative role in eliciting
information. This is tempered by the reciprocal activity of
responding to the sometimes unpredictable and partially
uncontrollable information which is actually elicited. A
certain threshold of clinical data acquisition is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of the diagnostic
thinking process. The major characteristics of the second
stage of the diagnostic thinking process, then, may be
summarised as:
Restructuring and re-interpretation of the
changing or unchanging array of clinical
information.
Restructuring by shift of force or by multiple
extrapolation from the same forceful feature
(also characteristic of Stage One when occuring
in close contiguity of time).
Assessment of interpretations by working from
the extrapolated context as the method of
establishing congruence of elicited and extra-
polated assays.
Acquisition of a sufficient threshold of clinical
information elicited.
Reciprocal determinative and responsive cognitive
operations and behaviour in relation to the flow
of information.
Idiosyncratic but not systematic errors.
Occasional tendency towards the set effect causing
error if an inappropriate extrapolated context is
located from the cue or from an inappropriate
forceful feature, resulting in failure of the
process of establishing congruence between elicited
and extrapolated arrays.
Stage Three: Resolution concerns the final selection, reject-
ion or not of the interpretations and re-interpretations of the
first two stages. It does not concern an unalterable endpoint,
but the point of greatest specificity currently possible for
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the problem solver. The major characteristics of this stage
may be summarised as:
Judgment of congruence of observed (elicited) and
expected (extrapolated) arrays of information,
although the observed array may be incomplete or
uncertain.
Possible reversibility or refinement of the
judgment.
Resolution by active confirmation, active or
passive elimination or postponement of judgment
of interpretations.
Nature of resolution determined by features of
the information elicited and the thinker's
cognitive pxocesses and structures.
Having thus traced the changing characteristics of the funda-
mental diagnostic thinking process through its three stages,
we may now turn to variants on that fundamental process by
considering its developmental and comparative aspects.
12.3 Developmental and Comparative Aspects of the Diagnostic
Thinking Process
This Section draws on the comparison of results of the question-
naire studies in endocrinology and neurology, and of the
relative performances of the groups of subjects in each study.
It is argued in Chapter Five (section 5.6.1) that the subjects
responding to each questionnaire may be taken as a longitudinal
sample. Section 5.6.2 argues the same case for subjects of the
account gathering study. Section 5.6.3 establishes that the
subjects of the two parallel studies are also comparable.
We may, therefore, infer a description of the development of
the diagnostic thinking process from the final year of under-
graduate medical education through to the years at registrar
level of clinical practice. We may also draw reasonable
conclusions concerning the generalisability of that process
across different clinical specialities.
In section 8.2 are suggested some differences between students'
and registrars' experiences which may influence the nature
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and therefore the development of the diagnostic thinking
process. These differences are cited as amount and type of
exposure to clinical phenomena (interviewing and examining
patients and making diagnoses primarily in order to learn,
as opposed to undertaking the same processes primarily to
manage, treat and cure the patient as part of the workload
of clinical responsibility); contextual aspects of knowledge
and skill development (learning as a student as opposed to
learning as a clinical practitioner); recency of initial
knowledge and skill acquisition; relative rehearsal of know-
ledge and skills; contextual aspects of knowledge and skill
rehearsal (rehearsal in order to become proficient, rehearsal
in order to maintain proficiency, rehearsal as a response to
a particular clinical situation, etc.); relative decay of
unrehearsed knowledge and skills; and changes in the storage
structure, inter-relatedness, use value, meaning or signifi-
cance and corollaries of knowledge and skills resulting from
practice. From subsequent discussion, we may now infer that
such differences as these may affect the structure of stored
information, the selection of forceful features, facility of
extrapolation, flexibility of interpretation and the cognitive
skills of the second and third stages of the diagnostic think-
ing process.
The questionnaire study, by indicating differences between
students and registrars, also allows inferences about a
developmental process. In endocrinology, it is shown that
students and registrars have relatively similar skills struct-
ures but different cognitive processes and, not surprisingly,
different diagnostic acumen (see Table 8.1). In making a
diagnosis, students rely much more heavily than do registrars
on the skills measured by the predictor sections of the
questionnaires (41 per cent and four per cent of the variance,
respectively). These skills are mastery of factual knowledge,
interpretation of symptoms and signs and selection of diag-
nostic possibilities, tests and investigations. It is
therefore concluded that the cognitive process skill develops
with clinical practice. However, the students display skills
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structures similar to those of the registrars, but, clearly,
at a lower level of achievement. Viewing these findings
developmentally, we may say that in endocrinology the neophyte
differentially develops the substance of that speciality and
later develops the aptitude.W In other words, process is
built on content. The two aspects of cognition do not appear
to develop simultaneously in their structure. The elements
precede the processes (see 12.1 above).
Turning to neurology, the questionnaire study shows that
students and registrars have similar cognitive processes, but
different skills structures (see section 8.4.3) and, predict-
ably, different diagnostic acumen. In making a diagnosis,
students rely to the same extent as registrars on the skills
measured by the predictor sections of the questionnaires (27
per cent of the variance accounted for in each case). Thus,
the cognitive process skill in neurology, unlike in endocrin-
ology, in undergraduate medical education already resembles
that of clinical practice. However, the content associated
with those processes does not develop the relative characteris-
tics of clinical practice until after the years of undergraduate
medical education. Thus, in developmental terms, unlike
endocrinology, the student differentially develops the aptitude
of the speciality of neurology prior to developing its sub-
stantial structure. As with endocrinology, however, the two
aspects of cognition do not appear to develop simultaneously
in their structures.
These findings suggest that development of the diagnostic think-
ing process in both specialities is characterised by increasing
equilibration of skills structures, possibly beyond a certain
threshold level (see section 8.8). This is so even for endo-
crinology, in which speciality a non-significant interaction
term (section 8.4.3) suggests similarity of students' and
registrars' skills structures. But this similarity is relative
and not absolute (see section 8.6.1), we may only say with
justification that endocrinology yields a relatively less
differentiated set of scores than does neurology (section 8.6.3).
Footnote (l}
	
see end of chapter
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However, it is worth noting that this is only true when scores
on section D (formulating a diagnosis) are included. If
these are excluded, the results of the Scheff tests (Tables
7.19, 7.21, 7.23 and 7.25) show that in endocrinology students
and registrars are relatively less similar than they are in
neurology. Thus the importance of the role of the untested
skills is indicated. In endocrinology, there is an increasing
development of, reliance upon or use of these skills with
experience of clinical practice. This does not appear to be
so in neurology. Many of these developmental differences are
attributed to the different effect of medical education in the
two specialities (section 8.8), but it remains the case that
tendency to equilibrate the skills structure is a fundamental
characteristic of the development of diagnostic skill and
that the development of a relative balance of contribution
from those skills and others not tested appears to be special-
ity specific. Thus, it is shown that cognitive processes but
not skills structures are speciality specific (section 8.9).
However, such a statement requires clarification, since it is
based entirely upon the predictive value of the first three
sections of the questionnaire for scores on the fourth and
on the amount of variance left unaccounted for in this predict-
ion. In stating that cognitive processes are different we are
really only saying that different amounts of variance remain
unaccounted for. Thus, they are different for students and
registrars in endocrinology and for registrars in endocrinology
and neurology, while being less dissimilar for students in
endocrinology and neurology and similar for students and
registrars in neurology. But are we to infer from this that
such similarities are qualitative or quantitative? The
account gathering study provides evidence in relation to this
question.
It will be recalled (from Chapter Eleven) that in all the cat-
egories identified, no statistically significant differences
were found between the groups of students, house officers and
registrars. We must conclude from this that students are in
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command of a range of cognitive skills not different from that
of registrars. Whether the presence of each of these skills
is a function of medical education or cognitive development
generally, is a matter for speculation, but it would seem
reasonable to infer that aptitude itself (i.e. cognitive pro-
cesses such as structuring, extrapolation, tendencies to
confirm or reject interpretations, etc.) is a function of
broader cognitive development and that aptitude is identified,
here, expressing itself or operating with a certain substance.
Thus, for example, the tendency to structure the world is a
general characteristic of human cognition see 12.1.1),
however, the development of particular structures which may
be located with greater or lesser facility is a function of
experience, in this case of medical education and clinical
practice. In essence, it appears that students, taken as a
group, display all the cognitive processes of house officers
and registrars. If this is so, wherein lies the difference
between tyro and expert?
One difference certainly lies in breadth, depth and extent of
knowledge. More important1y, it lies in the storage structure
and use value of that knowledge. Section 4.1.3 points out
that problem solving itself is a form of learning and, there-
fore, a spur to cognitive development in that working with
information and applying it will have modifying effects upon
the storage structures of that information in memory, upon its
accessibility and manipulability. In the present case, the
selecting operation may become more efficient and effective
with experience but that does not suggest that a less efficient
and effective operation is not applied to the very first
clinical problem encountered. Likewise, information learned
in lectures or textbooks or laboratory may assume a different
meaning and significance or may lose meaning and significance,
when considered in the light of clinical practice. By this,
we are saying no more than that its structural characteristics
alter. As structure alters, so must the substance and the
efficiency and effectiveness of extrapolation.
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The account gathering study shows that students are less well
equipped than are house officers and registrars to "think on
their feet" (section 11.8). It is suggested that this cannot
be a failure of knowledge as such (since the failure is
identified by the subject himself) but is a failure of struct-
ure or of extrapolation due, perhaps, to the way in which
students have learned and stored information and its relation-
ship to the structure of information elicited during the
clinical interview and the ability to impose structure on that
information and locate related information in the stored
structure which must be sought in the problem field. Thus, the
developmental characteristics of the knowledge base concern
not only the substance itself or its quantity but also its
structural properties and the changes in these with experience
and use. The developing ability to "think on one's feet" may
reflect an increasing definition and stability of the extra-
polated structure.
With regard to aptitude, it is reasonable to infer that,
account gathering results notwithstanding, there are develop-
mental differences. The results of the questionnaire study
indicate that, for endocrinology, there is an increasing,
developing reliance upon the processes not tested. Although
the account gathering study shows the same cognitive operations
and processes in students, house officers and registrars, it
does not demonstrate their relative distribution within each
of these groups. These two findings may suggest that the
development of such cognitive operations in the diagnostic
thinking process is, therefore, not a matter primarily of qual-
itative change, but rather of quantitative change. Thus, for
example, the neophyte may emphasise extrapolated interpretation
of all items of information, while the expert may prefer to
exclude some items of information as irrelevant. There may be
differences in terms of willingness to re-interpret information
or to reject interpretations without having performed an
exhaustive search. These are merely examples and do not pur-
port to be real, but the differing relative prominence or
incidence of the cognitive operations identified is put forward
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as a developmental characteristic of the diagnostic thinking
process. Just as it is suggested that the structure of
stored knowledge changes with experience, so is it also now
suggested that the structure of aptitude also develops and
changes. This possibility is mentioned in 12.1.1 above. It
is emphasised, however, that the processes themselves do not
change.
Although a general developmental model of the diagnostic
thinking process is thus postulated, it is necessary to con-
sider whether or not speciality specificity, as shown in the
questionnaire study, restricts its applicability. It is
reasonable to suggest that it does not. Given the generalis-
ability of the elements of the del to other areas of
problem solving and learning (see sections 4.1 and 12.1) and
their roots in general psychological theory, it is tenable
that general cognitive processes have been identified which
apply equally to other substance. Thus they would apply in
all specialities. However, the differences demonstrated
between registrars in endocrinology and neurology make it
reasonable to infer c3uantitative differences in cognitive
processes across specialities, just as we have inferred this
as a developmental feature. Thus different substance may be
more efficiently and effectively dealt with by different
cognitive operations. In terms of quality, however, we would
suggest no differences between specialities.
The work of Ekwo and Lo fling-Baucke (1979) gives support to
our contention that both substance and aptitude develop but
that aptitude develops structurally or quantitatively rather
than qualitatively. Ekwo and Loening-saucke (1979) show that
students in their study obtained 90 per cent of all data for
both familiar and unfamiliar problems but that they did not
always recognise its significance or use it to the full advan-
tage. Thus both substance and aptitude were inadequate.
Elstein et al (1978) also recognise this dual aspect and hint
at the problem solving experience as learning by altering
the structural aspects of memory. Their discussion, however,
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is with reference to good and poorer problem solvers:
• The differences between experts and weaker problem
solvers are more to be found in the repertory of
their experiences, organised in long term memory,
than in differences in the planning and problem
solving heuristics employed ... This does not
imply that medical problem solving is dependent
solely upon mastery of passively recalled content.
Knowledge must be retrieved and organised.
(pp 276-277)
Thus, the Michigan studies indicate a range of similar cogni-
tive operations in expert and weaker problem solver, but
point to the structure of substance as an important feature.
Our own interpretation of the diagnostic thinking process,
which gives pride of place to structural features of cognition,
may cause us to reverse the order of Elstein et al's last
two participles. lansek and Ball-a. (1979) seem to be suggest-
ing some differences between novice and expert which may be
seen. in terms of structure or interpretative activities as we
have presented them. In discussing the proportion of fruitful
(clarifying or hypothesis testing) questions asked by novice
and expert they state:
"It must be pointed out that this parameter in no
way took into account the capability of a novice's
clarifying question to convert the symptom into a
meaningful entity representing a neurological
malfunction. In this context, the expert asked
clarifying questions which usually achieved symptom
conversion, whereas the student asked clarifying
questions which merely elaborated on the surround-
ing circumstances of the symptom and failed to
achieve conversion".
Although lansek and Ball-a (1979) do not describe the precise
nature of symptom conversion, the context implies an operation
similar to that of structuring and interpretation as used in
the present study. In his study of chess players, de Groot
(1965) noted the same developmental phenomenon:
The rapid insight of the chessmaster into the
possibilities of a newly shown position, his
immediate 'seeing' of structural and dynamic
essentials, of possible combinatorial gimmicks,
and so forth, are only understandable if we
realise that as a result of his experience he
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quite literally 'sees' the position in a totally
different (and much more adequate) way than the
weaker player ... It is above all the treasury
of ready 'experience' which puts the master that
much ahead of the others. His extremely exten-
sive, widely branched and highly organised system
of knowledge and experience enables him, first,
to recognise immediately a chess position as one
belonging to an unwritten category with corres-
ponding board means to be applied, and, second,
to 'see' immediately and in a highly adequate
way its specific, individual features against the
background of the category".
'Seeing' in de Groot's terms, is analogous to the 'structuring'
of the current study. The perceptual and physical circum-
stances of the game of chess make the description more
immediate and comprehensible, but it is suggested that similar
operations apply where the field is composed of verbal, tac-
tile, quantitative,perceptual or descriptive information. De
Groot's (1965) study of chess players also gives support to
the theory of development suggested in relation to the present
study:
"... a master is a master primarily by virtue of
what he has been able to build up by experience;
and this is: (a a schooled and highly specific
way of perceiving, and (b) a system of reprod-
uctively available methods in memory".
We may relate (a) to substance as structured in memory which
yields in propensity, particularly by means of the selecting
operation, to perceive and interpret the field in certain
ways. We may relate (b) to aptitude or processes, although
the present study would question the reproductive use of
those processes. In general, however, de Groot (1965) makes
relevant comment on the nature and consequences of the rather
amorphous entity termed 'experience'. The close identity of
problem solving and learning, the dual nature of the diagnos-
tic thinking process and its structural development are thus
reflected in the work of de Groot despite the very different
nature of the subject areas of chess and clinical diagnosis.
The developmental and comparative aspects of the diagnostic
thinking process thus seem to have a number of essential
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characteristics which may be seen as arising from the struct-
ural aspects of the cognitive process. These characteristics
may be summarised as follows:
1. The development of the diagnostic thinking process con-
cerns changes in the structure of stored information, the
selection of forceful features (i.e. alteration in the
structure of the selecting operation), facility of extra-
polation, flexibility of interpretation and the cognitive
skills of the second and third stages of the process (see
section 12.2.4).
2. The two cognitive aspects of the diagnostic thinking pro-
cess (substance and aptitude) develop differentially in
both endocrinology and neurology. In endocrinology, sub-
stance has preferential development, while in neurology,
aptitude appears to have developmental predominance.
3. In both endocrinology and neurology, development is
characterised by increasing equilibration of the skills
structures as measured by sections A, B, C and D of the
questionnaires.
4. The development of a relative balance of contribution
towards the diagnostic thinking process from the skills
tested in sections A, B and C of the questionnaires and
others not so tested is speciality specific in endocrin-
ology and neurology.
5. Speciality specificity appears to apply to cognitive pro-
cesses, but not skills structures.
6. In the account gathering study, no statistically signi-
ficant differences are found in any category between
groups of students, house officers and registrars. It is
reasonable to infer that all three groups appear to be in
command of the same range of cognitive skills.
7. The cognitive processes identified are characteristic of
broader cognitive development and are not particular to
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the clinical problem solving environment in which they
are identified. A general tendency of process is thus
displayed in a particular context of substance.
8. The substance of the diagnostic thinking process develops
in breadth, depth and extent, and in its storage struct-
ure and use value.
9. As the structure of substance alters, so does the con-
comitant efficiency and effectiveness of extrapolation.
10. Development of the diagnostic thinking process brings
with it an increasing ability to "think on one's feet".
It is suggested that this reflects an increasing
facility in working in and with the extrapolated context
or an increasing definition and stability of those
contexts.
11. It is suggested that the development of aptitude in the
diagnostic thinking process is not primarily a matter of
qualitative change but is rather a change in quantity and
emphasis. Diffrent cognitive processes may predominate
at different stages of development and experience but
those processes themselves do not alter.
12. Points (8), (9), (10) and (11) suggest that development
of the diagnostic thinking process is characterised by
changes in the structure of both substance and aptitude.
13. The general developmental model postulated is not special-
ity specific, although quantitative (i.e. structural)
differences in aptitude appear to occur between special-
ities. It is suggested that different substance may be
more efficiently and effectively dealt with by different
cognitive operations. However, qualitative aspects of
the model are generalisable.
14. It is suggested that development is amenable to shaping
by education.
15. The postulated developmental model of the diagnostic
thinking process is substantiated in the work of Ekwo and
-Loenifl-Baucke (1979), Elstein et al (1978), lansek and
Balla (1979) and de Groot (1965).
12.4 Summary and Conclusions
The results of the questionnaire and account gathering studies
are related and a unified explanation and description of the
diagnostic thinking process in undergraduate medical education
and in clinical practice presented. The fundamental psycho-
logical features of that process are identified as structure
and extapo1ation. These are discussed separately in relation
to the results of the parallel studies and to wider psycho-
logical theory. These discussions are summarised at the
conclusion of sections 12.1.1 and 12.1.2 respectively. Three
stages in the diagnostic thinking process are identified and
discussed. These are: firstly, the initiation of interpre-
tations; secondly, progress of the diagnostic thinking process;
and thirdly, resolution. The discussion of each of these
stages is summarised at the conclusion of sections 12.2.1,
12.2.2 and 12.2.3 respectively. A discussion of the nature
of the model of the diagnostic thinking process thus postulated
and a resum of the central characteristics of three stages
is presented in section 12.2.4. Section 12.3 concerns dvelop-
mental and comparative aspects of the diagnostic thinking
process. The discussion is summarised at the conclusion of
that section.
-Footnote on page 340
(1)	 For the purpose of this discussion, the terms
'elements' and 'substance' are used interchange-
ably, meaning the content of thinking.
Footnote on page 394
(1) For the purpose of this discussion, the terms
'aptitude', 'process' and 'cognitive processes'
are used interchangeably and take Peel's (1967)
usage, meaning 'thinking method' or 'problem
solving processes' (see 4.1.2 above). In
particular, no other psychological meaning of
'aptitude' (e.g. 'propensity', 'capability',
'ability') is implied.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Implications of the Current Study for Pedagogical Approaches in the
Development of the Diagnostic Thinking Process
On the basis of the findings of the two parallel studies, the theorét-
ical interpretation of these and the review of literature and
pedagogical practice, we may now consider the implications of these
for medical education. This chapter comprises three main sections.
Firstly, we consider both the apparent and potential relationships
between medical education and clinical practice with regard to
development of the diagnostic thinking process. Secondly, aims for
the design of teaching strategies are considered. Finally, a dis-
cussion of possible pedagogical approaches is presented and evculuated.
Before proceeding, however, it must be stated that, having made no
direct study of the learning and clinical experiences of our subjects,
this chapter is based on second order inference and psychological
and pedagogical theory. Its suggestions and conclusions, therefore,
can only be tentative and propositional.
13.1 Medical Education and Clinical Practice
The relationship between medical education and clinical practice
in the development of the diagnostic thinking process may be
considered from two viewpoints: the relationship as it appears
to be at present; and, the relationship as it potentially
might be.
13.1.1 The Current Relationship
The current relationship between undergraduate medical education
and clinical practice may best be assessed by its effects.
Perusal of the first volume of the General Medical Council
Survey (GMC, 1977) indicates a large number of small differences
between the curriculum arrangements of the 38 medical schools
of the British Isles and Eire. Large differences in curriculum
organisation and philosophy or in teaching methods are des-
cribed and discussed in Chapter Four above. However, apart
from the present study, no data or results have been available
which facilitate some estimation of the relative effects of
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medical education and clinical practice on the diagnostic
thinking process.
The current questionnaire study yields a number of findings
which are of apparent importance to a discussion of the relation-
ship between medical education and clinical practice. In effect,
the relationship appears not to be a complex one. Firstly,
that undergraduate medical education appears differentially
to enhance or facilitate the skills tested and those untested
is made clear by the results of the one-way analyses of variance
and Scheff tests (see sections 8.3 and 8.6). This interpre-
tation is justified in the light of the second finding of the
equilibrating or compensatory effect o clinical practice on
those skills, such that scores on the four sections of the
questionnaire for registrars are not statistically significantly
different (section 8.6). Thirdly, the shaping effect of under-
graduate teaching and learning on thinking processes is also
made clear by the results of the linear regression analyses.
In endocrinology, students and registrars are very dissimilar;
while in neurology they are very similar (section 8.3).
It is clear, then, that medical education has a d€firiite effect
on skills facilitated, and that this effect is different in the
two specialities (see section 8.6.3). In addition, the effect
produced by medical education is unlike that of clinical prac-
tice, either in skills structure or cognitive processes, in
both specialities. The presentation of each speciality yields
in students a cognitive structure (skills structure plus
cognitive processes) particular to itself. Although that
structure changes with clinical practice, each speciality
remains distinct in terms of the cognitive structure of its
practitioners in that registrars in endocrinology and neurology
rely to different extents on the tested and untested skills
when making a diagnosis. However, homogeneity of level of
skills as measured by the four sections of the questionnaire,
characterises registrars in both specialities, regardless of
the skills structures shown at the end of undergraduate medical
education (see section 8.8). A discussion of the possible
derivation of those differences is presented in section 8.8.
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in terms of the different approaches of the specialities
studied and the consequent different teaching approaches.
Endocrinology is described as having an undifferentiated,
unanalytical or holistic approach, whetreas neurology has a
clearly articulated and logical philosophy of diagnosis and
teaching approach. The former yields a non-statistically
significant interaction term between scores of students and
registrars; the latter yields similar reliance on the skills
tested in making a diagnosis but less relative effectiveness
in actually achieving that diagnosis correctly.
The speciality differences shown by the questionnaire study
are particularly interesting when we recall that the student
subjects would all have had experience in both endocrinology
and neurology, and would have been taught according to their
respective pedagogies. It would appear, therefore, that an
approach learned in one speciality is not necessarily appro-
priate or transferable to another speciality. This is not
to suggest, however, that cognitive operations as such are
actually different. Indeed, we suggest that thinking processes
are qualitatively similar although quaniititatively different
across specialities. To what, then, may we attribute the
differences between students in the two specialities?
It is reasonable to assume that the difference is found in
the dominant organising concepts of the two teaching approaches.
The approach of neurology seems to be process orientated (see
section 8.8) whereas the approach of endocrinology teaching,
not having a clearly articulated logic of diagnosis, is by
default content orientated. We, therefore, see that in each
speciality the less emphasised aspect process in endocrinology;
content in neurology) is developmentally disadvantaged in the
diagnostic thinking of the student subjects. It seems hardly
surprising that students rely primarily on the skills which
are emphasised to them. Thus, both endocrinology and neurology
teaching achieve in students a relationship between skills
structures and cognitive processes which is not reflected in
clinical practice. However, the account gathering study shows
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quite clearly that although a cognitive structure is being
fostered in students which is not thoroughly appropriate in
their later clinical practice, all the necessary cognitive
skills are waiting in the wings.
To a certain extent Barrows and Bennett (1972) are correct in
their assertion that diagnostic thinking skills develop only
with clinical practice. Yet this needs qualification, for the
present studies have shown that those skills are all present
in the student, as much as the house officer or registrar.
Further, each process skill may well be fully fledged, although
it is clearly untenable to suggest that the substance requires
no elaboration. What develops with clinical practice seems
to be a particular inter-relationship or structure of these
skills. It is this aspect which medical education leaves in
embryonic form only. In section 12.1.1 it is argued that the
stored structure of knowledge (both aptitude and substance)
gained in medical education must, perforce, be unlike the
stored structures which result from clinical practice, since
the contextual aspects of the two are, and must be, different.
In sectionsll.8, 12.1.1 and 12.1.2 it is suggested that the
effect of clinical practice is to alter the stored structure
of aptitude and substance gradually rendering it more approp-
riate, complete and accessible in terms of clinical practice.
This may also imply that it becomes less appropriate, complete
and accessible in terms of the formal requirements of medical
education. Sections 8.2 and 12.3 mention some conditions of
clinical experience which may facilitate such structural
alteration and development. It is self evident that such
alteration is a function of learning and that clinical problem
solving itself is its vehicle or instigator during the years
of clinical practice. The earlier discussion of problem
solving as learning gives support to this view (see section
4.1.3). Lovell (1961) suggests that experience is the
greatest developer of thinking skills. This is echoed in the
advice of Wyn Pugh et al (1975) that, since rapid improvement
follows qualification to practise medicine, the factors in
the postgraduate years which lead to such a change should be
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identified and incorporated into the undergraduate curriculum.
They presume that this principle "underlies the policy of those
medical schools in which final year students take increasing
clinical responsibility".
In conclusion of this section, we may summarise the current
relationship with regard to development of the diagnostic
thinking process between medical education and clinical pra-
ctice as follows:
1. In the specialities of endocrinology and neurology, under-
graduate medical education facilitates either a relatively
appropriate skills structure (endocrinology) or relatively
appropriate cognitive processes (neurology) in relation to
the experienced practitioner. In neither case are both
aspects developed to similar degrees of appropriateness.
2. The different teaching approaches in endocrinology and
neurology foster different cognitive structures in students.
3. Structural development of the aptitude and substance of
the diagnostic thinking process occurs with clinical prac-
tice due to the increment in learning which accrues from
problem solving.
4. Homogeneity of skills is characteristic of the experienced
practitioner in both endocrinology and neurology, but the
relative contributions of these towards the diagnostic
thinking process is different.
5. Students have all the cognitive skills of the experienced
clinician, but use them. in different proportions. Thus,
with regard to aptitude, development of the diagnostic
thinking process is primarily quantitative.
6. With regard to substance, clinical practice facilitates both
qualitative and quantitative development of the stored
structures.
7. As stored structures of aptitude and substance become more
appropriate, complete arid accessible in terms of clinical
practice, they may become less so in terms of the formal
requirements of medical education.
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13.1.2 The Potential Relationship
In considering what the relationship between medical education
and clinical practice should be, we must bear in mind three
factors.
Firstly, we have shown that the diagnostic thinking process
facilitated during undergraduate medical education is not
commensurate with that demonstrated in clinical practice in
that some aspects of that process develop preferentially.
Secondly, it is also shown that the separate skills of the
diagnostic thinking process are in evidence during the final
phases of undergraduate medical education. We may suggest
that this is due to two factors: firstly, necessity to teach
and learn about the facts of bodily function and malfunction,
the indicators of disease and health and the available range
of diagnostic tests and investigations; and secondly, normal
cognitive development which brings with it a certain range of
possible cognitive operations which may be applied to the
problem of making a diagnosis just as much as they may be
applied to any other problem of similar complexity in any
other sphere of life. • Thirdly, it is shown that development
of the diagnostic thinking process continues during the years
of clinical practice addressed by this study.
Against the background of these three findings, it is necess-
ary to consider some fundamental issues. The first of these
concerns whether or not a student should be equipped with the
same skills, in the same proportions as the expert practitioner,
or whether it is reasonable and safe to allow some skills to
develop or refine with practice and application after the
stage of basic training (here, undergraduate medical education).
If the latter option is selected, then what criteria are to
be used to decide which skills will be allowed mainly to
develop with practice? In addition, what criteria will be
applied to determine the degree or level of basic skill
necessary in order to benefit most advantageously from the
experience of clinical practice?
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The finding of an apparent compensatory effect of clinical
practice on the skills less preferentially facilitated by
undergraduate medical education allows us to consider the
question in terms of other issues. For example, one of two
viewpoints could be adopted. Firstly, we could conclude
with some apparent justification that the ability to com-
pensate for deficiencies is engendered, or at least not
dispelled, by undergraduate medical education and therefore
the status quo is acceptable and appropriate. Or, secondly,
we could conclude that there should be no necessity for
compensatory activity, and therefore the status quo is
unacceptable and inappropriate. In essence, either of these
positions in untenable for the same reason, that medical
education can only be a preparation for practice and is, of
its very nature, different from practice. Education should,
at best, facilitate the basic skills and knowledge necessary
for practice. This being so, it is a defensible proposition
that, with regard to the variables here tested, medical edu-
cation is quite appropriate, since the skills engendered in
education are all used in practice varying only in their
relative magnitude of use. What is perhaps not defensible,
however, is that a vast area of relevant skill is not specif-
ically addressed by the educative process. That area is
reflected in the variance on section D of the questionnaires
unaccounted for by sections A, B and C in all groups of
subjects and consists of the cognitive processes identified
in the account gathering study and summarised in relation to
the three stages of the diagnostic thinking process (see
section 12.2.4).
In response to these issues, it must be reiterated that medical
education is a preparation for clinical practice and is not
the same as practice itself. It therefore can produce a
doctor who is qualified to practise but is not expert or
experienced in doing so. This is widely recognised at a
number of levels. For example, in terms of the rapid growth
of medical technology, Parry reports in 1978 that:
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"... it was no longer possible for undergraduate
education to produce a doctor fully qualified
to practise the whole range of medicine. All
doctors needed postgraduate specialist education
during the early years of practice, as well as
continuing education during the rest of their
professional lives".
	
(Parry, 1978, p.3)
This opinion reflects that of Barrows (1973). It is clear,
then, that undergraduate medical education can only be a
necessary preparation, but not a sufficient prescription for
clinical practice. But what form should this preparation
take? There are some useful, authoritative and complementary
answers to this question:
The object of this basic medical education
should be to provide a basis for future
vocational training; it is not to train
doctors to be biochemists, surgeons, general
practitioners, or any other kind of special-
ist". (General Medical Council, 1967).
Smart (1978) echoes this recommendation:
"It was no longer possible for the undergraduate
course to encompass the whole of medical know-
ledge and to produce an all-round doctor; in
these circumstances the aim of such a course
was to train the minds of students, with medicine
as the medium of education. The course should
cover the basic knowledge, skills and attitudes
of the profession and provide a certain amount
of broad experience ..."
	 (p.. 5)
Only Barrows (1973) takes the process of diagnosis as the
lynchpin of this general, basic and preparatory education:
"We can't teach all the content that may be
appropriate in every subject of medicine
The most appropriate gift we can give our
students is the skill for finding the approp-
nate content he needs whenever he needs it in
the future. Therefore, instead of being
concerned about what the student learns about
cardio-respiratory anatomy or physiology we
should be more concerned that he is able to
recognise the existence of cardio-respiratory
problems, define the problems, derive accurate
data about the nature of the problem and by
the application of good self-study skills
acquire the knowledge and information he needs
to understand and manage the problem". (p.27)
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Such aims as those defined by the GMC, Smart and Barrows,
remind us of Bruner's (1960) contention that:
"The first object of any act of learning, over
and beyond the pleasure it may give, is that
it should serve us in the future. Learning
should not only take us somewhere; it should
allow us later to go further more easily".
(p. 16)
How, then, may the sought for potential relationship between
medical education and clinical practice be defined? We find
that it must be defined in Its current terms.
Undergraduate medical education must be a broad preparation
for clinical practice and the continued, additional learning
which accompanies it. This conclusion is both a logical and
a pragmatic one. It is logical in the sense that clinical
problem solving makes continued learning (of aptitude if not
substance) unavoidable (see 4.1.3 above). It is pragmatic
in that undergraduate medical education is limited in time,
students are limited in their capacity to learn given such
time limits, and the body of knowledge and skill which could
be learned far outstrLps that capacity. Commonsense would
suggest that this is true of any undergraduate course,
student and subject.
We have, then, confirmed the status quo and concluded that
undergraduate medical education must be, even in an ideal
form, preparatory. However, it is necessary to define this
more closely since realisation of that preparation, its con-
tent and organisation may take many different forms. It is
not the sphere of this study and discussion to presume any
definition of what constitutes the best subject matter or
content of that preparation, for we are only concerned with
the thinking processes and the nature and role of knowledge
and cognitive skill associated with it. We are not concerned,
here, with what that knowledge might be. We are concerned,
however, with the structure of both substance and aptitude as
they are learned and as they develop. We are therefore
concerned with the presentation of the preparatory material
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and its effects upon the development of the diagnostic think-
ing process. We are concerned with preparation to think as
well as to learn and to know, It is indicated in the review
and discussions (Chapters Four, Eight, Eleven and Twelve)
that this is a matter worthy of some further consideration.
The following Section, therefore, initiates identification
of aims and criteria in the design of teaching strategies to
facilitate development of the diagnostic thinking process.
In summary of the present section, however, our conclusions
are as follows:
1. Undergraduate medical education can only be a preparation
for clinical practice. This confirms the status quo.
2. As a preparation, it should facilitate the basic skills
and knowledge necessary for practice.
3. The vast area of cognitive skill which comprises the dia-
gnostic thinking process must form part of the basic
preparation. This constitutes a preparation to think
which complements the preparation to learn and to know.
It is therefore necessary to consider the structure and
presentation of undergraduate medical education.
13.2 Aims in the Design of Teaching Strategies
This section concerns a definition of the general intended out-
come of any teaching strategy designed to facilitate development
of the diagnostic thinking process. It also necessarily
concerns a discussion of the types of characteristic which
such a strategy should display.
The results of the parallel studies indicate the complexity of
the diagnostic thinking process and its manifestations in
different specialities. Each study identifies specific aspects
of the process. The questionnaire study identifies three
skills to which undergraduate medical education may be said
to address itself (mastery of factual knowledge; interpretation
of symptoms and signs; selecting and testing diagnostic
possibilities). The account gathering study identifies many
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more cognitive skills and sources of error. In section
12.2.4 ten, seven and four cognitive processes are identified
in relation, respectively, to the first, second and third
stages of the diagnostic thinking process. It is also empha-
sised in section ll.5(above) that the desirability of any
particular cognitive process cannot be judged in absolute
terms, but only in relation to specific circumstances or
cases. Thus, prescription of specific diagnostic thinking
processes is neither appropriate nor reasonable. The dynamic,
unpredictable and uncontrollable aspects of the clinical
interview ensure that only generalisable statements of a very
broad type can sensibly be made. In effect, such statements
are analogous in generality to the eschewed description of
"hypothesis generation and testing". We may say that struct-
uring, extrapolation and interpretation are cognitive
processes common to the resolution of all clinical problems,
but the current studies indicate that few more precise
statements may be made. Indeed, many such statements could
only be made if the variables which give rise to certain pro-
cesses, and the parameters which define the field and flow of
information, are identif led and defined. It seems doubtful
that such variables and parameters could be identified in a
sample of clinical interviews in any way which would permit
generalisation to other circumstances. Even if this were
possible, it might scarcely be of practical use to the clinical
problem solver since it would only add to his task yet another
level of analysis.
Given the multiplicity and variety of variables, circumstances
and processes, and the range of possible interactions of
these, it is concluded, then, that specific sequences of
diagnostic thinking processes cannot be prescribed and incorp-
orated into undergraduate medical education in any detailed
specific or prescriptive form. Individual differences of
cognitive functioning alone would preclude such prescription.
However, the range of cognitive processes is amenable to
definition, as the current studies show. These processes are
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varied from the generalisability of structure and extrapolation
to, for example, the specificity of the set effect. It is
therefore suggested that undergraduate medical education should
facilitate an awareness of those processes at an appropriate
level of specificity, generalisability and practicality. It
might not be necessary, for example, for clinical practitioners
or students to have an awareness of the theoretical aspects of
structure and extrapolation. Rather, it is important that
both students and practitioners use the thinking and enquiring
processes described in those terms to their greatest effect
and efficiency. This implies that teaching and learning
strategies must be developed and designed on the basis of
those theories.
The conclusion that self awareness should be facilitated and
not prescriptions imposed, is presaged in section 4.1.3 earlier.
It is worth reiterating the point made:
"... the diagnostic thinking process must rely
heavily upon each individual's own cognitive
style and propensity. Externally imposed forms,
such as method of data collection or recording,
may have no effect upon the problem solver's
actual thinking processes. To specify the
particular properties of the clinical problem
solving process, therefore, does not necessarily
imply specification of a single or particular
form, but may mean only the identification of
a range of possible processes".
Thus, as Chapter Four concludes, teaching strategies must
present the diagnostic thinking process as an entity amenable
to conscious awareness and monitoring but not necessarily to
particular shaping other than correction should cognitive
error occur. Such a conclusion is supported by Lovell (1974)
who suggests that the influences at work in aiding development
of general ways of knowing include, firstly, education and
culture which subsumes types of concepts used and discussed
and opportunities to consider possibilities; and, secondly,
auto-regulation or the reflection of an individual on his own
co-ordinating activities. Lovell (1974) adds that the
development of such general ways of knowing determines ways
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in which particular knowledge is assimilated.
Given the current structuralist interpretation of the diag-
nostic thinking process, this is surely an aspect of primary
importance. The nature and development of the cognitive
structure of elements and processes will, it is suggested,
be the ultimate determinant of degree of efficiency and
effectiveness of the diagnostic thinking process. It is
argued earlier (section 12.3) that change in the structure
of both substance and aptitude is a major developmental
characteristic of the diagnostic thinking process.
Barrows (1973) seems also to have noted this phenomenon but
appears to imply that development is merely addition of
information and not change in its structure. Speaking of
the developing clinical problem solver he writes:
"As his experiences enrichen, his hypotheses
should become multiple memory associations
which produce a greater range of possibilities
for the patient's problem". (p. 22)
Barrows here reminds us, however, of the importance of sub-
stance. Eagerness to have clinical problem solvers develop
and use an awareness of their own cognitive processes cannot
be allowed to demote the necessary foundation of knowledge.
Aptitude and substance must develop appropriately in tandem if
the psychological interpretation of the diagnostic thinking
process here presented is accepted.
Medical education has already been criticised for presenting
factual information in a form unrelated to clinical practice.
For example, Weed (1969) considers that if the teacher does
other than:
"... present facts and principles as adjuncts of
concrete experience, entering the student's mind
at the level it understands ... he may erect a
structure of abstract information in the student's
mind that is confirmed by tradition, that passes
for education, but that, when the student is con-
fronted with a particular set of variables and
needs to take meaningful action, may crumble and
leave him anxious and confused".
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A more frequently voiced criticism is that medical education
primarily concentrates on the student's acquisition of factual
information and an understanding of pathophysiologic mechanisms
(Cutler, 1979), whereas sound clinical judgments are derived
equally from these and the skill to combine them appropriately
(Schwarz et al, 1973; Barrows, 1976; Myler-Crook, 1974). As
Barrows and Mitchell (1975) point out, having a set of facts
at his finger tips is no guarantee either that the student
will know when they are important in his work, or that he will
know how to use them. Indeed, Barrows and Bennett (1972)
suggest that not only does traditicnal medical education not
teach clinical problem solving skills, but actually inhibits
its development by forcing students to learn systematised
information, the organisation of which is counterposed to "the
inquiry, dynamic, variable problem solving skills we expect".
Mastery of factual knowledge, but lack of problem solving
ability has also been noted by other workers (Mayou, 1978) and
has been identified as creating difficulty in the transition
from medical education to clinical practice (Farquhar et al,
1970; Knaf 1 and Burkett, 1975). Pedagogical attention to the
structural aspects and inter-relationships of aptitude and
substance might diminish such divergence and difficulty.
Ausubel et al (1978) discuss this in clear terms:
"The possession of relevant background knowledge
(concepts, principles, transactional terms,
avai1able functions") in cognitive structure
particularly if clear, stable and discriminable,
facilitates problem solving .. Without such
knowledge, as a matter of fact, no problem
solving is possible irrespective of the learner's
degree of skill in discovery learning; without
it he or she could not even begin to understand
the nature of the problem confronted. Still
another cognitive structure source of positive
transfer inheres in applicable general elements
of strategy, orientation, and set that reflect
prior experience with related problems". (p. 572)
Thus Ausubel et al (1978) integrate in this statement the
importance of structure, of substance and aptitude, their
inter-dependence and the developmental role of experience. We
may also infer from this that the problem solving skill, being
- 
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demonstrated in that inter-dependence and development, should
most appropriately be learned where substance and aptitude
coincide. Thus, it may be argued that cognitive skills train-
ing per se, taught separately from the clinical problems and
then generalised or transferred to them (see section 4.2.4)
might not be the most efficient and effective strategy for
developing the diagnostic thinking process. It is already
suggested in the earlier section cited that the indirect
nature of the cognitive skills training method may have ass-
ociated problems of structure and transfer.
On the basis of this conclusion, it is important to reassert
that, despite criticisms of medical education's concentration
upon acquisition of factual knowledge (Yonke, 1979), the role
and importance of that knowledge must not be underestimated
or even accorded less prominence than it deserves. Elstein
et al (1979) also emphasise that reasoning strategies do not
operate in the abstract but are applied in conjunction with
the contents of memory. Ausubel et al (1978) are, again,
particularly clear and forceful in their opinion. In discuss-
ing cognitive factors' in classroom learning they state that:
"Punong these factors, the existing structure of
knowledge at the time of learning (cognitive
structure variables) is, perhaps, the most
important consideration. Since this involves,
by definition, the impact of all prior learning
experience on current learning processes, it is
co-extensive with the problem of transfer".
Within et al (1974) suggest reasons for this. They consider
that amount of knowledge per se is not as important for cogn-
itive clarity as is the degree of assimilation of knowledge.
A small fund of facts may be appropriately assimilated or a
large fund may not be appropriately assimilated. The latter
circumstance will yield an account of them in the subject,
when asked, which is confused, circumstantial, overspecific
and overconcrete. This they describe as being of "out of
focus" quality. Thus, students may learn factual information
in the library or laboratory which is out of focus clinically.
Consider, for example, the following texthook description:
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"The term cyanosis is used to describe the
clinical sign of a bluish colour of the skin
and mucous membranes resulting from an increased
amount of reduced hemaglobin, or of bemaglobin
derivatives, in the small blood vessels of those
areas". (iarrison, et al, 1971, p. 205)
Experience of cyanosed patients, however, may reveal that,
although 'bluish' may be the most accurate word available in
our vocabulary, it does not quite accurately describe the
physical sign of cyanosis and students may require assistance
in re-interpreting, or focussing, the meaning of the term in
clinical practice.
Having thus argued for the importance of the role and position
of knowledge or substance, we must now reconcile this position
with our simultaneous contention that the diagnostic thinking
process must be taught as a general skill or a range of poss-
ible skills and processes to be appropriately selected, used
and noted during the clinical problem solving process. This
latter conclusion reflects an acceptance of the tenet of
Bruner (1973):
"Let me in general propose this test as a measure
of the adequacy of any set of instructional pro-
positions - that once they are grasped, they
permit the maximum reconstruction of material
unknown to the reconstructor ... General
education does best to aim at being generic
education, training men to be good guessers,
stimulating the ability to go beyond the inform-
ation given to probable reconstructions of other
events".
This is reflected in the opinion of Barrows (1976) as he dis-
cusses the importance of equipping the medical student to be
an effective thinker or problem solver:
"... the physician will never be able to choose
the problem he wants to deal with. Patients
always come to him as unknowns - unknowns in
complexity, unknowns in urgency, unknowns as
far as the systems involved - therefore we
must add to the ability, that he has to deal
with these problems as unknown problems".
- k21 -
How, then, is it possible to propose that the aim of medical
education must be simultaneously generic and specific? This
question is answered by reference to the structural aspects
of teaching and learning. The instructional propositions of
Bruner (1973) can be of substance, of aptitude or of the
pedagogy itself. Each of these may be generic to the extent
that the structural aspects are sound and appropriate. With
regard to substance, one of the major conclusions of the two
parallel studies is that the efficient and effective inter-
pretation of clinical information is dependent upon the
appropriate structure, content and, therefore, accessibility
of the problem solver's store of knowledge. In addition,
these same characteristics of the store have a determining
influence upon the adequacy and completeness of the clinical
enquiry in progress (see section 11.13). Thus, the specific
aspect of the substance of medical education is, of course,
the identification of content. But the generic aspect of
substance is in the structure of its presentation and storage.
Such structure will be powerful in determining whether or not
the learner can apply his increased knowledge and skill to the
next unknown problem.' This reflects Bruner's U960) opinion
quite closely:
"The best way to create interest in a subject is
to render it worth knowing, which means to make
the knowledge gained usable in one's thinking
beyond the situation in which the learning has
occurred". (p. 31)
This may be achieved, according to Bruner (1960), by structural
means:
"... the curriculum of a subject should be
determined by the wost fundamental understand-
ing that can be achieved of the underlying
principles that give structure to the subject".
(p. 31)
In the current instance, of course, the structure of the sub-
ject concerns not only the characteristics of a body of
knowledge, but also the characteristics of the cognitive
processes of those who use that knowledge to solve problems.
Thus, the structure of aptitude, which is identified as the
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second type of instructional proposition of medical education,
is also fundamental and may be seen as generic. Indeed, as
some parts of the aptitude, such as the interpretation of
clinical information by means of cognitive operations of extra-
polation and structuring, appear to be common to all instances
of clinical problem solving, its generic nature is readily
perceived and must be accommodated by the pedagogy. However,
the specific aspects of aptitude must also be identified.
From the point of view of teaching and learning, these must
concern the specific awarenesses and self-monitoring abilities
which, it is proposed, medical education should encourage and
facilitate in the learner in a conscious manner. It is
suggested earlier in this section that detailed knowledge of
such generic aspects of the aptitude as structure and extra-
polation need not, necessarily, form part of the specific
education of the clinical problem solver but that both students
and practitioners should use the thinking and enquiry processes,
which may be described in these terms, to greatest effect. We
therefore must consider the third type of instructional propo-
sition of medical education which is the pedagogy itself.
The generic aspect of ' this may clearly be seen to be identified
with its structure. How students learn, the contexts and
methods of assimilation of new substance and aptitude, will
determine whether or not present learning will serve the future.
Having said this, there seems to be no opportunity f or the
pedagogy to have a specific aspect. It seems reasonable to
suggest that the pedagogy itself is the key to learning and
to development of the diagnostic thinking process..
We have considered substance and aptitude both in their spec-
ific and generic manifestations but all must be integrated
and stored appropriately. The pedagogy which, eventually, is
the major external determinant of the context and structure
of learning is, by implication, the major external promoter of
such integration and aropriate storage. Crutchfield (1972)
is particularly lucid on this point and is worth quoting at
length since he draws together much of the discussion of this
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entire section. We may take his "master thinking skill" as
the diagnostic thinking process:
"The ability of the individual to manage all these
diverse and disparate requirements in the problem
solving process has been termed the master think-
ing skill. This is a metaskill which enables the
effective co-ordination, integration, and utiliz-
ation of the many specific skills we have
enumerated. Without this overall master thinking
skill, an individual may be able to accomplish
some parts of the process, but not others
The educational implications of these comments
about the master thinking skill are clear. If we
seek to nurture the student's ability to think,
then we must give him appropriate training on the
many specific skills we have described. But in
order to do this most effectively - so as to
practise these skills in a mutually reinforcing
way and to make for optimal transfer - we should
train them simultaneously in the context of whole
problems which have considerable scope, complexity
and meaningfulness. In this fashion, the student
will practise using his productive mental processes
in the integrated way they must be used for genuine
problem solving". (p. 196)
We may, therefore, suggest a tentative description of the type
of learning which should be aimed for in relation to the
diagnostic thinking process. Such learning should ensure the
development of the applied diagnostic thinking process in
practice on the basis of the structurally appropriate assimi-
lation of an increasing body of relevant substance and
aptitude. Before concluding with a statement of suggested
aims in the design of teaching strategies, it may be helpful
to summarise the arguments in the following points:
1. Specific sequences of diagnostic thinking processes can-
not be prescribed and learned.
2. Undergraduate medical education should facilitate an
awareness of the range of potential cognitive processes
at appropriate levels of specificity and generalisability.
3. Teaching strategies must present the diagnostic thinking
process as an entity amenable to conscious awareness and
monitoring but not necessarily to particular shaping
other than post hoc correction.
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4. The nature and development of the cognitive structure
of elements and processes are the ultimate determiiant
of the efficiency and effectiveness of the diagnostic
thinking process. Therefore teaching and learning
strategies must be devised on the basis of structural
considerations.
5. Divergence and difficulty in the transition from
medical education to clinical practice might diminish
with greater pedagogical attention to structural
aspects, inter-dependence and inter-relationships
between substance and aptitude, and the developmental
role of experience.
6. Clinical problem solving skill should be learned where
substance and aptitude coincide and not as a separate
cognitive skill.
7. The importance of the acquisition of factual knowledge
must not be underestimated but that acquisition must be
structurally appropriate and in the context of relevant
aptitudes.
8. The design of teaching strategies must concern the
specificities arid generalities of substance and aptitude.
However, the pedagogy itself may be identified as only
having a generic aspect. It is the major promoter of
the necessary integration of substance and aptitude and
the development of appropriate storage structures.
9. Learning in relation to the diagnostic thinking process
must be based on the structurally appropriate assimi-
lation of an increasing body of relevant substance and
aptitude.
In conclusion, we may propose aims in the design of teaching
strategies as follows:
Aim 1: To facilitate an awareness of the range of possible
cognitive operations in the diagnostic thinking
process as defined in relation to its three stages
(section 12.2.4).
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Aim 2: To facilitate self awareness and self monitoring
during the clinical enquiry and problem solving
process and the ability to compensate for or
correct errors.
Aim 3: To facilitate appropriate reciprocal development of
the substance and aptitude of the diagnostic think-
ing process.
Aim 4: To facilitate development of a foundation of substance
and aptitude that is amenable to continued develLopment
during subsequent experiences of clinical practice
and problem solving, and formal postgraduate edication.
13.3 Pedagogical Approaches
The multiplicity of theories of learning (see, for example,
Cross, 1974 or Rilgard, 1964), dearth of theories of teaching
(Gage, 1964), and variety of viewpoints concerning curriculum
development (harris et al, 1975; Hooper, 1971; Stenhouse,
1975) make it advisable that the instructional designer should
indicate his own approach or guiding principles. The follow-
ing section, therefore, presents some discussion of the
present background considerations and general orientation in
the light of which possible pedagogical approaches are
suggested. Subsequent sections concern aspects of the peda-
gogy itself.
13.3.1 Contextual Considerations
Clearly, a major determinant of suitable pedagogical appro-
aches in development of the diagnostic thinking process is
the psychological interpretation of the process itself.
Thus, the structuralist theory which is developed in Chapters
Eleven and Twelve to describe and explain the clinical
problem solver's cognitive processes and characteristics,
is reflected in the associated pedagogical orientation pre-
saged in Chapter Four.
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However, other types of consideration are also influential.
We may begin with one which is purely pragmatic. In identify-
ing strategies to facilitate development of the diagnostic
thinking process, it must be borne in mind that the discussion
is in relation to British medical schools which have the
opportunity for educational innovation within certain limits
of finance, staffing levels, patient availability, the necess-
ary core curriculum, a particular examination structure and
so on. In addition, and perhaps even more important than
these factors, are the teachers with their existing views and
experiences of their roles and responsibilities, and the
students with their habits and views of learning. While the
pedagogy must be designed to facilitate learning, the crucial
role of the facilitator must not be overlooked. Bruner (1960)
makes this quite clear:
"A curriculum is more for teachers than it is for
pupils. If it cannot change, move, perturb,
inform teachers it will have no effect on those
whom they teach. It must be first and foremost
a curriculum for teachers. If it has any effect
on pupils, it will have it by virtue of having
had an effect on teachers. The doctrine that a
well-wrought curriculum is a way of 'teacher-
proofing' a body of knowledge in order to get it
to the student uncontaminated is nonsense".
Any proposed pedagogical approach, then, must take into account
these contextual factors and be practical and realistic within
their constraints. These, however, are not the only consider-
ations which play a part in shaping the eventual teaching and
learning strategy.
Any approach to course design must rest on certain implicit or
explicit assumptions about the learners for whom the course is
intended, about the most appropriate framework for presentation
of the course material, and about the possible or probable forms
of interaction betwee learner and course material. With regard
to each of these, our current assumptions are that the learners
apply some subset of their general range of cognitive processes
to the diagnostic problem and would do so regardless of the
pedagogy to which they are exposed. However, it is also assumed
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that the pedagogy can either enhance or hinder the develLopment
of an efficient, effective and appropriate selection anI
application of that subset of operations. Further, the assum-
ption is made that no cognitive prescription can be made to
guide the thinking processes of the clinical problem solver
in advance of his problem solving activity, but that his
education may equip him to generate and apply his own means
of cognitive self monitoring and control when the occasion
arises, as it will many times daily during his future clini-
cal practice. On the basis of these considerations, it is
concluded that the presentation of the substance of undergrad-
uate medical education must have due regard to the developing
and mature cognitive processes and structures associated with
its use in clinical practice and problem solving. These
assumptions and conclusions reflect the approach to course
design of Mace (1976), which she describes as follows:
"It assumes that the University ... bases its
courses on one (or a combination) of the forms
of knowledge, or disciplines, which represent
our past and current ways of trying to make
sense of the world. When he engages in study
of them a student becomes actively involved in
the attempt to reate such an understanding
for himself. He must be introduced to the
central concepts (or abstract generalisations),
procedures (methods by which discoveries are
made), and criteria (principles according to
which 'prooV, or what counts as 'evidence', is
established), that go to make up the subjects
under study and that will enable him to think
for himself within them. Moreover, I am assum-
ing that the way in which that introduction is
made will determine the nature and range of his
thinking". (p. 26)
Thus, Mace concisely describes the approach, assumptions and
areas of substance and process which are adopted in the pre-
sent discussion. She also indicates very clearly the set of
inter-relationships between substance, process, teaching and
learning. Her view of the learner also is redolent of the
present study which recognises the importance of the student's
already formed and forming cognitive structures and processes.
From this vantage point medical education may be seen as being
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yet another, albeit special, formative Influence or experience
which yields the cognitive assimilations and accommodations
which all other experiences also occasion. Thus, it is
important to recognise that medical education, like any other,
merges with a stream of cognitive development and, while not
necessarily affecting its flow, may alter its course. Mace
(1976) suminarises this assumption also when describing her
view of the learner:
"... he Is a person with purposes, concerns and
interests of his own ... Although he understands
what is being offered in terms of his own purposes,
concerns and habits of thought, in the very attempt
to understand, those purposes, concerns and habits
of thought are themselves modified and transformed.
When he acts selectively in this way on what is
being offered he also, in a sense, transforms that.
In short, in the attempt to create his own under-
standing he is both acted upon and acting upon"
(p . 26)
The present structuralist approach is very much in accord with
this opinion. Such an approach has an inevitable implication
for course design. Mace (1976) argues that attempts to define
closely the precise intended outcome of learning fail to
respect the attributes of the learner which she identifies, and
the dynamic relationship between learner and course material
which may be inferred. The general and broad nature of the
aims proposed for the design of teaching strategies in relation
to development of the diagnostic thinking process (section
13.2 conclusion) reflect Mace's concern. Each of these four
aims suggests the implicit assumption that the learner must be
enabled to define for himself his own interpretative responses,
perceptions, structures and processes and that, in the end,
substance and aptitude will be assimilated and developed on
the basis of the learner's previous learning and development
of aptitude and substance. It is for these reasons that
awareness, not prescription, is advocated.
We may now follow Mace's (1976) argument through to its conclu-
sion which is in accord with that of Stenhouse (1975):
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"We can take the structure of the subject in
question as our touchstone. Our aim would be
the clear and honest explication of the sorts
of procedures, concepts and criteria that are
at work, and this aim would inform our selection
of material for the course. In our attempt to
be clear about the structure of the subject,
ways of presenting it to others would suggest
themselves consistent with our view of those
others as purposeful and interestedw. ( p . 26)
For medical education, structure here must refer both to the
relationship between substance and aptitude and to the
relationship between learner and that which is to be learned,
as well as to the structural aspects of these elements
themselves.
Having considered some assumptions which underlie our select-
ion of possible pedagogical approaches in development of the
diagnostic thinking process, we may now turn to another,
related contextual consideration. This concerns our knowledge
of cognitive psychology and its implications for education.
A highly pertinent discussion is presented by Broadbent (1975)
who draws some conclusions apposite to the present frame of
reference and reinforcing to the previous assumptions and con-
clusions. With regard to the relationship ibetween formal
education and the stream of cognitive development of the
learner, Broadhent (1975) (considering child rather than
adult learners) points out that:
"By the time a teacher meets any child, some
system of organisation will probably already
exist, and it is likely that fresh information
will be best assimilated through the system
which is already tentatively established".
(p. 175)
Our present concern with the cognitive autotomy of the student,
or the primacy of the student's own cognitive structure at
the time of learning, is thus reinforced. However, Broadbent
(1975) also draws attention to the possible inhibiting effects
of that cognitive structure in terms of the resultant select-
ivity of the learner's attention. Such selectivity might be
set by the learner's previous learning.
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"Only some of the information presented will
receive attention, and if this is not decided
deliberately it will certainly be decided by
chance factors". (ibid)
Such a phenomenon is noted in the account gathering study as
the set effect (section 11.9.1). It may apply equally to the
type of formal learning now under consideration. The matter
is also discussed in 4.1.1 above, where it is pointed out that
regardless of the objective content of the environment, where
the learner is left unguided his own prior knowledge will
determine which parts of that environment will function as a
stimulus for him. The teacher's role, therefore, must include
having due regard to the context of the student's prior know-
ledge structure and ensure that all the elements of the clinical
or instructional environment are attended to and that new or
incongruent ones become structured in the learner's memory
store appropriately (or old ones become restructured), and
used to advantage in his developing problem solving strategies.
This conclusion reflects two more of Broadbent's (1975) mess-
ages from cognitive psychology to education:
"When something Is noticed in the environment, it can
be processed or encoded in a number of ways, and
the particular processing which takes place will
decide whether the effects are long lasting or trans-
itory".
"If the effects are to be enduring, then the inform-
ation must be organised at the time it is stored,
in such a way that a clear path leads to it from
the likely situations in which it may be needed".
(ibid)
It is clear that this area of our discussion may be summarised
as the relationship between the development of substance and
aptitude on the one hand and the teaching and learning process
on the other. The views of Bruner and Gagne on this relation-
ship are usually interpreted as antithetical (Shulman, 1972),
yet they seem quite reconcilable and consistent within the
present context. Firstly, consider Bruner's (1966) view. His
discussion happens to be in relation to mathematics teaching:
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a theory of instruction seeks to take
account of the fact that a curriculum reflects
not only the nature of knowledge itself - the
specific capabilities - but also the nature
of the knower ax of the knowledge - getting
process. It is the enterprise par excellence
where the line between the subject matter and
the method grows necessarily indistinct
We teach a subject, not to produce little
living libraries from that subject, but
rather to get a student to think mathematically
for himself, to consider matters as a historian
does, to take part in the process of knowledge-
getting. Knowing is a process, not a product".
(p. 72)
The structuralist approach which is here adopted with regard
to the process of medical education, reflecting the struct-
uralist interpretation of the diagnostic thinking process
itself, reflects Bruner's view in its recognition of the
close and necessary inter-relationship between substance and
aptitude. Substance must be acquired in a manner and to an
extent consistent with and conducive to the development of
efficient and effective aptitude. The point of apparent
reconciliation between the positions of Bruner and Gagn,
however, lies in this, very necessity to acquire substance,
and in the manner of doing so. Gagn (1965) agrees that formal
instruction should have the aim of "teaching the student how
to think" (p. 170) but doubts that this can be done independently
of content. With regard to such strategies or styles of think-
ing, Gagn (1965) considers that:
"Even if these could be taught (and it is possible
that they could), they would not provide the
individual with the basic firmament of thought,
which is subject-matter knowledge. Knowing
a set of strategies is not all that is required
for thinking; it is not even a substantial
part of what is needed. To be an effective pro-
blem solver, the individual must somehow have
acquired masses of structurally organised
knowledge. Such knowledge is made up of con-
tent principles, not heuristic ones". (p. 170)
Although it is undeniable that knowledge is made up of content
principles, Gagn seems to take insufficient account, firstly,
of the structural organisation to which he draws attention,
and secondly, of the possibility that knowledge can be of
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process as well as substance. In this light, although know-
ledge may be made up of content principles not heuristic ones,
it is equally undeniable that the former surely serves the
latter, and in some instances (such as development of concur-
rent self awareness of the diagnostic thinking process) the
former and latter may be identical. With regard to the
pedagogy of the diagnostic thinking process, then, the approaches
of Bruner and Gagne are mutually enhancing rather than mutually
exclusive.
Before progressing to a more specific discussion of that
pedagogy, it might be useful to consider other aspects of the
contextual factor of the relationship between manner and out-
come of learning. Stones (1966) takes a similar approach to
the interpretation of learning as does the present discission.
We may understand his schemas to be as our structures:
"Thus learning advances by a series of schemas
which increase in complexity as they assimilate
new- elements. The use of cognitive schemas may
be regarded as an important aspect of meaningful
learning. Learning which does not make use of
such schemas will have less wide application.
Behaviour which does not involve schemas will
tend to consist 'of arbitrary linkages and
responses. This we shall refer to as rote learn-
ing. (p. 147)
Thus, as Osgood (1953) points out in relation to Wertheimer's
work, "we cannot expect forceful, productive thinking in
problem situations from people who are trained by blind rote
methods". However, it is possible and useful to consider the
question of the relationship between style and outcome of
learning from a different viewpoint. So far, we have con-
sidered only the effects of learning both in terms of memory
store and problem solving ability resulting from use of that
store. We have considered the knowledge-getting process
mentioned by Bruner, only from the point of view of future
effects of present learning. However, we may also consider
the process of knowledge acquisition from the point of view
of the approach adopted by the learner.
- 
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Marton and Slj (1976) identify two levels of information
processing or approaches to learning in univeristy students.
These levels they call deep level and surface level process-
ing and describe in the following terms:
"ln the case of surface level processing the
student directs his attention towards learning
the text itself (the sign), i.e. he has a
reproductive conception of learning which
means that he is more or less forced to keep
to a rote learning strategy. In the case of
deep level processing, on the other hand,
the student is directed towards the intentional
content of the learning matera1 (what is
signified), i.e. he is directed towards com-
prehending what the author wants to say about,
for instance, a certain scientific problem or
principle". (pp 7-8)
Transposing this into the current framework, and in r€lation
to development of the diagnostic thinking process, to grasp
the significance of new material is to relate it to previous
learning and to perceive its inner structure. For Marton
(1975) "to grasp what is signified is simply to discover (or
to create) meaning. •In our opinion, this is precisely "what
it takes to learn". And - we may add - to teach is to
facilitate this learning". Given the nature of problem
solving as one type of learning, we may reasonably say that
the task of the medical teacher must be to facilitate some-
thing akin to Marton's deep level processing. Marton and
Sl (1976) are in no doubt that such a level of processing
is amenable to facilitation. Their 1976 study shows that
students can adapt their way of learning to their conception
of what is required of them. The present discussion reflects
their conclusions:
"The fundamental importance of recognising the
necessary link between the level of processing
adopted by the student and the level of under-
standing cannot be overstated. Students adopt
an approach determined by their expectations
of what is required of them. While many
students are apparently capable of using deep
or surface strategies, it may be that the
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current demands of the examination system at
school level are interpreted by them as requir-
ing mainly the recall of factual information
to the detriment of a deeper level of under-
standing. The present investigation suggests
that students may need to refocus their attention
on the underlying meaning of what they are
required to study and that this process could be
helped by ensuring that the assessment procedures
demand deep level processing. Hever, the
existence of a groupf students who 'technified'
their attempts at deep level processing indicate
that a more prolonged, and perhaps more explicit,
redirection of attention may be necessary".
(p. 125).
Howe and Colley (1976) add further experimental support to
the contention that the nature of learning is influenced by
the set created by the nature of questions put to the
learner following previous learning. This certainly has
implications for pedagogical as well as assessment procedures.
Whether the set for learning is created by the examination
system alone is a matter for debate. It would seem reason-
able to contend that it is also created, in the short term,
by the pedagogy itself. If the four aims defined earlier
(section 13.2) in rekation to development of the diagnostic
thinking process are adopted, then appropriate assessment
procedures must ensue. In the meanwhile, the present dis-
cussion addresses itself only to the pedagogy and not to
assessment strategy. The central issue concerns the means
and methods whereby the deep level processing associated with
appreciation of underlying meaning and comprehension of what
is signified may be facilitated both in relation to substance
and aptitude, to the content and process of preparation for
clinical practice. Such a pedagogy may be determined in
relation to our knowledge of the developing and experienced
diagnostic thinking process and to our inferences concerning
the structure of substance and application of aptitude and
the relationships between these elements.
These, then, are the preliminary contextual considerations to
be noted in any discussion of the pedagogy of the diagnostic
thinking process. They may be summarised as follows:
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1. Psychological nature of the developing and experienced
diagnostic thinking process.
2. Inferences concerning the substance and aptitude of
the diagnostic thinking process and their inter-dependence
and inter-relationship.
3. Limiting features of the medical school environment and
curriculum.
4. Present approaches and roles of medical teachers and
teaching.
5. Assumption of the learner's necessary and inevitable
application of a subset of the general range of cognitive
processes.
6. Assumption of the formative effect of the pedagogy.
7. Assumption of the inappropriateness of precise prescrip-
tion of a diagnostic thinking process, and of the
possibility of equipping the student to apply cognitive
self monitoring and control of his own contemporaneous
diagnostic thinking process.
8. Inter-relatedness of substance, process, teaching and
learning.
9. Recognition of the importance of the learner's inchoate,
forming and formed cognitive structures and processes
in facilitating or inhibiting learning.
10. The implications of cognitive psychology for education
in terms of selective attention and manner of the learner's
assimilative and accomodatory responses.
11. Recognition that the pedagogy must reflect the natures
of the substance and the aptitude.
12. Recognition of the deterministic realtionship between
style and outcome of learning.
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Having considered the context of the pedag ogy, it may be most
logical to progress to a consideration of its content.
13.3.2 Curriculum Content and the Role of the Teacher
The question of con tent is inseparable from that of the role
of the teacher, since what is suggested is not any radical
addition or subtraction from the content of any undergraduate
curriculum but rather an alteration in the presentation of
that content. It is argued above (section 13.2> that the
separate study of the diagnostic thinking process would be
inappropriate and, probably, counter-productive. The defined
aims (section 13.2) do not concern the student's learning of
any theory. They concern, firstly, the development of habits
of self monitoring and self awareness. Secondly, they concern
the reciprocal development of substance and aptitude such that
the formed cognitive structures and processes will serve the
future in the manner described in Aim 4 (section 13.2). The
first of these involves, of necessity, some knowledge of the
potential cognitive processes. But it is suggested that such
knowledge should be inferred from and be based on or grow out
of the learners' pratice of clinical problem solving. The
second of these, however, necessitates that the teacher has a
sound knowledge of the range of possible cognitive processes
which will be demonstrated by his students and that he has
the pedagogical (and analytical> skills to guide each student
to a practical and useful understanding and awareness of his
own cognitive processes. In addition, it necessitates a
basic knowledge and understanding of the structuralist rat-
ionale. It is emphasised that such knowledge of theory need
not be highly elaborated in order to be useful.
Wood et a]. (1976) discuss the role of tutoring in problem
solving. The tutorial process they conceive as an "inter
active, instructional relationship" whereby an expert helps
someone who is less expert. Wood et a]. (1976) are considering
only the situation in which a student is assisted in solving
a problem by having the teacher control the elements of the
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task that are initially beyond the learner's capacity, thus
perniitting him to concentrate on and complete only those
elements that are within his range of competence. Although
this may be part of the medical teacher's proposed task, he
has the additional one of guiding the student to an awareness
of the way in which he is approaching the clinical problem
and deciding upon a resolution or diagnosis. We are, perhaps,
echoing Bartlett's (1958) opinion that thinking is a form of
skill, that it has acknowledged experts and that it has to
be acquired by "well-informed practice". The teacher must
be acknowledged expert and informer in one. But Ausubel et
al (1978), using an apposite analogy, make it clear that
this dual role is unlikely to occur without preparation:
"Teaching, like medicine, requires a long
period of practical apprenticeship as well
as particular sensitivities, diagnostic skills
and the ability to prescribe and implement
suitable practices. These competencies go
beyond what is learned in applied science
courses such as educational psychology and
child development (or medical physiology
and pathology), or in clinical courses such
as methodology and student teaching (or clini-
cal diagnosis and clinical clerkship). Also,
the individual skilled in appraising an
educational situation (or in diagnosing a
patient's condition) is not necessarily
equally skilled in proposing and putting into
practice effective measures for learning (or
treatment). But judgment without knowledge
of principles is no more effective than know-
ledge of principles without judgment. Neither
is it any more likely to be free of error".
(p. 8)
In their discussion of the necessity for preparation of the
teacher, Ausubel et al (1978) return us to the question of
content. Given that it is the pedagogy of a process that is
under consideration, definition of content may seem somewhat
incongruous. However, given also that the structure and
elements of that process are defined and described, these
must (at some appropriate level of specificity) determine
or constitute the content of the instructional process.
Thus, the teacher would find it useful to have at his dis-
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posal a basic knowledge of the fundamental psychological
features of structure and extrapolation accompanied by more
specific (although, again, not necessarily highly elaborated)
knowledge of the major characteristics of the three stages
of the diagnostic thinking process as summarised in section
12.2.4 above. Such knowledge should enable the teacher to
analyse and interpret the thinking processes of the student
and to guide him towards his own understanding and knowledge
in turn. Coinplementarily, the structure or process of the
pedagogy must reflect and enhance the structure and course
of the diagnostic thinking or problem solving process itself.
However, achievement of such aims is equally dependent upon
the design and implementation of teaching strategies which
expose the learner's diagnostic thinking process or make it
otherwise amenable to interpretation and guidance or remedy.
The nature of such teaching strategies is the subject of
the following two sections. In preparation, we may suxnmarise
the present section in the following points:
1. No radical alteration of curriculum Content is proposed,
but alteration in the presentation of content is
advocated.
2. The medical teacher should have a sound knowledge of
the range of possible cognitive processes and the funda-
mental features of structure and extrapolation.
3. The medical teacher should have the pedagogical (and
analytical) skills to guide the student to practical and
useful understanding and awareness of his own contempor-
aneous diagnostic thinking processes.
4. The defined structure, elements and explanatory concepts
of the diagnostic thinking process should determine or
constitute the content of the associated pedagogy.
5. The structure or process of the pedagogy should reflect
and enhance the structure and course of the diagnostic
thinking process itself.
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We may conclude by placing the curriculum content and the
role of the teacher in their wider context:
The pedagogy, which is implemented by the teacher, should
reflect a structurally appropriate increasing store of
knowledge and a developing applied thinking process.
The teacher should guide the student towards self awareness,
monitoring and remedy of the contemporaneous diagnostic
thinking process.
Prospectively, these should prepare for the ready future
development of substance and aptitude by means of two comple-
mentary aspects:
A process of expedient teaching strategies.
A content of a serviceable analytical and synthetical frame-
work of theoretical constructs and defined processes as
suimnarised in relation to the three stages of the diagnostic
thinking process.
13.3.3 The Pedagogy of Strtcture
It is argued that pedagogy in the development of the diagnostic
thinking process must reflect the structural characteristics
of stored knowledge, as well as enhancing the development and
use of such knowledge in the process itself. The present
section considers pedagogical implications of structure and
therefore of substance, while section 13.3.4 concerns the
pedagogy of the cognitive process itself and therefore of
aptitude.
Armstrong et al (l79), in the context of interviewing,
diagnostic procedures and the doctor-patient relationship,
point out the importance of the internal representation of
the problem for the solver, since the way in which a problem
is represented and defined will largely determine how it will
be tackled". The discussion of structure is likewise one of
internal representation which is partially dependent upon
the context and manner of initial presentation of information.
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However, it would be erroneous to assume that information
presented during some real or simulated process of clinical
problem solving is also automatically stored within that
context. It is concluded earlier (section 4.2.2), for example,
that problem based learning leaves the question of structure
open. The organising agents in problem based learning are not
identified, thus no conclusions may be drawn about the struct-
ural properties of knowledge acquired through such learning.
In turn, it cannot be assumed with any justification that such
stored information will display greater ease of retrieval or
transfer in the face of a new clinical problem. Unless the
characteristics of the problem solver's own thinking are known
and taken into account, structural generalisation (and thus
transferability) is difficult to achieve by design. With
regard to the development of the diagnostic thinking process,
pedagogy should be designed to make full use of and maximally
enhance the cognitive structure of the learner if it is known
how he uses that structure in his thinking. The present
study provides clear indicators of this process. Section
12.2.4 summarises the main characteristics of the three
stages of the diagno&tic thinking process. Of these, certain
features may be considered as of special importance in any
discussion of the pedagogy of structure in development of the
diagnostic thinking process. These features concern the
structural characteristics of stored information and the
structural characteristics attributed to the changing array
of information which constitutes the clinical problem. We
may identify them as:
Stage One	 Differential forcefulness of items of informa-
tion.
Attribution of force by the selecting operation.
Absolute threshold of force.
Access to stored structures from any item of
information.
Varying degrees of appropriateness of extrapol-
ated contexts.
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stage Two	 Restructuring by shift of force.
Restructuring by multiple extrapolation from
the same forceful feature.
Stage Three None.
From these features, it may reasonably be concluded that the
pedagogy of structure involves learning not only the inform-
ation itself, but also its possible interpretative values
in relation to other items of information, either presented
or stored. It involves also learning that the same informa-
tion can be perceived in different ways depending upon its
context (actual or extrapolated or upon the relative import-
ance accorded to it. In brief, it involves learning that
information can be cognitively re-arranged and acquire new
meaningsand significance, just as pieces on a chess board can
be physically re-arranged and, because of the structure of
rules of the game, also acquire new meanings and significance.
The pedagogical questions, however, are How? and When?
In section 4.2.2 it is asked: What are the organising agents
in problem based learning? Subsequent discussion enables us
to answer that. They are the problem solver's identification
of forceful features and his methods of arranging information
in stored structures according to his (more or less accurate
and complete) perception of his own clinical problem solving
experiences. These organising agents may be limited or dis-
torted by previous experiences of learning outside the
clinical problem solving context. The quality of information
being 'out of focus' (see section 13.2) may generalise by
pro-active interference to new information. Having said this,
however, it must also be recognised that a process of retro-
active interference could just as well bring such information
sharply into clinical focus. Thus an experienced clinician
understands very clearly the meaning of 'bluish' when used to
describe the cyanosed state, unlike the clinical inexperienced
student who, having read the term, may be excused for seeking
a patient of cobalt or ultramarine hue. Such a line of
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argument leads us inexorably to question whether or not there
may be occasions when it is not actually necessary or most
profitable for a medical student to acquire information in a
structure appropriate to his clinical problem solving think-
ing process. After all, no cognitive structure is inviolable,
none is immune from restructuring and some information, per-
haps, may best be initially understood and assimilated within
a context other than that of the diagnostic problem solving
process. We may think, for example, of microbiology, chemical
pathology, physiology or anatomy. Within the purview of the
present discussion, it is necessary only to answer that the
same information may find itself located in more than one
structure (as multiple extrapolation from the same item or
items of clinical information indicates) and that a necessary
pre-requisite of restructuring is an ability to identify the
elements of the field of information (see section l2.2.l
Dickstein, 1968; Witkin et al, 1974).
The fourth of our identified aims (section 13.2) concerns the
development of a foundation of substance and aptitude that is
amenable to continued development. Such an aim must also
apply to any station of the undergraduate curriculum, as well
as to its endpoint, Giving pedagogical consideration to
structure thus requires attention to the possibility of a
range of sequential structures. Vertical integration of the
curriculum may seem an appropriate environment in which to
achieve exactly this. Without it, premature acquisition of
inappropriate, unalterable structures may result in premature
closure which inhibits the acquisition of more appropriate
structures later (Ausubel et al, 1978).
We have identified the learner's organising agents in the
clinical problem solving process as his identification of
forceful features and his arrangement of information according
to his perception of the field and extrapolation to stored
embedding contexts. The pedagogy of structure must aim to
achieve a conscious and clear use of these agents. It is
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suggested that they will operate regardless of the learning
environment. The pedagogical task is appropriate arrange-
ment of that environment to facilitate such operation to
maximal efficiency and effect. Ausubel et al (1978) advocate
the use of advance organisers in learruing'to enhance pro-
active facilitation' (see 12.2.1 above). In the present
context, it is suggested that the whole of undergraduate
medical education may be seen as the advance organiser for
clinical practice and clinical problem solving. Further, it
is suggested that each learner must develop his own structures
and processes through an awareness of his own cognitive
operations. The pedagogy of structure may yield the advance
organisers, but must itself be a concurrent organiser.
Some clarity in defining the role and psychological meaning
of structure in the diagnostic thinking process has been
achieved. To take advantage of this, the pedagogy may most
appropriately encourage the student to rehearse actively and
consciously the elements of that process which uses stored
knowledge and to involve himself in the equally active
identification, organisation and re-organisation of the elem-
ents of the field as they are elicited during the clinical
encounter. This must be done in relation to the stored
structures in order to achieve rational and useful acquisition
of knowledge. For example, the process, means and mechanism
of extrapolation may be demonstrated by the student himself
in ways to be described below and an awareness established of
the cognitive processes which usually remain hidden from
analytical view and are often represented as intuition. The
basis of such a strategy, it is suggested, must be the
identification of the elements of information available to the
problem solver and the opportunity for subsequent application
of active and conscious cognitive operations. Let us consider
the rationale for this statement.
We have already noted (section 4.1.1) Lunzer's (1968) and
Broadbent's (1975) illumination of the ileimna whereby what
functions as a stimulus for the learner is not necessarily an
- LLJ,f -
objective reflection of the field but may be determined by
his prior knowledge (or schemata or structures). Thus for
new structures to develop or established ones to become
appropriately restructured, it may be helpful in the first
instance to guide the learner's perception towards recognition
or identification of the elements of the clinical situation,
including those non standard ones identified in section 11.10
above. When he has perceived the field, the student might
be encouraged to classify and rehearse its structural proper-
ties and the means of assigning them. For example, extra-
polated contexts might be identified on the basis of the
elements, groups of elements may be identified and interpreted
and expectations discussed. In relation to the selecting
operation, consideration of the relative force or value of
items in yielding possible extrapolated contexts might be
undertaken and reasons for differential forcefulness considered
in relation to the learner's own stored structures, the clarity
of information elicited and so on. The degree of satisfaction
or cognitive ease the problem solver experiences in working
with different types, items and arrays of information may be
made explicit and analysed. The role of the teacher in all
this might be to guide the learner towards satisfactory and
serviceable interpretation and understanding of the relation-
ship between items of information elicited and that stored in
his own memory and to add to or restructure that store approp-
riately to future practice. Relationships, conjunctions,
disjunctions, intersections and so on may be pinpointed so
that the structural properties of new and established inform-
ation may be clarified and addition of the new to the store
may thus be more structurally sound than it otherwise would
be. A discussion of specific teaching methods or styles is
not intended here, yet the potential for both tutorial and
group work as well as for individualised learning is clear.
Likewise, the opportunity for integration of prior and present
learning is also presented. A further product of such an
approach may be to provide the problem solver with means of
changing course of identifying new avenues to explore during
the clinical interview when as happens (Armstrong et al, 1979)
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he runs out of questions after, presumably, having run out
of extrapolated contexts or items within them. The ability
to separate the field into its component parts and evaluate
each of these may also encourage avoidance of the set
effect (see 12.2.2. above) by enabling more rational compar-
ison of observed and expected findings.
Barrows (1973) suggests that groups or individual students
should approach problem solving by asking such questions as:
"Is there a problem here, is there more than one?
Can the problem or problems be defined?
What data or observations are needed to more
accurately characterise the problem or problems?"
(p. 60)
However, such an approach does not reflect the basis of the
diagnostic thinking process in cognitive operation on the
elements or a subset of the elements of the clinical situation
as it progresses and develops. Neither does it reflect the
structural aspects of the cognitive processes of the clinical
problem solver. The present proposed pedagogical approach
relies on the fundamental elements and aptitudes of the
diagnostic thinking process and upon making these amenable to
conscious awareness and use. In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, the proposed approach, which is based on the
interpretation and structured storage of the substance of the
clinical problem (the symptoms, signs and details of the
clinical history) would appear to facilitate transfer of
learning. Such transfer may be of aptitude and substance,
from problem to problem, or from time of acquisition of what
has been learned if such learning occurred outside the context
of a clinical problem, to the time of its retrieval in order
to solve a clinical problem or to be related to new learning.
The proposed strategy has the further and important character-
istic of allowing for individual differences in the content of
cognitive structure by allowing each learner to take advantage
of and work from his own present state. The overt nature of
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the types of teaching method indicated also allows the
teacher some access to the student's cognitive structure by
receiving specific information about the connections and
extrapolations which the student makes on the basis of items
or arrays of information presented. This reflects Lawless's
(1979) Opinion:
"Awareness of the importance of making connect-
ions between new and existing knowledge is the
important quality. Devices such as 'advance
organisers' (Ausubel, 1978) which acquaint the
learner with the overall structure of the subject
matter, and developing an overview by a 'spiral
curriculum' (Bruner, 1966), have been shown to
be effective, but the long term aim must be for
the student to develop techniques of working
out structure for his self".
Further, if indirect, support is given to the proposed
information based approach if we reconsider the results of
the present questionnaire study in relation to the philosophy
of neurological diagnosis and teaching. The study demonstrates
the similarity of students and registrars in their reliance
on the tested and untested areas of learning and thinking
necessary in clinical problem solving. Neurological teaching
tends to stress "the need for a full history and a full
description of all findings" (GMC, 1977). Thus the neurolog-
ical emphasis on the information itself appears to yield in
students cognitive characteristics more near those of the
expert than is the case in endocrinology which has no such
explicit emphasis. However, this statement must be tempered
by recognition of the relatively less frequent success in
actually making the correct diagnosis in neurology than in
endocrinology, when students and registrars are compared.
This may indicate that explicit attention to the elements
of the field of information may assist developnient of process
but not of helpful structures unless the structural character-
istics and the inter-relationships between new and stored
items of information are explored in an equally explicit
manner. Broadbent (1975) stresses this point, that even when
a learner "has noticed something about a situation, the way
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it has been noticed is important". To support this contention,
he cites Morton's (1967) work which showed that most regular
telephone users in his study could not reproduce the positions
of letters and digits on the telephone dial. Broadbent (1975)
concludes that:
"Cognitive psychology not only warns us that
information we present may fail to get into
the nervous system at all, but also makes it
clear that the future effects of what is seen
or heard depend very much on the categories
or codes into which information is placed
The storage of information is much less likely
to cause trouble if certain steps are taken at
the time of storage".
It is suggested that the proposed teaching strategy pays due
attention to these points by focussing attention on the field
of information items and making it possible to clarify the
student's stored structures in relation to these. Such guided
but active, and potentially individualised learning, provides
the opportunity to use the structured store, to restructure or
otherwise alter or refine it, and to draw attention to the
related cognitive process aspects of clinical problem solving.
Cutler's (1979) clue orientated approach to teaching"the
transformation of a data base into a problem list" perhaps
approaches the present stress on the perception of information
but lacks the necessary accompanying awareness of the comple-
mentary cognitive process.
it is appropriate now to consider the pedagogy of process but
before doing so we may summarise the discussion of the
pedagogy of structure:
1. Pedagogy in the development of the diagnostic thinking
process must reflect the structural characteristics of
stored knowledge and enhance its development and use.
2. The pedagogy of structure involves learning information
(factual knowledge) and its interpretative value in
relation to other presented or stored items of information.
In addition, it involves learning that information can be
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cognitively rearranged and thereby acquire new meanings
and significance.
3. Stored structures are subject to both pro-active and retro-
active interference.
4. A necessary pre-requisite in the pedagogy of structure
is facilitation of the ability to identify the elements
of the field of information.
5. The pedagogy of structure must aim to achieve conscious
and clear use of the clinical problem solving processes
of identification of forceful features and arrangement
of information according to perception of the field and
extrapolation to stored embedding contexts.
6. Undergraduate medical education may be seen as the advance
organiser for clinical practice and problem solving.
7. The learner must develop his own structures and processes
through an awareness of his own cognitive operations.
8. To achieve rational and useful acquisition of knowledge,
the student should rehearse actively and consciously the
elements of the process which uses the stored structures,
and should actively identify, organise and reorganise
the elements of the field elicited during the clinical
encounter.
9. Teaching methods might be designed to guide the student's
perception towards identification of the items of inform-
ation in the field, his means of assigning structure by
extrapolation, the structural properties of items of
information, their potential for restructuring or reorgan-
isation, selection of forceful features, attribution of
relative force, satisfactoriness of extrapolated contexts
and so on.
10. The role of the teacher must be to guide the perception
and understanding of the learner.
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11. Ability to analyse and evaluate the field of information
may encourage avoidance of the set effect.
12. It is suggested that a structurally based pedagogy reflects
the learning and thinking processes of the clinical pro-
blem solver; that it facilitates transfer of learning;
and that it allows for and uses to advantage individual
differences in the content of cognitive structure.
13. The proposed teaching strategy allows the teacher some
access to the student's cognitive structure.
13.3.4 The Pedagogy of Process and its Relationship to the Pedagogy
of Structure
The discussion of the pedagogy of structure closes with an
indication of the essential unity or inter-relatedness of
structure and process in the development of clinical problem
solving skill. The present distinction between structure
and process is, therefore, artifical and only useful for ana-
lytical purposes. The pedagogy of structure and the pedagogy
of process in practice, promise to be the same activity, just
as problem solving can be seen as a special type of learning
(see section 4.1.3 above) and therefore has implications for
the learner's structure of knowledge. However, just as
being presented with information is shown in the previous
section to be inadequate in ensuring the appropriate develop-
ment of stored structures, so is practice in solving problems
as such also inadequate without guidance and feedback about
the cognitive processes used (See section 4.1.3 above).
It is suggested that the aims of the pedagogy of process are
defined particularly as the first two of the four aims ident-
ified for the design of teaching strategies (see the
conclusion of section 13.2 above). These concern the devel-
opment of awareness of the range of possible cognitive
operations of the three stages of the diagnostic thinking
process and the facilitation of self awareness, self monitoring
and, if necessary, remedial thinking. The remaining aims
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concern the conjunction and outcome of teaching for both
structure and process. The content of the teaching primarily
must be derived from the cognitive operations identified in
the account gathering study (see Chapter Eleven) and summar-
ised in section 12.2.4. Thus the teacher should be able to
guide the student towards an awareness, use and control of
the cognitive operations of:
Stage One	 The selecting operation.
Extrapolation, single and multiple from
single or many items.
Stage Two	 Restructuring and re-interpretation by shift
of force or multiple extrapolation.
Comparison of expected and observed findings
by working from the extrapolated context.
Judgment of acquisition of sufficient inform-
ation.
Reciprocal determinative and responsive cogni-
tive operations and behaviour in relation to
the flow of information.
Possible errors, e.g. set effect (see section
11.9 above).
Stage Three Judgment of congruence of observed and expected
information.
Possible reversibility of the judgment.
Methods of resolution of the problem.
However, although these aspects may be identified as important
for the student's awareness, their separate identities do not,
while separate, add up to the diagnostic thinking process.
Crutchfield (1972) expresses this point:
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"... the thinker's purpose is to solve a problem
by using many specific skills. These skills
must be effectively co-ordinated with one
another if the problem solving process is to go
forward to a successful conclusion. The per-
fecting of one of these specific cognitive
skills is thus as much a matter of learning
how to integrate it with the other concurrently
operating skills as it is a matter of practising
this skill by itself. In short, what is required
is the development and strengthening of the
master thinking skill". (p. 196)
Full support is given to Crutchfield's viewpoint. Further,
qualified support is also given to the pedagogical lessons
which he draws from this conclusion:
"The educational implications of these comments
about the master thinking skill are clear. If
we seek to nurture the student's ability to think,
then we must give him appropriate training on
the many specific skills we have described. But
in order to do this most effectively - so as to
practise these skills in a mutually reinforcing
way and to make for optimal transfer - we should
train them simultaneously in the context of whole
problems which have considerable scope, complexity
and meaningfulness. In this fashion the student
will practise using his productive mental pro-
cesses in the integrated way they must be used
for genuine problem solving". (p. 196)
From this, it is clear that our support for this position
must be qualified simply because the aims of the pedagogies are
different. It is our contention that the diagnostic thinking
process is not special in its form, but only in its applica-
tion. The diagnostic thinking process is, it is suggested
(see Chapter Twelve) an everyday cognitive process. The skills
are already integrated. The training is not in problem solv-
ing per Se. The aim of the pedagogy of process must be to
facilitate analysis (and therefore separation) of the component
cognitive skills. It is not suggested that any new thinking
process be taught or learned, but just that those which are
applied are monitored and controlled and, if necessary, made
less prone to error. Thus the training of the pedagogy of
process is not like that of Crutchfield (1972). It is, rather,
training in self awareness. The learning which is intended
concerns the relative balance of the separate skills of the
- 
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diagnostic thinking process as described in Chapter Twelve.
Section 12.3 above discusses and summarises the developmental
aspects of the diagnostic thinking process. It is shown
that development is characterised by a change in balance and
relative contribution of the various separate cognitive
operations. No new operations appear to develop or be applied
as a result of experience. Rather, a more efficient and
effective use of those already extant is achieved. It is
suggested that with appropriate pedagogy the experienced balance
might be achieved more rationally and more efficiently than
the current apparently trial and error method allows. Peel
(1971) writes in terms of teaching being directed at enabling
thinkers to cross the bridge between different levels of judg-
ment. We are suggesting a similar process. In addition,
such a pedagogy might facilitate the ability for self monitor-
ing and control.
The importance of such analytical and remedial skills is
fundamental since, as is argued in section 13.2 above, pres-
cription of the thinking process is not appropriate or possible.
It can be stated with some certainty of generalisability
across all instances of clinical problem solving, that struct-
uring and interpretation by extrapolation to stored embedding
contexts is characteristic of the diagnostic thinking process.
However, the occurrence of the set effect, active confirmation
or any of the more specific, more idiosyncratic, more content
dependent processes, is unpredictable. Examples may be
constructed for demonstration, but the most useful instances
might arise in the learner's own thinking processes. The
teacher, therefore, should have full knowledge of the range
and mechanisms of diagnostic thinking processes of neophyte
and expert. From the point of view of the learner, theoretical
knowledge and understanding of such cognitive processes should
be helpful in facilitating self awareness and analysis and in
providing a frame of reference. However, the dominant aspect
of the pedagogy is neither that of adding a new subject to
the curriculum nor of facilitating discussions of theory.
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Rather, it is to have positive bearing upon the thinking
process while it is in progress.
Clearly, a major question for the planner or designer of
teaching concerns how the thinking processes of the learner
might be rendered amenable to his own and the teacher's
observation or analysis. A second question concerns the
pedagogical means by which the range of thinking processes
may be demonstrated to the learner for discussion and
analysis. With regard to the first of these, the present
account gathering study has demonstrated the reliability,
validity and usefulness of the method of videotape stimulated
recall. Such a method is amenable to modification for
teaching purposes as the work of Kagan (1977) and Kagan and
Krathwohl (1967) in interpersonal process recall clearly
demonstrates. Ward rounds and discussions of case histories
and clinical problems might also provide usefial opportunity
for illuminating the cognitive approach of the learner.
The skill of the teacher in eliciting and analysing or facil-
itating self analysis of appropriate reports and accounts is
crucial for such methods. As with the pedagogy of structure,
the opportunity for group work is available if the pedagogical
validity of vicarious experience is accepted.
However, although the proposed approaches might allow access
to the learner's thinking processes in situations of varying
degrees of fidelity, the question of how to istegrate the
results of the process into the learner's diagnostic thinking
process while in operation remains unanswered. At the McMaster
medical school self awareness questions are included in the
clinical problems which are constructed for students to solve
(Learning Resources Design Project, 1975). With problems of
reasonably high fidelity such as simulated patients this method
would seem likely to encourage transfer of self awareness to
the real clinical problem solving context. It is possible
that teaching methods may be constructed with lower fidelity
problems which also may provide for transfer.. It may be
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necessary to determine whether or not prompts to self
analysis or monitoring should best occur at fixed intervals
or at critical points identified by an observer (either
peer or teacher). In the light of the McMaster use of
observers for simultaneous interpretations of the clinical
problem solver's strategy (see section 3.1.2) this would seem
a reasonable strategy. The guiding principle in all this,
however, must be that self monitoring and rectification of
thinking or problem solving processes can best facilitate
transfer to actual clinical practice if learned in a situation
which closely approximates the real one. The skill of think-
ing, like any other, can best be learned through a judicious
combination of theory and practice (Fitts and Posner, 1967).
The phases of skill learning, as defined by Fitts and Posner,
(1967) commence with the learner's efforts to understand the
task:
"Whether left to his own devices or tutored by
an experienced instructor, the beginner in
most adult skill learning situations tries to
"understand" the task and what it demands. A
good instructor will call his attention to
important perceptual cues and response
characteristics and give diagnostic knowledge
of results". (p. 11)
Although Fitts and Posner (1967) are here referring to the
development of complex motor skills, the analogy with the
present cognitive skills development is clear. These authors
also describe the learner's reactions during the phases of
learning and provide a description of the development here
envisaged of the diagnostic thinking process. In particular,
they clarify a potential meaning of self monitoring, suggest-
ing that this declines to a lowered, autonomous, necessary
level during the final phase of learning:
"During the early phase of skill learning it is
usually necessary to attend to cues, events,
and responses that later go unnoticed.
During the final phase of skill learning, com-
ponent processes become increasingly autonomous,
less directly subject to cognitive control, and
less subject to interference from other ongoing
activities or environmental distractions. In
this phase, skills require less processing.
This means that they can be carried on while new
learning is in progress or while an individual is
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engaged in other perceptual and cognitive
activities". (pp 12, 14)
Thus, by analogy, it would be reasonable to infer that self
monitoring and awareness can be incorporated into the
diagnostic thinking process by successive stages until un-
obstrusively integrated. The possibility of achieving such
an aim in a field of cognitive skill, rather than that of
the motor skills addressed by Fitts and Posner (1967) is
suggested by some other authors. For example, Lawless (1979)
considers with regard to learning, that "creating awareness
in the student of his learning processes and their potential
for improvement is the first priority". Saljo (1978) agrees
that "... when people become aware of their own learning in
different respects, they will be better equipped to deal
with various sorts of learning difficulties". Such is our
thesis with regard to the development of the diagnostic think-
ing process.
We may now turn to the second of the two questions identified,
which concerns the pedagogical means by which the range of
thinking processes might be demonstrated to the learner for
his intellectual understanding and subsequent analytical use.
It has already been suggested that many examples will arise in
the learner's own thinking processes and methods of making
these amenable to observation and analysis have been suggested.
However, such examples might require clarification by refer-
ence to specially prepared and constructed demonstrations
which, in turn, need not be didactic but may provide the stud-
ent with opportunities for guided analysis of a controlled
field of information. Such demonstrations may take the form,
for example, of videotapes, films, reports or accounts with
designed occasions for interruption,analysis and discussion.
Appropriately planned conjunctions of clinical information and
the problem solver's response presented on videotape, film or
by report might provide a useful controlled device for teach-
ing and learning the elements of the diagnostic thinking
process by demonstration and analysis. Demonstration of the
more generalisable cognitive operations may be provided by the
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learners themselves. For example, the process of extra-
polation, the basis of it in selection of the forceful. feature
and related concepts of selective attention may be elicited
by means of simple exercises such as those described in the
previous section (13.3.3) whereby the learner might be pre-
sented with a field of information and asked to interpret it
and explain his rationale for the way in which he does so.
Conflicting interpretations may arise in a group of learners
and, with the guidance of the teacher, lessons drawn about
identification of the forceful feature, selective attention
and so on. Such methods are not to be confused with training
in hypothesis generation (see 4.2.3 above). Many media and
methods are available for reinforcement, demonstraticzn and
analysis of the fundamental concepts and cognitive processes
of clinical problem solving as identified throughout Chapters
Eleven and Twelve and summarised at the beginning of this
section. Some of the ones suggested here reflect those
reported and discussed by Peel (1971) in relation to jpromotion
of mature judgment among adolescents. We may note, finally,
that less active teaching methods may sometimes be both
adequate and appropriate given the necessity of some theoret-
ical knowledge. Ausubel et al's (1978) contention that
reception learning can be both meaningful and active presents
the possibility of didactic exposition and economical use of
teaching and learning time. Their position may be summarised:
"... reception learning is not necessarily rote in
character. Much ideational material (concepts,
generalisations) can be internalised and retainedi
meaningfully without prior problem solving
experience. And at no stage of development does
the learner have to discover principles independ-
ently in order to be able to understand and use
them meaningfully." (p. 25)
In these terms:
"... meaningful learning takes place if the learn-
ing task can be related in non-arbitrary,
substantive (non-verbatim) fashion to what the
learner already knows, and if the learner adopts
a corresponding learning set to do so". ( p. 27)
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The discussion of the pedagogy of process indicates features
both additional and complementary to those of the pedagogy
of structure. We may therefore conclude with a brief dis-
cussion of how these two aspects of the pedagogy of the
diagnostic thinking process may be related. The discussion
of the psychology of the diagnostic thinking process and its
development (Chapter Twelve) makes it clear that structure
and process are inextricably inter-related and inter-depend-
ent. The present discussion highlights two further aspects
of the pedagogy of the diagnostic thinking process. These
are its theory and its practice. It is in the practice that
structure and process are integrated while in the theory
they are separable. In their separate forms it is suggested
that they are useful for understanding and for providing a
frame of reference for analysis and for the design of teach-
ing methods and media. Given this, they may most usefully
remain separate when teaching and learning about the diag-
nostic thinking process. When facilitating or developing
that process the two can only be integrated. Thus the same
teaching methods can be used to identify and demonstrate both
structure and process aspects of clinical problem solving. If
the learner is undertaking interpretation of clinical inform-
ation by the proposed exercises in extrapolation he is,
perforce, using both process arid structure. However, if we
consider it more closely, the issue appears to resolve
itself quite logically. Reference to the summary of the dis-
cussion of the pedagogy of structure (see the conclusion of
section 13.3.3) shows quite clearly that, from the point of
view of the learner, the pedagogy appears to be one of process.
Structure only appears as a psychological construct in the
theoretical aspects of learning which might facilitate greater
self awareness and understanding. The major importance and
application of our knowledge of the role of structure in the
diagnostic thinking process is in relation to the design of
teaching methods, the facilitation of appropriately stored
learning, and as a frame of reference for the teacher in ana-
lysis and guidance of the learnerts performance. Thus, the
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integration of structure and process in the diagnostic thinking
process is reflected in the associated pedagogy and derived
teaching and learning methods. Similarly, the analytical use
of these concepts is apparent in similar ways both in the
study of the diagnostic thinking process and in the discussion
of pedagogy and design of teaching methods facilitatory to its
development.
Before proceeding to an evaluation of the proposed pedagogy,
we may summarise the present discussion as follows:
1. Practice in solving clinical problems is inadequate in
the absence of guidance and feedback about the cognitive
processes used.
2. The pedagogy of process concerns the development of self
monitoring, self awareness and cognitive correction or
compensation if necessary, rather than the development
of new skills. It also concerns the rational, efficient
and effective development of the balance of cognitive
processes typical of the experienced clinician.
3. The importance of the development of self analytical and
remedial cognitive skills derives from the inappropriat-
eness and impossibility of prescription of a diagnostic
thinking process applicable in all circumstances of
clinical problem solving.
4. Although some cognitive processes are generalisable
across all instances of clinical problem solving, many
others are more idiosyncratic, content dependent and
unpredictable.
5. The teacher should have full knowledge of the range and
mechanisms of the diagnostic thinking process of neo-
phyte and expert. The learner requires sufficient
theoretical knowledge to facilitate self analysis, self
awareness and remedy.
-6. The learner's thinking processes may be observed and
analysed by means of stimulated recall and accounts
elicited during discussions of case histories, ward
rounds and clinical problems. The skill of the teacher
is crucial in eliciting appropriate reports and facil-
itating self awareness and analysis. The opportunity
for group work is available.
7. The skill of thinking can best be learned and trans-
ferred by a judicious combination of theory and practice.
8. The skill of self monitoring should decline to a lowered,
autonomous, necessary level during the firal phase of
learning.
9. The range of possible thinking prx esses may be demon-
strated by means of the methods defined in (6) above,
as well as by specially constructed and designed
videotapes, films, reports and accounts. These might
have opportunity for interruption, analysis and discussion.
Meaningful reception learning might also have a useful
and appropriate role.
With regard to the inter-related and inter-dependent relation-
ship between the pedagogy of structure and the pedagogy of
process:
10. Structure and process are integrated in practice while
separate in theory.
11. The same teaching methods might be used to identify and
demonstrate both structure and process aspects of
clinical problem solving.
12. The major role of our knowledge of structure is in the
design of teaching methods and as a frame of reference
for the teacher.
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13.3.5 An Evaluation of the Proposed Pedagogical Approaches
An evaluation of the discussion of pedagogical approaches may
be achieved in relation to the criteria discussed in Section
4.1 above. These criteriul areas are: the role of structure
in learning; transfer of learning; and, problem solving and
learning. Each of these we may discuss in turn.
For a pedagogy to be structurally sound, section 4.1.1 points
out that it must enable the learner to enderstand the subject
matter in such a way that he may relate other things to it
meaningfully. The exposure which the learner has to the
subject must enab],e him to use it in his subsequent thinking.
It must admit of changes in the developing stored structures
of knowledge and skill. It must facilitate an efficient and
effective interaction between substance and aptitude. It
must take into account the learner's existing cognitive
structure. It must facilitate the increased manipulability
of the body of knowledge and the generation of new proposit-
ions. It is suggested that the proposed approach pays
attention to each of these criteria. Reference to the dis-
cussion of the pedagogy of structure (section 13.3.3) shows
thatthe approach should enable the learner to appreciate the
flexibility and manipulability of arrays of information. The
roles and relationship of stored structures and elicited
information are clarified. Information is identified in
relation to different stored structures. The encouragement
to identify the elements of the field and work with them by
organising and reorganising them in relation to extrapolated
contexts is emphasised. Conscious awareness of the role of
the forceful feature and its derivation and characteristics
is facilitated. Restructuring, extension or other alteration
of stored structures is made easier by the process of active
and analytical response to information so that relationships,
connections and disjunctions are made the subject of con-
scious thinking. Since the extension of the store of know-
ledge either by accretion or some form atE restructuring is
based in the context of self monitoring problem solving
- 461 -
thinking, it is suggested that both the approach and the
structures themselves will gain the necessary flexibility
to be of efficient and effective use in subsequent thinking.
In particular, the possibility and means of future change
and development is explored and internalised as part of the
learning process itself. The role, mechanism and concept
of extrapolation to embedding stored structures is given
its due emphasis in the proposed pedagogy such that the
learner may gain the process skill itself. Indeed, section
13.3.4 makes it quite clear that process and structure are
integrated in the pedagogy and separated only for analytical
and design purposes. Finally, the pedagogy is not prescrip-
tive of a process or a structure. Instead, each learner
works from and takes advantage of his own existing structures
through the process of conscious awareness of his own cogn-
tive processes and their substantive outcomes. Each learner
is guided towards self awareness. Thus individual differences
in structural content and use may be revealed and built upon.
For the pedagogy of the diagnostic thinking process to ensure
transfer of learning section 4.1.2 points out that present
learning must facilitate future problem solving. The transfer
must be of structure and process and should not be speciality
specific but generalisabi.e. The learner should acquire an
understanding of the fundamental structure of the subject,
and a transferable self awareness, monitoring and, where
necessary, rectification of cognitive error. In the context
of the diagnostic thinking process, transfer of substance
must also involve transfer of the capacity for restructuring
stored knowledge. It is argued that the development of a
conscious awareness of the cognitive operations of the dia-
gnostic thinking process and an ability for contemporaneous
self monitoring is, of necessity, transferable since some sub-
set of the range of operations to be taught (see section
13.3.4) is characteristic of every instance of clinical pro-
blem solving. The lack of prescription mentioned earlier
and the provision for individual differences in prior struct-
- L 62 -
ures and in development of substance and aptitude also
should lay a foundation, not externally or arbitrarily
imposed, appropriate to each individual which is amenable
to further future development. Training in the processes
of diagnostic thinking and the structurally based design of
substance acquisition is planned specifically to facilitate
future problem solving in clinical practice. The structural
characteristics of the information, for example, that of the
forceful feature, are applicable, and therefore transferable
to all instances of clinical problem salving. Indeed, in
section 13.3.3 it is argued that undergraduate medical
education may be seen as an advance organiser for clinical
practice and problem solving. The active nature of the
pedagogy proposed should ensure internalisation of the analy-
tical processes and their integration with the clinical
problem solving process. In section 13.3.3 it is stated that
the future effects of learning are dependent upon the steps
taken at the time of storage. Here, those steps concern both
substance and aptitude. The learner's attention is guided
towards the perception and evaluation of the items of inform-
ation presented, their relationship with information stored
in memory, the structural characteristics of both, their
developing aspects and the cognitive processes which operate
on them. In this way, the learner should acquire the necessary
understanding of the fundamental structures and processes of
clinical problem solving.
In terms of transfer, an important question concerns transfer
across specialities. It is argued that the diagnostic think-
ing process differs across specialities only quantitatively,
but not qualitatively (see section 12.3). The same might be
said of case specificity. Thus some subset of the range of
possible cognitive processes of clinical problem solving is
applied in all instances and cases and some, as argued, apply
to all instances and cases. The proposed pedagogy allows
rehearsal or analysis of all such processes and attempts to
integrate self awareness into the diagnostic thinking process
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itself. The balance of theory and practice in the proposed
pedagogy is appropriate to the future differences in relative
contribution of the separate processes across instances of
clinical problem solving regardless of speciality. In
addition, it seems reasonable to suggest that the proposed
pedagogy can be applied and implemented in any speciality.
It is not content dependent. Although based on different
reasoning, the overall positive conclusions concerning the
possibility of transfer of learning in medical education is
reflective of Elstein et al (1978). The type of transfer of
process which we describe is analogous to that described by
Bruner (1960) as "non-specific transfer or, more accurately,
the transfer of principles arid attitudes". Such an approach
as the one here proposed which should facilitate transfer of
both substance and process and the ability for further
development of both, should answer the problem described by
Miller et al (1961):
"But the inescapable truth is that even a course
of study four times as long as the present vogue
could not expose a student to every situation he
might someday face. In the rapidly changing
twentieth century world it is impossible to pre-
diet what is likely to happen next month, let
alone next year. Thus education for transfer
demands conscious and thoughtful attention".
(p. 62)
Ausubel et al (1978) describe some conditions of transfer.
These we may quote at length since it is considered that the
proposed pedagogy matches these conditions as well as the
criteria from section 4.1.2 above:
"Transferability ... is largely a function of
the relevance, meaningfulness, clarity, stabi-
lity, integrativeness, and explanatory power
of the originally learned subsumers
Transfer does not take place automatically and
without deliberate effort to appreciate and
practise the opportunities that are present for
transfer in a given learning situation. The
learner must also perceive the relationship of
the training to the criterial task ... Transfer
can be facilitated by providing opportunity for
- 464 -
learning principles in as wide a variety of
situations as possible by explicitly emphasis-
ipg the similarity between training and
criterial tasks and by presenting the latter
tasks continously or in close succession".
(pp 199 - 200)
Finally, we may evaluate the proposed pedagogy from the
point of view of the relationship between problem solving
and learning. Section 4.1.3 states that the product of both
medical education and clinical practice is a clinical pro-
blem solver who is continuing to learn. Such a product is
unavoidable since clinical problems, by their very ill
defined nature (see section 12.1.1) cannot be solved by
rote or reproductive means, but require productive thinking
and the new application, and therefore extension, of previous
learning. Thus past experience must be reorganised to fit
current demands. However, even for ill defined problems, it
is suggested after Peel (1967) that certain basic thought
processes are involved in all. These are discussed earlier
in this section. We may conclude that teaching the potentially
general skills might be the most useful tactic. However, it
is also noted by Peel (1967) and reflected in the current study
that different subjects in varying conditions emphasise
different aspects of thinking. It is therefore necessary to
take into account such individual differences, to note that
externally imposed forms of, for example, data collection, may
have no effect upon the problem solver's actual thinking
process, and to make available the range of possible processes
of which the clinical problem solver may at any one time apply
some subset.
It is suggested that the proposed pedagogy takes into consid-
eration each of these aspects of the relationship between
problem solving and learning. It is argued (sections 13.3.3
and 13.3.4) that such a pedagogical approach would lay a firm
basis for future development and alteration, since it is itself
based on the assumption that the learner represents a changing
system of both substance and process. The pedagogy is aimed
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at facilitating that developmental process to the greatest
efficiency and effectiveness. The future, and unpredictable,
problem solving performance of each individual learner is
also prepared for by providing him with the substance and
aptitude necessary for self awareness and monitoring of his
own diagnostic thinking processes. Thus a general skill
is learned with the mechanism of specific application. In
this way, also, individual differences in the structure of
substance, in aptitude and in their development are taken
into account. The teaching methods proposed allow self
analysis of genuine diagnostic thinking processes as well as
separate rehearsal of specific aspects of the process. In
addition, it is argued (section 13.3.4) that such analytical
processes can become integrated into the dynamic clinical
problem solving process itself. Therefore the learner
has the opportunity to learn at both a holist and an analy-
tical level and may rehearse the master skill as well as its
sub-skills. The problem based approaches discussed in 4.2.2.
above, would not seem,prima fade, to achieve this end. The
pedagogy of structure and the pedagogy of process when com-
bined form a pedagogy of problem solving which better match
our knowledge of the diagnostic thinking processes of neophyte
and expert and the developmental characteristics and exper-
iences which transform the former into the latter.
It is sometimes illuminating to resort to a truism. Miller
et al (196fl did so to effect:
"Learning how to be a doctor and being one are
obviously different things". (p. 62)
it is hoped, however, that the relationship between these two
states has been defined and an appropriate pedagogy indicated
which will make the transformation more efficient and effect-
ive than it otherwise might be.
13.4 Summary and Conclusions
Implications of the findings of the present parallel studies
are considered from the point of view of their indications
for undergraduate medical education as a preparation for
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clinical practice. The current relationship between these
is discussed and the potential relationship considered.
Four aims in the design of teaching strategies are defined.
On the basis of these, possible pedagogical approaches are
proposed. A practical and pragmatic approach is adopted
in the l4qht of contextual considerations, curriculum con-
siderations, curriculum content and the role of the medical
teacher. The pedagogy itself is discussed in terms of
structure and process and their integration. Finally, the
proposed pedagogy is evaluated in relation to the criterial
areas of the role of structure in learning, transfer of
learning, and the relationship between problem solving and
learning.
It is concluded that the proposed pedagogy stands up to
scrutiny in these lights and may be of help in the process
of transformation from student to doctor.
- 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Limitations of the Present Research and Indications for Further Study
The question of the limitations of the research here reported and of
the indications given of a need for further study are of necessity
closely related. However, for the purposes of discussion they may be
dealt with separately.
14.1 Limitations of the Present Research
The limitations of the present research derive principally from
two sources:firstly, the research design itself; and secondly,
the variables selected for or amenable to study. The research
design does not allow longitudinal sampling of the diagnostic
thinking process. Therefore, conclusions concerning its
development are dependent upon the validity assigned to the
arguments for comparability of the samples of subjects within
and between the parallel studies (see sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.3).
Although those arguments are not spurious, it is undoubtedly
the case that longitudinal samples would have been less open
to any doubts about comparability. Likewise, the research
design consists of two parallel studies of separate samples.
Again, although the arguments for their comparability are not
spurious, the same samples across studies would have been more
elegant and satisfactory.
A second limitation of the research design concerns the lack
of opportunity to study in depth individual differences within
samples of subjects. For example, no analysis of the substance
structure of any student 1 house officer or registrar is made
or available. With regard to process, the account gathering
study, which perforce collects information about each subject
individually and one at a time, yields no descriptive or
quantitative information concerning the cognitive processes
of any individual subject. The method of eliciting accounts
followed by content analysis yields data and results concerning
counts of incidences and frequencies by group and not by indi-
vidual subjects.
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The third limitation of the research design concerns the
comparison of specialities. It is reasonably argued and con-
cluded on the basis of the data that speciality differences
are quantitative and not qualitative, but studies of other
specialities would, if they yielded results of the same
order, give this conclusion a sounder base. As far as the
account gathering study is concerned, no speciality based
study has been made at all. Thus, the conclusions are based
on logical and inferential argument and reference to the work
of Barrows and the )4cMaster group in the field of neurology.
The final limitation of the present research concerns the
range of samples selected for study. It is assumed that the
samples of final year students are representative of the
products of the undergraduate medical curriculum. Extension
of sampling further back to second and first year clinical
students, and even to second and first year pre-clinical
students would give more substantial grounds for this assump-
tion. Likewise, the present sampling ceases at the level of
registrar/senior registrar. It is assumed that these subjects
represent the di4gnost,ic thinking process of the experienced
practitioner, yet it cannot be assumed that they also repre-
sent the fully mature process. Such an inference or conclusion
could only be based on a sample of consultant clinicians of
varying clinical experience.
The second source of limitations of the present research con-
cerns the variables selected for or amenable to study.
Although failure to study all possible variables does not
invalidate reasonable conclusions, interpretations of results
may be more deep and broad when further variables are added to
the pool. This is so for the present study. For examp1e the
role of the physical examination in the clinical problem
solving process is not studied. Neither is the stage of patient
management and treatment considered. It is argued that this
does not in any way invalidate the research or conclusions
based upon its results, but it is nonetheless not quite complete.
A second variable not studied is the precise experience of the
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subjects in undergraduate medical eddcation. An analysis of
the content and processes of teaching to which each subject
or group of subjects had been exposed might have proved
interesting and relevant and might have added substance to
arguments concerning comparability of samples of subjects or
the discussion concerning the present relationship between
medical education and clinical practice (see 13.1.1). A third
variable not studied is that of personality and its relation-
ship to cognitive style or clinical problem solving approach.
Simpson (1972) reports studies of psychological effects of the
undergraduate medical curriculum and cites, for example, the
authoritarian personality as a variable of interest. Miller
et al (1961) also consider personality as a relevant variable.
A fourth variable of possible relevance but not studied concerns
the possible role relatedness of the diagnostic thinking pro-
cess. The tasks of student, house officer and registrar are
quite different. The first has no clinical responsibilities
and is very much an imbiber of knowledge and skill; the second
has a task of thorough in-patient clerking and management, but
not of making definitive diagnoses while the third has greater
clinical responsibility and the task of diagnosis and treatment.
It is not suggested that these different roles would have
great determinative effect on the quality of the diagnostic
thinking processes, but rather that some variance might be
found in quantitative and content aspects.
The final variable of possible direct relevance and interest
which is nonetheless not studied is that of the subjects'
cognitive processes in content areas other than that of clini-
cal problem solving. It is suggested that the diagnostic
thinking process is a special application of everyday cognitive
operations (see Chapters Twelve and Thirteen) yet this assertion
is based on general psychological theory, not on evidence of
the subjects working with ill defined problems in different
content areas. It would be of some substantial interpretative
importance to have shown that the subj ects do display the same
cognitive operations in other aspects of their lives or with
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other types of problem. Although other variables of possible
relevance may be identified, those discussed are considered
to be of the greatest importance and relevance and, therefore,
have the most limiting effect upon strength and type of
inferences which are drawn from the results of the parallel
studies. We may now consider both these limitations and
results in the light of their implications for further research.
14.2 Indications for Further Study
Each of the limitations of the research which has been discussed
also constitutes an indication for further study. Additional
work based on the limitations of the research desigr would be
intended either to replicate or validate the present results
or conclusions; whereas additional work based on those variables
omitted from the research would be intended to deepem and
broaden its conclusions. Eowever, the results and conclusions
of the research itself provide indications for further study
in a number of other areas.
Firstly, and most importantly, the entire explanatory theoret-
ical framework erecte4 must be subject to study to determine
the extent of its paramorphism. The following aspects seem to
be of particular moment and salience for the validation of
the model: the nature of meaningful differences between pre-
diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations and their use; the
nature and psychological mechanism of the selecting operation
and the identification of the forceful feature; the psycholo-
gical mechanism of extrapolation; characteristics or features
which confer or constitute different degrees of forcefulness;
cognitive reasons for and features of different degrees of
satisfactoriness of extrapolation; features which comfer suff-
icient threshold of force; variables which affect restructuring;
the conditions of error; features which prompt the problem
solver's determinative and responsive behaviour during the
clinical interview, in particular the determinants of his pre-
cise questioning strategy; and, finally, determinants of the
nature of acceptable resolution of the problem.
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The results of the present study have facilitated certain
inferences about appropriate pedagogy in the development of
the diagnostic thinking process. Although the proposals
themselves are tentative they provide the basis for further
study of the most practical kind. One of the major reasons
for conducting the present study is described in Chapter One
as the prior necessity to understand the diagnostic thinking
process and its development before being able to design appro-
priate teaching methods. Thus, the study is perceived primarily
as enabling rational pedagogical design. It is this design
which requires further definiton, controlled implementation
and evaluation. In addition, the question of how medical
teachers might be trained and a new pedagogy introduced into
existing medical curricula is of considerable importance
and not without difficulty (Abercrowbie et al, 1978). The
present study represents a means of advance in rational
pedagogical design. But much remains to be done.
14.3 Summary
The limitations of the present research are described and
attributed either to the research design itself or to the sel-
ection or availability of variables for study. Such limitations
also constitute indications for possible further study.
Additional areas which require subsequent work are described
and identified as deriving from either the psychological study
or the associated inferences concerning appropriate pedagogy.
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EP ILOGt.JE
We may close with the words of a student, recorded during an account
gathering session. His description reflects the experience of being
a medical student and the process of learning to be a clinical doctor.
In his own way, he reflects also the theoretical, structuralist
rationale of this study. His words describe the process which, we
hope, the present study might help rationalise and advance to good
effect:
"I've got twenty minutes with this patient. When
you relate these things to consultants, its's
good to tell a story. Mind you, it's only inter-
esting now, when you begin to understand scmiething
There's a bridge, a link, you actually know some-
thing about the condition, so therefore yos can
].00k behind it"
12 December, 1976
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX 1
Information Given About the Features of Syncope and Epilepsy
Loss of consciousness may be due to syncope r major epilepsy.
Features of syncope
1. Often related to posture
(upright).
2. Preceded by faintness,
giddiness or nausea and
sweating.
3. Patient may remember fall-
ing or be aware throughout
the episode of what is
happening to him, or may
not.
4. Is not accompanied by
violent, uncontrolled limb
movements or micturition.
Features of major epilepsy
1. Not posture-related.
2. May occur following a
specific 'aura' (with
examples).
3. Patient will never remember
failing or any of the
circumstances occurring
during the seizure.
4. A violent, uncontrolled and
uncontrollable discharge of
neuironal activity making all
co-ordinated motor or cere-
bra.l activities impossible.
Violent, uncontrolled
jacititations, may micturate.
5. No severe after effects
such as headache or pro-
longed sleepiness.
5. Often followed by evidence
of severe cerebral disturb-
ance such as prolonged
sleepiness, automatism,
paralysis or headache.
..471f..
£ii4...p.jt	 1
Acromegaly
La) Serum growth hormone measurements during a glucose tolerance test
is a well recognised diagnostic procedure in acromegaly.
(b) Acroinegaly is con in children.
(c) Patients with acroniegaly may have a bitemporal heniianopia due to
a pituitary tumour.
(d) Plasma phosphate concentration is raised in acromegaly.
(e) Headache is a symptom of acromegaly.
Hypothyroidism
(a) Hypothyroidism in children affects bony growth and development.
(1) A normal serum TSH level is very rare in untreated myxoedema.
(c) Hypothyroidism occurs equally in men and women.
(d) Localised pre tibial myxoedema is common.
Ce) There is an increased incidence of pernicious anaemia in pa1ients
with hypothyroidism.
Primary Hyperparathyroidism
(a) In hyperparathyroidism the serum calcium and phosphorous are
elevated.
(b) Diarrhoea due to irritant colitis is common.
Cc) Many newly diagnosed cases nowadays are asymptomatic.
Cd) The disease causes skeletal deformities in some patients.
Ce) Ryperparathyroidism is due to a malignant tumour of the para-
thyroid in the majority of cases.
Seminiferous Tubule Dysgenesis (Klinefelter Syndrome)
(a) The patient may complain of gynaeccmastia coming on at puberty.
(b) On examination the testes are characteristically normal.
Cc) Patients are usually short.
Cd) These patients are characteristically infertile.
(e) All of the cells of these patients contain two X chromosc4*es in
most cases.
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Cushings Syndrome
(a) Patients with endogenous Cushings syndrome can have bilateral
adrenal hyperplasia.
(b) The pituitary fossa is enlarged in pituitary dependent Cushings
syndrome in the vast majority of cases.
Cc) Patients with untreated Cushings syndrome which is not due to a
carcinoma very rarely die from the disease in a five year period.
Cd) Proximal muscle weakness is rare in patients with Cushings
syndrome.
(e) Patients with Cushings syndrome due to adrenal adenoma usually
suppress the plasma cortisol if given 8 mg dexamethasone daily.
Auto Innnune Thyroiditis
(a) In auto immune thyroiditis there is a positive correlation
between lymphocytic infiltration of the thyroid gland and thyroid
auto antibody titres.
(b) Auto immune thyroiditis can be familial.
Cc) Auto immune thyroiditis can be the cause of a painful and tender
thyroid gland.
(d) absence of a goitre rules out the diagnosis of auto immune
thyroiditis.
(e) The tanned red cell test does not detect antibodies to thyro-
globulin.
Addisons Disease
(a) Some patients with Addisons disease have circulating adrenal.
auto-antibodies.
(b) Basal plasma cortisol concentration at 9 am may be 6ug% or
greater.
(c) Pigmentation of the skin may occur.
Cd) Postural hypotension occurs.
Ce) In Addisons disease the excretion of Water is impaired.
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Ovarian Dysgenesis (Turner's Syndrome)
(a) The patients are characteristically infertile.
(b) Cardiovascular abnormalities occur in some cases.
Cc) The majority of these females are chromatin positive.
(d) Retarded bone age leads to excess height.
Ce) These patients usually present with secondary amenorrhoea.
Phaeochromocytoma
(a) Phaeochromocytomas are sometimes bilateral and malignant.
(b) Persistent hypertension can occur with phaeochrcinocytoma.
Cc) Profound hypotension may follow surgical removal of previously
undiagnosed cases.
(d) Urinary excretion of 5H1AA is a useful screening test.
(e) There is an association with medullary carcinoma of the thyroid
in some patients.
Section B
Hyp9glycaemia
A patient is said to be in hypoglycaemic coma from an overdose of
soluble insulin. Which of the following findings are compatible with
this?
(a) Gradual, onset of unconsciousness over 1-2 days.
Ib) Clinically evident dehydration.
(c) Acidotic breathing pattern ("air hunger").
(d) Dilated pupils but normally reactive pupillary reflexes.
Ce) A pulse rate of 120/minute and pale sweaty skin.
percalcaemia
A patient has a serum calcium of 17 mg%. The following laboratory
and clinical findings may be diagnostically related to the hyper-
calcaemia.
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Cal Bilateral hilar lymphadenopathy on chest x ray.
W). Nb S found on haemoglobin electrophoresis.
Ic) A history of Coeliac disease.
Cd) A mastectomy two years previously for carcinoma of the breast.
Ce) An abnormal 'M' band on serum protein electrophoresis.
Diabetes Insipidus
In diabetes insipidus the following may be consistent with the
diagnosis:
(a) A body weight loss of greater than 5% occurs when the patient
is asked to stop drinking for 12 hours.
(b) The patient complains of nocturia.
(ci Clinical hypogonadisni is found in association.
(d) The condition came on after a head injury.
Ce) The basal plasma osmolality is found to be low before treatment
with ADfl is given.
Infertility
In an infertile man or woman the following are expected or character-
istic findings.
Ca) vaginal bleeding occured after exogenous progestogen administered
to a patient with Turner's syndrome.
(b) A male patient with a chromosome complement of 47 XXY has a sperm
count of 80 million/mI with 15% abnormal forms.
(c) An enlarged pituitary fossa was found in an infertile female who
complained of persistent breast discharge.
Cd) The occurrence of ovulation in a female patient was confirmed by
measuring the plasma oestrodiol concentration.
Ce) The occurrence of ovulation was satisfactorily confirmed in one
patient when records shows she menstruated at four to six week
intervals.
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Short Stature
A boy of 15 is referred with short stature. It may be true thaU
(a) The height of the boy' s parents can be used as one means of
estimating his height expectancy.
(b) A history of chronic otitis media indicates a pituitary cause.
(c) If his height is on or above the third percentile an abnormal-
ity of growth is excluded.
(4) If he has no evidence of puberty this suggests that his bone
age will be less than 14 years.
(e) A history of diarrhoea from early childhood can be diagnostic-
ally related to his short stature.
Gynae comas tia
In gynaecomastia the following findings can readily be related by
indicating an underlying diagnosis or cause.
(a) A history of heavy drinking.
(b) A history of haeuiptysis and weight loss.
(c A varicocele on the right hand side.
(d) High arched palate and long fingers.
(e) Both testes are 1 cm. in diameter but firm.
Delayed Puberty
An otherwise normal boy of nearly 16 is referred because his doctor
considers his puberty is delayed on the grounds that his voice has
not broken and he has a feminine appearance. It is entirely consist-
ent with this clinical picture that:
(a) He has a bone age of 16 years with no clinical evidence of
puberty on examination.
() The boy has no beard development but scrotal rugosity and some
pubic hair are present.
Cc) His chrousome complement is 45 X 0.
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(d). His span is 6 feet and his height is 5'9" and the testes are
1 cm. in diameter.
Ce) The boy is found to have no sense of smell.
Goitre
An English school girl of 18 presents with a large goitre.
(a) Dietary iodine deficiency is a likely cause.
(b) A finding of deafness may be related to the diagnosis.
(c) Hypothyroidism may be present.
(d) A family history of goitre may be related to the diagnosis.
Ce) Recent weight loss of twenty pounds may be diagnostically
related to the goitre.
Bypopituitari sin
A man of 18 is referred by his optician following the fiading of
left optic atrophy. He is 5'2" tall with no beard and a dry pale
skin. The testes are small. It is consistent with this clinical
picture that:
(a) Clinical dehydration is present.
(b) A low plasma a].dosterone concentration is found.
(c) An elevated serum TSH concentration is found on investigation.
(d) He has a bone age of approximately 18 years.
(e) He needs a larger than normal dose of insulin to induce hypo-
glycaeuiia in an insulin stress test.
Tetany
A 16 year old school girl presents in casualty with flexor spasms of
both wrists after a row with her boyfriend. The thumbs are adducted.
(a) A history of anaemia and offensive diarrhoea may be diagnostic-
ally relevant.
(b) A disturbance of respiration may be involved in the diagnosis.
(c) Previous surgery to the neck should be excluded.
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(d) The finding of a positive Trousseau' s sign is entirely compat-
ible with the clinical picture.
Ce) The serum calcium concentration may be normal.
Virilism
A 24 year old waitress is concerned by the growth of bair on the
forearms, breasts and thighs for 18 months. She has secondary
amenorrhoea of 2 years duration, some deepening of the voice and
enlargement of the clitoris.
(a) The information given is entirely consistent with a diagnosis
of constitutional hirsuitism.
()) The information given is consistent with a diagnosis of adrenal
tumour.
(c) The information given is consistent with an ovarian tumour.
(d) She may correctly be described as virilised on the information
given so far.
Ce) A high urinary pregnanetriol excretion would suggest an ovarian
tumour.
cbesi
In these patients:
(a) A calorific intake in excess of expenditure occurs.
(b) Carbohydrate restriction should be advocated for 3 days before
assessing glucose tolerance in the obese state.
(c) Cushings syndrome should be considered if the arms and legs are
thin in respect to the trunk.
(d) You iould expect the incidence of diabetes mellitus to be
greater than in non obese adults.
Ce) A restrictive type of result in pulmonary function tests occurs
in severe cases.
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Section C
Case A
A 57 year old widow who lived alorLe consulted her doctor in July
because of fatigue. On examination she looked pale and he prescribed
ferrous sulphate 200 mg tds. In 3 weeks she returned complaining
that she felt no better and in fact the tablets had greatly exacer-
bated her constipation so that she had to take Epsom Salts. Her
doctor requested a blood count which showed lib 10.4 G/d].. White cell
count 6400/cu MCHC 32, MCV 110 and platelets 240,000/Cu. He referred
her to the clinical haematologist at the local hospital where a
sternal marrow showed normoblastic erythropoesis and a biochemical
screen of serum revealed a blood urea of 45 mg/d]., serum albumen of
4.2 G/dl and a serum cholesterol of 400 mg%. The haematologist
referred the patient to a general physician who discovered vitiligo
on the arms and legs. Her eyes were watering and there was extensive
periobital and minimal ankle oedeina. The jugular venous pressure was
markedly raised though the lung bases were clear. The heart scuMs
were extremely difficult to hear and a iest x ray revealed marked
enlargement of the heart. Urine examination showed a trace of pro-
teinuria. He arranged for the patient to be admitted to hospital
but she did not turn up and when her own doctor went round to her
home to find out why, she seemed indifferent to his chiding remaining
sitting by the fire when he entered the room and not rising when he
left.
There is evidence of the following in this patient:
(a) vitamin B12 deficiency
(b) hyper magnesaemia
(c) auto ininune disorder
(d) nephrotic syndrome
(e) pericardial effusion
Which of the following could explain this patient's condition?
(a) carcinoma of bronchus
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(13k depressive illness
Cc) hypothyroidism
(d) cardiomyopathy
Ce) ischaemic heart disease.
Which of the following investigations may be helpful in this case?
(a) cardiac ultra sound
() thyroid stimulating hormone assay
(c) electroencephalogram
(d !VP
(e) serum magnesium estimation.
Section D
What .is the one most likely diagnosis?
Section C	 *
Case B
A 3 year old girl following a cold and sore throat suddenly was noticed
to become very thirsty. She also began to wet the bed and had to
pass water several times a night. In the past few weeks, although
her appetite was normal, she had lost weight. She was also becoming
very tired and fretful. In the past few days she had a productive
cough. Bowels were normal.
On examination the child was fretful and looked tired. Her skin was
dry and there had been some loss of weight. W anaemia nor lymphaden-
opathy. The pulse was 92 per minute regular, blood pressure 95/60.
All peripheral pulses were present. There were scattered rhonchi
over the lower left chest. Respiratory rate was 24 per minute. There
was some tenderness over the right iliac fossa but no guarding. The
central nervous system was normal on examination. Bones and joints
were normal.
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There is evidence of the following in this patient:
Cal urinary tract infection
(i) impairment of adrenal function
(cI hysterical, high water intake
(d} acute bronchitis
(e) high secretion of thyroid hormone.
Which of the following could explain this patient's condition?
(a) thyrotoxicosis
(b) Addisons disease
() acute peritonitis
(d) diabetes mellitus
(e) urinary tract infection.
Which of the following investigations may be helpful in this case?
(a) intraven ous pyelogram
(bI serum triiodothyronine .concentration
(C) urine test for glucose
(d) plasma bicarbonate concentration
(e) chest x ray examination.
Section D
What is the one most likely diagnosis?
Section C
Case C
A 17 year old with slight mental, subnormality was brought to the
clinic by his father, because of failure to thicken out". The boy
worked as a gardener for the local council. Appetite and food intake
were normal and the bowel habit a little constipated. There were no
other symptoms except occasional headaches but the father had once
had pulmonary tuberculosis. The mother had died aged 42 from a heart
-complaint. The patient was on the 25th percentile for height but
the 3rd percentile for weight. 	 examination there was no beard,
leg or chest hair but a little pubic and some axillary hair were
present and there was minimal gynaecomastia. The testers were 1 cm.
in length. A soft mid systolic murmur could be heard which varied
with posture but there were no other abnormalities in the cardio-
vascular system. Both arms and legs however seemed rather long for
his height. Mobility was normal.
There is evidence of the following in this patient:
(a) a chromosome abnormality
(b) eunuchoid habitus
(c) giantism
(d) congenital heart disease with somatic retardation
(e) hypogonadism.
Which of the following could explain this patient' s condition?
(a) testicular ectopia with maldescent
(b) Klinefelters syndrome
Cc) congenital syphilis
Cd) Marfans syndrome
(e) mumps.
Which of the following investigations may be helpful is this case?
(a) serum FSH concentration
(b) examination of chromosome morphology
(c) serum testosterone concentration
Cd) somatomedin assay
Ce) bone age estimation.
Section D
What is the one most likely diagnosis?
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Section C
Case D
A man of 52, a heavy smoking and drinking floor tile layer, attended
the clinic with 1 stone weight loss over the last 3 months and tender
painful wrists and ankles. He had had an irritating cough for 6
months and in the last 3 weeks had had to stop drinking his usual
3-4 pints of beer at night because he felt unwell after the first
pint. He had also been somewhat forgetful of late. On examination
there was clubbing of the fingers and some oedema of the ankles.
Examination of the chest showed a kyphosis of the thoracic spine.
The liver edge was just palpable and pulsation was present in the
epigastrium. He was admitted to the ward where the next day he
suffered an epileptic fit. A brain scan was normal but a chest x ray
showed a rounded but uncalcified opacity in the left mid zone 2 cm.
in diameter. The serum sodium was found to be 105 m Eq/i.
There is evidence of the following in this patient:
(a) metastatic cancer
(b) hypercalcaemia
(c) ectopic hormone formation
(d) negative water balance
(e) tiepatocellular failure.
Which of the following could explain this patient's condition?
(a) bronchial carcinoma without nietastases
(b) rheumatoid arthritis
Cc) inappropriate ADH secretion
(d) alcoholic hypoglycaemia
(e) hepatic cirrhosis.
Which of the following investigations may be helpful in this case?
La) LE cell preparation
(b) bilateral carotid arteriography
-(c') simultaneous urine and serum osmolality estimations
(SI) bronchoscopy
(e) glucose tolerance test.
Section D
What is the one most likely diagnosis?
Section C
Case E
A 62 year old lady was admitted with a history of haematuria on three
occasions in the last month. Each episode had been accompanied by
right loin pain. She had also noticed during the past year aching
pains in her muscles and back. She also suffered from abdominal
pain after meals and on opening her bowels and nocturia four times
per night. Physical examination showed an agitated lady with a red
face. Pulse was 100 per minute, BP. 170/105. Cardiovascular system
was otherwise normal. Examination of the back showed several papill-
oinata. bdominal examination revealed a loaded sigmoid colon, cranial
nerves were normal, all reflexes were present and brisk and the
plantar responses were flexor.
There is evidence of the following in this patient:
(a) hypercalcaemia
(b) malignant carcinoid syndrome
(c) severe endogenous depression
Cd) renal calculi formation
(e} po].ymyalgia rheumatica.
Which of the following could explain this patient's condition?
(a) osteomalacia
(b) myxoedema
Cd osteoporosis
(d) primary hyperparathyroidism
(e) bladder papilloma.
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Which of the following investigations may be helpful in this case?
(a) x ray of the hand
(J) 'VP
(c) plasma alkaline plxsphatase
(d) blood urea estimation
(e) water deprivation test.
Section D
What is the one most likely diagnosis?
* Copyrighted
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7PPENDIX 2
Questionnaire in Endocrinology - Content*
Section A
In Juvenile Onset Diabetes Mellitus
(a) Endogenous insulin secretion is frequently normal.
(b) The condition may cane on acutely, over a few days.
Cc) Severe dehydration occurs in some untreated patients.
Cd) Lack of insulin precipitates the development of ketosis.
(e) Visual disturbance due to refractive changes occurs as a
symptom.
Hyperthyroidism
(a) In Graves' disease true exophthalmos is only found in a
minority of cases.
(b) In Graves' disease long acting thyroid stimulator-protector
(LATSP) may be found in the blood stream.
Cc) Atrial fibrillation without other clinical evidence of hyper-
thyroidisin may occur in the elderly.
Cd) Graves' disease is coner in females.
Ce) It is rare for proximal muscle weakness to be associated with
hyperactive reflexes in Graves' disease.
Diabetes Mellitus (Maturity Onset)
(a) Patients with maturity onset diabetes mellitus commonly present
without ketosis.
(b) Patients may respond to treatment with diet alone.
(c) Treatment with steroida.l drugs may precipitate the onset of
diabetes.
Cd) Neuropathy does not normally occur in patients with maturity
onset diabetes.
Ce) The kidneys are not usually affected.
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J'PENDIX 3
Quest tonnaire in Neurology - Content4'
1. IN VITAMIN B DEFICIENCY
(a) Neurological COmpliCatiOns only occur when the
haemoglobtn falls below 10 gu.
(b) Folic acid improves the neurological symptoms but does
not help the anaemia.
(c) The lateral spinothalamic tracts are not involved.
(d) The plantars may be upgoing even when the knee jerks
and ankle jerks are depressed.
(e) Dementia or optic atrophy occur in a minority of cases.
2. REGARDING PARKINSONISM
(a) In Parkinson's disease there is depigmentation of the
red nucleus.
(b) Rigidity is of the spastic type.
(c) Symptomatic Parkinsonism is most commonly due to
phenothiaz ines.
(d.) L-d.opa crosses the blood-brain barrier and is converted
to dopamine, the active pharmacological agent.
(e) The tremor is present at rest and is decreased by
voluntary movements.
3. IN MIGRAINE
(a) The headache is always over one superficial temporal
artery.
(b) Attacks may be related to the menstrual cycle.
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(c) Visual. symptoms may jnc1de flashing lights, hemianopta
and scotouiata.
(d) Attacks usually last less than one hour.
(e) Permanent neurological sequelae do not occur.
4. REGARDING MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS
(a) It occurs more commonly in the tropics.
(b) In the middle-aged may present as a slowly progressive
paraparesis without relapses and remissions,
(c) Rarely affects the optic nerves.
(ci) There is a mean survival greater than ten years.
(e) The findings of an abnormal Lange curve, but negative
Wassertnann Reaction is in favour of the diagnosis.
5. REGARDING INTRACRANIAL HAEMORRHAGE
(a) Chronic subdural haematoma is apt to occur in the elderly
and in alcoholics.
(b) In extradural haemorrhage a dilating pupil suggests
tentorial herniation.
(c) Intracerebral haeiuorrhage usually has a stuttering onset.
(ci) Surgery for cerebral aneurysm should be delayed for at
least six weeks after a bleed.
(e) Patients with arteriovenous malformations may present with
migraine or epilepsy rather than a bleed.
6. REGARDING CEREBRAL TUMOUBS
(a) The commonest type is a meningioma.
(b) They usually have a rapid onset (less than 24 hours).
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(c) There may be no focal symptoms, only those due to raised
intracranial pressure.
(d) May be clinically indistinguishable from a cerebral
abscess.
(e) Posterior fossa tumours are more common in children.
7. REGARDING MENINGITIS
(a) The CSF sugar is usually lowered in viral meningitis.
(b) The three commonest causes of bacterial meningitis are
pneuniococcus, meningococcus and haemphilus thuluenzae.
(c) E coil meningitis usually occurs in the neonate.
(ci) Can present as pyrexia of unknown origin in children.
(e) Steroid therapy and lyinphomas predispose to tüberculous
and fungal meningitis.
8. REGARDING LESIONS DUE TO COMPRESSION BY SKELETAL SUCTURES
(a) The pain and tingling of carpal tunnel syndrome often comes
on at night.
(b) Cervical ribs may cause wasting of the small muscles of
the hand.
(c) The commonest site of lumbar disc protrusions is L 2-3.
(d) Lumbar disc protrusions say present as acute retention.
(e) There may be quite severe cervical spondylosis on x-ray
without symptoms.
9. REGARDING EPILEPSY
(a) A normal EEG excludes the diagnosis.
(b) "Absences" occurring for the first time in an adult are
usually not due to petit sal.
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(c) Seizures may occur during sleep.
(a) Attacks starting in one part of the body suggest a focal
lesion.
(e) A child with one epileptic parent has a 2 chance of
developing epilepsy.
10. REGARDING MYASThENIA GRAVIS
(a) Ptosia and diplopia are common presenting features.
(b) Fatiguability and. fluctuation in severity are important
diagnostic features.
(c) It may be associated with thyrotoxicosis.
(a) Intravenous injection of a short acting anticholinesterase
is a useful diagnostic test.
(e) May be associated with a tumour of the thymus gland.
11. REGARDING THE COMPLICATIONS OF ALCONOLISM
(a) In Wernicke 's encephalopathy 6th nerve palsies are
frequently seen.
(b) Korsakoff's psychosis consists of episodic paranoia and.
delusions of grandeur.
(c) Alcoholism is a common cause of peripheral neuropathy.
(a) Delirium tremens is a benign self limiting syndrome.
(e) Thberculosis is more common amongst alcoholics.
12. REGARDING DRUG THERAPY
(a) Epanutin (Phenytoin) is the drug of choice for petit mal.
(b) Tegretol (Carbamazine) helps the majority of patients with
trigeminal neuralgia.
(c) The spectrum of ampicillin includes the commonest bacteria
producing meningitis.
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(a) Dementia or a psychiatric history are contraindications
of the use of L-dopa.
(e) Methysergide (Deseril) is effective for an acute attack
of migraine.
Section B
1. REGARDING UPPER AND LOWER MOTOR NEURON LESIONS
(a) In lower motor neurone lesions the tone is decreased and
the reflexes are depressed.
(b) In upper motor neurone lesions wasting and fasciculation
may be seen.
(c) In lower motor neurone lesions of the face the upper part
is usually spared.
(ci) The abdominal reflexes are usually preserved in upper
motor neurone lesions.
(e) An upgoing plantar may be the only sign of an upper motor
neurone lesion.
2. IN CERELLAB LESIONS
(a) Inco-ordination occurs on the opposite side to the lesion.
(b) In middle lesions there may be no nystaginus and a normal
linger-nose test.
(c) Tone is usually increased.
(a) The tremor is made worse when a movement is performed.
(e) Inco-ordination is present whether the eyes are open or
closed.
3. REGARDING EXTRAPYRAMIDIiL DISORDERS
(a) There are marked difficulties with voluntary movements
but usually no actual muscle weakness.
(b) Sensory abnormalities may be marked.
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(c) Increased tone in association with normal reflexes may
be seen.
(d) Typically an intention tremor occurs.
(e) In chorea quasi-purposive involuntary movements are seen.
4. REGARDING TEE SENSORY SYSTEM
(a) Position and vibration fibres cross to the opposite Bide,
shortly after entering the spinal cord, pain and
temperature fibres do not cross till the brain stem.
(b) In peripheral neuropathy the sensory loss is most marked
distally.
(c) Loss of two point discrimination and astereognosia may
be the only abnormalities in cortical lesions.
(d) Root pain may be referred to the muscles supplied by that
root.
(e) Ataxia may be due to sensory loss.
5. REGARDING CRANIAL NERVE LESIONS
(a) In a Ilird nerve lesion the pupil does not react to light
but reacts to accommodation.
(b) In cavernous sinus lesions the cranial nerves involved may
be I, II, III, IV, V, VI.
(c) In cerebello-pontine angle lesions the cranial nerves
involved may be V, VI, VII, VIII.
(d.) Lesions of the superior and inferior oblique are most
evident when the affected eye is tested in the abducted
position.
(e) Pituitary tumours typically produce a binasal field defect.
6. REGARDING TEE SPINAL NERVES AND ROOTS
(a) A T.I. lesion produces wasting of all the small muscles of
the hand but no sensory loss in the hand.
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(b) A lesion of the deep branch of the ulnar nerve causes
wasting of the interossel but spares the thenar and
hypothenar eminences.
(c) A lesion of the deep palmar branch of the median rzezve
produces sensory loss in the Lfth and .5th fingers.
(d) An S.I. le8ion produces foot drop.
(e) A lesion of the lateral popliteal nerve produces depression
of the ankle jerk.
7. REGARDING CEREBRAL LESIONS
(a) Unilateral anosmia is suggestive of a temporal lobe lesion.
(b) In cortical blindness the pupils are usually normal.
(c) Parasagittal lesions can cause weakness and sensory loss
in both legs.
(d) The association of hemianopia, hemianaesthesia and hemiplegia
suggests a lesion of the internal capsule.
(e) The presence of a grasp reflex in an adult suggests a
lesion of the frontal lobe on the opposite side.
8. IN THE COMATOSE PATIENT
(a) The most reliable guide to progress is the briskness of
the tendon jerks.
(b) If there are focal signs the cause cannot be metabolic.
(c) A pupil that starts to dilate is suggestive of teritorial
herniation.
(d) Overdose is the commonest cause seen in a medical ward.
(e) High blood pressure may be due to intracranial lesions.
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9. IN CASES OF RAISED INTRACRANIAL PRESSURE
(a) Headache is worse in the erect posture.
(b) 6th nerve lesions can occur as false localising signs.
(c) Papifl.oedema occurs early in posterior fossa lesions.
(d) Papilloedema is associated with early visual loss.
(e) If there are no haemorrhages in the fundi lumbar puncture
can be safely undertaken.
10. REGARDING THE HISTORY IN NEUROLOGICAL PATIEN
(a) In patients with recurrent transient neurological disturbance
epilepsy, migraine and transient ischaemic attacks are
common causes.
(b) In dementia ability to remember distant events is usually
affected less than ability to remember recent events.
(c) Onset of symptoms within minutes is suggestive of infection.
(a) Neurosyphillis can .be excluded if the patient's attack of
venereal disease was treated with penicillin.
(e) In trigeminal neuralgia the pain is constant, throbbing
and may last several hours.
Section C
CASE A
A 60 year old labourer was admitted. following a series of fits. He
was a heavy smoker and drinker. His wife reported that while they
were watching T.Y. one side of his body began to twitch (she thought
the right side). Then he had violent movements of all four limbs,
went blue and frothed at the mouth. The movements ceased after about
a minute, but he did not wake up for a further fifteen minutes. Be
regained consciousness as the ambulance arrived but then had two
further fits on the way to hospital. His wife stated that he had
been generally unwell for about a month. He had been very tired,
complaining of headaches and had. had. a nasty cough with rusty sputum.
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On çueatiouing she also remembered that be had been waking with
night sweats and she thought he had lost several pounds in weight
during this period.
By the time of admission to the ward his fits had ceased. The
patient was thin, unkempt, looking older than his 60 years. His
temperature was 38.5°C. He was very restless and irritable. He
occasionally groaned and complained of pain in his head, but no
coherent history could be obtained from him. Slight cyanosis was
noted and on examination of his lunge there was evidence of
consolidation of the right lower lobe, as well as some generalised
rhonchi. His blood pressure was 170/90, but there were no other
abnormalities in the cardiovascular system. The liver was enlarged
to 3 finger-breadihe below the right costal margin. There were no
abnormalities in the cranial nerves except that fundal examination
showed blurring of the disc margins with venous engorgement. He
did not move the right side of the body as freely as the left side,
the reflexes were increased on the right with an upgoing plantar
reflex. Sensation to pain also appeared to be diminished on the right.
Co-ordination appeared normal.
1. The following could be said concerning this patient :
(a) he has grand mal epilepsy without evidence of focal content.
(b) he has evidence of raised intracranial pressure.
(c) he has evidence of acute pulmonary embolism in the lungs.
(ci) clinical findings suggest brainstem involvement.
(e) clinical findings suggest a lesion of the left hemisphere.
2. The following conditions could produce the neurological
abnormalities of this patient :
(a) hypertensive encephalopathy-.
(b) cerebral abscess.
(c) cerebral metastasis.
-(ci) hepatic precoma.
(e) tuberculosis
3. The following investigations should be performed :
(a) lumbar puncture.
(b) brain scan
(c) E.LG.
(ci) lung scan.
(e) liver scan.
Section D
Lf For this case write down the following s
(a) site' of lesion.
(b) side of lesion.
(c) disease.
(ci) primary site.
Section C
CASE B
A 50 year old hypertensive taxi driver was admitted to hospital.
Following an argument with a passenger he was telling a friend about
it over a cup of tea when he suddenly complained of severe pain at
the back of his head, began vomiting and shortly afterwards lost
consciousnees. His wife brought in his tablets. He had been on
methyl dopa 250 mga tds. for two years. He said he had had a sore
throat and been a little off colour for a few days.
On examination he was drowsy and confused. There was limitation of
neck flexion and Kernig's sign was positive. He could not open the
right eye. On raising the lid the right eye was seen to be turned
outwards. He could not turn his right eye upwards or inwards.
Light shone into either eye produced only contraction of the left
pupil which was smaller than the right. The fundi showed arterial
tortuosity and A-V nipping but no haemorrhages or exudates. There
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were no other neurological abnormalities. On general examination
0his temperature was 38.0 C and his blood pressure was 220/140. Bis
throat was reddened but there were no other abnormalities.
1. There is evidence of the following in this patient $
(a) aeningeal irritation.
(b) Homer's syndrome.
(c) internuclear ophtha]moplegia.
(d) third nerve palsy.
(e) raised intracranial pressure.
2. The following could explain this man's clinical picture s
(a) Migraine.
(b) Hypertensive encepimlopathy.
(c) Subarachnoid haemorrhage
(ci) Byncope.
(e) meningitis.
3. The following investigations should be performed :
(a) fluorescein angiography of the fundus.
(b) lumbar puncture.
(c) throat swab and culture.
(ci) air encephalogram.
(e) carotid angiogram.
Section D
4. For this case write down the following :
(a) site of lesion,
(b) side of lesion.
(c) disease.
(ci) underlying disease
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Section C
CASE C
A 36 year old housewife was admitted for investigation of weakness
in the legs. She had recently been in good health ut two years
previously had seen her doctor about numbness and pins and needles
In the right arm and leg which had cleared up withomt any specific
treatment after about six weeks. Over the last four weeks she had
noticed that her legs had become progressively stiffer and weaker
and that she would tend to fall if she Btulflbled. in tine street. Over
the last two weeks she had also complained of numbness in both legs.
In the four days before admission she complained of symptoms of
urgency and frequency.
On examination there was marked weakness and stiffness of both legs.
The reflexes in the legs were increased and both plamtars were
upgoing. Sensation to pin prick was cminished below the level of
the umbilicus. The rest of the sensory examination was considered
normal, as was examination of the upper limbs and cranial nerves.
General examination revealed no further abnormality except that the
bladder was palpable above the pubic symphysis.
].. There is evidence of the following in this patient z
(a) spastic paraparesis.
(b) "stocking" anaesthesia.
(c) thoracic sensory level.
(ci) neurogenic bladder disturbance.
(e) motor root lesions.
2. The following could explain this patient's picture :
(a) subacute polyneuropathy.
(b) multiple sclerosis.
(c) invasion of the lumbosacral plexus by cancer.
(a) tumour compressing the spinal, cord.
(e) tabes dorsalis.
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3. The following investigations should be performed z
(a) E.LG.
(b) plain x-rays of thoracic spine.
(c) myelograa.
(d) pelvic examination under anaesthesia.
(e) vertebral angiogram.
Section D
1f. For this case write down the following :
(a) site of lesion.
(b) disease.
Section C
CASE D
A 61 year old man consulted his doctor because over the past two
- months he had noticed weakness and thinning of the muscles of the
left hand. He had not experienced pain or numbness in the hand.
Apart from his hand he felt well.
On examination there was wasting and weakness of all the small
muscles of the left hand. The other muscles in the upper limbs
appeared normal. The tone and reflexes were also normal. Some
fasciculatlon was observed in the left thenar eminence, Examination
of the legs showed normal power and tone but the reflexes were very
brisk and the plantars upgoing. No sensory abnormalities were
detected.
1. There is evidence of the following in this patient :
(a) upper motor neurone lesion in the legs.
(b) lower motor neurone lesion in the arm.
(c) wasting in muscles supplied by both medial and ulnar nerves.
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(d) po8terjOr column loss.
(e) wasting in the T.l distribution.
1
2. The following could explain this patient's picture z
(a) carpal tunnel syndrome.
(b) brachial neuritis.
(c) cervical spondylosis.
(d) motor neurone disease.
(e) multiple sclerosis.
3. The following investigations should be performed:
(a) LM.G.
(b) x-rays of the cervical, spine.
(c) myelogram.
(d) carotid angiogram.
(e) brain scan.
Section 0
k. For this case write down the following
(a) site of lesion.
(b) side of lesion.
(c) disease.
Section C
CASE E
A 38 year old man presented to his doctor because of occipital.
headaches. For the past year he had. complained of ringing noises
in the right ear. and poor hearing in it. He had had his ears
syringed once to remove wax but with only a little improvement in
hearing. He also complained of a continual vague feeling of
unsteadiness. He had previously been in good health.
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On examination he was found to have very poor hearing in the right
ear. The tuning fork was found to be better heard near the right
ear than on the right mastoid. A tuning fork placed at the vertex
was better heard in the left ear 4. Both on smiling and raising the
eyebrows there was weakness of the right side of the face. Stimulating
the right cornea did not produce a blink in either eye. Horizontal
nystag*us was present. The rest of the neurological examination
revealed some moo-ordination of the right arm and leg. The general
medical examination was normal. Quite a lot of wax was seen in both
ears.
1. There is evidence of the following in this patient s
(a) nerve conduction deafness on the right side.
(b) upper motor neurons facial weakness.
(c) involvement of 5th nerve.
(a) left temporal lobe involvement.
(e) cerebellar involvement on the right side.
2. The following could explain this patient's picture :
(a) impacted wax.
(b) Menire's disease.
(c) acoustic neuroma.
(ci) basilar artery aneurysm.
(e) Bell's palsy.
3. The following investigations should be performed 8
(a) audiometry.
(b) E.E.C.
(c) x-rays of the internal auditory meati.
(a) air encephalogram.
(e) vertebral angiogram.
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Section D
L • For this case write down the following :
(a) site of lesion,
(b) side of lesion,
(c) disease.
Copyrighted
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APPENDIX k
1ation1e for Selection of Five Option Independent True False
Multiple Choice Questions
Multiple choice questions may take a number of different forms but,
in essence, consist of an item stem, which may be a statement or a
question, and two or more responses, or possible answers to the
item stem; these we shall call 'options'. Options which the
candidate should mark	 are called 'answers', while remain-
ing responses are 'distractors'. Depending upon the format of the
item, the candidate may be required only to indicate correct options.
This type of item most commonly takes the 'one from five' format,
where the candidate must select only one option as the answer.
Alternatively, the candidate may be required to mark all options
as either true or false. Much less straightforward formats which
require the candidate to perform tasks more complex than indicating
either true or false are also available (see Fleming et al, 1976)
but were rejected here as requiring a degree of test sophistication
unlikely to be found in British students and registrars.
Finally selected was the format in which each item has a stem and
five options, each of which the candidate may mark as either true or
false in relation to the stem. This format is known by different
names; for example, 'multiple true false' (Hill and Woods, 1971f),
'indeterminate' (Wood, 1977), 'multi-facet' (Schools' Council, 1965),
independepent true false' (Fleming et al, 1976). Such items should
be, in essence, no different from a series of separate true/false
questions (Barden et al, 1976; Jolly, 1976). This format was
selected for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the format is extremely flexible and versatile. As Fleming
et al (1976) point out, each option requires to be identified as true
or false on its own merits, rather than having one cption identified
as correct while the others are relegated to the status of distractor
by default. Thus each item requires as many decisions from the
candidate as there are options.
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econd1y, the format requires very little test sophistication on
the part of the candidate.
Thirdly, the conventions and limitations of item writing for this
format allowed sufficient latitude to test our subjects' knowledge
and thinking skills adequately and appropriately in each of the
four sections of the questionnaires.
Finally, this format has been extensively used in British undergrad-
uate and postgraduate medical education (Harden et al, 1976) and so
should have been familiar to most of our subjects. In particular,
our subjects were largely drawn from the medical schools and
hospitals of London University (where this format is used) and
Newcastle (where the format also originated). In addition, the
format has been used by The Royal College of Physicians, of which all
our registrars had passed the membership examination. We therefore
considered that the effect of test sophistication on scores would be
minimal.
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APPENDIX 5
Policy on Guessing, Instructions to Respondents and Scoring Schedule
for Questionnaires
Decisions to be taken about the appropriate MCQ scoring scbe&ule and
instructions to be given to subjects about responding to optiLons are
closely related, each being dependent, to a certain degree, G* the
test constructor's approach to the question of whether or not candi-
dates should be instructed to guess when they are unsure of the
correct response to an option. Although the following discussion
deals with these three aspects sequentially,in practice the diecisions
on each are taken in parallel.
The question of guessing has been widely discussed in the literature
(see, for example, the discussions of Cross and Frary, 1977; Uarden
et al, 1976; Lord, 1975; Palva and Korhonen, 1973; Rowley and Traub,
1977; Wood, 1977). However, only a brief exposition will be qiven
here since it is argued that the question itself is not crucial given
the role of our multiple choice questionnaires which is to discritni-
nate between groups (students and registrars) rather than individuals
and compare those groups not on total scores but on the relationship
between scores on each of the four sections of each questionnaire.
Rowley and Traub (1977) accurately suxnmarise th? controversial area:
"... the question of whether to encourage or to discourage
guessing has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. The
dilemma one faces in connection with this decision may
be summarised as follows: if one encourages students to
answer all questions, whether they know the answer or
not, a source of random variance is introduced
which decreases both reliability and validity; on the
other hand, if one attempts to discourage students from
guessing, it is apparent that some students will comply
to a greater extent than others, causing the test
results to be contaminated by personality factors whidh
the test was not intended to measureN. (pp. 16-17)
A number of workers suggest that candidates should be encouraged to
guess (for example, see Crehan et al, 1976; Harden et al, l976),
although suggested instructions vary from answering every item to
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answering oniy those items on which candidates feel themselves to
have at least partial knowledge. Arguments in favour of guessing
may be substantiated by studies showing that if candidates are
forced to guess, where previously they had chosen not to respond,
their total score increases (for example, Cross and Frary, 1977). An
alternativ or additional, argument in favour of guessing is expressed
by Harden et al (1976):
"... since the random error introduced by Instructions
to guess is less damaging to the meaning of the score
than the error introduced by varying tendencies to
guess ..., there are very good arguments in favour of
discontinuing the 'don't know' option in multiple
choice examination papers. ( p. 32)
In addition, the 'don't know' option might hide partial knowledge
and candidates of equal partial knowledge might not have equal will-
ingness to commit themselves to an answer. Sanderson (1973) also
comments on increased variability due to the 'don't know' option.
Arguments against encouraging guessing tend to be based on judgments
that it is psychologically wrong or 'unprofessional' to encourage
guessing (for example, see Clarke et al, 1976; Lennox, 1967; Rowley
and Traub, 1977) that, particularly in medicine, it is important for
a candidate to recognise when he does not know the answer to a prob-
lem (Harden et al, 1976), and that the use of a guessing penalty
improves the reliability and validity of the scores obtained on the
test (see Rowley and Traub, 1977).
As an area of research, the question of encouragement to guess or not
is made difficult to answer by the seeming lack of independence of the
three main variables (scoring schedule, instructions to subjects and
guessing) and the number of different forms that each of these vari-
ables may take (for example, scoring schedules may have different
formulae for penalty or counter-marking, instructions to subjects
across independent research studies take differing forms, guessing
may be advised more or less strongly or on the basis of partial or no
knowledge). It is extremely difficult, therefore, to interpret and
compare research findings.
The decision about guessing, therefore, was largely made on grounds
other than those cited above. Firstly, as already indicated, the
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purpose was not to compare one candidate's score with that of another,
but was to compare one group of candidates with another group primar-
ily in terms of the relationship found within each group between
scores on each of the four sections of each questionnaire. Where the
groups are compared in terms of absolute scores, it is reasonable to
assume (although the assumption is not tested) a similar distribution
of personalities across groups, therefore a similar range and distri-
bution of test taking strategies. Secondly, the decision was taken
in terms of the subjects' test taking experience. The 'don't know'
option is still available in most MCQ's used by British medical
schools, and the Royal College of Physicians. Availability of the
'don't know' option was therefore more likely to be conmiensurate with
the subjects' past experience. Finally, respouses to these question-
naires were unspeeded and subjects were not subjected to any of the
competitive or examination stresses which may trigger guessing
strategies in those with that propensity, although this is not to
suggest that guessing behaviour will have been eliminated among the
subjects.
The instructions to candidates, then, were as follows:
"In the following questions, put a tick (v') if the
statement is correct; put a cross (X) if the statement
is incorrect. Leave the space blank if you do not
know the answer. Do not guess".
No further information about, for example, the scoring schedule was
considered necessary or desirable, since the questionnaires were to
be implemented as teaching tools, not as testing instruments, and
maximisation of scores was not as important a criterion as consistent
test taking strategy for each individual across all four sections of
the questionnaire.
Having decided on encouragement not to guess, the selection of a
scoring schedule becomes less problematical, since scoring schedule
and instructions to candidates on guessing are complementary.
The basic choice of scoring schedule is between number right scoring
and formula scoring systems. Number right scoring gives the candi-
date credit for each correct response, therefore test instructions
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should inform the candidate that to answer every item is the best
strategy, since no penalty is given for incorrect responses. Formula
scoring, however, penalises wrong answers by giving a counter mark,
therefore test instructions should inform the candidate that he
should not guess on those items to which he does not know the answer.
Lord (1975) suggests that the candidate should also be advised to
answer the item whenever he has any valid partial information to
guide him. We did not offer specific guidance on this point, con-
sidering that each subject's own judgment of whether or not he 'knew
the answer' would not be assisted by drawing his attention to the
concept of partial information about which he would also have to make
a similar judgment. One candidate's idea of partial information may
be another's of knowing the answer and yet another's of not knowing
the answer.
Given the other characteristics of the questionnaires, then, a formula
marking schedule was the only one appropriate. Lord (1975) quotes the
usual formula score as
R - (number wrong)
A-i
where R is the number of right answers and A is the number of choices
pet item. The MCQ' s may each be taken as a series of separate true/
false questions (Harden et al, 1976; Jolly, 1976) and so in this
formula (A-i) is zero. The formula used therefore is
R - (number wrong)
which is equivalent to awarding +1 for a correct response, -1 for an
incorrect response and zero for no response. This schedule has been
very widely used in Britain (Buckley-Sharp and Harris, 1971; Fleming
et al, 1976; Harden et al, 1976) although some modifications have been
suggested, such as confidence testing (Palva and Korhonen, 1973;
Rothman, 1969) or greater weighting of the counter mark (Lennox, 1967).
Whithy (1977) gives a short review of advantages and disadvantages
of no penalty and penalty marking systems, attempts at correction
for guessing, the use of the lQfl know' option and confidence
weighting. Although his review is far from comprehensive, it gives
indication of the breadth of thinking about these questions within
medical education alone.
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APPENDIX 6
The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient: Nature • Purpose and
Formula
In essence, the intraclass correlation coefficient (R) is an index
of similarity of responses given by respondents in a single class.
Haggard (1958) defines the index as follows:
WThe coefficient of intraclass correlation is the
measure of the relative homogeneity of the scores within
the classes in relation to the total variation among all
scores in the table. Thus maximal positive correlation
exists when all the intraclase scores are identical and
the scores only differ from class to class. As the
relative hetrogeneity of intraclass scores increases,
the computed value of R will decrease; maximal negative
correlation exists when the hetrogeneity of the intra-
class scores is maximal and all the class means are the
sam&'. (Haggard 1950, i6)
It will be clear, then, that R is closely related to F. Haggard
(1958) shows that R and. F are functionally related and that the
relationship is monotonle. However, there are two important
differences between H and F. Firstly, H is a test statistic,
having no theoretical upper limit and whose ianing is a function
of the number of degrees of freedom, whereas J( may be used as a
general descriptive statistic whose maximal value is +1 and whose
magnitude is independent of the number of associated degrees of
freedom. Secondly, F and B enable one to answer different questions:
F pertains to questions of difference, whereas H pertains to questions
of similarity. However, the coefficient of intraclass correlation
is phrased in terms of a ratio of components of variance which can
be estimated directly from the uua1 analysis of variance tables.
The formula for estimating B may be written
B-	 -	 BCMS-.WMS
BCNS + (k-1)wNs
where BCMS is the between-classes mean square
WMS is the within-classes mean square
k is the number of members per class in the sample
5)2 -
The level of significance of R is identical with that of the
corresponding F (is BCMS/WMS), although the F table is generally
appropriate only for one-tail tests, that is where BC1'tSWMS.
Although lewy ( 1973) recommends the use of the intraclass
correlation coefficient in the selection of items for a teat, we
are using the statistic as Haggard (1958) demonstrates it, in
analysis of the test as a whole. Given that test homogeneity is
determined, this is an appropriate analysis, not even requiring
the separate calculation of R for each section of the questionnaire.
Within SS (68df)
BCMS
WMS
R
• ___
5288	 809364
4007
	 475865
.9295
	
1285229
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APPENDIX 7
Calculation of the Entraclass Correlation Coefficient (R) for
Endocrinology and Neurology Questionnaires Separately
(N.B. All figures have been rounded to one decimal place for these
tables, The original calculation worked to 3 decimal places).
1. Questionnaire in Endocrinology
Class	 Number
Registrars	 35
Students	 35
5149	 768615
3520	 376600
8669	 1145215
Correction Term (C)
Total SS (69df)
Between SS (ldf)
86692
-	
- 1073593.770
- 1145215 - 1073593.7 - 71621.3
(51492
 + 35202.) - c - 37909.235
S
- 33712.1
- 37909.2
- 495.8
BC - WMS
BCNS + O-l)WMS
- 0.68
Statistical Significance of R
F corresponding to R = BCMS = 76.46 (df. 1,68)
WMS
(p .001)
2. Questionnaire in Neurology
Class	 Number
Registrars	 35
Students	 35
Within SS (68df)
BCMS
WMS
a 5)J+
Correction Term (C)
92952
a 1234243.270
Total SS (69df)
Between SS (ldf)
R
- 1.285229 - 1234243.2 - 50985.8
- (52882 + 4372) - C
	
23442.435
a 27543.4
a 23442.4
27543.4 a 405.068
BCMS -
+ (k-l)WMS a 0.62
Statistical SiQnificance of R
SCMS
F corresponding to R
	
57.9 (df. 1,68)
WMS
(p -. .001)
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APPENDIX 8
Calculation of the Test Difficulty Index
Test difficulty is defined by Hubbard and Clemens (1961) as "the
ratio of the average number of correct responses, or test mean
score, to the maximum number of correct responses". It say be
expressed thus:
Test difficulty -	 Test Mean
Number of items in test
As with measures of item difficulty, the lower the value yielded,
the more difficult the test. We would expect test difficulty
values to be relatively high for registrars and relatively low
for students.
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APPENDIX 9
Calculation of the Phi Coefficient
Values of the phi coefficient were obtained by taking the upper
25 scoring registrars and the lower 25 scoring students and
calculating the percent in each group correct for each ites of the
questionnaire.
The value of 4 was then read fros a chart prepared for estisating
the phi coefficient (given in hubbard and Cleinans, 1961) except
in borderline cases when was calculated according to the
foraula.
- PU-P1
2 _.j-
where P	 per cent passing item in the upper
50 per ceit of scorers le registrars
- per cent passing item in lower
50 per pent of scorers Ic students
P - ineanofPandPj.
q - 1-p
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APPENDIX 10
Values of the Phi Coefficient (4)) for the Questionnaires in
Endocrinology and Neurolpg
ENDOCRINOLOGY
	
NEUROLOGY
Item	 4)	 Significance
	 Item	 Significance
level
	 level
Section A
1
2
3
k
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Section B
1
2
3
1
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Section C
1
0. k5
0.15
0. 20'
o.kO
0.30
0.140
0.35
0.50
0.30
0.30
0.35
0.70
0.60
0.65
0.30
0.10
0.20
0.30
0. 29#
0.60
0. 25I
0.55
0.110
Q•14
0.55
p< .05
N.S.
N .S.
p ( .05
PiC. .05
p( .05
p< .05
p .05
p . .05
p. .05
p .05
p . .05
p 4.05
p. .0.5
N .S.
N .S.
p ( .05
p .05
p 4.05
N.S.
p4.05
p < .05
p ( .05
pi(.O5
Section A
1
2
3
if
5
6
7
8
9
10
U
12
Section B
1
2
3
If
5
6
7
8
9
10
Section C
1
2
3
035
0.75
0.75
0.145
0.50
0.60
0.70
0 • 10
0.30
0.50
0.50
0.35
0. 29'
0.65
0.60
0.110
0.145
0.145
0.30
0.60
0.65
0.35
0.50
0.30
0.30
p 05
p<.O5
p. 05
p.(.05
p' 05
p(.05
p(..05
N.S.
p..O5
p(. 05
p(.05
p' 05
p.O5
p (.05
p<.O5
p(.05
pc.05
p(.05
p(.0.5
(, 05
p(.05
p(.05
p<..05
p.O5
p<.. 05
23
LI.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1k
15
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
0.50
0.kO
0.31
0.50
0.60
0.50
0.60
0.22"
0.50
0.70
0.70
0.60
0.70
0.60
p .05
p .05
p 4.05
p 4.05
p .05
p 4.05
p .05
N .S.
p .05
p & .05
p .05
p < .05
p 4 .05
p ..05
0.50
0 • 20
0.30
0.60
0.75
0.70
0.11.0
0.65
0.75
0.65
0.50
0.50
p .05
N.S.
p • 05
p<.l,05
p <.05
Pc .05
p .05
p .05
p • 05
p < .05
P(.05
p 05
For each questionnaire:
Number of students: 25
Number of registrars: 25
Value of 4) at .5 per cent significance level for .50 subjects: 0.28
Values of 4) marked with an asterisk were calculated according to the
formula described in Appendix 9.
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APPEIDIX 11 -
The Split Half Test of Reliability, Method and Correct!on Factor
To apply the split half technique, the test is divided tmto two halves
(for example, by assigning odd numbered items to one half and even
numbered items to the other half) and a correlation coefficient
calculated between them. A correction factor should be applied for
length of test, since this may have some influence on its reliability.
The reliability coefficient for a whole test may be estimated using
the Spearman-Brown formula (Ferguson, 1966):
- 2r
1+r
Where r	 is the reliability coefficient for the whole test
is the reliability of the half test
The statistical significance of the resultant value of r may be
tested as described by Ferguson (1966), taking the null hypothesis as
H : r- 00
with N - 2 degrees of freedom
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IPPENDIX 12
Notes on the Interpretation of Regression Summary Tables
R represents the correlation between the criterion and the weighted
sum of the predictors.
R2 (the variance of the regression function) is obtained by multi-
plying each correlation of a predictor with the criterion by its
corresponding regression coefficient and summing these products.
This regression function examines the inter-relationship of the set
of variables and descrthes how well that set of variables predicts
the criterion variable. That is to say that the increase in R2
tells us how much of the variance on the criterion variable is
explained by the variables as they are added to the regression
equation.
We must be circumspect in interpreting the regression function. We
way speculate about relative contributions of the predictor variables
but must remember that the obtained prediction results from a system
of predictors in which the elements interact in a complex fashion.
A final point to be remembered is that if two variables have a
fairly high correlation with the criterion and a low correlation
with each other, both measure different aspects of the criterion and
both will contribute substantially to prediction. But if two vari-
ables have a high correlation with each other, they are measures of
much the same thing, and the inclusion of both, instead of either
one or the other, will contribute little to the prediction achieved.
- 521
APPENDIX 13
Discriminant Analysis as Applied to the Questionnaires in
Endocrinology and Neurology
In applying a discriminant analysis the intention is to distinguish
statistically, between the two groups of subjects, and to consider
the nature of that distinction in order to infer some distinguishing
features of the groups • The four sections of each multiple choice
questionnaire represent a collection of variables that measure
characteristics on which the groups might be expected to differ.
Discriminant analysis optimises these variables in terms of their
power to discriminate between the groups. Kiecka (1975) describes
this operation thus:
NThe mathematical objective of discriminant analysis
is to weigh and linearly combine the discriminant
variables In some fashion so that the groups are forced
to be as statistically distinct as possible. In other
words, we want to "discriminate" between the groups in
the sense of being able to tell them apart".
In many cases, no single Issue will perfectly differentiate between
groups, but by taking several issues and mathematically combining
them, a single dimension may be found. on which one group Is clustered
at one end, and the other group at the other end.
Tatsuoka (1971) states that:
"... the problem of studying the direction of group
differences is, equivalently, a problem of finding a
linear combination of the original predictor variables
that shows large differences in group means.
Discrininant analysis is a method for determining such
linear combinations".
Alternatively, Cooley and Lohnes (1971) describe the derivation of
discriininant functions slightly differently:
"In research studies Involving several samples from
different populations located at different places in
a multivariate measurement space, but assumed to be
samples from populations having a common dispersion,
It can be very interesting to locate the best reduced-
rank model for parsimoniously but effectively describing
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the measured differences of the groups. In multiple
discriminant analysis the samples are projected from
their places in the complete measurement space into
a suitable sub-space".
Once the discriminant functions have been derived, these may be
used for two purposes, either for analysis, or for classification.
A full discussion of the latter approach is given in Hope (1968),
but, for the present study, the former technique of analysis
predominates, while classification is only used as an indication
of the adequacy of the discriminant functions derived.
Two alternative methods of discriminant analysis are available,
direct analysis and stepwise analysis. Using the direct method,
all Independent variables are entered into the analysis concurrently
The discriininant functions are created directly from the entire set
of variables, regardless of the discriminating power of each. Using
the stepwise method, all Independent variables are entered into the
analysis on the basis of their discriminating power. Often, the full
set of variables contains excess information about the group differences,
or perhaps some of the variables may not be very useful in discriminating
among the groups. By sequentially selecting the 'next best' discriminator
at each step, a reduced set o variables will be found which is as good
as, or better than, the entire set. Both forms of analysis were under-
taken in the present study and. were computed using the S1S programme
'DISCRIMINANT' on the UIAC CDC6600 computer. The stepwise procedure
used Bao's V as the selected criterion.
Rao's V. the criterion according to which best discriminating variables
are next aeleeted In turn, is a generalised. distance measure. The
variable selected is the one which contributes the largest Increase in
V when added to the previous variables. This amounts to the greatest
overall separation of groups. A variable Is considered for selection
only if its partial F ratio is larger than a specified value. This
ratio measures the discrimination introduced by the variable after
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taking into account the discrimination achieved by the other selected
variables. Each subsequent discriminating variable is selected as
the variable best able to improve the value of the discrimination
criterion in combination with previously selected variables. The
points made in The final two paragraphs of Appendix 12, therefore,
also apply to the interpretation of the results of stepwise discrim-
iflant analysis.
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APPENDIX 14
The Scheff Method as Applied to Data from Questionnaires in
Endocrinology and Neuroloqy, after One-Way Analysis of Variance
The method as applied is described by Ferguson (1966).
1. Calculate F ratios using the formula:
F	 (X1-X2)
2S (fl +n
w 1	 2)/n1n2
2. From tables, obtain a value of F at the required significance
level for df1 K-i and df2 N-K.
3. Calculate F', which is K-i times the required F.
4. Compare the values of F and F'. For any difference to be
significant at the required level, F must be at least equal to
F'.
Note:
Ferguson (1966) suggests that concern may attach to the fact that
the Scheffe procedure is more rigorous than others, and wi]]. lead
to fewer significant results. Scheff's own recommendation to
employ a less rigorous significance level, such as .10, is quoted.
This level is accordingly adopted here, although inspection of
results shows that the same pattern of statistically significant
and non-significant results would emerge if a significance level
of .01 were adopted.
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2½PPENDIX 15
Procedures for Normalisation of Raw Scores
All scores were normalised as percentages. For each section of each
questionnaire the theoretical range of scores may differ. These
values are as follows:
Theoretical	 Theoretical
Questionnaire	 Section	 Minimum	 - Maximum
Endocrinology	 A	 -60	 +60
B	 -60	 +60
C	 -75	 +75
D
	 0	 +6
Neurology	 A	 -60	 +60
B	 -50	 +50
C	 -75
	
+75
D
	 0	 +15
For each section D, normalisation to percentage values was achieved
by dividing the gained score by the theoretical maximum and mult-
iplying by 100, thus:
100 (Gained score/Theoretical maximum score)
For sections A, B and C, the procedure for normalisation of raw
scores took into account the negative sign of the theoretical minimum
scores. In those cases, then, the theoretical maximum score was
added to the gained score, and this sum divided by twice the theoret-
ical maximum score and multiplied by 100 thus:
100 (Gained score + Theoretical maximum score) /2 (Theoretical
maximum score)
This effectively relocates the theoretical minimum score to zero,
and expresses the gained score as a percentage of the new theoretical
maximum score which is now twice the value of the original theoretical
maximum score.
- .526
A?PE14DIX 16
Discriminant Analysis Results and Discussion
Four discrlininant analyses were performed, one direct and one stepwise
for endocrinology and neurology questionnaires separately. The
results of each of these analyses will be reported separately.
A. Direct Analysis - Endocrinology
Table A shows the values of Wilks' lambda (U-statistic), associated
F values and levels of significance for each of the four variables
(sections A, B, C and D). These represent the results of an
Table A. Direct Discriminant Analysis (Endocrinology). Values
of Wilks' Lambda (U-statistic)
Variable	 Wilks' lambda	 F value	 Level of
(d.f.l,68)	 significance
section A	 0.7058	 2835	 p.O1
Section B	 0.683k	 31.50
	
p.Ol
Section C	 0.5163	 56.47	 p.01.
Section D
	 0.8325	 13.68	 p.01
analysis of dispersion to test the differences between the means of
the two groups to determine whether or not we are correct in
supposing that they are not drawn from one and the same population.
Although we know that the two groups are drawn from different
populations of persons, the analysis of dispersion concerns populations
of measures or characteristics of persons, not a population of persons
qua persons. The characteristics here selected might include no
measures on which the groups actually differ. Inspection of Table A
showt, however, that our samples are drawn from different populations
of characteristics. We may therefore proceed to the results of the
discriminant analysis proper.
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The maximum number of discriminant functions possible either is
one less than the number of groups or is equal to the number of
discriminant variables if there are more groups than variables.
In this case, therefore, we may expect one discriminant function
only. Table B shows the values of the canonical correlation
and Wilks' lambda for that one discriminant function.
Table B. Direct Discriminant Analysis (Endocrinology). Values
of Canonical Correlation and Wilks' Lambda.
Canonical	 Wilks'	 Chi-square	 df.	 Level of
correlation	 lambda	 significance
0.7354	 0.4592
	
52.14	 4	 p..0OO
From the information provided in Table B, we may judge the importance
of the derived discriminant function. The square of the canonical
correlation indicates the proportion of variance in the discriminant
function explained by the two groups. This value is 0.5408, or 54 per
cent. This is a relatively, low value, indicating that the direct
combination of independent variables does not produce a highly efficient
discriminant function.
The value of Wilks' lambda (0.4592) reflects this conclusion. Wilke'
lambda is an inverse measure of the discriminating power in the indepen-
dent variables. The smaller the value of lambda, the greater the
discriminating power. The present value of lambda does not suggest a
very powerful discriminant function, although it does have some degree
of utility. The associated value of chi-square with its level of
significance at less than 0.1 per cent suggests a low probability of
the derived value of lambda occurring due to the chance of sampling
alone.
Table C shows the values of the standardised discriminant function co-
efficients associated with each independent variable. Ignoring the sign,
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each coefficient represents the relative contribution of its
associated variable to the discriminant function. The sign
denotes whether that contribution is positive or negative. We
may use these values to 'name' the discriminant function by
identifying its dominant characteristic. In this case section C
(selecting and. testing possible diagnoses) defines the function,
with some contribution from section A (mastery of factual
knowledge). To some extent these may represent operations of
seemingly less cognitive complexity than those tested in section
B (interpretation of symptoms and signs) and section D (formulating
a diagnosis).
Table C. Direct Discrirninant Analysis ( Endocrinology). Values
of Standardised Djscriminant Function Coefficients.
Variable	 Value
Section A	 -0.5205
Section B	 -0.1503
Section C	 -1.0184
Section D	 -0.0597
A final test of the adequacy of the derived discriminant function may
be made with reference to the according classification of cases. By
classifying the cases used to derive the function in the initial
instance and comparing predicted with actual group membership, we
can measure empirically the success in discrimination by observing
the proportion of correct classifications, If' a large proportion
of misclassifications occurs, then we can conclude that the variables
selected are poor discriminators.
Table D shows that 80 per cent of the subjects were classified
corectly using the derived discriminant function. More registrars
were correctly classified than were students (31 as opposed to 25).
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Almost one third of the students (10) were misclassified. This
finding follows on from and gives further support to the previous
indications that the variables selected do not, when combined, produce
a highly powerful discriminant function, although that function does
have anappreciab].e degree of discriminatory power.
Table D. Direct Discrinilnant Analysis (Endocrinology).
Classification of Cases.
Actual Group	 Predicted Group Membership
Students	 Registrars
Students
Registrars
25
(35.7 per cent)
'4.(5.7 per cent)
10
(14,3 per cent)
3'(44.3 per cent)
B. Stepwise Analysis - Endocrinology
Although, in essence, this analysis produced the same ultimate results
as the direct method, it does furnish us with information about the
intermediate stages culminating in those same conclusions and thus
enables a deeper and more accurate understanding of the derivation of
the function and the relative contribution of each variable to that final
value.
Given Table A, we may immediately inspect the summary table of the
stepwise discriminant analysis, presented in Table E.
Table E. Stepwise Discriminant Analysis (Endocrinology).
Summary Table.
Variable	 Wilks'	 Level of	 Bao 's	 Change in Level of
entered	 lambda	 significance	 V	 Rao's V	 significance
Section C 0.5463
	
p..000
	 56.47
	
56.47	 p..00O
Section A 0.4630
	 pz...000
	 78.87	 22.40	 p4.oOo
Section B 0.4598
	
p..0OO
	
79.89	 1.02	 p,..313
Section D 0.4592	 p..000
	
80.08	 0.19	 p4.668
- 530 -
The results of the stepwise analysis reflect exactly the findings
of the direct analysis, and may be so interpreted in conjunction
with Tables B and C. We have further evidence that sections C and
A are instrumental in the discriminant function, while sections
B and D add very little to the value of Rao's V, and subtract little
from the value of Wilks' lambda. We must bear in mind that each
successive variable is selected given the variables already
contributing to the function; we may therefore conclude only that
sections C and A form a reduced set of variables which is almost as
good as the entire set in discriminating between the two groups.
C. Direct Analysis - Neurology
Table F shows the values of Wilks' lambda (U-statistic), associated
F values and levels of significance for each of the four variables.
It can be seen that our samples are drawn from different populations
of characteristics. We may therefore proceed to the results of the
diserlininant analysis proper.
Table F. Direct Discriininant Analysis (Neurology). Values
of Wilks' Lambda (U-statistic)
Variable	 Wilks' lambda	 F value	 Level of
(d.f 1,68)	 sigpificance
Section A
	
0.5206
	
62.63
	
4(.Ol
Section B
	
0.7248
	
25.81	 p4.0].
Section C
	 0.6791	 32.13
	 p4.01
Section D
	 0.6621	 34.70	 p'..01
Table C shows the values of the canonical correlation and Wilks'
lambda for the d.iscrIininant function. The value of the squared
canonical correlation is 0
.5726 , which indicates that 57 per cent
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Table C. Direct Discriminant Analysis (Neurology). Values of
Canonical Correlation and Wilks' Lambda.
Canonical	 Wilka'	 chi-square	 d.f	 Level of
correlation	 lambda	 significance
0.7567	 0.4275
	
56.94
	
4	 p.,000
of the variance in the discriminant function is accounted for by the
two groups. This is a relatively low value, although slightly higher
than that associated with the endocrinology study, and indicates that
the direct combination of the independent variables does not yield a
highly efficient discriminant function. The statistically significant
value of Wilks' lambda (0.4275) reflects this conclusion although, as
with the discriminant function associated with the endocrinology data,
the function does have some degree of power.
Table H shows the values of the standardised discriminant function
coefficients associated with each variable. The dominant variable
associated with the function is section A, followed by section B and
almost equivalent contributins from sections C and D. We see here
then, a different picture from that drawn by the same coefficients
on the endocrinology data, where section C is predominant. However,
again it is a variable of seemingly less cognitive complexity which
contributes most to the discriminant function.
Table H. Direct Discriminant Analysis (Neurology). Values of
Standardised Discriminant Iunction Coefficients.
Variable	 Value
Section A	 -1.2512
Section B
	
0. 6170
Section C	 -0.5290
Section D	
-.0.5273
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Considering the classification of cases on the basis of the derived
discriminant function, Table .1 shows that 85.7 per cent of the
subjects were classified correctly. As with the endocrinology study.
more registrars are correctly classified than are students ((32 as
opposed to 28). We may conclude that, although the derived unction is not
highly powerful, it does have an appreciable degree of discr.uiinatory
power in terms of the classification of cases demonstrated.
Table S. Direct Discriminant Analysis (Neurology).
Classification of Cases.
Actual Group	 Predicted Group Membership
Students	 Registrars
28	 7Students	
(LO per cent)	 (10 per cent)
Registrars	 3	 32(Li , 3
 per cent)	 ('15.7 per cemt)
P. Stepwise Analysis - Neurology
Again, this analysis produces the same ultimate result as the direct
method, but furnishes us with further information about the
derivation of the function. Given Table F, we may immediately inspect
the stepwise analysis summary table, given in Table K.
Table K. Stepwise Discriminant Analysis (Neurology).
Summary Table.
Variable	 Wilks'	 Level of	 Rao's	 Change in Level of
entered	 lambda	 significance	 V	 Rao's V	 significance
Section A 0.5206	 p.00O	 62.63	 62.63	 p.000
Section C 0.4800	 p.00O	 73.68	 11.05
	
pc.00l
Section D 0.4558	 p.O00	 81.18	 750	 p(.006
section B 0.4275
	
p..000	 91.08	 9.90	 pc..002
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The results of the stepwise analysis do not exactly reflect the
findings of the direct analysis, since section C rather than section
B is selected after section A. This must reflect a high correlation
between sections A and B, presuming section A to account for those
parts of section B with which it is correlated. A high correlation
betweet sections A and B would also imply a low partial correlation
which relegates section B to being selected as the fourth rather than
second variable in the discriminant function. Tables 7.3 and 7.f give
support to this conclusion, showing statistically significant
correlations between sections A and B on the neurology questionnaire
for both students and registrars.
Reflecting the results of the stepwise analysis for endocrinology,
we may conclude that sections A and C form a reduced set of variables
which is almost as good as the entire set in discriminating between
the two groups. However, the pattern of reduction in the value of
Wilks' lambda and parallel increase in the value of flao's V is rather
unlike that shown for endocrinology in Table E. For neurology, section
A is the most instrumental variable, whereas for endocrinology section
C is most important. The increases in ao's V upon selection of the
second variable are also markedly different. Proportionately, the
second variable entered in neurology accounts for a much smaller
increase in Rao's V than does the second variable entered in the
endocrinology study. In addition, the third and fourth variables
selected for neurology play a greater part in the d.iscriminant
function than do the parallel variables for endocrinology. However,
these differences are predominantly a matter of degree. It must be
concluded that in both endocrinology and neurology sections A and C
form a reduced set of variables which is almost as good as the entire
set in discriminating between the two groups. However, in
endocrinology, section C is predominant, whereas in neurology section
A is predominant.
F. Endocrinology
Both the direct and discriminant analyses show the same results, we
shall therefore consider them jointly. The four sections of the
- 
531+ -
questionnaire produce a discriminant function of value, which
correctly classifies 80 per cent of our subjects. The function,
however, is less successful in classifying students than registrars.
In addition the function derived has relatively poor values On
other indices of power (square of the canonical correlation
0.5408; Wjlks' lambda = 0.4592).
From these results we may conclude that the variables measured in
the questionnaire do not constitute a highly appropriate or complete
set if these are to be used as the basis of discriminating between
students and registrars, If this conclusion is unacceptable, the
only alternative interpretation is that the groups are, in reality,
not discrimi.nable beyond the attained level of efficiency. At both
empirical and cominonsense levels, this latter explanation of the
results would seem untenable. We must therefore support the
conclusion that our present set of variables is incomplete in terms
of discriminating between the two groups of subjects.
The results of the discriminant analysis of the endocrinology data
best suggest that processes and skills other than those here tested
may add to the efficiency of the function obtained.
F. Neurology
Since the results of the direct and. stepwise analyses are cornp].e-
mentary, they will not be treated separately. The derived discrim-
inant function correctly classifies 85.7 per cent of the subjects,
which is slightly better than the similar index for endocrinology,
but the values of Wilks' lambda (0.4275) and the square of the
canonical correlation coefficient (0.5726) are relatively poor.
From the above indices, we may conclude that the variables which
make up the four sections of the neurology questionnaire do not
constitute a highly complete or appropriate set from which to derive
an efficient discriminant function. As with endocrinology, the
alternative interpretation of non-discriminability must be rejected.
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4e conclude that the results of the discriminant analysis of the
neurology data suggest that processes and skills other than those
here tested may add. to the efficiency of the function obtained.
C. Comparison of Endocrinology and Neurology
Two points of comparison are immediately obvious. Firstly, in both
endocrinology and neurology there are variables other than those
tested which might yield a more efficient discriminant function.
This finding was expected. In both cases, the untested variable
might be identified as the dynamic, active (and interactive), clinician-
generated aspect of the diagnostic problem solving process. Secondly,
on both cases sections A and C form a reduced set of variables which
is almost as good as the entire set in discriminating between students
and registrars.
In the same reduced sets of variables, we also find, a point of
considerable contrast between endocrinology and neurology. For
endocrinology, the discriminant function is defined by section C
(selecting and testing diagnostic possibilities), whereas, for
neurology, the function is defined by section A (mastery of factual
knowledge). As emphasised above, however, these variables are weighted
and. do not necessarily pinpoint the areas of greatest difference between
the groups when unweighted.
In conclusion, the discriminant analysis has confirmed a greater
breadth of the diagnostic process and of skills inherent in the study
and. practice of endocrinology and neurology than is measured by the
multiple choice questionnaires. This is as expected.
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APPENDIX 17
Example of Experimenter's Notes Taken During Simultaneous Viewing
of a Patient - House Officer Encounter
Houseman
Name ?
Age ?
Married ?
Job ?
What brought you in ?
How long ?
Getting worse ?
Phlegm ?
Colour ?
Smoker ?
How far could you walk ?
SOB got worse 7
Cough worse ?
Not bothered before ?
Coughed blood 7
Ill before ?
Ops ?
Why thyroid ?
Rh. fever, T.B. 7
How's heart ?
Chest pain on exercise ?
Wheezing ?
Bow many pillows?
Wake up breathless 7
Ankles swell 7
Leg pain on walking 7
Appetite ?
Weight 7
flearthurn, indigestion 7
After meals ?
Bowels 7
Patient
59.
Yes,
Motor Mechanic.
Cough, SOB.
6/12.
Both cough and SOB.
In a.m., excess.
White.
2 cigars daily.
No problem walking.
Yes.
Sometimes in a.ni.
No.
No.
Heart strain, year before..
Slipped disc, hernia, thytoid.
Lost weight.
No.
Normal.
No. Tightness since cough.
Just tightness.
2.
No.
No.
No.
Good.
Steady•
Indigestion.
Before.
No change.
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Houseman
Blood ?
WW 7
Good stream, etc. 7
Headaches, fits, faints 7
Pins and needles ?
Numbness ?
How long for 7
Same period as cough and SOB ?
Weakness ?
Wife 7
Children ?
Parents ?
Sibs 7
T.B. 7
Heart trouble ?
Diabetes 7
Epilepsy ?
Main problem is cough and SOB 7
And numbness and tingling 7
Patient
No.
OK.
Yes.
Headaches in a.m.
Left arm, down to fingers.
From left elbow down, tingling
in left hand.
6 weeks,
Coughing when shoulder pain came on.
Only hand.
OK.
One, married.
Mother, 84, heart attack.
Father, died World War II.
7, OK.
No.
No.
No.
No.
Yes.
Yes,
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APPENDIX 18
Transcript of an Account Gathering Session with a Student, with
Experimenter' s Notes
Notes
Student
	
Patient
Name ?
Age ?
	
59
Woik ?
	
Retired.
Problem ?
	
M.I. July 1975, repeated 1977.
Account
E. 'Lou ask about his name, his age, his work and his present problem,
is that your normal way of starting an interview ?
S. It depends on the patient and on how they appear, if it was
somebody who was very ill, no, I would ask them about their pre-
sent problem and you can usually find Out name and age from the
end of the ted anyway. But it is important to find out about
somebody's work because it may often have a bearing on the
situation and also if he's going back to work afterwards; and
knowing if he's retired may be important as well.
Notes
1/52 ago, 'small infarct'.
What happened?	 Came to coronary unit.
What did you notice wrong ?	 Acute discomfort.
Where ?
	
Pressure, pushing side of heart.
Account
E. So that was the events of a week ago and him coming into the
coronary care unit and you asking for an elaboration of his
symptoms and what was wrong, what were you thinking about his
problems at the time ?
_ 539
S. Has he had a coronary or not. What else could he have had,
because he went up on to coronary care. It was very likely
that he did or, at least, that there was something wrong with
his heart-angina or something of that sort. I wanted to find
out whether the pain was typical heart pain or if it wasn't.
E. So you're elaborating on his symptoms.
S. Yes.
Notes
Did pain move ? 	 No.
Arms ?	 No.
Faint, sweaty, sick ?	 Not in 1975, last was middle of
night. Felt sick.
Account
E. You're asking about particular things, fainting, feeling sweaty,
feeling sick, pain in his arms.
S. Again, trying to localie whether or not it was typical cardiac
pain.
E. And what did it appear to be at that time ?
S. Atypical.
E. So what did you think about it appearing atypical ?
S. Well, there is a variety in the type of heart pain people can
have. Old people often don't have any pain at all, and, as he
said, they don't know whether or not he'd had a heart attack,
and from that history I don't either.
Notes
General health ? 	 Good.
Pain on exertion 7	 No, normal tiredness.
Drugs 7
	 No, just anticoagulants.
Warfarin ?
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Account
E. So that was his general health, pain on exertion, and drugs.
What did you get out of that 7
S. I wanted to know whether or not he had any angina, which he
didn't, because that and a heart attack are part of the same
disease. I wanted to know whether he's had any treatment. The
sort of thing I might have expected would have been something
for hypertension, warfarin or some other anticoagulant, or
something for arrhythmia or congestive heart failure. Something
like that, I'm just trying to find out.
E. So you're looking for clues as to what his problem might have
been, it being atypical in the way that you say.
S. I was looking for clues to see whether he has any other heart
frailty really; to find out whether he is hypertensive, which
would make ischemic heart disease more likely, and that sort of
thing. Whether he has any residual damage, whether he has
other lesions or heart failure, or arrhythmias, and it seems
that he doesn't have any really.
Notes
General health 7
	
Good.
Why retired ?	 Nothing to do with health.
Stress ?
	
No.
Chest trouble ?
	
Cough, 20 cigarettes a day.
Account
E. You talked about why he retired and then asked about chest
trouble.
S. His retirement might have been because of heart trouble; even
though he talked about pain in 1975 it might have been because
it was a particularly stressful situation. It is said by some
people that stress causes ischemic heart disease.
E. You went on to ask about chest trouble and cough.
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S. This is part of the systemic enquiry that I'm niaking at the
moment, and which I'll. continue to find out if there's anything
else wrong with him. Fairly routine sort of screening pattern
which I do; but again chest is more relevant to him if he had
heart failure or scnething. Be could have shortness of breath
which I did go on to ask.
E. So at the moment you're thinking about ischeinic heart disease,
are you ?
S. Well, now I'm going on to find out whether Ithere's anything else,
any other clues which need following up. It's still basically
accepting the experts' opinion that it's praably heart and that
he probably had an infarct, because they've done the investi-
gations, so there's not much else you can do really.
Notes
Haemoptysis ?	 No.
Wake up with SOB ? 	 No.
Appetite ?	 Good.
Weight ?	 No change.
Bowels ?	 No trouble.
Constipation, blood ?	 No.
WW ?	 OK.
Everything else OK ?	 Yes.
Account
E. What are you thinking there 7
S. Anything else that could be relevant to him. Is there anything
else that seems relevant. It's not typical Iheart pain, but I
haven't picked anything up on that which could be relevant. We
could go through the differential diagnosis of things that might
be relevant to epigastric pain, but there wasn't anything there.
K. At this stage, you're thinking that there's something cardiac
but you're not precisely sure what.
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S. Throughout I've thought that he had atypical heart pain which
was probably caused by an infarct, my reasons for that being
basically the pain and, more than that, other peoples' opinions
who've had longer with him and such like; and on the past
history as well, not just the recent episod. In the past he
had an infarct, which is making it much more likely that be
would have another one this time. But I am looking for other
possible causes for some sort of epigastric pain. I'm just
trying to exclude other things really to make sure that there
isn't any other pathology or any thing else that has come on
which has co-existed with it or which may be causing it.
Notes
Better since in ?
Drugs ?
Easy to rest, restful life 7
Past illnesses ?
Diabetes ?
Yes.
Anticoagulant and others.
Yes.
No.
No. Thrombosis, 1963.
Account
S
E. Anything there ?
S. Nothing new, no.
E. Could you give a brief suzsnary of this patient ?
S. A generally well, 59 year old man, who's had 2 attacks of pro-
bable heart pain, in July 1975 and about a week ago, which were
probably caused by an Infarct.
H. And what things in particular make you say that, make you
conclude that ?
S. In someone of his age it very common, especially being a smoker,
and somebody with a probably stressful job. He appears to have
no other cause, no other symptoms at all, and, more than these,
-
it's what other people think. If they've been able to do ECG's
and relevant blood tests.
- 543 -
. Is there anything in his history that might make you doubt your
conclusions ?
S. The atypical pain. The fact that he didn't feel faint, sweaty
or nauseated or vomit, although he did a bit. People normally
faint or black out, and feel cold and sweaty. The treatment of
warfarin or another anticoagulant is quite likely for the first
infarct but it wouldn't have suprised me if he'd been on some-
thing else as well, something for hypertension, something for
arrhythmias, something for heart failure, but he wasn't on any
of those.
E. If you could have examined him, what would you have done ?
S. I'd have done the routine type of examination, respiratory,
cardiovascular, seeing if there was anything wrong with his lungs,
to see if there was any pulmonary oedema, and such like signs of
heart failure Otherwise it would have been a very routine
examination, expecting to find little murmurs or ninysastatmus
but it would seem unlikely. He's very well and making such a
good recovery. Investigations, especially if I'd seen him
immediately, obviously one would have a chest x-ray, ECG, CPK,
haemoglobin, these would be the immediate things, and depending
upon the results of those, especially if the symptoms didn't get
better, which they do seem to be. It might seem a good idea to
do a barium meal, to see if there was some lesion of the stomach
or duoden urn; but if he got better and there was no recurrence
of pain I wouldn't do that.
E. Finally, how typical do you think that history was of you ? Was
it your normal way of going about things, your normal style 7
S. It was very similar. I think everything was there in the end,
but it might have come in a slightly different order.
APPENDIX 19
Transcript of an Account Gathering Session with a House Officer,
with Experimenter's Notes
Notes
House Officer	 Patient
Age ?
	
4]..
When caine in ?	 2 weeks ago.
Main complaint ?	 Blood in urine.
Account
S. I usually begin by asking them how old they are, whether they
are married or not, and then how many times they've been into
hospital, whether it's the first time or not, and then I get
straight down to it.
E. This man's got blood in his urine. What did you think ?
S. Haematuria, and he's also having a problem with his renal tract,
somewhere from his kidneys down to the uretere, his bladder or
urethra, and I thought of the causes of haematuria.
Notes
How long for ? 3 years ago, for couple of days.
Stopped after 6-7 months, then
came for couple of days.
Stopped. This time, for last
2 months, more regmiar.
Account
S. You want to know whether he's passing blood all the time, or
whether It's intermittent. You're thinking about the causes of
haematuria and whether he's got a stone, let's say, which
could be passing down and so giving him blood at some stage,
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arid nothing at another stage; or if he's got a history of
trauma which means he'll bleed for a while and then stop
bleeding. So I'm finding out a bit more about his
bleeding. Very non-specific/specific, so that particular
part of his history narrowed it down a little if anything.
It wasn't too helpful, but it's useful to know.
Notes
Blood, bright red or dark ?
Mixed with urine?
Clots ?
Pain in side ?
No kicks ?
Sometimes bright red; in
morning dark, passing all
the way through.
Yes; sometimes small drop
at end.
Yes, sometimes.
No.
No. 6 years ago, bad fall
on side. X-ray, Bald badly
bruised ribs,
Account
E. You started. off with what the blood was like; sometimes it
was bright red, in the mornings, sometimes dark.
S. He could have an inflammation or a tear, say, right low
down the end of his penis, and if it bled it would look
just like fresh blood, just as though you'd cut yourself.
So It would be something fairly low down. If It's higher
up it's likely to be darker.
E. He said sometimes it was one and sometimes the other. What
about that ?
S. That didn't help.
E. You wanted to know If it was mixed with the urine and how
it came out, whether it was coming out all the time or just
sometimes.
- 
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S. Well, that points to some sort of tear, really. If he's
got a urethral tear or something like that he might bleed
after he's passed urine; he might find there's blood coming
out after he's stopped peeing.
E. Again, his answer was sometimes it's one thing and sometimes
it's the other.
S. Signs of prostatisin. That localises it below the bladder.
I didn't think he had prostatism, although he said he had.
a poor stream, but then, he might have to pass some sort of
obstruction. I asked him how many times he went during the
day. If he went lots and lots of times it would point to a
urinary tract infection of some sort; but he wasn't passing
a lot more water or going to the toilet more frequently.
E. So what are you thinking about him by this stage ?
S. I thought the problems were In his bladder specifically. I
couldn't say, a bladder tumour or a papilloma, I don't know.
Sometimes when you see a patient you have fixed ideas and
you're out to prove it. I'm like that. If I get some idea
I'll stick to it and I'll pursue that. I know I do it, but
I feel so confident about it. Quite a lot of the time you're
wrong.
E. But you didn't have any ideas like that about this man.
S. At that stage I was beginning to feel strongly about his
bladder.
E. You asked him next about pain in his side, whether he'd ever
been kicked.
S. This all still refers to the renal tract. Any history of
trauma, or kicking or accidents to the loin will cause
haematuria and I only asked him that after I'd found out he
had clots. Sometimes you can get them in the right order.
No.
No.
No.
Yes.
- 
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E. He told you about a fall be had six years ago ?
S. Yea, his problems began after that.
E. So here you begin to feel you can locate it a bit more.
S. I think so, yes.
Notes
Burning, stinging?
Wind. in water ?
Weak, lethargic ?
Weight loss ?
Other illnesses ?
Operations ?
TB., Diabetes, Rheumatic
Fever, Epilepsy ?
Perfectly healthy ?
No.
No. Everything normal,
except for blood.
No.
No, gained if anything.
Account
B. That section began by you asking about burning, stinging,
wind in his water.
S. The burning and stinging is urinary tract infectiom which
I thought he didn't have because he didn't have any
frequency. The pneumaturia, the wind in his water, is a
question that I don't usually ask. If they're passing
wind, in their urine it means they ' ye got a communication,
usually with the bowel. It could be due to cancer or
something, or diverticular disease, or there are other
causes I can't think of at the moment. It's a specific
sign, if they say 'yes', it specifically points to the
fact that there's something wrong with the bowel. They
might have a cancer there, and they often complain cf
passing bubbles or gas.
E. Were you then going onto something more routine, when you
asked if be was weak and lethargic ?
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S. It's more general questions tied up with this. If he's
losing blood I want to know how much hes losing, and
when you're anaemic you feel breathless and generally very
tired, just generally run down. And I didn't know whether
he'd been losing enough, I didn't really quantitate it.
I didn't ask him how many buckets of blood he was passing,
so I specifically asked him whether he was having any effects
from blood loss, I don't think he's lost a lot.
E. And then you asked him about other illnesses and operations.
S. That's routine. I specifically asked him about TB because
TB causes blood in the urine anyhow, although I had no
indication that he had TB.
E. Why did you go onto routine questions at that point ?
S. I was stuck. I often do that when I run out of questions.
I go onto routine ones. It g.ves me time to think. I was
thinking what else it might be then, and. I didn't come up
with anything, I wasn't really sure.
E. So is it still just something in the bladder ?
S. Yes. I don't think I'm going to be able to narrow it down.
I'd like to have a ].oek at it. I didn't really pin him down
to anything. I could have probably if I'd really laboured
the point, got him to commit himself in one way or the other.
Patients' interpretations of symptoms are not always what
you'd like them to be. If you're passing clots, it means
that blood is being allowed to hang around and when he passes
urine it comes out there. So that points to some sort of
bladder lesion.
E. And again he said, yes, sometimes ?
S. Yes, I'm wondering if he has got something in the bladder.
He's going to be cystoscoped later on today, so they're
obviously thinking something like that.
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E. Is that what you're thinking about at the time you were
trying to locate it ?
S. Yes, I was trying to locate at which level in the renal
tract . . . . .
E. Were you feeling here that you were beginning to know ?
S. Yes, it was probably his bladder.
Notes
Tablets?
Anticoagulants ?
Thirsty?
Difficulty passing water ?
Poor stream ?
Dribbling?
How many times a day?
Middle of night ?
No.
No.
No.
Sometimes, if I've drunk a
lot.
If I've drunk a lot.
No.
Normally 5-6 times.
Only at first, not now.
Account
E. You started off that section with tablets, whether he'd been
on anticoagulants.
S. If he's on anticoagulants and he's over anticoagulated he'll
bleed, he'll bleed from other places as well. Haematuria
is a good sign. I just wanted to make sure he wasn't on
anticoagulants.
E. Then you asked whether he was thirsty ?
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5, That just flipped through my mind. I was thinking of kidney
stones again and hypercalcaemia. Hypercalcaemia makes you
thirsty and a high calcium level is a good indication of
kidney stones.
E. He wasn't thirsty ?
S. No, I didn't expect him to be.
E. And then questions about passing water.
Notes
Mother and father ?
	
Mother died, stroke, 10 years
ago. Father dled, Ca lung.
Sibs ?
	
cwie brother, alive, well.
Wife ?
	
Epileptic.
Children?	 3.
Well ?
	
Yes.
No-one in family with the problem? No.
No-one with bleeding disorders or
kidney trouble, stones ?
	
No, mother had gall stones.
Account
E. What about that family history?
S. I was trying to elicit any history of cancer. It's fairly
routine but it is relevant in this case, because if you're
thinking of a tumour in the bladder or something like that,
then there may- be a strong family history of cancer. So
specifically I always ask whether there's anything relevant.
Sometimes it gives you a clue and sometimes it doesn't. His
father had cancer of the lung but no one else had cancer.
Cancer doesn't run high in the family. His mother had gall
stones, but that was specific. There was nothing specific
there. But no one in the family had had bleeding disorders
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which could cause haeinaturia. No-one with kidney trouble,
so this was a new thing.
Notes
Job ?
How long ?
Appetite ?
Weight ?
Bowels ?
Passing blood ?
Tarry stools ?
Smoke?
Drink?
Allergy ?
Drugs ?
Account
Stores manager.
1 year. Before, transport
Manager.
O.K.
O.K.
O.K.
No.
No.
20 a day.
6 pints daily, 5 days a week.
No.
No.
E. His job, his appetite, weight, bowels.
S. Those are routine questipns. His job can be specific to
his condition. People who work in the aniline dye industry
get cancer of the bladder. Sometimes I don't bother with
the social history, it all depends on how much time I've got.
And the other questions are just review of the systems, just
generally to see if there's anything else involved apart
from this.
E. And was there anything interesting there ?
S. Apart from the fact that he smoked, smokers have a higher
risk of cancer than anyone else and he's a fairly heavy
drinker I thought. But I don't think that was really the
cause of it. I was thinking more about his bladder, the
fact that smokers have a higher likelihood of getting cancer.
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E. Are you thinking of cancer in particular ?
S. I'm thinking more of it now.
E. Were you thinking of it at the time ?
S. I suppose I was really.
I
Notes
Chest pain ?
Palpitations ?
Ankle swelling ?
Chest pain on walking ?
Pain in calves ?
Wake up at night gasping ?
Cough?
Phlegm?
Breathless on back?
Breathless walking uphill ?
Coughed up blood ?
Fits, faints ?
Skin rashes ?
Diabetic ?
Since in, what tests ?
No.
No.
No,
No.
No.
No.
No.
No. Occasionally white.
No.
No.
No.
No.
Boils.
No.
None yet. cystoscope to come,
Account
S. This is all part of my routine. The first set were just
cardiovascular symptoms. He's quite fit really. No signs
of any heart failure, or angina, or anything. The coughing
and breathlessness main, were just his respiratory system.
I'm just seeing what his condition is like.
E. How would you suminarlse this patient?
S. A fit young man who presents with haematuria, query cause,
probably In his bladder.
E. If you could have examined him, what would you have done ?
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S. I would have examined him fully. I wouldn't expect to find
anything on examination, although I would with tests.
E What tests would you have had done ?
S. (e needs to have an IVP. That's the primary procedure. But
before you do that, you do a chest X-ray, abdominal X-ray,
take blood, full blood count, ESR, urine electrolytes and I'd
take it from there.
E. Row typical was that of you?
S. Eighty per cent. Usually I'm in a hurry so I pressurise them
a lot more, and. that's where you fix in your mind that they've
got something wrong, that theyve got what you think is wrong.
You're in a hurry and. you miss out a lot of questions. £ lot
of the time you get a feel about the patient. If they're good
historians then you believe them, but sometimes they don't
answer your questions or they don't understand your questions,
so you simplify them, and then you only believe half of what
they say. When I'm on the ward clerking patients routinely
I take a lot longer than that.
Registrar
Name ?
Age ?
What brought you in ?
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&PPENDIX 20
Transcript of an Account Gathering Session with a Registrar,
with Experimenter's Notes
Notes
Patient
75
Stomach pains. Hal small drink.
Dr. said indigestion. Tummy
pains. Finished bottle of stuff.
Pain got worse. Dr. said ulcer.
Tablets,
Account
E. You ask him his name, his age, arid what brought him in. Is that
your normal way of beginning an interview ?
S. It's rather artificial, because be's been in hospital for
sometime, whereas one would normally see him in casualty or
outpatients first.
Ed. He tells you about the pain in his stomach and an ulcer. What
did you think about it then ?
S. One does try to discourage them going on and on albout what the
doctors had told them. But initially he said that he had an
epigastric pain, which may well have been indigestion. I didn't
think it was necessarily that. It may have been ILots of other
things in the duodenum.
E. What types of other things did you think of or didn't you think of
anything in particular?
S. It could have been something very non-specific. itt could have
been a peptic ulcer. It could have been gall stomes • It could
have been due to angina or a heart. cause.
- .555 -
notes
Tell me more about pain,
precipitants ?
Wake p at night ?
Anything make it better ?
Milk helped?
Aiwaym in same place ?
Vomiting ?
With pain ?
Vomiting related to pain ?
What brought up?
2-3 hours after food or drink.
Yes.
Tablets.
Yes, or biscuit,
Yes.
Yes.
No. 2-3 times in last month,
Eased it.
Brown liquid soup.
Account
E. You're asking him about the pain in particular, what sort of
pitch and what's associated with it. What sort of picture
are you getting here ?
S. I'm seeing if there's a peptic ulcer which causes it or something
else wrong with the stomach.
E. You ask him specifically about its precipitants, and he said
that it came on 2-3 hour after food or drink. Did that tell
you something specific ?
S. Well, with duodenal ulcer you get pain when you're hungry, and
with a gastric ulcer you get pain when you've just had
something to eat. But I don't think that's any longer a valid
distiniction. A gastric ulcer might wake you up in the middle
of the night and be relieved by having something to eat or
drink.
E. In fact that was the case, that it woke him up at night and
hawing something to eat eased it.
S. It was eased by milk, so I thought it might be a duodenal ulcer.
E. You asked him whether the pain was always in the same place.
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S. If the pain had been due to heart disease it would have been
up in the chest. It Light have gone up to the jaw, down in the
arm. It could have been due to pancreatitis. He might have
had a history of pancreatitis, in which case it would radiate to
the back. If it had been gall bladder, it might have radiated
right across the epigastrium.
E. So you're asking him where it's located to rule out things.
S. I didn't rule them out, I left them in abeyance.
E. You asked about vomitting and its association with the pain.
S. The fact that vomitting relieved the pain, means that it could
be either a gastric or a duodena]. ulcer. The other thing one is
thinking about, is that he might have a cancer in his stomach or
something like that. And with this vomitting one wants to know
what he '8 vomitting up. It might tell you whether he has some
form of pylorio stenosis secondary to a cancer, but he 's just
bringing up a brown fluid that tells me that he's unlikely to
have a pyloric stenosis but he may well have a duodena]. ulcer or
a cancer of the stomach.
Notes
Eating 0.1. 9
Weight O.K. ?
Only vomitted. 3 times 9
Bowels 9
How many times ?
When came on ?
Motions normal. No blood ?
Account
Yes.
Losing. Stone in last 6 weeks.
Yes.
Constipated.
Waited 3-4 days.
Over 3-k months ago. Beer didn't
cure it.
No, but black. A lot of wind and
belching.
E. Are you getting anything out of this ?
S. The fact that he's eating well is really neither here nor there,
but the fact that be's losing weight could well be significant.
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People with an ordinary peptic ulcer don't normally lose weight
unless they've got some complication like a pyloric stenosia,
which means they can't keep food down. People with stomach
ulcers tend to lose weight. He says he's lost a stone in 6 weeks.
The fact that he's constipated is probably only relevant in an
indirect way. If you bleed into your gut, you probably get a lot
of diarrhoea, and you get a lot of blood in the motions. And. he
said that his motions were black sometimes. He may have been
losing blood, but he didn't have diarrhoea, so that suggests that
he hasn't lost a lot of blood.
E. Does it suggest anything else ?
S. That his motions were black only suggests that he's been on iron
tablets.
E. What's your overall picture of him at the moment? Are you
thinking in terms of malignancy?
S. I'm keeping that in mind. I'm thinking also of duodenal or gastric
ulcer.
Notes
Tablets ?
	
For gout, water.
Aspirin ?
	
No
Alcohol ?
	
2 pints a week.
How much was most ?
	
3-4 pints daily.
Smoker?
	
No.
Serious illnesses ?
	
Broken leg, bad ankles, 2 hernias,
haemorrhoids.
Account
E. Were the tablets of interest ?
S. Only that in some tablets cause ulceration of the stomach.
asked about aspirins specifically. And the other thing is, I'm
just looking for other causes of peptic ulceration.
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E. So all those questions mean that you're looking specifically at
that possibility.
S. Yes, that he drinks 2 pints a week and doesn't smoke doesn't tell
me anything.
E. The section ends with you asking about serious illnesses. Does
that mean you're beginning a more routine enquiry?
S. Yes.
E. Why did you go onto a routine enquiry then ?
S. I thougbt that I couldn't learn any more from the enquiry.
So were you feeling reasonably happy about what was wrong with him?
S. I haven't proved beyond all doubt. I knew what investigations I
would order, I would do a barium meal, blood count.
Notes
No past ulcers ?
Job ?
No pain before this year?
Married ?
Quite well apart from pain ?
Chest pain'
Pain in chest when walking
uphill ?
Walk upstairs ?
Ankle swelling?
Wake up with SOB?
No.
Retired 16 years. Chemical engineer.
No.
Not now.
Yes.
MI 3 years ago. Angina 9 years ago.
Bronchial trouble,
Can't walk far, because of pain in
throat.
Dr. said not to.
Not now.
No. Just pain.
Account
S. This is mostly routine, but if he bad ulcers in the past it would
be more likely that he had then now and not a cancer or something.
If he's been losing blood, he might be anaemic which could cause
chest pain and shortness of breath. Or he could have had heart
disease or lung disease. It's always worth asking.
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E. He told you that he'd had angina, he'd had a heart attack and
couldn't walk uphill.
S. It's good to have an idea about him and. about his general fitness
what he can and can't do. It would be important if yon were to
come to operate on him.
E. He said he couldn't walk up a hill because he had a pain in his
throat.
S. Yes, angina can give you a pain in the throat.
Notes
Cough ?
	
No.
WW?
	
O.L, get up 2-3 times at night.
Blood in water ?	 No.
Headaches?	 No.
Fainting ?	 No.
Account
S. These are just routine questions that you ask as they come to
mind. You would just ask to find out whether he had any
malignancy of any kind, or if he coughed up any blood..
E. If you could have examined this patient, what would yoi have done
and what would you have expected to have found ?
S. I would see if he was jaundiced, because he might have had
biliary colic. Pulse, and blood pressure, and see if he was
tender in the abdomen, whether there was any distention. I
would probably have done a rectal examination, if his motions
were very black, full blood count etc.
E. What are your conclusions about this patient at the moment ?
S. I think I'd concluded that he'd had a duodenal ulcer, but I'm a
bit worried about his weight loss.
K. How typical of you was that interview ?
S. Fairly typical.
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APPENDIX 21
Diagnosis given in 'ach Patient's Medical Record - Cases !een by
Students
Patient 1 (1) Thyrotoxicosis (ii) Allergy to ATD
Patient 2 (i) Subarachnoid haemorrhage (ii) to (iv) Post-
gastrectomy/vagotoniy diarrhoea, hypoglycaemia,
dumping
PatIent 3 (i) Rheumatoid arthritis (ii) Arteritic ulcer
Patient L1 (I) Asthma (ii) Hypertension -4 epistaxls
(iii) Angina (iv) Acute bronchitis
Patient_5 (i) Chronic LVF (ii.) Followed mitral incompetence
due to mitral stenosis eurgex 	 (iii) Cerebral embolus
(iv) Hypertension on treatment (v) Epileptic on
treatment
Patient 6 (1) Myocardial. infarct (ii) Ventricular tachycardia
Patient 7 (i) Asthma on steroids precipitated by infection
(ii) Duodenal ulcer (iii) Haematemesis from steroids
(iv) Gastric surgery (v) Glaucoma (vi) Prostatism
Patient 8 (i) Benign prostatic hypertrophy (ii) Hypochondriac
(iii) Depression
Patient 9 (i) Subacute bacterial endocarditis
Patient 10 (i) Nocturnal panic attacks (ii) Neurofibromatosis
(iii) Obsessive/depressive
Patient ii (1) Thyrotoxicosis (ii) L.orchidectomy (? tumour
? hydrocoele) (iii) Ca bronchus
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Patient 12 (i) Chronic pulmonary fibrosit (ii) Chronic
bronchitis (iii) Emphysema
Patientj	 (i) ?lyxoedema (ii) fleflux oesophagttis
(iii) Familial optic atrophy
patient i	 (i) Nocturnal panic attacks (ii) Neurofibromatosis
(iii) Obsessive/depressive
Patient 15 (i) Nyocardial infarct (ii) Diabetes (iii) Dermatitis
(eczema)
Patient 16 (t) Chronic rheumatic and ischaemic heart disease
(ii) Paget's disease (iii) Penicillin allergy
Patient 17 (i) Ca bronchut (ii) Superior vena cava obstruction
(iii) Recurrent laryngeal nerve involvement
(iv) Prostatism
Patient 18 (i) Drug-induced allergic jaundice
Patient 19 (i) Stokes Adams attacks due to ischaemic heart disease
Patient 20 (i) Recurrent rnyocardial infarct (ii) Dysrhythmia
complicating
Patient 21 (1) Syncopal episodes ? myocardia]. (ii) Cervical
spondylosis (iii) Prostatisa (iv) Urinary tract
infection (v) Treated hypertensive (vii) Acute
bronchitis
Patient 22 (1) Rheumatic heart disease (ii) Acute pulmonary
oedema
NB ' indicates that this diagnosis could not be made on the history
alone in this patient.
Patient 2
Patient 3
-
APPENDIX 22
Diagnoses Given in each Patient's Medical Record Cases Seen by
House Officers
Patient 1 (I) Hiatus hernia with ref'lux oesophagitis and
stricture (ii) Chronic bronchitis with asthma
(i) Priina.ry bfliary cirrhosis (ii) Scleroderma
(1) Pamilial polycystic liver and pancreas with
hepatic failure (ii) Steathorroea
Patient 4	 (i) Qenera].jseci atheromatous vascular disease
(it) Myocardial infarct (iii) Sinoatrial disease
due to ischaemic heart disease (iv) Diabetes
tient 5	 (1) Aibright's syndrome (it) Osteosarcoma of
femur* (iii) Depression
Patient 6	 (i.) Chronic rheumatic heart disease (ii) Mitral
valve replacement (iii) Past subacute bacterial
endocarditis (iv) Stress incontinence
Patient 7
	
(1) Diabetes (ii) Depression (iii) Arterio-
pathic foot ulcer (iv) Cholecystitis
Patient 8
	 (i) Haemateinesis ? peptic ulcer (ii) Multiple
nutritional deficiencies in a vegetarian
(iii) Viral throat infection (iv) Malabsorption
syndrome
Patient 9
	
(1) Ca bronchus* (it) Superior vena cava
obstruction (iii) Recurrent laryngeal nerve
involvement (iv) Prostatism
Patient 10 (1) Chronic bronchitis with airways obstruction
(ii) Bronchiectasis (iii) Respiratory failure
(iv) Congestive cardiac failure
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Patient 11 (1) Angina (ii) Myocardial infarct
Patient 12 (1) Chronic lymphatic 1eukaemia' (ii) Anxiety
Patient]
	
(i) Recurrent urinary tract infection with
calculi (ii) Mixed pernicious/dietary anaemia
(iii) Giving LV? (iv) Depression in social
isolate
Patient 14 (I) Chronic rheumatic heart disease (ii) Congestive
cardiac failure (iii) ? Subacute bacterial
endocarditis
Patient 15 (1) Aibright's syndromel' (ii) Osteosarcomaof femur
(iii) Depression (iv) Minor CVA * dysphasia
Patient 16 (i) Treated duodenal ulcer (ii) Dumping syndrome
(iii) Coeliac disease (lv) Dermatitis herpeti-
formis (v) Chronic bronchitie (vi) Prostatism
Patient 17 (i) Sarcoiclosis* (ii) Erythema nodosum
Patient 18 (i) Myocardia]. infarction
Patient 19 (i) Ca broncus*' (ii) Cervical spondy].osis
Patient 20 (1) Ca bladder
Patient 21 (1) Crohn's disease (ii) Subacute intestinal
obstruction
Patient 22 (i) Bronchopneumonia after falling and rib fracture
NB indicates that this diagnosis could not be made on the history
alone in this patient.
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PPENDTI 23
Diagnoses Given in each Patient's Medical c 	 Cases Seen
Patient 1	 (i) Chronic myeloid1eukaemia'i
Patient 2
	 (1) Chronic bronchitis with asthma (ii) Chronic
duodena). ulcer (iii) Ischaemic heart disease
(iv) —+ recurrent supraventricular tachycardia
(v) —9 angina
Patient	 (1) Thyrotoxicosis (ii) Pernicious anaemia'1'
(iii) Cardiac failure from (i) and (ii)
Patient 4 (1) Thyrotoxicosis (ii) Allergy to ATh
Patient 5	 (i) Chronic pancreatitis complicated by diabetes
mellitus (ii) Nyxoedema on treatment (iii) Blind
loop syndrome following bypass operation for mistaken
Ca pancreas'1'
Patient 6
	
(1) Chronic myeloid leukaemia'1'
Patient 7
	
(i) Myocardial infarct (ii) LVF
Patient -	 (1) Intrinsic asthma (ii) Acute bronchitis
(iii) Allergic aspergillosis'1'
Patient 9
	 (1) Crohn's disease
Patient 10 (1) Acute pancreatitis — hepato renal failure
(ii) Secondary diabetes mellitus (iii) Alcoholic'1'
Patient 1]. (1) Crohn's disease
tient 12 (i) Pre-eclampsia of first pregnancy (ii) Ante-
partum haemorrhage (iii) Acute tubular necrosis
(iv) Diffuse intravascular coagulation
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Patient i	 (1) Osteomyelitis —4 leg amputation (ii) C.C.F.
(iii) Shingles (iv) As'mptomatic chronie duodenal
ulcer 1 (v) Haematemesjs
Patient 1f (1) Pulmonary tuberculosis
Patient ]5 (i) Duodenal ulcer (ii) Haematemesis (iii) Past
myocardial infarct
Patient 16 (1) Past Ca breast (ii) Steroid-induced diabetes
(iii) Steroid-induced hypertension (iv) Depression
(v) Simulating paraplegia*
Patient 17 (i) Chronic rheumatic heart disease (ii) Mitral
valve replacement (iii) Past subacute bacterial
endocarditis (iv) Stress incontinence (v) Post
operative cerebra]. embolus
Patient 18 (1) Malabsorptl.on (ii) Steatorrhoea
Patient 19 (1) Nyocardial infarct (ii) Reflux oesophagltis
(iii) Cervical spondylosis (iv) Depression
Patient 20 (1) Duodenal i1cer (ii) Angina (iii) Cardiac
arrest from ischaemic heart disease (iv) Osteo-
arthritis of hip (v) Treated gout
Patient 21 (1) Malnutrition (ii) Chronic bronchitis
(iii) Duodenal ulcer	 (iv) Broken ribs after
fall with exacerbation of chest infection
Patient 22 (i) Pulmonary TB. (II) Malnutrition (iii) Epilepsy
NB ' indicates that this diagnosis could not be made on the history
alone in this patient.
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APPENDIX 24
Statistical Analyses of Patients' Diagnoses and Diagnoses Made
Across Groups of Subjects
Table 1. Number of Diagnoses Given in Patients' Medical
!ecords: Total, Range, Mean for Each Grou(22 subjects
per group)
Total	 Range	 Mean	 S.D.
Students
	 66	 1-6	 i.4i
House Officers	 63	 1-6	 2.86	 1.32
Registrars	 66	 1-5	 3	 1.48
Table 2. Analysis of Variance Summary Table, Comparing
Number of Patients' Diagnoses per Group
Source of variation	 •	 55	 Df.	 Variance
estimate
between	 0.26	 2	 0.13
Within	 124.6	 63	 1.98
Total	 - 124.86	 65	 F=O.06 (df.
2,63)NS.
Table 3. Numbers of Possible Diagnoses and Diagnoses Actually
Made for Each Group of Subjects (raw data1
_____ DIAGNCES GI EN
	 ______ DIAGNC ES MADE
Total Range Mean
	
SD Total	 Range	 Mean	 SD
tudents	 60	 1-6	 2.82 1.33 38	 0-6	 1.73 1,45
H cers	 1-6	 2.54 1.40 25	 0-3	 1,23 1.02
Registrars 57	 0-5	 2.63 1.40 41	 0-4	 1.86 1.24
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Table 4. Analysis of Variance SujninarTable for the
Proportion of Correct Diagnoses Achieved by Each Subject
Source of variation	 Df.	 Variance
estimate
Between	 7510	 2	 3755
Within	 83993
	
6	 1333
Total	 91503
	 65	 F=2. 8169
(df. 2,63)
NS,
- 568 -
APPENDIX 25
Preliminary Considerations in the Interpretation of Protocols
De Groot (1965) discusses the problem of protocol interpretation
as follows:
"If theory or hypothesis testing is the research goal,
ad hoc interpretations are taboo: predictions on
introspective phenomena, like predictions on any
other kind of phenomena, presuppose objective operational-
izations. The procedures for protocol coding, in
particular, must be objectively established in advance"
(p. 383).
Although his subsequent discussion concerns only theory formation,
not hypothesis testing, de Groat draws attention to a number of
important points. For example, he mentions the need to avoid
"arbitrary assumptions and decisions"; he asks us to consider
"whether the effort required for meticulous protocol categorisation
and. analysis is well spent". He answers clearly in the affirmative.
He also reminds us to be aware of the limits of justifiable
interpretation in account analysis.
Fistein et al (1978) concentrate on considerations of a different
order. They describe the four principles which directed the
formulation of their scoring system (objectivity and reliability;
task relevance; theoretical relevance; discriminant validity) and
their method of developing content for that system:
"Our strategy was to develop the fundamental units of
analysis from observations of physicians' performance
in the setting of high-fidelity simulation, utilizing
the episodic-review and stimulated-recall techniques
to identify the fundamental elements in terms of which
the solution of medical problems was organised. In
the analysis of simulation data, much time was devoted
to refining and sharpening the concepts by developing
more operational definitions with satisfactory interrater
reliability" (p. 51)
For some aspects of their protocols, nearly a year was spent without
success in attempting to develop a scoring scheme. However, the
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derivation of these was based on the protocols themselves and. not
on research hypotheses. This former approach is certainly more
arduous than the latter and is also a necessary prerequisite stage
(de Groot, 1965).
Richardson (1977), working in the entirely different field of
housing research, faced the same problem of trying "to establish
a methodology for dealing with data with no nuiabers attached".
His decision "to look at people's talk about their experiences
of changing environments as a primary source of data" caused him
to crystallise the present problem:
"This decision, while being a solution to one set of
research problems, was mother to a host of others,
particularly in the area of numerical or statistical
analysis. In abandoning structured instruments and
questionnaires, we had also left behind the cosy bed
of statistical package programmes and ease of
translation of raw data to a form suitable for analysis".
Method of 'translation of raw data' is thus the first problem for
solution, to be undertaken always in the light of the statistical
options available for analysis of the translation. This method
will invariably involve the development of a form of content
categorisation system. Turney and Robb (1971) emphasise the
importance of this process:
"The classification of data into convenient and logical
categories is most critical in succesfufly reporting
descriptive research. In categorising data, the researcher
may well ask himself: What am I trying to describe? What
are the elements that will contribute most to the
description? What tables could best illustrate the
description? Descriptive data can be collected in large
quantities, and unless they are systematically dealt
with, conclusions are difficult to draw. Ideally, one
should be able to reduce data to quantitative terms and.
report them in tabular form. Where this is impossible,
precise summaries are necessary".
Appendix 26 describes the method and process of content analysis
applied to the accounts gathered for this study in an attempt to
achieve Turney and Robb's ideal.
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APPENDIX 26
The Method of Content Analysis
Hoisti (1968) defines content analysis in the broadest terms as:
"any technique for making inferences by systematically and
objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages".
The inferences to be made concern the antecedents of the
communication; in this instance, the thinking process being
explained by the subject. The validity of such an inferential
process has been discussed and established (section 9.2), we
therefore need only to describe the methodology.
The first decision to be made concerns the qualitative or
quantitative use of content analysis. In essence we may say
that the quantitative use of the method involves identifying
frequency of occurrence of communication of any defined, category,
whereas qualitative use of the method merely requires identifi-
cation of presence or absence of the defined category. Given
our criticisms of others' use of accounts in terms of spurious
quantification and unwarranted overinterpretation of data (see
Chapter Three) and our awareness of the uncertainty of
completeness and chronological accuracy of reports, it was
considered unjustifiable to use a quantitative content analysis
for each subject with one special exception (pre-diagnostic and
diagnostic interpretations of clinical information). Our adopted
approach, then, was primarily qualitative in that frequencies of
any given category were not usually counted for each subject, but
evidence was sought that the thinking process or content
identified by any one category was either present or absent in
any one subject. However, given the unusually large sample sizes,
identification of presence or absence alone, which in one sense is
the special case of quantification where the quantities are limited
to one or zero, admits of statistical comparison of groups.
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The next stage of development of the content analysis involves
identifying categories of analysis for each hypothesis and
indicators for the presence of each category.
The Formulation of Categories of Analysi.s and Identification of
Indicators of_Categories
Berelson (1971) points out that "since the categories contain the
substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no
better than its system of categories". The development of a
worthwhile set of categories is entirely dependent mpon the
presence of fully stated, clear and specific research hypotheses.
This point seems to be emphasised above all others by writers
on the subject:
"...relatively few ideas are "discovered" in the actual
process of analysis. The hit-or-miss method of
analysing "everything" in a body of content in the hope
that "something will turn up" is seldom productive, and
is certainly uneconomic. If the problem is not clarified
to the point where several worthwhile hypotheses or
questions can be formulated, then the projected analysis
should be "abandoned" (p. 162).
Carney (1972) also makes the point that content analysis cannot
be used to "go fishing". Therefore, by a circular process of
going from the research hypotheses to the transcripts and back
again, a number of possible categories are identified. for each
hypothesis. Simultaneously, indicators for each category are
listed. An indicator is merely a statement of the forms of words,
with the content of those words if necessary, which ,iould allow
confirmation of presence of the associated category of thinking
or response.
The categories themselves must have certain characteristics:
1) They must suit both the hypotheses and the subject matter.
ii) They must "set out clearly what sort of thing has to go
into each of them and how that 'thing' is to be recognised"
(Carney, 1972).
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iii) They must be inclusive enough to hold. all appropriate items.
iv) They must, between them, cover the whole range of issues
pertinent to the enquiry.
v) They have to be such that an item can be classified under
only one of them for any one hypothesis.
Both Berelson (1971) and Carney (1972) make it quite clear that
identification of a workable set of categories is very- much a matter
of trial and error. The process as it occurred in this study is
summarised in the Figure. In all, this cycle on average for each
hypothesis, occurred five times before a satisfactory set of
categories and indicators emerged. With each successive refinement
of categories and indicators the array becomes more workable and a
greater number of transcripts (at one point, 63) must be read in
order to disprove the system. Only when all 66 transcripts were
read. and. categorised. without problem was an array accepted as
workable. It thus can appear to the researcher that the major
feature of content analysis is its time consuming and circular
developmental nature.
a
ESTER
Check
,,,.A hypothe?
EXT]	 Reject category	 Define
system	 categories
¶
Accept category
system	
(	
transcripts
Refer to
Identify
Figure. The Process of Category and. Indicator
Identification for Content Analysts
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The process eventually yielded 14 separate categories for the
seven hypotheses amenable to content analysis (Hypotheses 10 to
16). All research hypotheses are stated in section 5.].. However,
only Hypotheses 10 to 20 refer to the account gathering study. Of
these,. Hypotheses 17 to 20 are framed in null terms as a matter
of formality only. In essence, Hypotheses 17 to 20 ask whether
or not the data furnish us with any evidence of certain types or
features of cognitive process. For these hypotheses, therefore,
content analysis in its present form was not applied.. Instead,
the transcripts were simply scanned in detail for possible evidence
of such features as Hypotheses 17 to 20 identify. Content analysis
in the form described was not appropriate since the research
hypotheses give no indication of possible categories. Hypotheses
17 to 20, therefore, demand a process which de Groot (1965) refers
to as 'theory formation' rather than 'hypothesis testing'.
Hypotheses 10 to 16, however, reflect this more advanced research
stage of hypothesis testing and so require the process of content
analysis.
The content of the 14 categories is presented as results (section
10.1).
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APPENDD( 27 -
Establishment of Reliability and Validity of Content Analysis
Categories and Raters
Each content analysis was performed by one person only. Jhen
technical medical expertise was required in the identification of
pre-diagnostic and diagnostic interpretations, the rater was a
consultant physician. All other analyses were performed by the
author. In both cases reliability of raters was established by
reference to other judges and. test-retest reliability was
established by repeated ratings. In addition, the classification
of subjects' interpretations into pre-diagnostic and diagnostic
categories was validated by four other consultant physician raters.
Each of these tests may be considered in turn.
Validity and Reliability of Pre-diagnostic and Diagnostic
Interpretations Categories (Categories (a) arid (b) for
Hypotheses 10, 11 and 12)
The experimenter and primary rater independently identified all
interpretations of clinical information made by each subject.
There was 100 per cent agrement between those two raters on
this. The interpretations were ordered alphabetically for each
group of subjects. Students made 175 different interpretations,
house officers 200 and registrars 235. A total of 610 interpretations
was therefore listed. Each interpretation was classified. by the
primary rater as either 'pre-diagnostic' or 'diagnostic' according
the definitions of those terms given (see section io.i.i). One in
six (approximately 17 per cent) of these interpret.ations was taken
from all the alphabetical lists and these 105 formed into an inter-
rater and test-retest reliability form (see Appendix 28 for the
items thus selected and. the designated category of each item). The
representativeness of the sample of items is shown in Table 1.
Approximately the same ratio of pre-diagnostic to diagnostic
interpretations occur in both population and sample.
43.4
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Table 1. Characteristics of Population and Sample of
Pre-diagnostic and. Diagnostic Interpretations.
Pre-diagnostic	 Diagnostic	 Total
Population	 387	 223	 610
	
(63%)
	
(37%)
Sample
	 6k
	
41
	
105
	
(61%)	 (:39%)
The form was distributed to the primary rater and four consultant
physicians, with definitions of the categories. Each respondent
assigned each items to one category. The primary rater's test- retest
reliability obtained by repeated ratings was 100 per cent. esults of
the inter-rater reliability test are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Results of Inter-rater Beliability Study of
Pre-diagnostic and Diagnostic Catgories
4 out of 4 raters ' 3 out of 4 raters	 2 out of If raters
(100 per cent	 (7.5 per cent	 (50 per cent
agreement)	 agreement)	 agreement)
Number
of items	 7
l'ercent	 83	 1:3
of items
Total number of items rated - 420
Total number of disagreed ratings - 64
Overall agreement - 85 per cent
Overall inter-rater reliability is seen to be 85 per cent. Although
one may have hoped for a higher value than this, in the circumstances
this would probably be unrealistic. For example, a number of
disagreements arose when the items under consideration impinged on the
7	 7
84
3
96 per cent
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area in which a rater was a specialist (for example: "thyrotoxicosis,
"coronary") and whereas others would accept these as 'diagnostic', the
specialist would not. It also occurred that the inaccuracey and
incorrectness of some items offended and provoked replies of 'impossible'
only (for exam:ple: 'LVF secondary to mitral stenosis', 'cardiac
problems secondary to asthma'). Given these responses, an inter-rater
reliability of 85 per cent is accepted as satisfactory.
Inter-rater and Repeat Reliability of all other Categories
These forms of reliability were established using a sample of seven
transcripts (11 per cent sample). Two transcripts were of registrars,
two of house officers and three of students. Each transcript was
subjected to content analysis using the remaining 12 categories by
both the experimenter (repeat reliability) and an independent rater.
Repeat reliability was 100 per cent. Table 3 shows the results of
inter-rater reliability for each category.
Table 3. Results of Inter-rater Reliability c3tudy for the
Remaining 12 Categories
Category	 11(c) 12.(c) 13(a) 13(b) 14(a) 14(b) 14(c)
Number agreed	 7	 6	 7	 6	 7	 6(out of 7)
Category	 15(a) 15(b) 15(c) 16(a) 16(b)
Number agreed
(outof7)	 7	 7	 7
Total number of categories rated
Total number of disagreed ratings
Overall agreement
An overall reliability of 96 per cent is shown, with 100 per cent
agreement on nine categories, and six out of seven agreement on the
remaining three categories. Such a level of agreement is accepted
as satisfactory and indicative of both validity of the categories
and reliability of their use.
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Validity and reliability of' the content analysis category system is
thus established. Given the demonstrated validity of case content
across groups (section 9.2.3 and Appendix 2Lf) and subjects'
estimation of the validity of' their own performances (Table 9.5),
all necessary statistical parameters have been applied to the method
and encourage confidence in both its validity and reliability of
Implementation In this study.
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APPENDIX 28
Items with Designated Categories Selected for Reliability Studl
of Pre-diagnostie (P-d) and Diagnostic (D) Interpretations
ITEM
Weak ankle
Anaemia due to uterine bleeding
Arrhythmia
Mesenteric angina
Antepartuin haemorrhage
Biliary colic
Chronic bronchitis
Gastric carcinoma
Congestive cardiac failure
Coronary
Ischaemic colitis
Carcinoma of the breast with secondaries in
the back
Antacid induced diarrhoea
Dysentery
An emotional thing
Gall bladder problems
Prednisolone induced hypertension
Hiatus hernia
Haemochromatosis
Iron overdose
Paralytic Ileus
Jod-Basedow I*lenomenon
Lassitude
Chronic lymphatic leukamia
Lumbar puncture
Myaesthenia from carcinoma
Myxoedema madness
Myocardial infarct
Nephrotic syndrome
Something neurological
CATEGORY
P-cl
D
P-d
D
D
D
D
D
P-cl
D
D
D
D
P-cl
P-d
P-cl
D
D
D
D
P-cl
D
P-d
D
P-a
P-d
D
D
P-cl
P-d
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ITEM
An organic thing
Pyloric stenosis secondary to carcinoma of
the stomach
Pneumonic elements
Peritonitis
Psychological problems
Respiratory disease
Root pain
Renal biopsy
Something wrong with the stomach
Retinal vein thrombosis
Gastric ulcer
Varicose ulcer
Weakness from lying in bed.
Anaemia caused. by blood loss
Anaemia secondary to malignancy
Chronic obstructive airways disease
Asbestosis
Blood pressure
Apical lung carcinoma
Chest trouble
Calcium metabolism defect
Cardiac failure
CVA
Some reason for cardiac drugs
Diverticular disease
Familial bone disease
Gutty thing
Hypothermic
On iron tablets
Iritis
Liver disease
LVF secondary to mitral stenosis
Malnutrition
Autonomic nervous system giddy spefls
CATEGORY
P-d
D
P-cl
P-d
P-d
P-d
P-d
P-d
P-cl
D
D
D
P-cl
P-a
P-cl
D
D
P-d
D
P-d
P-d
P-d
P-a
P-cl
D
P-a
P-cl
P-a
P-cl
P-d
P-d
D
P-a
P-cl
CATEGORY
P-a
D
P.-d
P-cl
P-d
P-d
P-cl
D
P-a
P-d
P-d
P-d
0
D
P-d
P-d
P-a
P-d
P-cl
D
P-d
P-d
D
P-cl
0
0
0
P-cl
D
D
P-d
P-d
P-cl
P-d
D
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ITEM
Oedema.
psoriasi8
Prostatism
Polyuria/POlydipsia related to calcium
Bone pain
Rheumatoid
Syncope
TB
Underlying constitutional illness
Peripheral vascular disease
Aortic valve disease
Atheroina
Asthma
Steroid induced Cushing's
Cardiac problem secondary to asthma
Carcirzomatosjs
Paroxysmal dye pnoea
Dysphasia
Ear trouble
Grand Mal epilepsy
A fit
Hypoglycaemia
Hay fever
Indigestion
Lung abscess
Meningitis complicating labarynthitis
Myxoedema
Neurofibroma
Oedema from subcutaneous intravenous fluid
Porphyria
Respiratory tract infection
Gastric reflux
Bony secondaries
Thrombotic episode
Acute hepatitis
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ITEM
Haematemesis frog peptic ulcer
Raised intracranial pressure headache
Thyrotoxicosis
Uraemia
Virus infection
Valvular defect
CATEGORY
D
P-d
D
P-d
P-d
P-cl
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APPENDIX 29
Content Analy8iS Raw Data: Observed Frequencies per Category
per Gr
Hypothesis	 Category	 Frequency per Group (n='ZZ)	 TOTAL
Students House Officers Registrars n=66
10	 a	 154	 164	 165
	
483
b	 91	 96	 114	 301
11	 a	 10	 17	 15	 42
b	 7	 8	 7	 22
c	 9	 4	 6	 19
12	 a	 22	 22	 21	 6.5
b	 21	 22	 22	 6
c	 22	 22	 22	 66
13	 a	 3	 6	 4	 13
b	 12	 14	 12	 38
14	 a	 18	 11	 12	 41
b	 14	 14	 13	 41
c	 12	 13	 15	 40
15	 a	 6	 1	 1	 8
b	 21	 20	 21	 62
c	 21	 21	 18	 60
16	 a	 12	 8	 4	 24
b	 3	 1	 4	 8
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APPENDIX 30
Raw Data of Content Analysis using Categories io( (pre-diagnos tic
Interpretations) and 10(b) (diagnostic Interpretations), Recording
the Exact Number of Each Type per Subject per Group
Subject	 Students	 House OlTicers	 Registrars
Number	 10(a) 10(b) Total 10(a) 10(b) Total 10(a) 10(b) Total_ -
	
01	 7	 0	 7	 2	 1.	 3	 10	 3	 U
	02	 10	 4	 114.	 7	 4	 11	 17	 7	 24
	
03	 2	 5	 7	 10	 1	 ii	 7	 7	 i4
	
04	 10	 3	 13	 17	 1	 18	 7	 4	 ii
	
05	 18	 1	 19	 4	 3	 7	 3	 4	 7
	
06	 9	 4	 13	 3	 4	 7	 18	 10	 28
	
07	 6	 8	 14	 8	 0	 8	 2	 5	 7
	
08	 17	 4	 21	 7	 7	 14	 4	 2	 6
	
09	 8	 2	 10	 12	 3	 15	 7	 3	 10
	
10	 7	 4	 11	 13	 10	 23	 5	 5	 10
	
11	 2	 9	 11	 8	 5	 13	 3	 6	 9
	
12	 6	 3	 9.	 9	 6	 15	 16	 9	 25
	
13	 4	 4	 8	 12	 4	 16	 6	 8	 lLi.
	
14	 8	 1	 12	 5	 8	 1	 7	 5	 12
	
15	 1.	 3	 4	 9	 3	 12	 7	 4	 11
	
16	 4	 5	 9	 6	 7	 13	 7	 6	 13
	
17	 10	 7	 17	 10	 7	 17	 0	 3
	
18	 2	 5	 7	 6	 4	 10	 5	 6	 11
	
19	 2	 5	 7	 7	 11	 18	 9	 7	 16
	
20	 6	 3	 9	 2	 1	 3	 8	 6	 14
	
21	 ii	 3	 14	 4	 1	 5	 8	 11
	
22	 4	 5	 9	 '3	 5	 8	 9	 1	 10
Total	 154	 91	 245
	
164	 96	 260	 165
	
1111.
	279
	
Mean	 7	 4.1	 U.1	 7.4	 4.4	 11.8	 7.5	 5.2	 12.7
	S D	 4.56	 2.05 4.22	 3.87
	
3.05 5.15	 14.57 2.28 6.10
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